JACK BOSS V LOOMIS EWERT PARSLEY DAVIS & GOTTING PC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JACK BOSS and MARI BOSS,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2010
Plaintiffs/CrossDefendants/Appellants,
v
LOOMIS, EWERT, PARSLEY, DAVIS, &
GOTTING, PC, KELLY K. REED, CATHERINE
A. JACOBS, KEVIN J. RORAGEN, WILLIAM
CULBERTSON, S. WHITFIELD LEE, R.
ANDREW GATELY,
No. 287578 and 289438
Allegan County Court
LC No. 05-037882-CK
Defendants-Appellees,
and
TALL GRASS INVESTMENT CORP,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/Appellee,
and
EAGLE TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Zahra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 287578, plaintiffs Jack Boss and Mari Boss,1 appeal a July 9, 2007 order
granting the renewed motion for summary disposition of plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim
brought by defendant law firm Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting, PC and by individual
1
We were advised at oral argument that Mari Boss has been adjudged bankrupt and therefore,
the appellee relinquish their claims against her.
-1-
attorneys within the law firm, Kelly K. Reed, Catherine A. Jacobs, Kevin J. Roragen, (“the
Loomis defendants”). The trial court granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7)
on the ground that plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to
claims of professional malpractice as set out in MCL 600.5805. The matter at issue involved the
appropriate accrual date as determined under MCL 600.5838. Because we are precluded from
readdressing this argument by the law of the case doctrine, we affirm.
In Docket No. 289438, plaintiffs appeal a post-judgment order granting sanctions
pursuant to MCL 600.2591 to defendants Tall Grass Investment Corporation, William
Culbertson, S. Whitfield Lee, and R. Andrew Gately, against plaintiffs, jointly and severally.
Because plaintiffs have not sufficiently developed their arguments on appeal nor have they
presented applicable legal authority for their arguments they have not established error, and we
affirm.
I
This case arises out of the sale of 80% of defendant Eagle Transport Services, Inc. and
related real estate from plaintiff Jack Boss, who retained the other 20%, to defendants Tall Grass
Investment Corporation, Culbertson, Lee, and Gately. In the complaint, filed June 17, 2005,
plaintiffs alleged a fraud claim against those defendants, specifically alleging that they raided the
assets of Eagle, and caused Eagle to withhold payments for company cars, credit cards, and other
business assets that caused plaintiffs to be personally responsible for those payments, thus
destroying plaintiffs’ credit rating. With regard to the Loomis defendants, in a count alleging
legal malpractice, plaintiffs alleged that the documents for the transfer drafted by the attorneys at
defendant Loomis firm were insufficient and failed to protect plaintiffs from the acts of the Tall
Grass defendants.
Defendant Loomis firm represented plaintiffs beginning in 1992 in various matters both
personal and business-oriented. Defendant Jacobs provided estate-planning services to plaintiffs,
which were completed in April 1999. From March 2001 to November 2001, the Loomis firm
represented Eagle and Jack Boss in facilitating the termination of Michael Dargis, a minority
shareholder in Eagle. Plaintiff Jack Boss and defendant Jacobs agree that the Dargis termination
matter ended in November 2001. Neither of those matters is involved in this action.
Defendant attorneys Jacobs, Reed, and Roragen each averred that Eagle and plaintiffs
retained defendant Loomis firm on July 25, 2002, to represent their interests in the sale of Eagle
to Tall Grass, that Tall Grass acquired a majority of Eagle’s shares on March 13, 2003, and that
“[t]he last date Loomis performed legal services for Jack and Mari Boss related to the Tall Grass
Acquisition was on April 7, 2003.” Also, April 7, 2003, is the date of the last service rendered
by defendant Loomis firm on the Tall Grass acquisition as reflected in the firm billing invoice.
Defendant attorneys Jacobs, Reed, and Roragen each averred that the Loomis firm continued to
represent Eagle after the acquisition by Tall Grass, but did not represent plaintiffs “individually
on any matter related to the sale of their interest in Eagle.”
