PAUL M LUBIENSKI V SCIO TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PAUL M. LUBIENSKI, GEORGE LUBIENSKI,
ROSE MARIE LUBIENSKI, WALTER
LUBIENSKI, MARY FLANAGAN, ROBERT
FLANAGAN, OAKRIDGE ESTATES
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and ARBOR HEIGHTS,
LLC,
UNPUBLISHED
March 23, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 288727
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001098-CZ
SCIO TOWNSHIP and SCIO TOWNSHIP
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendants-Appellees.
PAUL M. LUBIENSKI, GEORGE LUBIENSKI,
ROSE MARIE LUBIENSKI, WALTER
LUBIENSKI, MARY FLANAGAN, ROBERT
FLANAGAN, OAKRIDGE ESTATES
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, and ARBOR HEIGHTS,
LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 288769
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001098-CZ
SCIO TOWNSHIP and SCIO TOWNSHIP
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Markey and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s September 26, 2008,1
order finding that the denial of their request for a conditional use permit and site plan approval
by defendants Scio Township and Scio Township Board of Trustees (referred to collectively as
“the township”) complied with the law, was supported by competent, material and substantial
evidence on the record, and reflected a proper exercise of discretion. Plaintiffs also appeal the
trial court’s October 20, 2008, order denying their motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiffs own adjoining pieces of property, totaling approximately 120 acres, in Scio
Township. They seek to develop an “open space residential neighborhood” known as “Oakridge
Estates,” with 64 lots and a community wastewater treatment system, on the property. Plaintiffs
allege that in 1997, they “divided the main parcel of the Property into six approximately 20-acre
parcels,” and that after the division, “there were 9 parcels.” In 1999, they applied for and were
granted approval by the township to divide a 25-acre parcel. They also received a variance to
improve Daleview Drive, which is located on the property, as a private road. Plaintiffs continued
discussions with the township regarding the proposed development and believed, based on
representations by the township, that the density permitted on the property was 64 units.
On April 6, 2006, plaintiffs applied for a conditional use permit and site plan approval
from the township. The site plan application indicated that there would be 64 units spread over
the property and listed three separate property identification numbers: H-08-12-100-022, H-0801-400-002, and H-08-12-200-039. In a letter dated April 27, 2006, the township’s attorney,
Michael Homier, advised plaintiffs’ attorney that the density proposed by plaintiffs “grossly
exceed[ed] that permitted by the [t]ownship’s zoning ordinance.” Homier stated that pursuant to
the applicable formula in the ordinance, the maximum number of units permitted for the
development was 31 units. According to plaintiffs, after several additional meetings with the
township, the township planning commission recommended denial of their conditional use
permit and site plan and the board of trustees followed the commission’s recommendation. In
regard to the density issue, the board’s resolution stated: “The petition fails to conform to the
density permitted by the Scio Township Zoning Ordinance as communicated to the Applicant
[plaintiffs] by the Township Attorney’s letter dated April 27, 2006 and concurring analysis of the
Township’s Planner, Carlisle Wortman, dated May 4, 2006, both of which are hereby
incorporated by reference as support for denying the Petition.” Plaintiffs sought review of the
board’s decision by the township’s zoning board of appeals (ZBA), but the ZBA declined to
review the decision based on lack of jurisdiction.
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint against the township in the trial court.
Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint challenged the township’s rejection of their request for a
conditional use permit and site plan approval. In addition, plaintiffs sought superintending
control (Count II). They also advanced a substantive due process challenge to the validity of the
township’s zoning ordinance (Count III), and a temporary takings challenge (Count IV).
1
While the trial court’s register of actions states that the order was both signed and filed on
September 29, the order itself indicates that it was signed on September 26.
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The township moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction under MCR
2.116(C)(4) and (I)(1). The trial court issued a March 15, 2007, order stating that count I of the
complaint was an appeal as of right of an administrative decision. The court dismissed count II
of the complaint, stating that a writ of superintending control was unwarranted and must be
dismissed under MCR 3.302(D)(2), and dismissed counts III and IV of the complaint because
they were not ripe for review. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to amend their complaint to
add a claim for declaratory judgment, which the trial court denied. Following oral arguments on
count I of plaintiffs’ complaint, the court issued its September 26, 2008, opinion and order,
finding that the township’s decision complied with the law, was supported by competent,
material and substantial evidence on the record, and reflected a proper exercise of discretion.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its October 20, 2008,
order.
