KATHLEEN RYAN V LAMPHERE PUBLIC SCHL SYSTEM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KATHLEEN RYAN, Personal Representative of
the Estate of PATRICK D. RYAN, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 286741
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-081952-NO
LAMPHERE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM,
CYNTHIA J. PENN, JOHN A. NICHOLS, and
AUDREY MARSHALL,1
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the circuit court’s opinion and order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Plaintiff’s decedent, Patrick Ryan (the decedent), was a cognitively impaired 23 or 24year-old male who also suffered from a seizure disorder. The decedent attended school at the
Lamphere Center, a school for 18 to 26-year-old students with physical and cognitive disabilities
from throughout Oakland County. Lamphere Center is located at Paige Middle School in the
Lamphere Public School System. Despite his disabilities, the decedent engaged in sporting
activities, including swimming, and participated in the Special Olympics. The decedent’s
Special Olympics practice sessions took place at the Paige Middle School swimming pool.
During a Special Olympics practice session on April 15, 2005, the decedent drowned in the
swimming pool.
1
Defendant Marshall’s name is spelled as “Audrie Marshal” on this Court’s docket sheet and
variously as “Audrie Marshal” and “Audrey Marshal” on other papers contained in the lower
court file. However, she testified at her deposition that the correct spelling of her name is
“Audrey Marshall.”
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Defendant John Nichols was a substitute teacher at the Lamphere Center at the time of
the decedent’s death. Nichols had originally been hired as a paraprofessional and had begun
“helping out with Special Olympics” at that time. Later, in approximately 2002, Nichols became
a substitute teacher at the Lamphere Center and took on the role of a full-time coach for the
Special Olympics. Nichols testified that the Special Olympics practice sessions were typically
held three days a week at about 11:00 a.m. “because [the Special Olympics] had to work around”
the class schedule at Paige Middle School.
Defendant Cynthia Penn was employed as a paraprofessional at the Lamphere Center at
the time of the decedent’s drowning. When Penn first began working at the Lamphere Center,
she volunteered to help with the Special Olympics basketball program. However, after being
employed at the Lamphere Center for about a year or two, Penn began working with the Special
Olympics swimming program. For most of the school day, Penn was assigned to a classroom
with a teacher, two other paraprofessionals, and approximately 15 students. But she assisted
with Special Olympics swimming practice at 11:00 a.m. about three days a week.
Defendant Audrey Marshall was a student at Lamphere High School at the time of the
decedent’s death. Marshall was on the Lamphere High School swimming team and was a
certified lifeguard. She had been certified as a lifeguard through the American Red Cross in
approximately 2003. Sometime in 2004, Cynthia Penn approached Marshall and another
Lamphere High School student and asked them whether they would be interested in volunteering
as lifeguards during the Special Olympics swimming practice sessions. Marshall and the other
student agreed, and began volunteering as lifeguards during the Special Olympics practice
sessions approximately two or three times per week. Marshall was not paid for the time she
spent lifeguarding at the Special Olympics practice sessions.
Penn, Nichols, and Marshall were present at a Special Olympics swimming practice
session on April 15, 2005. Nichols and Penn testified that there were 12 students in the
swimming pool that day, including the decedent. According to Nichols, the practice session
began as usual, with the students warming up by swimming laps. After everyone had finished
warming up and swimming laps, Nichols went to work with some students in the deep end of the
pool, while Penn went to work with some other students on the side of the shallow end of the
pool. Penn testified that she spoke to the decedent, who was swimming in the shallow end,
concerning some relay races in which he was going to participate. After speaking with the
decedent, Penn stepped away from the area where the decedent was swimming and “took a step
to the side just to talk with the next relay team.” Penn never saw the decedent leave the shallow
end, which is where he remained throughout. At that time, Marshall was scanning the pool as
she had been taught to do. She then bent down to help one of the students re-buckle his
floatation device, which had become undone.
Penn testified that it had only been “a few seconds” since she had last spoken to the
decedent when she again looked in his direction. It appeared to Penn that the decedent was
standing on the bottom of the shallow end with his face submerged in the water. Penn did not
initially believe that anything was wrong, but because the decedent was standing in the middle of
one of the relay lanes, she called out, “Patrick, you need to move.” Penn also asked another
student swimming near the decedent to tap him on the head and get his attention. However, the
decedent did not respond to Penn’s call or to the tap. At that time, Penn jumped into the water
and turned the decedent over. The decedent did not respond at all. According to Penn, when she
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jumped into the water, Nichols was still in the deep end of the pool and Marshall was still on the
side of the pool with another student.
Marshall testified that after she finished helping the student with his floatation device and
stood back up, she noticed that Penn had jumped into the pool. She looked toward the shallow
end and saw the decedent face down. Marshall went to the shallow end at that time. Nichols
testified that he noticed Penn jumping into the pool and knew that something was wrong. He got
to the shallow end quickly, and was there by the time Penn was turning the decedent over.
