MCM MARINE INC V OTTAWA COUNTY ROAD COMM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MCM MARINE, INC,
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 286294
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 05-053642-CZ
OTTAWA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant,
and
PREIN & NEWHOF, INC,
Defendant-Appellee.
MCM MARINE, INC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 290702
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 05-053642-CZ
OTTAWA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant,
and
PREIN & NEWHOF, INC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and WHITBECK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case stems from the Ottawa County Road Commission’s public, competitive bidding
process for a water intake filtration bed repair project where a previous bed had been constructed
in 2001-2002. In Docket No. 286294, plaintiff MCM Marine, Inc. appeals as of right the trial
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court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of the Ottawa Road Commission’s project
engineer, defendant Prein & Newhof, Inc. MCM Marine contends that Prein & Newhof racially
discriminated against MCM Marine and wrongfully excluded MCM Marine from being awarded
the repair project. We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in
favor of Prein & Newhof.1 Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Ottawa Road Commission operates the Northwest Ottawa Water System, which
provides public water to communities in the northwest portion of Ottawa County, Michigan.
Prein & Newhof is a civil engineering firm that Ottawa Road Commission hired to serve as
project engineer and representative on both the original bed project and the repair project. MCM
Marine is a marine contractor with nearly 25 years of experience. MCM Marine has long been
recognized as a minority-owned business enterprise.
Between December 2000 and September 2002, the Ottawa Road Commission planned
and constructed a new water intake filtration bed near the Grand Haven channel. Great Lakes
Dock & Material was the primary contractor on the job, and MCM Marine performed excavation
work on the project as a subcontractor for Great Lakes Dock & Material. During the course of
the original bed project, delays occurred, which Prein & Newhof attributed to MCM Marine.
According to Mark Lee, Prein & Newhof’s Project Engineer, MCM Marine was having
personnel issues, including workers “walk[ing] off the job.”
In June 2003, the Ottawa Road Commission discovered that sand was entering the water
treatment plant, which was eventually attributed to a failure in the intake bed, due in part to overexcavation. Prein & Newhof requested that Great Lakes Dock & Material repair the project
under its warranty; however, Great Lakes Dock & Material responded that the warranty would
not cover the repairs and that they would require additional compensation. By Spring 2004,
neither the dispute nor the defect had been resolved, and the parties were at an impasse.
Therefore, in May 2004, the Ottawa Road Commission terminated Great Lakes Dock & Material
as the contractor on the project. Litigation between Great Lakes Dock & Material, the Ottawa
Road Commission, and Prein & Newhof followed.
In February 2005, the Ottawa Road Commission began soliciting bids for repair of the
bed project, ostensibly seeking the lowest responsible, responsive bidder. MCM Marine
submitted a bid in March 2005. In addition to its general contract bid, MCM Marine also
submitted proposals to other bidders on the project, including Great Lakes Dock & Material,
1
MCM Marine also brought claims against the Ottawa Road Commission in Docket No. 286294.
And in Docket No. 290702, MCM Marine appealed as of right the trial court’s award of attorney
fees and costs to the Ottawa Road Commission. However, in March 2010, after oral arguments
were heard in the Court of Appeals, MCM Marine and the Ottawa Road Commission executed a
stipulation for voluntary dismissal of the appeals as to the Ottawa Road Commission. Therefore,
we do not address any of the claims against the Ottawa Road Commission in Docket No. 286294
or any of the claims in Docket No. 290702.
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Luedtke Engineering, and Durocher Marine to perform a portion of the work as a subcontractor.
In total, bids were received from five contractors, ranging from $774,383 to $1,475,000:
1.
Great Lakes (with MCM Marine as subcontractor)..............................$774,383
2.
MCM Marine (with Great Lakes as subcontractor)..............................$817,098
3.
Luedtke Engineering (with MCM Marine as subcontractor).............$1,064,200
4.
King Company ...................................................................................$1,139,500
5.
Durocher Marine (with MCM Marine as subcontractor)...................$1,475,000
MCM Marine was the only bidder with minority ownership.
Pat Staskiewicz, Public Utilities Engineer for the Ottawa Road Commission, admitted
that MCM Marine’s bid was responsive, and Ken Zarzecki, Director of Public Utilities for the
Ottawa Road Commission, admitted that MCM Marine was a responsible contractor. However,
in a written staff report, Zarzecki recommended rejection of MCM Marine’s bid, explaining as
follows:
MCM Marine, Inc. (“MCM”) submitted the next lowest bid. For a
number of reasons, staff does not recommend that the bid of MCM be accepted.
