HORA S LOLOEE V NASIR ALI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HORA S. LOLOEE,
UNPUBLISHED
April 6, 2010
Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellant,
v
NASIR ALI, MIR ASGHAR, and MIDMICHIGAN AMBULATORY PHYSICIAN,
P.L.C., doing business as ADVANCE URGENT
CARE & WALK IN CLINIC,
No. 284881
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 06-022431-CZ
Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Fort Hood and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action alleging breach of contract, employment discrimination, and retaliatory
discharge, plaintiff Hora S. Loloee appeals as of right circuit court orders granting defendants’
motions for summary disposition and awarding defendants attorney fees and costs. We affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Underlying Facts and Procedure
Plaintiff is a registered medical assistant. Defendants Nasir Ali and Mir Asghar are
physicians and principals in defendant Mid-Michigan Ambulatory Physician, P.L.C. (MMAP).
Plaintiff met Ali when she worked at the Delta Medical Center in Okemos, where Ali
“moonlight[ed]” on weekends before he and Asghar formed MMAP. In January 2005, Ali
informed plaintiff that he and Asghar intended to open an urgent care center in Brighton, and
inquired whether plaintiff would consider working as the new venture’s office manager. Plaintiff
expressed interest and began negotiating with Ali the terms of her employment. Ali suggested
that plaintiff should invest in the new business. Plaintiff subsequently wrote Ali a check for
$20,000, which entitled her to a 20% share in the enterprise.
At plaintiff’s deposition, she recounted Ali’s proposal that she draft an employment
agreement, which Ali’s wife, an attorney, would review. Around May 2005, plaintiff presented
Ali with contract outlining the terms of her employment. Ali forwarded the contract to Asghar,
who initialed each page and signed the agreement on June 3, 2005. Ali gave back to plaintiff the
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contract signed by Asghar, although neither plaintiff nor Ali signed the document. At some
point after June 3, 2005, Ali and Asghar drafted a replacement employment agreement and asked
plaintiff to sign it. On August 15, 2005, plaintiff emailed Ali and Asghar a revised version of the
replacement agreement. Plaintiff’s handwritten modifications included a higher hourly wage rate
and the elimination of a paragraph permitting at will termination. Neither Ali nor Asghar signed
the revised employment contract.
Around August 20, 2005, plaintiff commenced employment as the office manager and a
medical assistant at Advance Urgent Care & Walk In Clinic, an assumed name of MMAP. Ali
and Asghar soon became dissatisfied with plaintiff’s performance in both her office manager and
medical assistant capacities. On September 15, 2005, Asghar criticized plaintiff as she attempted
to perform an EKG; Asghar accused plaintiff of wasting time by unnecessarily shaving the
patient’s chest and failing to recognize that the EKG machine contained no paper. Asghar sent
Ali a “Letter of Concern” detailing these events, and on September 16, 2005, Ali forwarded the
letter to plaintiff. Plaintiff responded with in an email that with regard to the EKG machine, “we
[are] all guilty of not having the machine checked and ready to go.” On September 20, 2005, Ali
and Asghar advised plaintiff in a letter that “as of this time you are not qualified for the position
of Office Manager,” in light of plaintiff’s “[p]oor communication skills,” “[u]nsatisfactory
operational skills,” “[l]ack of knowledge with respect to clinic inventory,” and “[i]nability to
follow directions from physicians.” Ali and Asghar’s letter further declared that plaintiff would
no longer serve as the clinic’s office manager, but that they would continue plaintiff’s medical
assistant employment “as an employee at will with an additional three month probationary
period,” at a reduced rate of pay. With the letter, Ali and Asghar enclosed a certified check for
$20,000.