On November 6, 2008, plaintiffs filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court,
seeking to appeal the trial court’s September 26, 2008, order (Docket No. 288727). On the same
day, plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal in this Court, appealing the trial court’s October 20, 2008,
order (Docket No. 288769). The township filed a motion to dismiss docket no. 288769, arguing
that the trial court’s October 20, 2008, order was an order entered on appeal from a decision of a
tribunal and, pursuant to MCR 7.203(A)(1), such an order may not be appealed as of right. The
township argued that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A panel of this Court
denied the township’s motion to dismiss, granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal, and
consolidated plaintiffs’ appeals. Lubienski v Scio Twp, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered January 8, 2009 (Docket No. 288727); Lubienski v Scio Twp, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered December 23, 2008 (Docket No. 288769).2
II. The Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
Plaintiffs first argue that count I of their complaint challenging the township’s denial of
their request for a conditional use permit and site plan approval invoked the original, rather than
appellate, jurisdiction of the trial court and therefore that the court applied the wrong standard of
review. We disagree.
Const 1963, art 6, § 28 states, in part:
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative officer or
agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasijudicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by
the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the
determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are
authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same
2
Given this Court’s orders, the township’s arguments on appeal pertaining to this Court’s
alleged lack of jurisdiction are now moot.
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are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole
record.
The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq., vests townships
with the authority to regulate land development and use. Various actions under the MZEA,
including approval or rejection of conditional use permit requests and site plans, are essentially
administrative in nature. See Sun Communities v Leroy Twp, 241 Mich App 665, 669; 617
NW2d 42 (2000) (stating that “[v]arious actions under the TZA, such as site-plan review and the
approval of special use permit requests, are essentially administrative in nature”).3 The MZEA
anticipates that final decisions are made by the ZBA, which may then be appealed to the circuit
court. See MCL 125.3605 and 3606. MCL 125.3606(1) provides:
Any party aggrieved by a decision of the [ZBA] may appeal to the circuit court
for the county in which the property is located. The circuit court shall review the
record and decision to ensure that the decision meets all of the following
requirements:
(a) Complies with the constitution and laws of the state.
(b) Is based upon proper procedure.
(c) Is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record.
(d) Represents the reasonable exercise of discretion granted by law to the
[ZBA].
The MZEA does not address situations such as this where the township board of trustees,
not the ZBA, makes the final decision. This Court has held that if a township’s zoning ordinance
does not provide for an appeal from an administrative decision of the township’s board to the
ZBA, then the board’s decision is final and subject to appellate review by the circuit court
pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 28. See Carleton Sportsman’s Club v Exeter Twp, 217 Mich
App 195, 198-200; 550 NW2d 867 (1996); see also Krohn v Saginaw, 175 Mich App 193, 195196; 437 NW2d 260 (1988). Plaintiffs argue that Livonia Hotel, LLC v Livonia, 259 Mich App
116; 673 NW2d 763 (2003) controls here. But as the township points out, in that case, the
plaintiffs’ “complaint raised issues that ‘had nothing to do with whether [the] appellant was
entitled to special use approval.’ Rather, [the] plaintiffs challenged the legal authority of the
mayor to veto the city council’s approval of a special use, asserted that it had a vested right to a
restaurant licensed to serve alcoholic beverages, and ‘challenged on constitutional grounds the
validity of the zoning ordinance’s treatment of restaurants in hotels.’” Id. at 124. Such issues
fell within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court. Id. at 123-124. Whereas, in this case,
count I of plaintiffs’ complaint specifically dealt with the township’s denial of their request for a
3
The TZA is the Township Zoning Act (TZA), MCL 125.271 et seq. It was repealed by 2006
PA 110, effective July 1, 2006, and replaced by the MZEA. The township issued its decision in
this case on September 12, 2006 and applied the MZEA.
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conditional use permit and site plan, invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the court.
Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that count I was a claim of appeal of an
administrative decision, subject to review under Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
III. Ripeness
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court improperly dismissed counts II, III, and IV of
their complaint as not ripe for review. Again, we disagree.
First, as the township points out, the trial court did not dismiss count II on the basis that
the count was not ripe. The court dismissed count II, plaintiffs’ claim for superintending control,
in light of its decision to treat count I as a claim of appeal. The court reasoned that pursuant to
MCR 3.302(D)(2), a “writ of superintending control is not only not necessary but is not
warranted given the Court’s ruling.” MCR 3.302(D)(2) provides: “When an appeal in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the circuit court, or the recorder’s court is available, that
method of review must be used. If superintending control is sought and an appeal is available,
the complaint for superintending control must be dismissed.” Plaintiffs have not challenged the
basis of the trial court’s decision in regard to count II and we need not address it.