Defendant Roragen averred that after the Tall Grass acquisition, defendant Culbertson
asked him to continue as legal counsel for Eagle, and that Roragen told him he would, but if a
conflict of interest arose with Jack Boss, he would be unable to represent either without a signed
waiver of conflict. Defendant Roragen also averred that in 1999, plaintiffs had entered into a
-2-
land contract for the purchase of a piece of property, and that around July 4, 2004, Eagle
discovered that the property was listed as one of its assets. Defendant Roragen stated that
defendant Culbertson asked him to represent Eagle in the quiet title action relative to that
property and that he contacted plaintiff Jack Boss to ask him to waive any conflict of interest if
the Loomis firm agreed to represent Eagle in that action, and that Jack Boss refused to do so.2
Defendants Jacobs and Reed each averred that on September 16, 2003, Jack Boss asked
the firm to represent his wife, plaintiff Mari Boss, after Eagle terminated her employment, and
that they explained that they could not represent Mari without obtaining a conflict of interest
waiver from Eagle.
The Loomis defendants all moved for summary disposition on the ground that under
MCL 600.5838, a claim of professional malpractice accrues “at the time that person discontinues
serving the plaintiff in a professional . . . capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for
malpractice arose,” and the matter out of which this claim arose – the Tall Grass acquisition –
was completed on April 7, 2003. But plaintiffs did not file their complaint until June 17, 2005,
beyond the two-year limitations period set out in MCL 600.5805(5).
In response to the Loomis defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiffs did not
argue that representation on the Tall Grass acquisition continued beyond April 7, 2003. Instead,
they argued that they had relied on the Loomis defendants for all their legal needs for many years
and that the representation did not cease with the finalization of the Eagle/Tall Grass matter.
Plaintiffs further argued that defendant Loomis firm continued to represent them on many other
items, some related to Eagle, some not. Plaintiffs relied on an invoice from the Loomis firm to
plaintiff Jack Boss for “Legal Services Rendered Through September 30, 2003.” That invoice
lists services for three dates. The first service was for September 3, 2003, and is described as
follows: “Review file for creation of new LLC, forward LLC operating agreements and ancillary
documentation to be signed by client as prepared by Catherine Jacobs in 2001.” The second
service date on the invoice is for September 8, 2003, which is described as, “Telephone
conference with Kevin J. Roragen regarding Tall Grass’ agreement to waive conflict of interest
in MSA, LLC negotiation with Eagle.” And the third service date is for September 16, 2003, and
it is described as, “Telephone conference with Jack Boss regarding Mari being fired by Eagle;
telephone conference with Jack Boss and Catherine A. Jacobs regarding ethical prohibition for
Loomis to represent Mari with respect to her termination at Eagle without Eagle’s waiver of the
conflict of interest.”
During oral argument on the summary disposition motion, plaintiffs argued that the
Loomis defendants had not discontinued serving them as clients and invoked the “last treatment
rule.” In an apparent effort to clarify plaintiffs’ argument, the trial court posited a scenario to
plaintiffs’ attorney:
2
See Dargis v Boss, Unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 16, 2008
(Docket No. 273473).
-3-
Let’s say a lawyer represents a client over a twenty year period in various matters.
During the early part of the representation, the lawyer gives the client bad advice
regarding one matter. Would the client still have a malpractice claim years later if
the lawyer was still representing the client, but in a completely different matter?
Plaintiffs’ attorney responded in the affirmative.
Ultimately the trial court granted the Loomis defendants’ renewed motion for summary
disposition with prejudice holding that:
Here, the court takes note of Mr. Roragen’s affidavit, which shows that he
asked Mr. Boss for a waiver, but finds that there was no duty for the Defendants
to send a letter terminating representation. Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims
arise out of the Tall Grass Acquisition matter and the last September billing
regarding Mari Boss had nothing to do with this malpractice claim. The Court
finds the Defendants discontinued serving Plaintiffs in the Tall Grass Acquisition
matter in April 2003. Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims are barred pursuant to
the statute of limitations.
