ROXIE PHILLIPS V KAREN MCDONALD LOPEZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROXIE PHILLIPS,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 288236
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-087516-NM
KAREN MCDONALD LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this legal malpractice action, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting
summary disposition to defendant. We affirm.
The underlying case involved a medical malpractice claim against George Dass, M.D.
Dr. Dass had performed surgeries on plaintiff’s elbow on October 29, 1999, and April 16, 2001.
On March 24, 2003, plaintiff, acting in pro per, served a notice of intent on Dr. Dass. Thereafter,
plaintiff retained defendant, who filed a complaint on October 20, 2003. However, the complaint
was dismissed because plaintiff had failed to serve the defendants or place a copy of the
complaint in the hands of a process server before the expiration of the statute of limitations. This
Court affirmed that dismissal in Phillips v Dass, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued September 19, 2006 (Docket No 267992).
In the present lawsuit, plaintiff averred that, due to defendant’s negligence, she lost the
ability to pursue her case against Dass. Defendant countered that the notice of intent served on
Dr. Dass, which was required by MCL 600.2912b, was deficient. MCL 600.2912b provides that
the notice must be served 182 days before the filing of a medical malpractice complaint. If
served and the limitations period on the claim would expire during the 182 days, the limitations
period is tolled “not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the
applicable notice period after the date notice is given.” See MCL 600.5856. Defendant argued
that the limitations period expired on April 16, 2003, and, because it was not tolled by the
deficient notice, the underlying case was therefore subject to dismissal before plaintiff even
retained defendant. Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged there could be no legal malpractice if the
medical malpractice case was “dead” when it came to defendant. The trial court determined that
the limitations period was not tolled because the notice was deficient and, therefore, defendant
could not be liable for legal malpractice. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant’s motion
for summary disposition.
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This Court reviews an order granting summary disposition de novo. Saffian v Simmons,
477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be granted if
the evidence submitted by the parties “fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material
fact, [and] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461
Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
The elements of a legal malpractice claim are “(1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (2) negligence in the legal representation of the plaintiff; (3) that the negligence was
a proximate cause of an injury; and (4) the fact and extent of the injury alleged.” Coleman v
Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 63; 503 NW2d 435 (1993) (footnotes and citation omitted). To prove
proximate cause, a plaintiff “must show that but for the attorney’s alleged malpractice, he would
have been successful in the underlying suit.” Id. In other words, the plaintiff must prove two
cases within a single proceeding. Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444 Mich 579, 585-586; 513
NW2d 773 (1994).
Defendant’s alleged negligence would have proximately caused plaintiff’s injury only if
the medical malpractice case would otherwise have proceeded against Dr. Dass. The question,
therefore, is whether the medical malpractice case would have been dismissed based on the
notice of intent.
Whether the notice of intent was deficient must be judged based on the case law in effect
at the time the medical malpractice case would have been pending. Since the notice of intent
was served on March 24, 2003, this would be the starting point of the analysis. We note that the
case law on sufficiency has evolved,1 culminating in a decision adverse to plaintiff with the
release of Boodt v Borgess Medical Ctr, 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008)(Boodt II). While it
is possible that the medical malpractice case would have settled or terminated while the case law
favored plaintiff, plaintiff would not be able to meet her burden of establishing this fact. Thus,
we conclude that the sufficiency of the notice must be judged according to Boodt II.
MCL 600.2912b(4) provides:
The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall
contain a statement of at least all of the following:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.
1
Based on Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (On Remand), 252 Mich App 664; 653 NW2d 441
(2002)(Roberts on Remand), plaintiff’s 2003 notice of intent was adequate when filed. We
conclude that it would have been deemed inadequate under Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp
(After Remand), 470 Mich 679, 701; 684 NW2d 711 (2004)(Roberts II), but that it would have
passed muster under Boodt v Borgess Medical Center, 272 Mich App 621, 728 NW2d 471
(2006)(Boodt I).
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(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or
care was breached by the health professional or health facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with
the alleged standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or
care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the claimant is
notifying under this section in relation to the claim.
In Boodt II, supra, the Court held:
Regarding causation, the notice of intent states: “If the standard of care had been
followed, [the decedent] would not have died on October 11, 2001.” This
statement does not describe the “manner in which it is alleged the breach of the
standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the
notice,” as required by MCL 600.2912b(4)(e). Even when the notice is read in its
entirety, it does not describe the manner in which the breach was the proximate
cause of the injury. When so read, the notice merely indicates that [the defendant]
caused a perforation and that he then failed to do several things that he
presumably should have done. . . . However, the notice does not describe the
manner in which these actions or the lack thereof caused [the] death. As this
Court explained in [Roberts II], “it is not sufficient under this provision to merely
state that defendants’ alleged negligence caused an injury. Rather, § 2912b(4)(e)
requires that a notice of intent more precisely contain a statement as to the manner
in which it is alleged that the breach was a proximate cause of the injury.”
(Emphasis in original.)
Although the instant notice of intent may conceivably have apprised [the
defendant] of the nature and gravamen of plaintiff’s allegations, this is not the
statutory standard; § 2912b(4)(e) requires something more. In particular, it
requires a “statement” describing the “manner in which it is alleged the breach of
the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in
the notice.” MCL 600.2912b(4)(e). The notice at issue here does not contain
such a statement. [481 Mich at 560-561 (footnote omitted).]
The statement regarding proximate causation in the instant case is not distinguishable
from that deemed insufficient in Boodt II. Here, plaintiff’s notice stated: “As a result of the
violations of the standard of care, [plaintiff] has required additional surgery, pain and discomfort
and other problems.” This statement indicates the alleged breach was a cause but not the “but
for” cause of additional surgery. Moreover, there is no explanation of the “manner in which it is
alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury.”
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Indeed, one is left to wonder whether the prosthesis may have failed for other or additional
reasons. Accordingly, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Boodt II, plaintiff’s notice of intent
would have been deficient. The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition.2
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
2
We note that in Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156; 772 NW2d 272 (2009), the Supreme Court
held that a defective but timely notice of intent would toll the statute of limitations given a 2004
amendment to MCL 600.5856. Whether plaintiff’s medical malpractice case would have been
pending when Bush was decided need not be determined. Plaintiff would not be entitled to
tolling based on Bush since her May 23, 2003 notice of intent was served when the predecessor
statute was still in effect.
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