In count III of their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that the township’s zoning ordinance, as
applied to their property, had no reasonable relationship to public health, safety, and welfare, was
arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable, deprived them of the use and enjoyment of their
property without due process, and unreasonably restricted the use of their property with no
legitimate governmental purpose. In count IV, plaintiffs asserted that the zoning ordinance, as
applied, constituted a temporary taking of their property without just compensation. The trial
court held that because plaintiffs could have applied for rezoning but failed to do so, the
administrative process was incomplete and plaintiffs’ substantive due process and temporary
takings claims were not ripe for review.
In dismissing counts III and IV, the trial court granted the township’s motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4). Generally, we review “de novo a trial
court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition. . . . Summary disposition for lack of
jurisdiction under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is proper when a plaintiff has failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies.” Braun v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 262 Mich App 154, 157; 683 NW2d
755 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court stated, in Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576; 550
NW2d 772 (1996), that an “‘as applied’” challenge, as opposed to a facial challenge, to the
validity of a zoning ordinance, “whether analyzed under 42 USC 1983 as a denial of equal
protection, as a deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking
under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is subject to the rule of finality.”
The Court further stated that the “‘finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial
decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete
injury.’” Id. at 577 (citation omitted). “In other words, where the possibility exists that a
municipality may have granted a variance–or some other form of relief–from the challenged
provisions of the ordinance, the extent of the alleged injury is unascertainable unless these
alternative forms of potential relief are pursued to a final conclusion.” Conlin v Scio Twp, 262
Mich App 379, 382; 686 NW2d 16 (2004).
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In Paragon Props, 452 Mich at 572, the plaintiff claimed that its property had no
economic potential for development as zoned, the zoning ordinance was unreasonable,
confiscatory, and discriminatory as applied to the property, and the ordinance unconstitutionally
deprived the plaintiff of its property in violation of the due process clauses of the Michigan and
federal constitutions. The trial court held that the zoning ordinance as applied to the property
effected an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 573. This Court reversed the trial court on the grounds
that the plaintiff’s constitutional claim was not ripe for review because the plaintiff had not
sought a variance from the ZBA and had not brought a state inverse condemnation action. Id.
The Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision, stating that the city’s denial of the plaintiff’s
“rezoning request is not a final decision because, absent a request for a variance, there is no
information regarding the potential uses of the property that might have been permitted, nor,
therefore, is there information regarding the extent of the injury [the plaintiff] may have suffered
. . . .” Id. at 580. While the city’s “denial of rezoning is certainly a decision, it is not a final
decision . . . because had [the plaintiff] petitioned for a land use variance, [it] might have been
eligible for alternative relief . . . .” Id.
Similarly, in Conlin, 262 Mich App at 381, the plaintiffs alleged that the township’s
zoning ordinance, particularly the density restrictions therein, were ultra vires and a violation of
substantive due process, both on their face and as applied. The trial court found that the action
was not ripe for review because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies. Id.
at 382. This Court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs’ “as applied” challenge was
subject to the rule of finality and explained that although the plaintiffs had participated in an
informal preapplication conference, it was undisputed that they had never submitted “a formal
site plan . . . for preliminary or final approval[,] . . . applied for conditional land use approval of a
Rural Open Space Development, or for a dimensional variance from the challenged density
requirements[, or] . . . applied for rezoning of their land to a classification that would allow
developments at the density they desired.” Id. at 383. Accordingly, this Court held that “the trial
court properly found that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, therefore,
their ‘as applied’ challenge was not ripe for judicial review.” Id.
As the township notes in its brief on appeal, this Court in Braun, 262 Mich App at 158159, applied the rule of finality to takings claims. The Braun Court adopted the rule of finality in
Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 620-621; 121 S Ct 2448; 150 L Ed 2d 592 (2001):
Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation which is
alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner’s first
having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to
exercise their full discretion in considering development plans for the property,
including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law. As a
general rule, until these ordinary processes have been followed the extent of the
restriction on property is not known and a regulatory taking has not yet been
established.
The Braun Court further stated that “a determination of alternative uses of property as zoned is a
condition precedent to a valid takings claim. In other words, the landowner must show that he
sought alternative uses of the property as zoned and was denied, thus leaving the property owner
with land having no economically productive or reasonably beneficial use.” Braun, 262 Mich
App at 159. We acknowledge that the rules articulated in Braun and its progeny, see, e.g.,
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Frenchtown Charter Twp v City of Monroe, 275 Mich App 1, 7; 737 NW2d 328 (2007), are not
directly applicable to this case. In those cases, the landowners claimed that the municipalities’
denial of their requests for rezoning constituted unconstitutional takings. Thus, in order to
establish that the municipality had issued a final decision as to the use of their properties, the
landowners had to prove that they sought alternative uses as currently zoned and were denied.