First, MCM proposes to use [Great Lakes Dock & Material] as its subcontractor,
which is unacceptable. Further, MCM was a subcontractor of [Great Lakes Dock
& Material] on the original construction of the South Intake. That prior
experience was not good, as there were delays on the part of MCM to have [sic]
equipment and laborers on the project and in performing the work. Moreover, the
work plan submitted by MCM having its dredge working between barges raises a
concern that the work may be very sensitive to weather conditions. Therefore,
Staff does not believe that acceptance of this bid would be in the best interests of
the OCRC or the Water System.
Zarzecki recommended rejection of Great Lakes Dock & Material’s bid based on the fact that it
was the primary contractor responsible for the original project, which failed. Zarzecki also
recommended rejection of Luedtke’s bid, noting that Luedtke proposed to use MCM Marine as a
subcontractor, which, for the reasons stated above, Zarzecki found unacceptable. Ultimately,
Zarzecki recommended acceptance of King Company as the lowest acceptable bidder.
King Company, which was the only bidder that did not have any minority participation,
had performed maintenance work on the original intake bed for several years. Before bidding on
this project, King Company had numerous conversations with Prein & Newhof concerning the
nature of the work and the anticipated costs. Indeed, the Ottawa Road Commission had
considered giving King Company the job without even seeking other bids. However,
Staskiewicz directed Prein & Newhof to get quotes from other contractors to “at least show that
[the Ottawa Road Commission] had put forth an effort to get the best price[.]” In an August
2003 memorandum to the Ottawa Road Commission, Staskiewicz explained,
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2) We have met with King Construction to discuss the repair. They can perform
the work and they think they can complete the work yet this year, but that all
depends on us authorizing them to start as soon as possible. They will be
submitting a written proposal to us on Monday. . . .
***
5) We are also investigating concerns that were raised with respect to whether we
can simply “hire King” or whether our policy of Treasury Department guidelines
requires competitive bids/quotations. We obviously want to keep this issue as
clean as possible.
Pursuant to a contract between Prein & Newhof and the Ottawa Road Commission, Prein
& Newhof was required to evaluate and recommend an award for the project. The Ottawa Road
Commission directed Prein & Newhof to find reasons to support the rejection of MCM Marine’s
bid. Thereafter, Prein & Newhof requested that MCM Marine submit a statement of its
qualifications, references, financial status, contracts in progress, and similar information.
According to the Ottawa Road Commission, the reason for the request was to give the Ottawa
Road Commission another level of information to consider the contractors. However, Zarzecki,
Staskiewicz, and Lee admitted that no one contacted MCM Marine’s references. Prein &
Newhof then contacted MCM Marine to inquire about its plan for completing the project.
Neither Prein & Newhof nor the Ottawa Road Commission voiced any concern regarding MCM
Marine’s proposed plan.
Prein & Newhof then directed Luedtke to contact King Company regarding its possible
replacement of MCM Marine as Luedtke’s subcontractor. However, King Company declined.
Luedtke then advised Prein & Newhof that King Company had declined, and Luedtke assured
Prein & Newhof that it did not have any concerns with MCM Marine’s qualifications, that it was
comfortable with MCM Marine, and that it would address any alleged concerns that Prein &
Newhof had relative to MCM Marine. After meeting with the Ottawa Road Commission,
Luedtke was under the impression that the commission was “seriously considering” awarding it
the project, regardless whether MCM Marine was used as a subcontractor.
However, in April 2005, the Ottawa Road Commission awarded King Company the
project. It was later revealed that before the award of the project, King Company stated that, if it
was awarded the project, it would provide the Ottawa Road Commission a $100,000 credit
“guaranteed” at the end of the project and would not “gouge for extras.” And, although Zarzecki
and Staskiewicz admitted that it was improper to consider the credit, they accepted it regardless.
Notably, including the $100,000 credit, the final contract amount, with approved extras, was
$1,521,783.02, $704,685.02 higher than MCM Marine’s bid.
MCM Marine then filed its complaint, alleging racial discrimination.2 More specifically,
MCM Marine alleged that Prein & Newhof violated 42 USC 1981, the Fifth Amendment, and
2
MCM alleged claims against the Ottawa Road Commission. However, as stated, appeal of
those claims has been dismissed, and we need not address them.