Nichols lifted the decedent out of the water. Marshall testified that it took only seconds for
Nichols to reach the shallow end and to remove the decedent from the water. Nichols and
Marshall began to perform CPR while Penn called 911 from a nearby telephone. Marshall
estimated that it had been only “15 seconds, maybe 25 seconds,” from the time Penn jumped into
the shallow end until the time CPR was commenced. According to the police report filed in this
matter, “Penn and Nichols stated they had turned away from the victim for 1 to 2 min[utes] and
when they turned back to him [he] was floating face down in the water.”
According to the relevant deposition testimony, Nichols cleared the decedent’s airway
and Marshall checked for a pulse. Nichols performed rescue breathing while Marshall
performed chest compressions. Nichols testified that the decedent vomited, that he again cleared
the decedent’s airway, and that he continued to perform rescue breathing. Nichols testified that
he and Marshall continued performing CPR even after the paramedics arrived, because the
paramedics “had asked us to continue while they were setting up.” Nichols could not remember
how long it took for the paramedics to arrive on the scene after Penn called 911. Nichols
confirmed that he had never seen the decedent panicking or thrashing about in the water, and that
no one had even known that anything was wrong until Penn jumped into the shallow end of the
pool. Nichols recalled that this had occurred at about 11:15 a.m.
The decedent was transported to the hospital, where he was placed on life support.
Doctors were able to restart the decedent’s heart, but he never recovered his brain function. He
later died. Oakland County Medical Examiner Dr. Ljubisa Dragovic performed an autopsy on
the decedent on April 17, 2005. Dr. Dragovic determined that the cause of death was “anoxic
encephalopathy due to near drowning.” Dragovic explained that the death resulted from
“deprivation of adequate oxygen supply because of the occasion of near drowning . . . .”
Dragovic opined that “[i]ndividuals who are unconscious drown very quickly,” and that in the
case of an unconscious victim, “drowning can actually be accomplished [in] a minimum of 30
seconds.” Dragovic noted, “[O]f course, if the resuscitative measures are initiated immediately,
there may be artificial [prolongation] of life . . . without brain as it happened in this case.”
Dragovic explained that the decedent had likely suffered a seizure, become unconscious or semiunconscious, and quickly drowned.
Kathleen Martin, the retired Director of Special Services for the Lamphere Public
Schools, testified that she was the supervisor of the Lamphere Center at the time of the
decedent’s death in 2005. Martin confirmed that although the Lamphere Center is part of the
Lamphere Public School System, it serves multiple school districts in Oakland County by
providing special services for students with disabilities from those districts. Martin testified that
the Special Olympics Coordinator is an employee of the Lamphere Public Schools and works
closely with the Lamphere Public Schools Athletic Department to schedule the use of school
facilities and the various Special Olympics practice times. Martin believed that the Special
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Olympics Coordinator, in conjunction with the Athletic Department, was also responsible for
scheduling lifeguarding times for Marshall and other student lifeguards. Martin stated that
“Special Olympics and the Athletic Department working together” typically handled such
scheduling responsibilities
Martin confirmed that both Nichols and Penn were Lamphere Public Schools employees
who spent part of their time on certain days coaching the Special Olympics. Martin did not
specify whether Nichols and Penn were paid for their time coaching the Special Olympics, but
did confirm that Nichols’s and Penn’s Special Olympics coaching occurred on school premises
during normal school hours. Martin testified that the Special Olympics practice sessions were
“not operated in the same way” as typical Athletic Department activities, and noted that the
Special Olympics practice sessions were “extracurricular” and “voluntary.” She confirmed that
the Lamphere Public School System “doesn’t run the Special Olympics,” and testified that the
school district controls the Special Olympics “[o]nly to the extent that it’s done during school
hours” and to the extent that the school district “provide[s] the facility for the kids to participate
in . . . .” Of note, although Martin did agree with counsel’s suggestion that the Special Olympics
“was part of the special services that [the decedent] received from Lamphere Center,” she
thereafter agreed with opposing counsel that the Special Olympics was “not part of the
curriculum of the school . . . .”
In April 2007, plaintiff sued defendant Lamphere Public School System, as well as
individual defendants Penn, Nichols, and Marshall. Plaintiff’s complaint set forth only one
count, against all four defendants, entitled “Gross Negligence.” Plaintiff listed several ways in
which defendants were allegedly grossly negligent. Among other things, plaintiff alleged that
the Lamphere Public School System was grossly negligent for failing to have adequate
safeguards in place at the swimming pool to prevent drowning, for failing to have adequate staff
present, for failing to have proper rescue equipment at the pool, for failing to train and hire
enough lifeguards, and for failing to implement a pool supervision plan for swimmers with
special needs. Among other things, plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants were grossly
negligent for failing to timely recognize that the decedent was drowning and in need of help, for
failing to properly watch and supervise the decedent while he was in the water, for failing to
timely remove the decedent from the pool, for allowing the decedent to submerge his face below
the water of the shallow end, for failing to timely administer CPR and other lifesaving methods,
and for failing to follow standard protocol for the prevention of drowning.
