DALE V ARMSTRONG V IOSCO TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DALE V. ARMSTRONG,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 288027
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 04-021069-CZ
IOSCO TOWNSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Judges K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Saad and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this zoning dispute, the trial court entered an order in favor of defendant, Iosco
Township, after a bench trial. Plaintiff, Dale V. Armstrong, now appeals by right. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
Plaintiff owns approximately 22 acres of property located in Livingston County,
Michigan. The property is situated at the northeast corner of Kern and Lange Roads in Iosco
Township. The land is vacant, except for an old farmhouse on its southeastern side and some
utility poles. It is not farmable because its surface consists mostly of sand and rock.
At the time of this litigation, the property was zoned agricultural-residential (A-R).
Under the township’s zoning ordinance, A-R zoned land is intended for agricultural and single
family residential uses and is meant to achieve a low-density residential environment “that will
not encroach upon neighboring agricultural uses.” Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 8, § 800.
Permitted principal uses on A-R zoned land include, for example, farms and farm buildings,
single-family dwellings, public parks, and forest preservation areas. Certain special land uses
not explicitly allowed on A-R zoned land could be permitted “upon the issuance of a special use
permit . . . .” Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 8, §802. Section 207 of the ordinance defines “special
land use” and “special land use permit,” respectively, as:
Special Land Use. A use permitted by the Township Board, with the
recommendation of the Planning Commission, to accommodate certain land uses
that are not normally compatible with other land uses permitted in a district or
whose effect upon adjoining land uses are not immediately determinable;
therefore, require certain conditional regulations to guide their development
within a given district. Such uses are reviewed by the Planning Commission
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including site plan review and the addition of specific requirements to insure
conformity within the district.
Special Land Use Permit. The permit issued for a special land use after approval
by the Township Board. [Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 2, §208]
The special land uses that may be permitted on A-R zoned land include use as a
manufactured home community, or mobile home park. Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 8, §802.
The township’s ordinance does not otherwise permit or establish a zoning district specifically for
manufactured housing. Thus, a landowner wishing to develop a manufactured housing
community must apply for a special use permit (SUP), “subject to the standards specified in
Article 19 [of the ordinance].” Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 8, §802.
Article 19 provides the procedures for obtaining a SUP. A landowner must submit a SUP
application to the township clerk, along with a detailed site plan. Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art
19, §1902. With regard to manufactured housing, part O of article 19 requires the developer to
provide certain details in the preliminary site plan. Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 19, §1905.
Once an application is submitted, the township’s planning commission considers whether the
application should be approved, denied, or approved with conditions and provides its
recommendation to the township board. Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 19, §§1903, 1908. In the
interim, a public hearing must be held on the SUP application within 60 days of its submittal.
Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 19, §1902. Once the township board receives the planning
commission’s recommendation, it has the discretion to approve or deny the permit.
A. PLAINTIFF’S SUP APPLICATION
In January 2001, plaintiff submitted to the township a SUP application for manufactured
housing to be developed on the subject property. Plaintiff’s SUP application included a
preliminary site plan detailing the layout of the community and the dimensions of the lots.
Plaintiff’s plan envisioned a 50-unit community called “Glacier Rock Estates.” The development
also included a community building, some open space, three foot tall evergreen trees, a storm
water retention pond, a septic tank and tile field area, and a “well house” with a an isolation
radius of 200 feet. Kern Road, which intersects with Lange Road, would provide access to the
development. Both roads are gravel. Plaintiff contemplated that the development would house
senior citizens. At the time, no manufactured housing community existed within the township.
In the same month, the township’s planning commission recommended approving plaintiff’s
SUP application; in its view, plaintiff’s application met the township’s requirements under the
zoning ordinance. The planning commission’s recommendation was provided to the township
board.
In March 2001, the township board held a public meeting, the topic of which was
plaintiff’s proposed manufactured housing community. During the meeting, members of the
public expressed concerns regarding the proposed development’s effect on the condition of the
streets near the site, surrounding property values, and the “pastoral” character of area. After the
meeting, the township sent plaintiff a list of questions for its further consideration.
The next month, the township board considered plaintiff’s SUP application in a meeting
and decided to deny the application. According to the township board, denial of plaintiff’s
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application was appropriate because the proposed use was “not in harmony with existing
ordinances or the surrounding residential community, the bridge on Lange [Road] is [a] single
lane and in poor condition, bad and unpaved roads [sic], emergency vehicles would have
problems getting in/out of the proposed Park, the negative impact the park would have on nearby
wells and the ground water, along with drainage issues.” Accordingly, the board sent plaintiff a
letter informing him of its decision.
B. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES
In November 2004, plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the township, asserting violations of
the Equal Protection Clause and the Substantive Due Process Clause, and alleging that the
current zoning was exclusionary and failed to meet a legitimate purpose in contravention of
sections 297a and 273 of the Township Zoning Act (TZA), MCL 125.271 et seq.,1 respectively.
In December 2005, the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. Initially, the
trial court granted defendant’s motion on the grounds that plaintiff’s claims were not ripe and
dismissed the case in its entirety. Plaintiff, however, moved for reconsideration and the trial
court granted the motion.2
The matter was reset for a pretrial hearing, at which the trial court requested
supplemental briefing only on the exclusionary zoning issue. During the hearing and in his
supplemental briefing, plaintiff raised for the first time an argument that his exclusionary zoning
claim was also based on § 7, MCL 125.2307, of the Manufactured Housing Commission Act
(MCHA),3 MCL 125.3301 et seq., under which he would not have to establish that a demand for
manufactured housing existed, unlike under § 297a of the TZA.
1
2006 PA 110 repealed the TZA, MCL 125.271 to MCL 125.310. However, 2006 PA 110 did
not void ordinances or permits based on 1943 PA 184, or otherwise affect any pending litigation
that existed as of April 10, 2006.
2
After the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the matter was re-assigned to
a different judge for administrative reasons.
3
MCL 125.2307 provides in part:
(3) A local government ordinance shall not be designed as exclusionary to mobile
homes generally whether the mobile homes are located inside or outside of mobile
home parks or seasonal mobile home parks.
*
*
*
(6) A local government ordinance shall not contain roof configuration standards
or special use zoning requirements that apply only to, or excludes, mobile homes.
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Ultimately, the trial court denied both parties’ motions for summary disposition. It
reasoned that plaintiff’s claims fall under the TZA, not the MCHA, and ruled that a question of
fact remained with regard to plaintiff’s claims. The court set a date for bench trial.
C. BENCH TRIAL
At trial, plaintiff presented evidence and testimony that the wells that would be placed on
his property for the development would provide sufficient water capacity and would not affect
the water pressure, or capacity, in nearby residential properties. Plaintiff also produced
testimony that the development would result in additional vehicular traffic on nearby roads, but
would not cause “undue deterioration of the roads,” and would actually improve drainage in the
area, because components of the proposed plan, specifically the detention basin and ditches
along the roads, would better direct the flow of water.
Further, Brian Frantz, a community planner, testified for plaintiff that a need for
manufactured housing existed in the township. Frantz’s conclusion was based on his analysis of
demographic data within a three-mile radius of plaintiff’s property; the data was collected from
the U.S. Census Bureau, the Federal Housing Administration, and other government or
organizational sources. Basically, Frantz compared the median household income of individuals
residing in Iosco Township, the median cost of a house in the township, and the mortgage that
approximately a third of individuals in the township could afford, and the fact that no
manufactured housing units existed in the township, to conclude that available affordable
housing in the community was lacking and that a need for manufactured housing existed. Frantz
testified that he did not know of any other planners who had employed a similar methodology.
In addition, Frantz testified that using the three mile radius was “a reasonable thing based on . . .
my professional opinion . . . .”
Defendant provided the testimony of John Enos, a community planner for the township,
who testified that a manufactured home community was not in harmony with the existing
ordinances for the surrounding residential area. According to Enos, the surrounding area had a
very natural rural character, consisting of significant woodlands, historical agricultural buildings,
rolling hills and other natural areas, such as the Red Cedar River. In his view, the proposed
development, which envisioned 2.2 housing units per acre was not compatible with this existing
rural landscape and the township’s decision to deny the SUP was entirely reasonable. Enos
further testified that there was no need for manufactured housing at the site proposed by plaintiff,
based on the fact that many units were already available within a six-mile radius. Specifically,
on the date that plaintiff filed his SUP application in January 2001, approximately 46
manufactured home lots were available at Burkhart Ridge, four miles away from the subject
property. At the conclusion of trial, the court entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s claims.4
4
During trial, plaintiff stipulated dismissal of his claim based on a violation of MCL 125.273.
Thus, the trial court’s order only pertained to plaintiff’s due process, equal protection, and
exclusionary zoning claims.
(continued…)
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II. MANUFACTURED HOUSING COMMISSION ACT
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary
disposition because the township’s SUP requirement for mobile homes violates MCL 125.2307
of the MHCA. In plaintiff’s view, MCL 125.2307 provides plaintiff with another avenue by
which to pursue his exclusionary zoning claim. We disagree with plaintiff. This Court reviews a
trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Dorman v Clinton Twp, 269
Mich App 638, 644; 714 NW2d 350 (2006).