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the Fourteenth Amendment by denying MCM Marine the right to work on the repair project
because MCM Marine is a Native American-owned business. MCM also alleged claims of
tortious interference with business expectancy and malpractice against Prein & Newhof. MCM
alleged that Prein & Newhof “intentionally and maliciously” interfered with MCM Marine’s
business expectancy to contract with the Ottawa Road Commission when it “wrongfully
induced” the Ottawa Road Commission to award the project to King Company and reject MCM
Marine. MCM also alleged that, as a professional engineer, Prein & Newhof breached its duty to
the project bidders “to use that standard of care commonly employed by similarly situated
engineers within the engineering community.”
Prein & Newhof moved for summary disposition of the claims against it under MCR
2.116(C)(10).
At the beginning of a February 2008 hearing on the motion, Prein & Newhof requested to
withdraw its argument on the malpractice claim for insurance reasons. No objections were
made; therefore, the trial court granted the request.
In March 2008, the trial court issued its 20-page opinion and order, dismissing all of
MCM Marine’s claims against Prein & Newhof, except the malpractice claim. Prein & Newhof
later re-filed its motion for summary disposition on the malpractice claim, which the trial court
granted. MCM Marine now appeals.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a party may move for dismissal of a claim on the ground that
there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must specifically identify the undisputed factual
issues and support its position with documentary evidence.3 The trial court must consider all the
documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.4 We review de novo
the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition.5
B. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS EXPECTATION
The necessary elements for tortious interference with a business expectation are:
(1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) knowledge of
the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) an intentional
interference causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and
3
MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b) and (4); Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
4
MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden, 461 Mich at 120.
5
Tillman v Great Lakes Truck Ctr, Inc, 277 Mich App 47, 48; 742 NW2d 622 (2007).
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(4) resulting damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been
disrupted.[6]
More specifically, with respect to the third element, a plaintiff must allege “the intentional doing
of a per se wrongful act or the doing of a lawful act with malice and unjustified in law for the
purpose of invading the contractual rights or business relationship of another.”7 “‘A wrongful
act per se is an act that is inherently wrongful or an act that can never be justified under any
circumstances.’”8 “‘If the defendant’s conduct was not wrongful per se, the plaintiff must
demonstrate specific, affirmative acts that corroborate the unlawful purpose of the
interference.’”9 An improper act is one that is illegal, unethical, or fraudulent.10 “Where the
defendant’s actions were motivated by legitimate business reasons, its actions would not
constitute improper motive or interference.”11
MCM Marine argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its claim for tortious
interference with business expectation against Prein & Newhof where there was evidence that
the interference was improper in nature and all other elements were met. In so arguing, MCM
Marine also points out that the trial court “acknowledged that there is evidence that [the Ottawa
Road Commission and Prein & Newhof] intentionally avoided granting the contract to” MCM
Marine. However, this statement cannot be taken out of context. The trial court immediately
thereafter stated that “[t]his avoidance . . . must be based on an improper or unlawful reason.”
We agree with the trial court that there was some evidence that Prein & Newhof assisted
in intentionally avoiding awarding the contract to MCM Marine. The evidence raised a question
of fact whether the Ottawa Road Commission had a prior-set intention to award the contract to
King Company and was only going through the formality of the bidding process to adhere to
protocol. And the facts indicated that the Ottawa Road Commission instructed Prein & Newhof
to assist in developing reasons on which to reject MCM Marine’s bid. However, MCM Marine
has not provided any evidence of racial discrimination and MCM Marine has not alleged any
other illegal or malicious act. To the contrary, the record evidences that Prein & Newhof had
legitimate reasons to make the recommendations that it did. MCM Marine’s participation in the
project was not acceptable because of the problems with the original construction. Therefore, the
evidence suggests that Prein & Newhof was merely performing its contractual duty to
6
Joba Construction Co, Inc v Burns & Roe, Inc, 121 Mich App 615, 634; 329 NW2d 760
(1982).
7
Badiee v Brighton Area Schools, 265 Mich App 343, 367; 695 NW2d 521 (2005) (quotations
and citations omitted).
8
Id., quoting Prysak v R L Polk Co, 193 Mich App 1, 12-13; 483 NW2d 629 (1992).
9
Id., quoting CMI Int’l, Inc v Intermet Int’l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 131; 649 NW2d 808
(2002); Feldman v Green, 138 Mich App 360, 369-370; 360 NW2d 881 (1984).
10
Weitting v McFeeters, 104 Mich App 188, 198; 304 NW2d 525 (1981).