On September 28, 2005, an attorney for plaintiff sent Ali and Asghar a letter advising
them that their September 20, 2005 correspondence “evidences [thei]r intention to breach the
[employment] contract.” The attorney’s letter urged Ali and Asghar to restore plaintiff’s office
manager position and her higher pay rate, and to “acknowledge in writing that [plaintiff] remains
eligible for the bonus called for by paragraph 6 of the Agreement.”1 On the same day, events at
the clinic deepened Ali’s and Asghar’s dissatisfaction with plaintiff’s professional abilities. On
September 28, 2005, plaintiff took an x-ray of a patient’s injured elbow. A radiologist who
reviewed the x-ray films concluded that the lateral views “are not true lateral views
compromising interpretation.” The radiologist further opined that the “AP views are also
technically suboptimal.” When repeated two days later, x-ray films of the patient’s elbow
revealed a fracture.
Plaintiff’s affidavit asserts that on October 4, 2005, she met with Ali “to apprise him of
concerns [she] had about comments Dr. Asghar had made.” Plaintiff recounted that Asghar
“had, on several occasions, made comments about the body shapes of other women who worked
1
The June 2005 employment agreement guaranteed plaintiff a 10% annual bonus “irrespective
of whether or not employee continues her employment beyond the required minimum of 3 years
of employment . . . .”
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for the defendants. He speculated about what they would look like naked and wondered out
loud, ‘How their husbands touched them or what do they touch.’” On October 6, 2005, Ali sent
plaintiff a letter terminating her employment. The letter advised plaintiff that she was
unqualified “for the position of Medical Assistant,” based on “the following shortcomings”:
a.
Unsatisfactory operational skills (i.e. setup and running of EKG;
priority of patients);
b.
Unsatisfactory administration of x-rays; and
[c].
Inability to follow directions from physicians.
On October 11, 2006, plaintiff filed in the Livingston Circuit Court a complaint setting
forth claims for breach of contract, religious and national origin discrimination in violation of the
Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq, gender discrimination in violation of the CRA,
and retaliation in violation of the CRA. In April 2007, defendants filed a motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The motion asserted that (1) that parties had
never entered into a binding, enforceable employment contract, (2) plaintiff’s lack of
qualification for her medical assistant position precluded her discrimination claims, (3)
defendants terminated plaintiff for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, and (4) because
plaintiff never complained of discrimination before her termination, she could not establish the
elements of a retaliatory discharge claim. In June 2007, the circuit court ruled from the bench
that it would grant the motion for summary disposition in part and deny the motion in part:
On the contract, clear to me there’s no meeting of the minds. No, those emails do not add up to an actual contract such as contemplated and argued for on
behalf of the Plaintiff, and I grant the summary disposition. There’s no meeting
of the minds. It’s clear from the deposition and otherwise.
Number two, as far as the discrimination clause, I’m going to grant
summary disposition on that also. In fact, and it’s clear from the evidence, that it
was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason set forth for the discharge and there’s
no adequate answer to that such as would show . . . that this was a pretext. I grant
summary disposition on that.
I’m not going to grant it on the retaliation at this time. I do note that she
did talk about complaining and being fired. The fact that she did hear these
things, according to her affidavit, herself and other women employees, she says,
complained to her seems to me that this could in fact be the kind of retaliatory
firing that is contemplated. I will in fact deny the motion for summary disposition
on that count.
In September 2007, defendants again sought summary disposition of plaintiff’s retaliation
claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the evidence undisputedly established that
defendants had fired plaintiff for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. In October 2007, the
circuit court granted defendants’ motion, opining from the bench that plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that defendants’ proffered explanation for her discharge amounted to a pretext. The
circuit court added, “Not only am I going to grant summary disposition, I will tell you that I will
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seriously consider attorneys fees in this matter. I think that this case warrants that.” Defendants
thereafter moved for attorney fees and costs pursuant to MCL 600.2591. At the conclusion of a
December 2007 hearing, the circuit court ruled that “this was a frivolous lawsuit from the
beginning.” The parties then stipulated that the amount of defendants’ attorney fees and costs
totaled $24,213.42. Plaintiff specifically reserved her right to appeal defendants’ entitlement to
any attorney fees or costs.