We agree with the trial court that claims III and IV of plaintiffs’ complaint were subject
to the rule of finality and, because plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, their
claims were not ripe for review. The township’s denial of plaintiffs’ request for a conditional
use permit and site plan approval was a decision, but it was not a final decision as contemplated
by Paragon Props and Conlin. Plaintiffs could have applied for rezoning but failed to do so.
Absent a rezoning request, “there is no information regarding the potential uses of the property
that might have been permitted,” or “the extent of the injury [plaintiffs] may have suffered.”
Paragon Props, 452 Mich at 580. Had plaintiffs applied for rezoning to a classification that
would allow the density they desired, they “might have been eligible for alternative relief from
the provisions of the ordinance.” Id.
In arguing that their claims are ripe for review, plaintiffs rely almost exclusively on DF
Land Dev, LLC v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued September 15, 2009 (Docket No. 287400). Initially, we note that unpublished
opinions of this Court are not precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis. MCR
7.215(C)(1). Moreover, DF Land Dev is materially distinguishable from this case on its face.
The DF Land Dev Court held that “Braun only applies to those claims that combine a takings
claim with one or more ‘as applied’ constitutional challenges,” and because the plaintiff had not
raised a takings claim, the trial court erred in “relying on Braun and concluding that the
[plaintiff’s] ‘as applied’ claims were not ripe for judicial review.” DF Land Dev, unpub op at 7.
Plaintiffs fail to recognize that they did, in fact, raise a takings claim, making the holding in DF
Land Dev inapplicable here.
In their reply brief, plaintiffs additionally argue that a rezoning request would have been
futile and thus should not be required. Plaintiffs assert that the township reached a “definitive
position” in this case and “won’t change their mind,” rezoning request or not. In discussing the
futility exception to the finality rule, this Court has stated that where it is clear that further
administrative proceedings would be futile and nothing more than a formality, resort to the
administrative body is not mandated. L & L Wine & Liquor Corp v Liquor Control Comm, 274
Mich App 354, 358; 733 NW2d 107 (2007). However, “[f]utility will not be presumed,” and a
mere expectation that a body will decide or act in a certain way is insufficient to satisfy the
futility exception. Id. at 358-359. Plaintiffs’ bald assertion that the township “won’t change [its]
mind[],” is insufficient to satisfy the exception.
The trial court properly determined that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies and properly dismissed their substantive due process and takings challenges to the
zoning ordinance as not ripe for review.
IV. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Their Complaint
Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly denied their motion to amend their
complaint. We find that the trial court properly denied their motion.
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We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of
discretion. Dorman v Clinton Twp, 269 Mich App 638, 654; 714 NW2d 350 (2006). MCR
2.118(A)(2) states that “[e]xcept as provided in subrule (A)(1), a party may amend a pleading
only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires.”
Thus, a motion to amend should ordinarily be denied only for particularized
reasons, including undue delay, bad faith or a dilatory motive, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party, or futility. The trial court must specify its reasons for denying
leave to amend, and the failure to do so requires reversal unless the amendment
would be futile.
. . . An amendment would be futile if (1) ignoring the substantive merits of the
claim, it is legally insufficient on its face; (2) it merely restates allegations already
made; or (3) it adds a claim over which the court lacks jurisdiction. [PT Today,
Inc v Comm’r of the Office of Financial & Ins Services, 270 Mich App 110, 143;
715 NW2d 398 (2006) (citations omitted).]
In this case, after the trial court issued its order stating that count I of plaintiffs’
complaint would be treated as a claim of appeal and dismissing counts II, III, and IV, plaintiffs
filed a motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for declaratory judgment. In their motion
to amend, plaintiffs asserted: “The sole change proposed . . . is to add a new and different Count
V which seeks a declaratory ruling from the Court regarding the proper application of Scio
Township Ordinance 6.04(D). . . . Count V seeks a declaration from the Court regarding the
density permitted [on plaintiffs’ property]. . . . Any determinations made with regard to the
pending appeal are unlikely to result in a determination of the proper application of Ordinance
6.04(D). A declaration is requested by the Amended Complaint to resolve the ambiguities in
Ordinance 6.04(D) and avoid future litigation over the application of the ordinance. . . . The
calculations made by both the [plaintiffs and the township] with regard to the ordinance
demonstrate the varying nature of the interpretations provided under Ordinance 6.04(D). The
interpretation of the ordinance can only be resolved with a declaration by the Court as to how the
permitted density is calculated for [plaintiffs’ property].”
The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend because the amendment would be
futile. Specifically, the trial court held that plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment as to
the correct interpretation of the township's zoning ordinance was not properly before the court.