The trial court dismissed defendant law firm Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting,
PC and defendant individual attorneys Reed, Jacobs, and Roragen for the reason that plaintiffs’
claims were barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Plaintiffs sought
delayed leave to appeal the trial court’s ruling in this Court. This Court denied plaintiffs’
delayed application for leave to appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds presented.” Boss v
Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting, PC, Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered February 4, 2008 (Docket No. 280716).3
The matter proceeded against the remaining defendants. Defendant Eagle Transport
apparently did not file an appearance in the matter because it was then defunct. Plaintiffs
submitted a proposed default judgment against defendant Eagle Transport in the amount of
$605,899.39. The trial court entered the default judgment on October 11, 2006. With regard to
the remaining defendants, case evaluation was held in May 2007. Plaintiffs were awarded
$125,000. The remaining defendants, Tall Grass, Culbertson, Lee, and Gately all filed an
acceptance of the award. Plaintiffs rejected the case evaluation.
Jury trial commenced on May 5, 2008 and continued through May 16, 2008. The jury
found no cause of action regarding any of plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants.
The jury did, however, award a judgment in the amount of $64,114.54 in favor of defendant Tall
Grass Investment Corp. against plaintiffs jointly and severally. The trial court entered a final
3
Plaintiffs filed an application for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ order in the Supreme
Court. Our Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal because it was “not
persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.” Boss v Loomis, Ewert,
Parsley, Davis & Gotting, PC, Order of the Supreme Court, entered May 27, 2008 (Docket No.
136038).
-4-
judgment in accordance with the jury verdict on August 14, 2008. With regard to case
evaluation sanctions, on November 7, 2008, the trial court entered a stipulated order granting
defendants, Tall Grass, Culbertson, Lee, and Gately, case evaluation sanctions in the amount of
$133,275 in actual attorneys’ fees against plaintiffs jointly and severally. The trial court also
entered an Order for Sanctions pursuant to MCL 600.2591 on November 26, 2008 awarding
defendants, Tall Grass, Culbertson, Lee, and Gately, $23,759 in sanctions against plaintiffs
jointly and severally after finding that plaintiffs’ defamation claim was frivolous. Plaintiffs now
appeal as of right.
II
First, in Docket No. 287578, plaintiffs argue again on appeal that the trial court erred
when it determined that the statute of limitations had run with regard to defendants Loomis,
Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting, PC and by individual attorneys within the law firm, Reed,
Jacobs, and Roragen. Plaintiffs previously sought delayed leave to appeal the trial court’s ruling
regarding the statute of limitations in this Court immediately following the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition against the Loomis defendants in Docket No. 280716. At that time, this
Court denied plaintiffs’ delayed application for leave to appeal “for lack of merit in the grounds
presented.” Boss v Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting, PC, Unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered February 4, 2008 (Docket No. 280716). “Under the law of the case
doctrine, an appellate court ruling on a particular issue binds the appellate court and all lower
tribunals with regard to that issue.” Webb v Smith (After Second Remand), 224 Mich App 203,
209; 568 NW2d 378 (1997). Because this Court expressed an opinion on the merits of plaintiffs’
arguments in denying the application for leave to appeal in Docket No. 280716, the law of the
case doctrine precludes us from readdressing the arguments.