II. Issues Presented and Analysis
We review de novo a circuit court’s summary disposition ruling. Robertson v Blue Water
Oil Co, 268 Mich App 588, 592; 708 NW2d 749 (2005).2 “The existence and interpretation of a
contract are questions of law [that we also] review[] de novo.” Kloian v Domino's Pizza, LLC,
273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006). A motion brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim.” Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App
618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004). “Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR
2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665
NW2d 468 (2003). “In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the
pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact
exists to warrant a trial.” Walsh, 263 Mich App at 621. “A genuine issue of material fact exists
when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an
issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West, 469 Mich at 183.
A. Breach of Contract
Plaintiff first challenges the circuit court’s ruling that because there the parties reached no
“meeting of the minds” with respect to the essential terms of plaintiff’s employment, the parties
never entered a binding employment agreement. Plaintiff asserts that contrary to the circuit
court’s ruling, the parties agreed to be bound by the June 3, 2005 employment agreement that
Asghar signed. “[A]n employment contract is just a contract.” Thomas v John Deere Corp, 205
Mich App 91, 93; 517 NW2d 265 (1994). Negotiations and discussions “cannot . . . substitute
for the formal requirements of a contract.” Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360, 364; 573
NW2d 329 (1997). A valid contract demands the existence of both an offer and an acceptance.
“[A]n acceptance sufficient to create a contract arises where the individual to whom an offer is
extended manifests an intent to be bound by the offer, and all legal consequences flowing from
the offer, through voluntarily undertaking some unequivocal act sufficient for the purpose.”
Kraus v Gerrish Twp, 205 Mich App 25, 45; 517 NW2d 756 (1994), aff’d in part and remanded
in part on other grounds in Kraus v Dep’t of Commerce, 451 Mich 420; 547 NW2d 870 (1996).
2
Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The
circuit court did not specify under which subrule it found summary disposition appropriate, but
because the parties plainly referenced documentary evidence beyond the pleadings as relevant to
plaintiff’s claims, subrule (C)(10) governs our analysis. Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618,
621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004).
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An acceptance converts an offer into a binding contract. Baller v Spivack, 213 Mich 436, 441;
182 NW 70 (1921).
“Contractual liability is consensual. A basic requirement of contract formation is that the
parties mutually assent to be bound.” Rood v Gen Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 118; 507
NW2d 591 (1993) (citation omitted). In Rood, id. at 119, the Supreme Court described as
follows the analysis governing a mutuality determination:
In deciding whether a party has assented to a contract, we follow the
objective theory of assent, focusing on how a reasonable person in the position of
the promisee would have interpreted the promisor’s statements or conduct.
Calamari & Perillo, Contracts (3d ed), § 2-2, p 27. As Professor Farnsworth
stated:
“Since it is difficult for a workable system of contract law to take account
of assent unless there has been an overt expression of it, courts have required that
assent to the formation of a contract be manifested in some way, by words or
other conduct, if it is to be effective.” (Id. at § 3.1, pp 160-161).
Otherwise stated, to determine whether there was mutual assent to a contract, we
use an objective test, looking to the expressed words of the parties and their
visible acts, and ask whether a reasonable person could have interpreted the words
or conduct in the manner that is alleged. Thus, we begin our analysis by looking
to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction, including all
writings, oral statements, and other conduct by which the parties manifested their
intent. [Internal quotation omitted.]
Similarly, Professor Corbin describes mutual assent as follows:
Agreement consists of mutual expressions; it does not consist of
harmonious intentions or states of mind. . . . At present, however, what we
observe for judicial purposes is the conduct of the parties. We observe this
conduct and we describe it as the expression of a state of mind. It is by the
conduct of two parties, by their bodily manifestations, that we must determine the
existence of what is called agreement. . . . This is what is meant by mutual assent.
[1 Corbin, Contracts (1993 ed), § 1.9, pp 25-26.]