Plaintiff retained drowning expert Dr. Jerome Modell, and submitted a report that he
prepared for use in this case. Modell disputed Dragovic’s conclusion that the decedent could
have drowned in as little as 30 seconds. Contrary to the testimony of Penn and Nichols, Modell
believed that the decedent had been under water for much more than “seconds.” He opined that
if the decedent “had been retrieved and resuscitated, as necessary, within 1 ½ to 2 minutes of the
onset of submersion, he would have survived without aspiration and, if rescue and resuscitation
occurred within 3 minutes of the onset of submersion, even though he would have aspirated and
required follow-up care, within reasonable medical probability, he also would have survived.”
Modell concluded that the time taken to realize that the decedent was drowning, to remove him
from the pool, and to begin CPR and rescue breathing must have been much longer than the time
period the witnesses had reported.
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Defendants moved for summary disposition. Without holding oral argument,2 the circuit
court granted summary disposition in favor of all four defendants on the basis of governmental
immunity. The circuit court ruled that the Lamphere Public School System had been engaged in
the exercise of a governmental function and was therefore entitled to governmental immunity
pursuant to MCL 691.1407(1). With respect to the individual defendants, the circuit court ruled
that Penn, Nichols, and Marshall were either governmental employees or volunteers acting
within their authority, see MCL 691.1407(2)(a), that the school district had been engaged in the
exercise of a governmental function at the time, see MCL 691.1407(2)(b), and that it was beyond
genuine factual dispute that Penn, Nichols, and Marshall had not been grossly negligent, see
MCL 691.1407(2)(c). The court noted that even if the three individual defendants were
somehow negligent, evidence of ordinary negligence does not create a genuine issue of material
fact concerning gross negligence. See Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 122-123; 597 NW2d
817 (1999).
II
Summary disposition is properly granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) when, among
other things, a claim is barred by governmental immunity. We review de novo the circuit court’s
grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Tarlea v Crabtree, 263 Mich App
80, 87; 687 NW2d 333 (2004). Similarly, “[t]he applicability of governmental immunity is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal.” Herman v Detroit, 261 Mich App 141, 143;
680 NW2d 71 (2004). In reviewing a C(7) motion, we consider the affidavits, depositions,
admissions, and other documentary evidence to determine whether the defendant is in fact
entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Tarlea, 263 Mich App at 87. We view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and make all legitimate inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party as well. Jackson v Saginaw Co, 458 Mich 141, 142; 580 NW2d 870 (1998).
Whether an activity of a governmental agency constitutes a “governmental function”
within the meaning of MCL 691.1407 is a question of law. Ovist v Dep’t of Highways, 119 Mich
App 245, 250; 326 NW2d 468 (1982). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Cowles v Bank
West, 476 Mich 1, 13; 719 NW2d 94 (2006). Whether an individual defendant was acting as a
governmental employee or governmental volunteer within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(2), or
as an agent for a private nongovernmental entity, are generally questions of fact for the jury.
Vargo v Sauer, 457 Mich 49, 71-72; 576 NW2d 656 (1998); Rakowski v Sarb, 269 Mich App
619, 626; 713 NW2d 787 (2006).3
2
The circuit court is specifically authorized to dispense with oral argument, MCL 2.119(E)(3),
especially when the court has been “fully apprised of the parties’ positions, by way of the
parties’ briefs, before rendering a decision,” Fast Air, Inc v Knight, 235 Mich App 541, 550; 599
NW2d 489 (1999). Such was the case here.
3
We acknowledge that in Rakowski, 269 Mich App at 626, this Court held that there was no
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the individual defendant at issue was a
governmental employee within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(2). However, by so holding, the
Rakowski Court implicitly recognized that questions concerning an individual defendant’s status
(continued…)
-5-
III
The government tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., “broadly shields a
governmental agency from tort liability ‘if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or
discharge of a governmental function.’” Grimes v Dep’t of Transportation, 475 Mich 72, 76-77;
715 NW2d 275 (2006), quoting MCL 691.1407(1). A public school district, such as defendant
Lamphere Public School System, unambiguously qualifies as a “governmental agency” within
the meaning of the GTLA. MCL 691.1401(b) and (d). Therefore, the relevant question for
decision is whether defendant Lamphere Public School System was engaged in “the exercise or
discharge of a governmental function” at the time of the decedent’s death. If it was, then it is
immune from any potential tort liability arising out of the decedent’s drowning. MCL
691.1407(1). Throughout our analysis, we must remain mindful that “the immunity conferred
upon governmental agencies is broad, and the statutory exceptions thereto are to be narrowly
construed.” Nawrocki v Macomb Co Road Comm, 463 Mich 143, 158; 615 NW2d 702 (2000)
(emphasis in original).