Were we to address the merits of the argument, we would find no merit to plaintiffs’
argument on this issue. A legal malpractice claim must be brought within two years of the date
the claim accrues, or within six months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
existence of the claim, whichever is later. MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838. In Kloian v
Schwartz, 272 Mich App 232; 725 NW2d 671 (2006), this Court stated the two year limitations
period and that accrual is at the time the attorney discontinues serving the plaintiff “as to the
matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose.” Id., 237. The Kloian Court also quoted
Gebhardt v O’Rourke, 444 Mich 535, 543; 510 NW2d 900 (1994), for the proposition that “a
legal malpractice claim accrues on the attorney’s ‘last day of professional service’ in the matter
out of which the claim for malpractice arose.” Kloian, supra at 232, quoting Gebhardt, supra at
543. Moreover, the Kloian Court went on to explain,
[W]hen an attorney is not dismissed by the court or the client, and substitute
counsel is not retained, the attorney’s service discontinues “upon completion of a
specific legal service that the lawyer was retained to perform.” [Id. (internal
citations omitted).]
Plaintiffs here relied on the invoice captioned “Legal Services Rendered Through
September 30, 2003.” “The matter out of which the claim for malpractice arose,” or put another
way, “the specific legal service that the lawyer was retained to perform” was the acquisition of
Eagle Transport by Tall Grass. None of the three services described in the invoice had anything
to do with that transaction. The one for September 3, 2003, relates to the separate matter of the
-5-
formation of a limited liability company. The second one dated September 8, 2003, relates to a
telephone conference in which Tall Grass’s conflict of interest waiver is sought in regard to a
negotiation with Eagle regarding an entity called MSA, LLC. Although Tall Grass is involved in
the conference call, its acquisition of Eagle Transport is not at issue in any way. And finally, the
third dated September 16, 2003, is a conference call regarding possible representation of Mari
Boss after Eagle Transport terminated her employment. That too does not involve the Tall Grass
acquisition.
Again on appeal, plaintiffs rely on the “last treatment rule” discussed in Levy v Martin,
463 Mich 478; 620 NW2d 292 (2001), and argue that it applies in the present case. In Levy, our
Supreme Court considered a malpractice action against an accountant who prepared annual tax
returns for the plaintiff. In that case, as the result of an IRS audit of 1991 and 1992 tax years, the
plaintiff was required to pay additional taxes as well as interest and other legal and accounting
expenses. The plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against the defendant accountants in 1997. Id.
at 480-481. The Levy Court began its analysis by reviewing the application of “the last treatment
rule” in Morgan v Taylor, 434 Mich 180; 451 NW2d 852 (1990), involving a malpractice claim
in connection with a 1981 optometric examination. The plaintiff in Morgan had an examination
less than two years earlier and the Levy Court said, “the issue in Morgan was whether ‘routine,
periodic examinations’ extend the limitation period.” Id., 483. In Morgan, the Court stated that
the “last treatment rule” applied in the context of routine, periodic examinations, holding that:
It is the doctor’s assurance upon completion of the periodic examination that the
patient is in good health which induces the patient to take no further action other
than scheduling the next periodic examination.
Particularly in light of the contractual arrangement which bound defendant
and entitled plaintiff to periodic eye examinations, it cannot be said that the
relationship between plaintiff and defendant terminated after each visit. [Levy,
supra at 483-484 quoting Morgan, supra at 194 (internal footnotes omitted).]
Turning to the facts in its case, the Levy Court adopted as its own, Judge Whitbeck’s dissenting
opinion in Levy that the “last treatment rule” applies in the context of routine and periodic
services such as individual tax preparations. In that opinion as quoted in Levy, Judge Whitbeck
wrote,
A patient who attended a periodic examination and was not diagnosed with any
medical problem was under the rationale of the last treatment rule provided with
an “assurance” of good health that induced the patient to take no further action to
investigate the pertinent health matters until the next periodic examination.
Likewise, a client who entrusts preparation of annual tax returns to an accountant
is provided with an assurance of professional preparation of the tax returns that
induces the client to take no further action regarding those matters until it is time
to prepare the next year’s tax returns. [Levy, supra at 485.]