The record evidence here agrees that (1) the employment agreement plaintiff prepared
and gave to Ali and Asghar constituted an offer of employment, (2) the agreement contained no
term expressly requiring mutual signatures, (3) Asghar signed the document without modifying
any of its terms, and (4) in August 2005, the parties commenced mutual performance under the
terms of the contract. Plaintiff rendered services as defendants’ office manager and a registered
medical assistant, and defendants paid plaintiff the salary set forth in the employment agreement.
This undisputed evidence of mutual conduct in conformity with the terms of the June 2005
employment agreement establishes mutual assent to the contract, and a “meeting of the minds.”
Plaintiff’s neglect to sign the contract does not alter our conclusion. “If a written draft of an
agreement is prepared, submitted to both parties, and each of them expresses unconditional
assent thereto, there is a written contract.” 1 Corbin, Contracts (1993 ed), § 2.10, p 165. Under
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the common law, “there need be no signatures unless the parties have made them necessary at
the time they express their assent and as a condition modifying that assent.” Id.
Defendants maintain that plaintiff’s admissions during her deposition prove that “there
was never an agreeable offer and acceptance.” Defendants refer to the following excerpt in
support of their position:
Defense counsel: Was there ever a time that you guys came to an
agreement on language of the contract for everybody to sign?
Plaintiff’s counsel: After Exhibit 10 [plaintiff’s proposed revisions to
defendants’ proffered August 2005 replacement employment contract]?
Defense counsel: Um-humm. Yes.
Plaintiff: I believe so.
Defense counsel: Okay. Show me.
Plaintiff: We never—
***
Plaintiff’s counsel: He’s talking about after you sent Exhibit 10, did you
come to an agreement on anything after you sent Exhibit 10?
Plaintiff: No.
Defense counsel: Okay.
Plaintiff: We never—
Defense counsel: So that there was never a meeting of the minds with
regard to the specific employment contract between you and Dr. Ali or his
organization after you had sent him your requested revisions in Exhibit 10,
correct?
Plaintiff: No.
Defense counsel: Is that correct or incorrect?
Plaintiff: We never agree on anything after that, no.
Defense counsel: So in other words, the changes that you’d requested in
Exhibit 10 on the Employment Agreement you E-mailed over to my client were
never made, correct, because you never agreed on those things, isn’t that correct?
Plaintiff: No. After the revised contract they send me and we made some
changes in it, never agree on it, no. [Emphasis added.]
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Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the cited deposition testimony supports
that after the parties’ entry into the June 3, 2005 contract, they did not thereafter achieve a
meeting of the minds concerning a replacement contract or any contractual modifications of the
June 3, 2005 agreement. “[W]here there is no mutual agreement to enter into a new contract
modifying a previous contract, there is no new contract and, thus, no modification.” Quality
Products & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 372-373; 666 NW2d 251
(2003).3 Moreover, even were we to conclude that plaintiff expressed in her deposition
dissatisfaction with the initial contract signed by Asghar or that she believed that it lacked any
essential provisions, an objective analysis of the relevant circumstances reveals that the parties
agreed to be bound by the terms of the June 3, 2005 agreement. “A meeting of the minds can be
found from performance and acquiescence in that performance.” Sanchez v Eagle Alloy, Inc,
254 Mich App 651, 666; 658 NW2d 510 (2003). Plaintiff quit her job at the Delta Medical
Center, gave defendants a $20,000 loan, and assumed responsibility as defendants’ office
manager and a clinic medical assistant. Defendants empowered plaintiff to be their office
manager and a medical assistant, and paid her according to the terms of the written agreement.
The record of the parties’ performance supports that with regard to the June 3, 2005 agreement,
the parties achieved a meeting of the minds. Consequently, the circuit court incorrectly granted
defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s breach of contract count on the ground that no
enforceable agreement existed.
Nevertheless, we reject plaintiff’s assertion that defendants breached the contract by
firing her “without just cause and without notice or warning.” The June 3, 2005 contract reads in
¶ 9,
This contract of employment may not be terminate [sic] unless upon the
occurrence of any of the following events: (a) the death of the Employee; (b) the
failure of the Employee to perform her duties satisfactorily after notice or warning
thereof; (c) economic reasons of the Employers which may arise during the term
of this Agreement and which may be beyond the control of the Employers.