The court determined that the ZBA was the proper body to interpret the ordinance and clarify
any ambiguity therein, that plaintiffs had not raised the issue of ambiguity before the township or
the ZBA, and that only after the ZBA had addressed the issue would it be ripe for the court’s
review.
We agree with the trial court’s determination that permitting plaintiffs to amend their
complaint would have been futile in that their proposed claim for declaratory judgment was not
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properly before the court. MCL 125.3603(1), a subsection of the MZEA, provides that the ZBA
shall hear and decide matters referred to the ZBA or upon which the ZBA “is required to pass
under a zoning ordinance adopted under this act.” Scio Township Ordinance 36-427,4 which
addresses the powers and duties of the ZBA, provides that the ZBA “shall hear and decide
requests for interpretation of this chapter or the zoning map, taking into consideration the intent
and purpose of this chapter and the waste plan.” Ordinance 36-427(d)(1). In their motion to
amend, plaintiffs asserted that the zoning ordinance at issue is ambiguous and must therefore be
interpreted by the trial court. Plaintiffs failed to raise this issue before the township board or the
ZBA–the body authorized by Ordinance 36-427(d)(1) to interpret the township’s zoning
ordinance. Plaintiffs concede in their reply brief on appeal that “the ZBA was the proper forum”
for zoning ordinance interpretation, but claim that the trial court should have considered the issue
because the ZBA denied their request for a hearing. But as the trial court alluded in denying
plaintiffs’ motion to amend, plaintiffs only requested that the ZBA review the township’s denial
of their conditional use permit and site plan. They did not request an interpretation of the
township’s zoning ordinance or claim that the ordinance was ambiguous. Given the timing of
plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint, which immediately followed the trial court’s
decision to treat count I as a claim of appeal and dismiss counts II, III, and IV, it appears that
plaintiffs were attempting to invoke the original jurisdiction of the court, rather than its appellate
jurisdiction, by adding the proposed count V to the complaint. The trial court could review the
township’s denial of plaintiffs’ request for a conditional use permit and site plan approval under
its appellate jurisdiction, but plaintiffs’ claim that the zoning ordinance was ambiguous and
required interpretation was not properly before the court.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend
their complaint.
V. Alleged Due Process Violation
Plaintiffs argue that they were denied due process of law by the ZBA’s failure to grant
them a hearing and review the township’s decision, and, presumably, the trial court’s failure to
order a ZBA hearing after plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs’ due
process argument fails.
4
The township’s website states that the township board adopted Ordinance 2009-04 on June 23,
2009. The website further states: “This ordinance codified all Scio Township Ordinances
effective July 28, 2009 per MCL 41.186. All previous stand alone ordinances, including the
Township Zoning Ordinance, are now included as regulations in the Scio Township Code. Some
modifications, mostly required updates, were made to previous ordinances and included in the
Code. If items from previous ordinances are not included in the Code document, they are no
longer valid.” Township of Scio, Ordinances, http://www.twp.scio.mi.us/ordinances (accessed
January 11, 2010). The current version of the township’s ordinances indicates that Ordinance
36-427 was formerly Ordinance 15.04.
See http://library1.municode.com/defaulttest/home.htm?infobase=14234&doc_action=whatsnew (accessed January 11, 2010).
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The township asserts that because plaintiffs failed to raise their due process argument
before the ZBA or the trial court, this Court need not address the issue. See Hall v Small, 267
Mich App 330, 335; 705 NW2d 741 (2005) (stating that in general, issues raised for the first time
on appeal are not subject to review). The township correctly asserts that plaintiffs did not raise
this issue before the ZBA, in their complaint, or in response to the township’s motion for
summary disposition. Plaintiffs did, however, raise it in their motion for reconsideration. The
trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion without addressing their due process argument. An argument
is not properly preserved for appeal when a party raises an issue for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration; however, this Court may address the issue if it involves a question of law and
the parties have presented all of the facts necessary for its resolution. Farmers Ins Exch v Farm
Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan, 272 Mich App 106, 117-118; 724 NW2d 485 (2006). The issue
preservation requirements are designed to prevent a party from harboring error as an appellate
parachute by “sandbagging” the trial court after an unfavorable ruling is rendered. See Polkton
Charter Twp v Pellegrom, 265 Mich App 88, 95-96; 693 NW2d 170 (2005). Given plaintiffs’
limited briefing of this issue on appeal, we need not address it.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ due process argument fails. They assert in their brief on appeal that
they “were denied any opportunity to speak or present any evidence before the ZBA, which is a
denial of due process.” In civil cases, the “fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” English v Blue Cross
Blue Shield, 263 Mich App 449, 459; 688 NW2d 523 (2004) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). In denying plaintiffs’ request for a hearing and review of the township’s decision, the
ZBA stated:
We have been advised by . . . the Township Counsel that the [ZBA] cannot grant
the relief that you have requested under the Township Zoning Ordinance and the
[MZEA] as we do not have jurisdiction to hear this. So at this point we are just
going to close this item and we are recommending that your fees be returned.