11
Mino v Clio School Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 78; 661 NW2d 586 (2003) (quotation and citation
omitted).
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recommend the best bidder for the Ottawa Road Commission. And, considering MCM Marine’s
involvement in the original, failed project and its personnel issues, it was not the best bidder.
Additionally, MCM Marine argues Prein & Newhof’s conduct was unethical, contending
that “the NSPE Code of Ethics sets forth an identifiable written standard of ethical conduct for
engineers, and therefore for [Prein & Newhof].” However, none of MCM Marine’s claims of
unethical conduct show that Prein & Newhof acted with malice for the specific purpose of
invading MCM Marine’s business relationship with the Ottawa Road Commission. In other
words, there is no evidence that Prein & Newhof acted intentionally to actively induce the
Ottawa Road Commission to not award MCM Marine the contract.12 Again, the evidence
suggests that Prein & Newhof was merely performing its contractual duty for the Ottawa Road
Commission. And “[w]here the defendant’s actions were motivated by legitimate business
reasons, its actions would not constitute improper motive or interference.”13
Because we conclude that Prein & Newhof did not intentionally interfere with any
alleged business expectancy of MCM Marine, we need not address the other three elements of
tortious interference with a business expectation.14
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Prein & Newhof summary
disposition on MCM Marine’s tortious interference with business expectancy claim because
there was no question of fact as to whether Prein & Newhof intentionally interfered with any
alleged business expectancy of MCM Marine.
C. MALPRACTICE CLAIM
MCM Marine argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its malpractice claim against
Prein & Newhof because a project engineer on a public project owes a duty of care to a bidder.
To prove negligence, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the existence of a legal duty owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of such duty, (3) a proximate causal relationship
between the breach of such duty and an injury to the plaintiff, and (4) damages suffered by the
plaintiff.”15 “The threshold question in a negligence action is whether the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff.”16 “‘Duty is essentially a question of whether the relationship between the actor
and the injured person gives rise to any legal obligation on the actor’s part for the benefit of the
12
See Formall, Inc v Community Nat’l Bank, 166 Mich App 772, 780-781; 421 NW2d 289
(1988); Feldman, 138 Mich App at 375-376.
13
Mino, 255 Mich App at 78 (quotation and citation omitted).
14
Karaczewski v Farbman Stein & Co, 478 Mich 28, 43; 732 NW2d 56 (2007) (stating that use
of the word “and” in a statute “makes it perfectly clear” that the Legislature intended that all
elements must be met).
15
Schaendorf v Consumers Energy Co, 275 Mich App 507, 512-513; 739 NW2d 402 (2007).
16
Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 463; 683 NW2d 587 (2004).
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injured person.’”17 The factors that are relevant in determining whether a legal duty exists are
“foreseeability of the harm, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of connection between the
conduct an injury, moral blame attached to the conduct, policy of preventing future harm, and . .
. the burdens and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach.”18 As
against professional engineers, a “malpractice claim requires proof of simple negligence based
on a breach of a professional standard of care.”19
As the trial court concluded, it is foreseeable that a project engineer’s supervision of a bid
process could result in a bidder not being selected and losing the opportunity to profit from the
contract. However, foreseeability of harm alone is not sufficient to impose a duty.20 The
Michigan Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he most important factor to be considered is the
relationship of the parties.”21 Where there is no relationship between the parties, there is no duty
owed to the other party, and the court does not need to address the other factors.22 Here, Prein &
Newhof entered a contract with the Ottawa Road Commission to evaluate bids for the repair
project. Therefore, Prein & Newhof’s obligation was to make a recommendation for the benefit
of the Ottawa Road Commission and the community. Prein & Newhof had no contractual or any
other type of relationship with MCM Marine. Thus, Prein & Newhof did not have a duty to act
for the benefit of MCM Marine, or any other potential bidder.
MCM Marine nevertheless relies on Bacco Construction Co v American Colloid Co,23 for
the proposition that privity between the parties is not required when the victim is foreseeable.
Specifically, MCM Marine relies on the Bacco Court’s statement that “design professionals are
liable for foreseeable injuries to foreseeable victims which proximately result from negligent
performance of their professional duties.”24 However, Bacco and the cases it relies on are
distinguishable from the present facts.
In Bacco, this Court addressed the issue whether a contractor may maintain an action
against a project engineer or architect in the absence of a contractual relationship.25 After
reviewing cases from other jurisdictions that indicated a “clear trend . . . to allow a negligence
17
Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 552-553; 739 NW2d 313 (2007), quoting Moning v Alfono,
400 Mich 425, 438-439; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).
18
Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 101 n 4; 490 NW2d 330 (1992).