Plaintiff does not dispute that on September 16, 2005, Ali and Asghar notified her in writing that
she had not appropriately performed an EKG and had neglected to properly maintain the EKG
equipment. On October 6, 2005, Ali and Asghar terminated plaintiff, citing the events
surrounding the EKG and plaintiff’s subsequent “unsatisfactory administration” of the elbow x-
3
We note that ¶ 13 of the June 3, 2005 agreement governed contractual modifications:
No waiver or modification of this employment agreement or of any
covenant, condition, or limitation herein contained shall be valid unless in writing
and duly executed by the party to be charged therewith. Furthermore, no
evidence of any waiver or modification shall be offered or received in evidence in
any proceeding, arbitration, or litigation between the parties arising out of or
affecting this agreement, or the rights or obligations of any party hereunder,
unless such waiver or modification is in writing, duly executed as aforesaid. . . .
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ray. By the clear and unambiguous terms of the June 3, 2005 agreement, the contract authorized
defendants to terminate plaintiff’s employment, after notice, on the basis of her failures to
satisfactorily perform her duties. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
we conclude that no reasonable juror could find that defendants breached the contract’s
termination clause. Accordingly, we conclude that, although for different reasons, the circuit
court correctly granted defendants summary disposition of the portion of plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim arising from her termination.
Plaintiff’s complaint additionally asserted that defendants breached their contractual
obligation pursuant to the agreement’s bonus provision, ¶ 6, which states:
In addition to the foregoing, employers will guarantee employee 10% of
the net profits earned yearly, as a “Bonus.” Employee shall continues [sic] to
receive this bonus annually irrespective of whether or not employee continues her
employment beyond the required minimum of 3 years of employment, unless she
request [sic] repayment of the good faith loan she made to employers on may [sic]
2005[.]
Paragraph 8 of the agreement delineated the following conditions surrounding “Termination of
[plaintiff’s] Bonus”:
The Employee shall not be eligible for the above-mentioned “Bonus,” if
she quits her job before three complete years of employment or upon request for
return of the good faith loan. However, after minimum of three years of
employment, she shall continue to receive the above-mentioned “Bonus” even if
she does not work in the above-mentioned medical center, but as long as she has
not made request for return of the good faith loan.
Defendants do not challenge plaintiff’s assertions that she never quit her job or requested
repayment of her $20,000 “good faith loan.”4 The plain, unambiguous language of the bonus
terms therefore entitled plaintiff to an annual bonus, “irrespective” whether her employment
continued beyond three years. Although inartfully drafted, none of the conditions contained in
the “Termination of Bonus” paragraph preclude plaintiff’s eligibility for the bonus payments.
We thus conclude that the circuit court erred by granting defendants summary disposition
regarding the unpaid bonus aspect of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
B. Discrimination
Plaintiff next challenges the circuit court’s finding that she failed to rebut defendants’
claim that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons warranted her termination. Plaintiff submits
that defendants discriminated against her because of her gender and her Shiite Muslim faith.
Defendants reply that because plaintiff did not possess the requisite qualifications for her
position as the clinic’s office manager, she failed to present a prima facie discrimination claim.
4
Notably, defendants’ brief entirely fails to address the contractual bonus language.
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We need not consider whether plaintiff established a prima facie discrimination claim, given that
the circuit court correctly held that plaintiff did not rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons proffered in support of her termination. After presenting a prima facie case of
discrimination under the CRA, the plaintiff must nevertheless “proceed through the familiar
steps set forth in McDonnell Douglas [Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802-803; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L
Ed 2d 668 (1973).]” Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).