Plaintiffs assert that because the ZBA is charged with interpreting the township’s zoning
ordinance, see Ordinance 36-427(d)(1), it had jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ application for
review.5 As discussed, however, plaintiffs did not request that the ZBA interpret the ordinance.
Rather, plaintiffs requested that the ZBA review the township’s denial of their conditional use
permit and site plan. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any authority indicating that such review was
within the ZBA’s jurisdiction. In fact, in their application to the ZBA, plaintiffs stated that it was
“unclear” in the township’s zoning ordinance whether the ZBA had the authority to review a site
plan and conditional use decision on appeal, and that they were “being forced to appeal to the
ZBA, to preserve their rights.” In their complaint, plaintiffs stated that the ZBA “does not have
the authority to review site plan applications” or to “grant a variance to permit the Open Space
Option requested.” Even on appeal, plaintiffs point to nothing in the MZEA or the township’s
5
Plaintiffs additionally asserted in their brief on appeal that the ZBA improperly delegated its
power to the township’s attorney by allowing the attorney to interpret the township’s zoning
ordinance and make a decision on jurisdiction. But plaintiffs essentially abandon this issue in
their reply brief on appeal.
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zoning ordinance granting the ZBA the authority to review their application. A party may not
leave it to this Court to search for authority in support of its position by giving “issues cursory
treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley,
259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003).
VI. The Township Attorney’s First Opinion Letter
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in denying their request to obtain and review
the first letter drafted by the township’s attorney regarding his opinion as to the density permitted
on plaintiffs’ property because the court had a duty to review the whole record and the letter was
vital to plaintiffs’ case. We disagree.
According to plaintiffs, the township’s attorney issued an opinion letter regarding the
density permitted on plaintiffs’ property in September 2005. The township supervisor sent
plaintiffs a letter dated September 9, 2005, stating: “Our Township Attorney has offered his
opinion on density calculation in the letter you referred to. This information will be provided to
our Planning Commission for their consideration.” On the same day, the township supervisor
left plaintiffs a voicemail message indicating that he believed the density permitted on their
property was 64 units. Thereafter, plaintiffs sent the township a request under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) for a copy of the opinion letter. The township denied the request,
indicating that the requested document was subject to the attorney-client privilege and was
therefore “exempt from disclosure pursuant to Section 13(1)(g) of the FOIA.” The township’s
letter further stated that plaintiffs had the right to submit a written appeal or to “seek judicial
review . . . as stated in Section 10.”
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to obtain and review, in
camera if necessary, the township attorney’s opinion letter. Plaintiffs did not appeal the
township’s denial of their FOIA request or seek judicial review of the denial. Nor did plaintiffs
raise this issue in their complaint. Based on our review of the record, plaintiffs first raised this
issue in their motion for reconsideration, stating that the trial court should review the opinion
letter before issuing its final decision and provide a copy of the letter to plaintiffs “as the
argument that it is protected by attorney-client privilege is moot.” The trial court denied
plaintiffs’ motion and did not address this issue. As indicated, an argument is not properly
preserved for appeal when a party raises an issue for the first time in a motion for
reconsideration. Farmers Ins Exch, 272 Mich App at 117. In addition, because plaintiffs have
provided this Court with limited briefing of this issue, we will only briefly address it. See
Peterson Novelties, 259 Mich App at 14.
According to plaintiffs, the trial court should have obtained and reviewed the township
attorney’s opinion letter because the court was required to review the entire record and the
opinion letter, which was vital to plaintiffs’ case, was necessary to conduct a proper review of
the township’s decision. In so arguing, plaintiffs rely on MCL 125.3606, which provides, in
part:
(1) Any party aggrieved by a decision of the [ZBA] may appeal to the circuit
court for the county in which the property is located. The circuit court shall
review the record and decision to ensure that the decision meets all of the
following requirements:
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(a) Complies with the constitution and laws of the state.
(b) Is based upon proper procedure.
(c) Is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record.
(d) Represents the reasonable exercise of discretion granted by law to the
[ZBA].
(2) If the court finds the record inadequate to make the review required by this
section or finds that additional material evidence exists that with good reason was
not presented, the court shall order further proceedings on conditions that the
court considers proper. The [ZBA] may modify its findings and decision as a
result of the new proceedings or may affirm the original decision. The
supplementary record and decision shall be filed with the court. The court may
affirm, reverse, or modify the decision.