The “last treatment rule” thus applies in the context of routine and periodic services such
as individual tax preparations. However, none of the services provided by the Loomis
defendants to plaintiffs in September 2003 fall into that category. Instead, they involve separate,
disparate matters wholly distinct from the legal services performed by the Loomis defendants for
-6-
plaintiffs related to the Tall Grass acquisition that was completed on April 7, 2003. For these
reasons the “last treatment rule” is inapplicable and, were we to address plaintiffs’ argument on
this issue, we would conclude that it is without merit.
III
In Docket No. 289438, plaintiffs first argue that the trial court clearly erred in
determining that their defamation claim in their complaint was frivolous. Whether a claim is
frivolous depends on the facts of the case and review of a trial court’s finding of frivolity is for
clear error. Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 661-662; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). MCL 600.2591
provides that costs and fees shall be awarded if a court finds that a party’s claim or defense was
frivolous. Frivolous is defined in MCL 600.2591(3)(a) as one or more of the following:
(i) The party’s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the defense
was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party.
(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that
party’s legal position were in fact true.
(iii) The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit. [MCL
600.2591(3)(a).]
Likewise, MCR 2.114(E) and MCR 2.625(A)(2) mandate an award of costs and fees on a finding
of a frivolous claim. The sanctions may be levied against the attorney, the represented party, or
both. MCR 2.114(E).
Here, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their defamation claim at the beginning of trial
before any proofs went to the jury. In a post-trial motion, defendants Tall Grass, Culbertson,
Lee, and Gately filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to MCL 600.2591 against plaintiffs on
three counts of their seven-count complaint. The trial court denied the motion on the quantum
meruit/unjust enrichment count and the tortious interference with business relationship count, but
granted it with regard to the defamation count. The trial court stated as follows at the November
7, 2008 hearing on the matter:
The defamation issue is different. First of all I didn’t hear anything at all
that would even come close to defamation. It was dismissed before we went to
trial, or actually not before we went to trial but before we started submitting
proofs.
So, I think at best that the petitioners here would be entitled—and I think
because of that meeting the criteria, and based on what the Court recalls the
testimony was during the course of the trial, that there was absolutely nothing that
would support that and never was, and there never was at any time. That there
wasn’t a good basis to proceed on a claim such as that.
I would, since I understand the difficulty in attempting to break down in a
multi-count suit, I’m going to just divide it equally and since there were 5 claims
-7-
against these petitioner[s], award attorney fees on the basis of frivolous claims
under the Statute of one-fifth of the total at the adjusted attorney fee rate.
The trial court then issued an order on November 26, 2008 granting sanctions pursuant to MCL
600.2591 in the amount of $23, 759 against plaintiffs to defendants Tall Grass, Culbertson, Lee,
and Gately.
Plaintiffs present two arguments on appeal in support of their assertion that the trial court
clearly erred when it determined that their defamation claim was frivolous. First, plaintiffs seem
to contend that when the case went to case evaluation, the case evaluators did not find any
portion of plaintiffs’ claims to be frivolous, so the trial court should not have found the
defamation claim to be frivolous. And secondly, plaintiffs seem to be arguing that because the
trial court allowed some portion of their complaint to go to the jury, then the entire case,
including the defamation claim, could not have been frivolous. Though, plaintiffs barely
articulate their arguments well enough for us to understand what they are arguing. And plaintiffs
provide absolutely no support for their arguments. A party may not merely announce his
position and leave it to this Court to unravel and elaborate for him his arguments and search for
authority to support or reject his position. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100
(1998). We decline to address this argument due to plaintiffs’ cursory treatment of the
arguments. Silver Creek Twp v Corso, 246 Mich App 94, 99; 631 NW2d 346 (2001).
However, we do observe that the absence of factual support for plaintiffs’ allegations
support the conclusion that the defamation claim was frivolous pursuant to MCL
600.2591(3)(a)(iii). A suit for defamation must allege:
1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, 2) an unprivileged
communication to a third party, 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the
part of the publisher, and 4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by publication. [Rouch v
Evening News, 440 Mich 238, 251; 487 NW2d 205 (1992).]