At the outset, we note that plaintiff failed to specifically plead an exclusionary zoning
claim based on MCL 125.2307 and did not file a motion for summary disposition under the
MCHA. Rather, plaintiff raised his argument related to MCL 125.2307 for the first time at a
pretrial hearing and filed a supplemental brief in support of his exclusionary zoning claim
articulating this argument. The trial court addressed plaintiff’s assertion by explaining that the
TZA, not the MCHA, controls plaintiff’s exclusionary zoning claim; thus, it made no explicit
summary disposition ruling on the MCL 125.2307 “claim.”
We conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that the TZA controls
plaintiff’s exclusionary zoning claim and not the MHCA. First, the provisions of the MCHA do
not control over local zoning laws. Silver Creek Twp v Corso, 246 Mich App 94, 98; 631 NW2d
346 (2001). The TZA enables townships to “regulate the development and proper use of land . . .
.” Id. The MHCA, on the other hand, “regulate[s] and provide[s] for minimum construction and
safety standards with regard to mobile home businesses and parks.” Id. at 278. Second, it is
plainly obvious, given the purpose of the MHCA, that the MHCA does not provide the legal
basis for an exclusionary zoning claim; it does not seek to provide a plaintiff recourse if a
township attempts to exclude a lawful land use. Rather, MCL 125.297a of the TZA does. The
trial court did not err.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Plaintiff also contends that the zoning ordinance violates his substantive due process and
equal protection rights because it totally excludes use of land for manufactured housing and,
thus, the trial court erred by dismissing those claims. We disagree. Following a bench trial, we
review for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact. Frericks v Highland Twp, 228 Mich App
575, 583; 579 NW2d 441 (1998). We review its conclusions of law de novo. Id. Constitutional
questions are also reviewed de novo. Scots Ventures, Inc v Hayes Twp, 212 Mich App 530, 532;
537 NW2d 610 (1995).
The Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution, US Const, Am XIV, and Const
1963, art 1, § 2 guarantee equal protection of the laws. The Fourteenth Amendment and Const
1963, art 1, § 17 guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. The former seeks to ensure “that all persons similarly situated . . . be treated
alike[,]” Great Lakes Society v Georgetown Twp, 281 Mich App 396, 427; 761 NW2d 371
(2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted), while the latter aims to prevent the arbitrary
(…continued)
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deprivation of property or liberty rights, Landon Holdings, Inc v Grattan Township, 257 Mich
App 154, 173; 667 NW2d 93 (2003).
Generally, zoning ordinances are presumed to be constitutionally valid. Silva v Ada Twp,
416 Mich 153, 159; 330 NW2d 663 (1982). Further, where a challenger has raised both equal
protection and substantive due process claims and the challenger cannot show a suspect or
somewhat suspect classification, as is the case here, the analysis under the two clauses is
essentially the same. Landon Holdings, Inc, supra at 173, 177. In both instances, the
challenging party has the burden of showing that the ordinance is not rationally related to, and
does not advance, a legitimate state interest or that the ordinance is unreasonable because of the
purely arbitrary, capricious, and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from
the subject area. Id. at 175; Houdek v Centerville Twp, 276 Mich App 568, 574; 741 NW2d 587
(2007). “Further, in order to show that an ordinance is not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest, a challenger must negate every conceivable basis that might support the
ordinance or show that the ordinance is based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of
the State’s goals.” Houdek, supra at 583 (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, if the
ordinance totally excludes a use, the burden is on the government to prove that the ordinance is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest. Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc v
Orchard Lake Village, 221 Mich App 19, 24; 561 NW2d 405 (1997).
Because the character of the ordinance as either totally exclusionary, or not, affects our
analysis, we first consider plaintiff’s argument that the township’s ordinance totally excludes
mobile home communities. Here, the township’s zoning ordinance permits the use of land for
mobile homes provided a landowner obtains a special use permit. Importantly, although the
ordinance requires SUPs for special uses, it nonetheless characterizes such uses as “permitted.”
See Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 2, §208 (defining “special land use”). Hence, the SUP
procedure is not an authorization to permit prohibited uses, like a variance or a nonconforming
use. Rather, the intent of the ordinance is to permit “certain other land uses which may be
necessary or desirable in certain districts, but on account of their actual or potential impact . . . .
need to be carefully regulated with respect to their location for the protection of township
residents.” See Iosco Zoning Ordinance, art 19, §1900. Thus, the use is permitted, but the
township has not yet decided where it is most appropriate. Accordingly, it cannot be said that
the township’s ordinance totally excludes manufactured home communities.