“[O]nce a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant has the
opportunity to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision in an
effort to rebut the presumption created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Id. at 464. If the
defendant produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, “the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the evidence in the case, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, is ‘sufficient to
permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the
adverse action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff.’” Id. at 465, quoting Lytle v Malady
(On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). A plaintiff can establish pretext by
substantiating that the proffered reasons for the adverse employment action (1) had no basis in
fact, (2) were not the actual factors motivating the decision, or (3) were insufficient to justify the
decision. Dubey v Stroh Brewery Co, 185 Mich App 561, 565-566; 462 NW2d 758 (1990).
Defendants introduced evidence tending to prove that they fired plaintiff because she did
not follow their orders, neglected to perform necessary office management tasks, performed xrays improperly, and lacked requisite communication skills. Defendants’ advancement of these
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating plaintiff’s employment shifted to her the
burden to articulate evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to her, would permit
a reasonable fact finder to conclude that defendants’ proffered reasons for their decision
constituted pretexts. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 253; 101 S Ct
1089; 67 L Ed 2d 207 (1981). Plaintiff theorizes that defendants’ justifications for her
termination qualify as pretexts in light of the facts that they failed to inform her of any
deficiencies in her performance after the warning issued in September 2005, and they did not fire
another employee who also had neglected to put paper in the EKG machine. Our review of the
record leads us to conclude that plaintiff has presented no evidence from which a fact finder
could reasonably conclude that defendants’ articulated reasons for her termination constituted
pretexts. Plaintiff conceded at her deposition that defendants’ criticisms of her x-ray
performance and her disregard of physician orders possessed merit and amounted to appropriate
bases for her termination. Plaintiff has not demonstrated pretext arising from defendants’
treatment of her coworker because she and the other employee were not similarly situated. To
show that two employees are similarly situated, a plaintiff must establish the near identity of all
relevant aspects of the other person’s employment situation. Smith v Goodwill Industries of West
Michigan, Inc, 243 Mich App 438, 449; 622 NW2d 337 (2000). Because plaintiff served as
defendants’ office manager and a medical assistant, she and her coworker were not similarly
situated. In conclusion, the circuit court correctly granted defendants summary disposition of
plaintiff’s discrimination claims.
For substantially similar reasons, we also reject plaintiff’s argument that the circuit court
erred by dismissing her retaliation claim. Plaintiff complains that defendants terminated her on
the day after she complained of Asghar’s references to the appearance and sexual practices of
other female employees. The antiretaliation portion of the CRA cautions that
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[t]wo or more persons shall not conspire to, or a person shall not:
(a)
Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has
opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this act. [MCL 37.2701.]
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the CRA, a plaintiff must show
(1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was known by the
defendant; (3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the
plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action. [Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental
Health Services, 472 Mich 263, 273; 696 NW2d 646, amended 473 Mich 1205
(2005) (internal quotation omitted).]
“To establish causation [when bringing a retaliation claim under the CRA], the plaintiff must
show that his participation in activity protected by the CRA was a ‘significant factor’ in the
employer’s adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal link between the two.”
Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 315; 628 NW2d 63 (2001). Even
assuming that plaintiff crossed this hurdle and established a prima facie retaliation case, she has
nevertheless failed to carry her burden of proving that defendants’ articulated reasons for firing
her qualified as pretexts. When viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record
evidence demonstrates that plaintiff did not create an issue of fact for the jury regarding whether
defendants’ proffered reasons for her discharge constituted mere pretexts. Plaintiff has put
forward no evidence that defendants’ justifications had no basis in fact, insufficiently explained
her discharge, or were not the actual factors motivating her termination. Defendants presented
abundant evidence that plaintiff did not possess the professional skills necessary to serve as
either their office manager or a medical assistant. The circuit court thus properly granted
defendants summary disposition of the retaliation claim.
Lastly, plaintiff challenges the circuit court’s award of attorney fees and costs. In light of
our decision to reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition on one aspect of
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, we reverse the circuit court’s finding that plaintiff’s action
was frivolous under MCR 2.625 or MCL 600.2591, and we vacate the award of attorney fees and
costs.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Costs to neither party.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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