Plaintiffs also cite Schadewald v Brule, 225 Mich App 26; 570 NW2d 788 (1997), in which this
Court stated that the “function of the trial court when reviewing the [ZBA’s] grant of a variance
is to determine whether the decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence on the whole record” under the now repealed MCL 125.293a(1). Schadewald, 225
Mich App at 34.
Arguably, the township is correct and the township attorney’s opinion letter is subject to
the attorney-client privilege and therefore exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. See Leibel v
Gen Motors Corp, 250 Mich App 229, 238-239; 646 NW2d 179 (2002) (holding that a written
memorandum drafted by an attorney for his client containing legal opinions and
recommendations was protected by the attorney-client privilege). MCL 15.243(1)(g) provides
that a “public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record” under the FOIA
“[i]nformation or records subject to the attorney-client privilege.” But even if the letter is not
subject to the privilege, plaintiffs have not established that, absent the letter, the record was
inadequate for the trial court to properly review the township’s decision in this matter. Even if,
as plaintiffs suggest, the opinion letter revealed an initial density calculation of 64 units by the
township’s attorney, the existing record was adequate for the trial court to review the township’s
ultimate decision as to the permissible density and determine whether the decision complied with
the law, was based on proper procedure, was supported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence on the record, and represented a reasonable exercise of discretion. See MCL 125.3606.
VII. The Density Calculation
Finally, plaintiffs argue that in affirming the township’s denial of their conditional use
permit and site plan, the trial court must have misread their application materials or
misinterpreted and misapplied the township’s zoning ordinance. Again, we disagree.
In considering plaintiffs’ appeal of the township’s decision, the trial court was charged
with reviewing the record and determining whether the decision complied with the law and
proper procedure, was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record,
and represented a reasonable exercise of discretion. See MCL 125.3606(1); Const 1963, art 6, §
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28. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we must determine “whether the . . . court applied
correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial
evidence test to the [township’s] factual findings.” Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App
226, 234; 559 NW2d 342 (1996). This standard regarding the substantial evidence test is the
same as the clearly erroneous standard. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court,
on the whole record, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id. at 234-235.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs’ property is located in a general agricultural (“A-1”) zoning
district. Scio Township Ordinance 36-75, formerly Ordinance 4.08, Note 3, limits the density of
developments in A-1 districts according to the following formula:
3. Single-family dwelling on lots a minimum 2 1/2 acres in size provided that the
overall density permitted as of right upon a parcel existing as of March 31, 1997,
shall be restricted to the following:
a. For a parcel of ten acres or less, existing as of March 31, 1997 up to a
total of four dwelling units.
b. For a parcel of greater than ten acres, up to and including 120 acres,
existing as of March 31, 1997 one additional dwelling for each whole ten acres in
excess of the first ten acres, up to a maximum of 11 dwellings.
c. For parcels of greater than 120 acres existing as of March 31, 1997 one
additional dwelling for each whole 40 acres in excess of the first 120 acres.
d. For a parcel of not less than 20 acres existing as of March 31, 1997
two additional dwellings may be permitted, if one of the following conditions
apply:
(i) Because of the establishment of one or more new roads, no
new driveway accesses to an existing public road for any of the resulting parcels
under subsections 3.a through c of this section or this subsection 3.d are created or
required.
(ii) One of the resulting parcels under subsections 3.a through c of
this section and this subsection 3.d comprises not less than 60 percent of the area
of the parent parcel or parent tract.
Plaintiffs applied for an open space development under Ordinance 36-130, formerly
Ordinance 6.04, which begins with a base density calculated pursuant to Ordinance 36-75, and
then adds “bonus density” if certain criteria are met. Ordinance 36-130(d)(1) provides:
(d) Project density. Land found within the districts noted in subsection (b) of
this section may be developed, at the option of the land owner, with the same
number of dwelling units on a portion of land that, as determined by the township,
could otherwise be developed, under existing ordinances, laws and rules, on the
entire land area.
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(1) The following special density standards shall apply to land found
within the A-1, General agriculture district. The number of dwelling units
permitted under the open space preservation option on property zoned A-1 shall
not exceed the overall density permitted as of right as set forth in section 36-75,
note 3, of the schedule of regulations, plus additional density based upon the
application of one of the following criteria, whichever results in the least number
of additional dwelling units:
a. Two dwelling units for the first ten acres plus one dwelling unit
for each whole ten acres in excess of the first ten acres of the parcel; or
b.
Seven dwelling units, or ten dwelling units if one of the
resulting lots or parcels comprises not less than 60 percent of the area of the
parcel being developed.