Plaintiff, however, asserts that the ordinance is totally exclusionary because the township
has not designated any property specifically for manufactured housing. Plaintiff also points to
the fact that no manufactured housing community exists in the township as evidence that the
ordinance is totally exclusionary. However, these facts do not show that manufactured housing
is totally excluded. Such facts are not indicative of the ordinance’s character; a use is not
necessarily excluded simply because it does not yet exist.
Plaintiff also relies on language Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc, supra, which states,
[A]n ordinance which totally excludes a use recognized by the constitution or
other laws of the state, carries a strong taint of unlawful discrimination and a
denial of equal protection of the law.
*
*
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*
The fact that plaintiff could apply for a variance or a special permit does not cure
the defect in the zoning ordinance. Eveline Twp v H & D Trucking Co, 181 Mich.
App. 25, 34; 448 N.W.2d 727 (1989). [Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc, supra at
23 (some citations omitted and emphasis added).]
However, this Court in Landon Holdings, Inc, which involved an ordinance requiring a special
use permit for certain uses, limited the applicability of the Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc, to
its facts, noting that its reference to “a special permit” was unexplained. Landon Holdings, Inc,
surpa at 170. The Landon Holdings, Inc Court further clarified that the facts of Countrywalk
Condominiums, Inc, involved a nonconforming use, not one that was permitted under a special
use permit. Id. After our review of the relevant facts in this case, and the township’s zoning
ordinance, we are of the view that the SUP procedure here is similar to that in Landon Holdings,
Inc, and is not a permit procedure for a non-conforming use, like that in Countrywalk. Thus, we
are not persuaded to follow the dicta in Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc, as plaintiff urges us to
do.
Having concluded that the ordinance is not totally exclusionary, we must reject plaintiff’s
argument that the township failed to meet its burden of proof. Because the ordinance is not
totally exclusionary, the burden was on plaintiff, not the township, to show that the ordinance is
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Countrywalk Condominiums, Inc, supra at 24.
And, after our review of the record, we hold that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof.
Here, the township’s planner, Enos, testified that plaintiff’s proposed plan for a manufactured
community situated on plaintiff’s land was not in conformity with the rural character of the area.
And, as this Court has recognized, preserving the character of an area is a legitimate interest that
may be advanced by zoning regulations. Dorman, supra at 651-652. Plaintiff failed to rebut this
evidence. Thus, plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail.
IV. EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Plaintiff also contends that the evidence showed that a demonstrated need for
manufactured housing existed when plaintiff applied for the SUP and that the trial court’s
contrary finding was against the great weight of the evidence. Specifically, plaintiff contends
that the trial court erroneously relied on current market conditions, improperly rejected Frantz’s
expert testimony, and misinterpreted an affidavit.
The TZA precludes a township from totally prohibiting a lawful land use under certain
circumstances. Frericks, supra at 610. Specifically, MCL 125.297a5 provides:
A zoning ordinance or zoning decision shall not have the effect of totally
prohibiting the establishment of a land use within a township in the presence of a
demonstrated need for that land use within either the township or surrounding
area within the state, unless there is no location with the township where the use
may be appropriately located, or the use is unlawful.
5
This provision was recodified in nearly identical language as MCL 125.3207.
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To prevail on a claim of exclusionary zoning, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the challenged
ordinance has the effect of totally excluding the land use within the township, (2) there is a
demonstrated need for the excluded land use in the township or surrounding area, (3) the use is
appropriate for the location, and (4) the use is lawful.” Houdek, supra at 575. It is not necessary
for a plaintiff to show than an ordinance excludes a use on its face, rather it will suffice to show
that the ordinance makes a use a “practical impossibility.” Landon Holdings, Inc, supra at 168.
We find it unnecessary to address plaintiff’s argument relating to his burden to show that
a demonstrated need exists because plaintiff has failed to show “that the challenged ordinance
has the effect of totally excluding the land use within the township.” Houdek, supra at 575. As
we have already determined in our analysis under section III, the township’s zoning ordinance
requiring a SUP is not facially, totally exclusionary. Thus, to prevail on his claim, plaintiff
should have produced evidence showing that the ordinance’s practical effect was exclusionary,
or that the SUP procedures were illusory. Plaintiff, however, presented no evidence showing
that the township intentionally seeks to preclude the development of manufactured housing
communities or otherwise has a practice of prohibiting manufactured housing communities under
the SUP procedures. And, as we have already explained, the fact that no manufactured housing
communities currently exist in the township and the fact that the township has no area
specifically designated for manufacturing housing, does not necessarily mean that the ordinance
effectively excludes such a use. Accordingly, the trial court appropriately granted judgment in
defendant’s favor.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Henry William Saad
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