And, claims for defamation must be pleaded with specificity. Royal Palace Homes, Inc v
Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc, 197 Mich App 48, 52; 495 NW2d 391 (1992). A plaintiff must allege
and identify specifically which statements he considers to be materially false. Id. at 52-53. With
regard to their defamation claim, plaintiffs’ complaint simply states, “[d]efendants [Lee],
Culbertson, and Gately maliciously defamed the character of Plaintiffs by making untrue
accusations of embezzlement against Plaintiffs to employees of Defendant Eagle and others after
the termination of Plaintiffs’ employment.” The complaint does not identify specific statements,
which defendants specifically made what statements, the content of the statements, and to whom
the statements were directed. It is not enough that a plaintiff allege all the necessary elements.
The complaint must be “well grounded in fact” and filed only after “reasonable inquiry.” MCR
2.114(D)(2). In sum, were we able to review this argument fully, we would conclude that, based
on the record presented, the trial court did not clearly err in finding plaintiffs’ defamation claim
frivolous because it was “devoid of arguable legal merit.” MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(iii).
IV
-8-
Finally, in Docket No. 289438, plaintiffs set forth this question in their statement of
questions presented:
Did the Trial Court err in not allowing Plaintiffs/Appellants an offset of the Eagle
judgment amount of $605,899.39 against the legal fee sanctions claim of
$28,766.80 since the legal fee invoices were submitted to Eagle Transport
Services, Inc.?
With regard to plaintiffs setoff request in the trial court at a hearing on October 3, 2008, the trial
court held as follows:
That’s neither here nor there. He was sued individually. I don’t want to
mince words. Lets not play any games. I understand who everybody is, I heard 2
weeks of trial. I understand that and as far as I’m concerned it’s clear from those
billings, Wardrop and McQueen’s, that they were for this lawsuit and for the
defense and the prosecution of the claims of Culberston, Whitfield Lee and
Gately. The Court makes that determination.
To hold otherwise would be putting a strained interpretation on what was
billed out and for why. Eagle wasn’t even part of the lawsuit at the time that these
billings occurred. So that’s what the Court is holding. If Mr. Boss and Mrs. Boss
disagree with it they certainly can have the Court of Appeals take a second look.
So, you may enter an order that says you’re entitled to the sanctions
provided for as you requested, but the amount at this time is reserved for an
evidentiary hearing as to the appropriateness of attorney fees only.
On the sixth and final page of their brief on appeal, plaintiffs’ entire argument with
regard to this issue is as follows:
The Trial Court clearly erred in failing to recognize the [default] judgment
in the amount of $605,899.39 to offset case evaluation sanctions especially since
the attorney fee invoices which were the basis for sanctions were rendered in [sic]
behalf of Eagle and sent to Eagle.
As can be seen by the dearth of analysis presented and absolutely no citation to authority,
plaintiffs do not provide any factual or legal basis for why the trial court erred when it
disallowed the setoff plaintiffs requested. In any event, we cannot analyze what plaintiffs have
not presented. Again, “[i]t is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a
position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis
for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority
either to sustain or reject his position. The appellant himself must first adequately prime the
pump; only then does the appellate well begin to flow.” Mitcham v City of Detroit, 355 Mich
182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). We do note, however, the general proposition that, “[t]he law
treats a corporation as an entirely separate entity from its shareholders[.]” Rymal v Baergen, 262
Mich App 274, 293; 686 NW2d 241 (2004). On this record, it appears that Eagle Transport was
a separate entity from defendants Tall Grass Investment Corporation, Culbertson, Lee, and
-9-
Gately, and as such, plaintiffs, even had they been able to properly articulate their argument on
this issue, would not have been able to establish error. Id.
Affirmed. Defendants, being the prevailing parties, may tax costs pursuant to MCR
7.219.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Brian K. Zahara
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.