19
Phillips v Mazda Motor Mfg (USA) Corp, 204 Mich App 401, 409; 516 NW2d 502 (1994).
20
Samson v Saginaw Professional Bldg, Inc, 393 Mich 393, 406; 224 NW2d 843 (1975).
21
In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist Court of Appeals of Texas, 479 Mich 498,
505; 740 NW2d 206 (2007).
22
Id. at 507.
23
Bacco Construction Co v American Colloid Co, 148 Mich App 397, 414; 384 NW2d 427
(1986).
24
Id.
25
Id.
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action without direct privity of contract,” this Court concluded that a project engineer that made
improper calculations and specifications for a construction job was liable to a third-party
subcontractor that relied on those erroneous calculations and specifications when performing the
construction.26 Similarly, in the two primary cases on which the Bacco Court relied, Donnelly
Construction Co v Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland27 and A R Moyer, Inc v Graham,28 the Arizona
Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court each held that a third-party general contractor,
who may foreseeably be injured by an architect’s negligence and errors in preparing and
approving construction plans, has a cause of action against the architect, notwithstanding absence
of privity.
The facts of Bacco, Donnelly, and A R Moyer are clearly different than the facts here. In
each of those cases the third-party contractor, or subcontractor, was pursuing a claim against a
project engineer or architect for negligence that led to the contractor or subcontractor suffering
injuries on a project on which it was currently working. As the Bacco Court recognized, the
“risk of harm” in that situation was “the financial hardship created by having to cure the defects
which may very well not be caused by the contractor.”29 Here, MCM Marine was not relying on
Prein & Newhof’s specifications or plans in the performance of an existing construction project.
It was merely bidding to work on a project in the future. Thus, while MCM Marine may have
lost the opportunity to profit from the contract, it was entirely dissimilar to the contractors in
Bacco, Donnelly, and A R Moyer who suffered actual losses from the negligence of the engineer
or architect.
Further, MCM Marine is simply a disappointed bidder on a construction project, and
Michigan law makes clear that disappointed bidders have no protected interest in being awarded
a government contract.30 Indeed, a panel of this Court has recognized that there is no authority
for a cause of action for damages in connection with alleged improprieties, like the failure to act
in good faith, in the award of public contracts.31 And, as the trial court recognized, MCM
Marine’s claim that Prein & Newhof owed it a duty was, essentially, based on its claimed
entitlement as a bidder to benefit from or be protected by the competitive bidding process. But it
is well settled that competitive bidding is designed for the benefit of taxpayers, and not for the
26
Id. at 414-416.
27
Donnelly Construction Co v Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P2d 1292, 1296 (Ariz, 1984).
28
A R Moyer, Inc v Graham, 285 So 2d 397, 402 (Fla, 1973), overruled in part by Abstract Corp
v Fernandez Co, 458 So 2d 766 (Fla, 1984).
29
Bacco, 148 Mich App at 416.
30
Talbot Paving Co v Detroit, 109 Mich 657, 661-662; 67 NW 979 (1896).
31
EBI-Detroit, Inc v City of Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued April 30, 2009 (Docket No. 277953). We note that although this case is not binding,
MCR 7.215(C)(1), we may view it as persuasive, Dyball v Lennox, 260 Mich App 698, 705 n 1;
680 NW2d 522 (2003).
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benefit or enrichment of the bidders.32 Therefore, Prein & Newhof, acting on behalf of the
public and the Ottawa Road Commission, owed no duty to MCM Marine.
Further, as Prein & Newhof points out, design professionals must be free to provide
professional opinions candidly to their clients, without risk that disgruntled, disappointed bidders
will sue them. In the context of bid solicitations, the design professional’s duty to give candid
advice to its client supersedes any alleged duty to one of the competing bidders.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Prein & Newhof summary
disposition on MCM Marine’s malpractice claim because there was no relationship between
Prein & Newhof and MCM Marine, and Prein & Newhof owed no duty to MCM Marine, who
was simply a disappointed bidder.
D. 42 USC 1981 LIABILITY FOR INTERFERENCE WITH THIRD-PARTY CONTRACT
MCM Marine argues that Prein & Newhof should be liable pursuant to 42 USC 1981 for
interfering with the Ottawa Road Commission and MCM Marine’s right to make and enforce a
contract, even though MCM did not seek to contract with Prein & Newhof.