Plaintiffs argue that the township’s zoning ordinance permits a total of 64 units on their
property, while the township and trial court concluded that the ordinance permits only 31 units.
The discrepancy between the parties’ calculations arises from their disagreement regarding the
number of parcels plaintiffs possess, within the meaning of the term “parcel” in the zoning
ordinance. Plaintiffs’ site plan application indicated that there would be 64 units spread over
their property and listed three separate property identification numbers: H-08-12-100-022, H-0801-400-002, and H-08-12-200-039. Plaintiffs assert that prior to March 31, 1997, they divided
the largest parcel, H-08-12-100-022, between several family members. According to plaintiffs,
after the divisions, plaintiffs possessed nine parcels to be developed. However, there is no record
evidence that plaintiffs obtained township approval for the divisions, and the record indicates
that plaintiffs did not record the deed transfers with the county register of deeds until after 1997.
Ordinance 36-5, formerly Ordinance 2.02, defines the term “parcel” as “a piece or tract of
land.” At the time of plaintiffs’ alleged division of their property, the township regulated land
division through the 1993 Acreage Parcel Division Ordinance (APDO), repealed in 1997. Under
the APDO, all divisions were subject to the township’s prior review and approval. Section
100.2(2) of the APDO provided that “[a]ny real property division, which has not been first
approved by the Township, will not be considered a valid division of such property under the
terms of this Ordinance; and any parcel of real property, which has not received approval by the
Township pursuant to the provisions of this Ordinance, will not be placed on the Township tax
rolls as a separate and individual parcel of property.” Section 306.0 provided that “[n]o acreage
parcel may be divided in the Township except in accordance with the terms of this article.”
Section 201.0 defined “[a]creage parcel” as “[a]ny parcel of land in the Township which is not
located in or part of a recorded plat,” and “[d]ivision or divide” as “[t]o separate into parts or
parcels by virtue of change of ownership, separation on the tax rolls, or any other means, any
parcel of land.”
Upon reviewing the township’s zoning ordinance and the APDO, the township and trial
court determined that plaintiffs possessed only three parcels as of March 31, 1997 because they
failed to obtain prior township approval for their land divisions as required by the APDO. The
township and trial court did not misread plaintiffs’ application materials. Plaintiffs argue on
appeal that the township and trial court improperly revised the definition of “parcel” in the
zoning ordinance to mean “approved division” through application of the APDO. According to
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plaintiffs, under the APDO, the only consequence of failing to obtain township approval for a
land division was that the divided pieces of land were not placed on the township tax rolls, and
that such failure did not preclude the pieces of land from qualifying as separate parcels for
purposes of density calculation under the zoning ordinance. We disagree.
The APDO provided that any real property division that has not been first approved by
the township “will not be considered a valid division of such property,” section 100.2(2), and
that no parcel in the township may be divided except in accordance with the ordinance, section
306.0. Moreover, plaintiffs have not pointed to any inconsistencies between the zoning
ordinance and the APDO, or to any ambiguities in either ordinance. If statutory language is
unambiguous, judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. Nastal v
Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005). The language
must be enforced as written. Fluor Enterprises, Inc v Revenue Div, Dep’t of Treasury, 477 Mich
170, 174; 730 NW2d 722 (2007). Furthermore, “statutes that relate to the same subject matter or
share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as one law . . . in order to
effectuate the legislative purpose as found in harmonious statutes” and, if possible, construe and
apply the statutes in a manner that avoids conflict. In re Project Cost & Special Assessment, 282
Mich App 142, 148; 762 NW2d 192 (2009) (citations omitted). See Goldstone v Bloomfield Twp
Pub Library, 479 Mich 554, 568 n 15; 737 NW2d 476 (2007) (stating that the rules of statutory
construction also apply to local ordinances). It was therefore appropriate for the township to
look to the APDO to determine how many parcels plaintiffs possessed as of March 31, 1997 in
order to conduct the necessary density calculations under the zoning ordinance.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that if, in fact, they possessed only three parcels as of March 31,
1997, the township’s density calculations under the zoning ordinance were correct, and its
decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record and
represented a reasonable exercise of discretion.6 Therefore, because the township and trial court
properly determined that plaintiffs had only three parcels to be developed, we affirm the court’s
order upholding the township’s denial of plaintiffs’ conditional use permit and site plan.
Affirmed. Defendants, being the prevailing parties, may tax costs pursuant to MCR
7.219.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
6
During plaintiffs’ rebuttal at the oral argument in this case, plaintiffs’ counsel questioned for
the first time the township’s density calculation results based on three parcels, but provided no
basis for or analysis of his challenge.
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