42 USC 1981 protects the right to “make and enforce contracts.” To prove a violation of
§ 1981, a plaintiff must show that the defendant purposefully discriminated based on race.33
Showing a mere disparate impact on a specific race is insufficient.34 Purposeful discrimination
can be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence.35 Because MCM Marine does not provide
any direct evidence that Prein & Newhof intentionally discriminated against it based on race, we
consider the circumstantial evidence.
The trial court relied on two cases in ruling that Prein & Newhof was not liable under 42
USC 1981. In PAS Communications, Inc v Sprint Corp,36 the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas concluded that the plaintiff could not show that it attempted to contract with
the defendant because the defendant did not own the buildings or control the janitorial service
contracts on the property that the plaintiff attempted to win. And in McDonald v Union Camp
Corp,37 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that “a statement by an
intermediate level management official is not indicative of discrimination when the ultimate
decision to discharge is made by an upper level official.” Moreover, as Prein & Newhof points
out, this Court has also stated that to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination on
the basis of circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must show that “the person who discharged [him
32
Lasky v City of Bad Axe, 352 Mich 272, 276; 89 NW2d 520 (1958).
33
General Building Contractors Assoc, Inc v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 391; 102 S Ct 3141; 73
L Ed 2d 835 (1982).
34
Id. at 383 n 8.
35
Amini v Oberlin College, 440 F3d 350, 358 (CA 6, 2006).
36
PAS Communications, Inc v Sprint Corp, 139 F Supp 2d 1149, 1171 (D Kan, 2001).
37
McDonald v Union Camp Corp, 898 F2d 1155, 1161 (CA 6, 1990).
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or] her was predisposed to discriminate against persons in [the] plaintiff’s protected class and
actually acted on that predisposition in discharging [him or] her.”38
Here, there was no contract between Prein & Newhof and MCM Marine. Further, MCM
Marine was not seeking to contract with Prein & Newhof.39 Rather, MCM Marine was seeking
to contract with the Ottawa Road Commission. And, although Prein & Newhof assisted in the
selection process, Prein & Newhof did not actually make the final decision regarding which
bidder the Ottawa Road Commission chose to award the contract.40 There was no question of
fact that the Ottawa Road Commission made the final decision to award the contract to King
Company based solely on its own staff report.41
MCM Marine cites Lewis-Kearns v Mayflower Transit,42 to support that “Section 1981,
however, ‘proscribes not only discrimination by the contracting party. . . but also discriminatory
interference by a third party with the exercise of the right to make contracts.’” But the LewisKearns Court went on to state that “[a]s long as the interference prevents or impedes the
formation of the contract, it is covered by section 1981.”43 The Lewis-Kearns Court then ruled
that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the defendants “actually influenced” the
contracting party’s decision. But here, again, there was no question of fact that the Ottawa Road
Commission made the final decision to award the contract to King Company based solely on its
own staff report.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Prein & Newhof summary
disposition on MCM Marine’s 42 USC 1981 claim because Prein & Newhof could not have
deprived MCM Marine a right to contract. Prein & Newhof was not the final decision maker in
awarding the contract, and there was no question of fact that the Ottawa Road Commission made
the final decision to award the contract to King Company based solely on its own staff report.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted Prein & Newhof summary disposition on MCM Marine’s
tortious interference with business expectancy claim because there was no question of fact that
Prein & Newhof did not intentionally interfere with any alleged business expectancy of MCM
Marine. Further, the trial court properly granted Prein & Newhof summary disposition on MCM
Marine’s malpractice claim because there was no relationship between Prein & Newhof and
MCM Marine, and Prein & Newhof owed no duty to MCM Marine, who was simply a
disappointed bidder. And the trial court properly granted Prein & Newhof summary disposition
38
Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 607 n 6; 572 NW2d 679 (1997).
39
See PAS Communications, 139 F Supp 2d at 1171.
40
See McDonald, 898 F2d at 1161.
41
See Harrison, 225 Mich App at 607 n 6.
42
Lewis-Kearns v Mayflower Transit, 932 F Supp 1061, 1070 (ND Ill, 1996) (quotation and
citation omitted).
43
Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
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on MCM Marine’s 42 USC 1981 claim because Prein & Newhof could not have deprived MCM
Marine a right to contract when Prein & Newhof was not the final decision maker in awarding
the contract and there was no question of fact that the Ottawa Road Commission made the final
decision to award the contract to King Company based solely on its own staff report.
We affirm.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
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