The GTLA defines “[g]overnmental function” as “an activity that is expressly or
impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other
law.” MCL 691.1401(f). “To determine whether a governmental agency is engaged in a
governmental function, the focus must be on the general activity, not the specific conduct
involved at the time of the tort.” Pardon v Finkel, 213 Mich App 643, 649; 540 NW2d 774
(1995). In the context of drowning deaths, for example, our Supreme Court has observed that
because counties and townships are authorized by statute to maintain and operate public parks
and recreational areas, the operation of a public swimming facility by a county and township
constituted a “governmental function,” and the governmental entities were therefore entitled to
immunity from tort liability when the plaintiff’s decedent drowned there. Richardson v Jackson
Co, 432 Mich 377, 381-383; 443 NW2d 105 (1989). Likewise, this Court has determined that
because the Department of Natural Resources was authorized by statute to operate a public
recreation area and swimming beach, such an activity was a governmental function that entitled
the department to tort immunity when the plaintiff’s decedent drowned at the beach. Jenkinson v
Dep’t of Natural Resources, 159 Mich App 376, 379; 406 NW2d 302 (1987). This Court has
similarly held that because the Department of Social Services was statutorily obligated to
provide “an effective program of out-of-home care for delinquent or neglected children,” the
department’s operation of an off-premises swimming outing for such children at Lake Michigan
constituted a governmental function, entitling the department to immunity from tort liability
when one of the children drowned in the lake. Willis v Nienow, 113 Mich App 30, 37; 317
NW2d 273 (1982).
Turning to the present case, the parties agree that the operation of a public school in
general, as well as the implementation and execution of a public school’s curriculum, are
governmental functions within the meaning of the GTLA. This much is beyond dispute.
Stringwell v Ann Arbor Pub School Dist, 262 Mich App 709, 712; 686 NW2d 825 (2004); Davis,
138 Mich App at 155; Brosnan v Livonia Pub Schools, 123 Mich App 377, 381; 333 NW2d 288
(1983); Deaner v Utica Community School Dist, 99 Mich App 103, 108; 297 NW2d 625 (1980).
(…continued)
under MCL 691.1407(2) are for the jury when reasonable minds could differ.
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Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that the loaning out of a public school’s swimming facilities to a
private entity, such as the Special Olympics here, goes beyond the normal operation of a public
school district. Plaintiff further contends that the Special Olympics practice sessions held on the
premises of defendant Lamphere Public School System were not part of the school’s curriculum,
and were therefore not sufficiently related to the educational mission of the school to rise to the
level of a governmental function. Defendants respond by arguing that the Special Olympics
swimming practice sessions were part of the regular curriculum at the Lamphere Center.
Accordingly, defendants maintain that the school district’s act of loaning out the swimming pool
and permitting its use for Special Olympics practice sessions qualified as a “governmental
function” within the meaning of MCL 691.1407.
Contrary to defense counsel’s misleading representations at oral argument before this
Court, it is beyond factual dispute that the Special Olympics swimming practice sessions in
which the decedent participated were not part of the regular curriculum of the Lamphere Center
or the Lamphere Public Schools, and were not akin to a regular physical education program
required by state statute. Indeed, Kathleen Martin specifically testified that the practice sessions
were not a component of the school’s curriculum. Defense counsel’s assertion that the
swimming practice sessions were held in conjunction with regular physical education classes is
entirely disproved by the record evidence in this case. The uncontroverted evidence establishes
that although the Special Olympics practice sessions were held on school premises and during
school hours, they did not constitute a regular class offering for students at the Lamphere Center.
And although Nichols and Penn were employees of defendant Lamphere Public School System,
coaching the Special Olympics practice sessions was not one of their regular classroom
assignments. Instead, the evidence indicates that Nichols and Penn undertook these coaching
activities in addition to their normal classroom responsibilities at the Lamphere Center. We
acknowledge that Nichols and Penn supervised the swimming practice sessions during their
normal workdays, and were therefore essentially paid a portion of their normal salaries for their
time spent coaching the Special Olympics. But in spite of defense counsel’s protestations to the
contrary, this fact did not somehow transform the Special Olympics practice sessions into a
“special education program [of] Lamphere Public Schools,” “simply a swimming class,” “a
school practice . . . provided to . . . the special education students,” or “a swim class which is part
of [the] sports or physical education requirements of the special education program.” Nor were
the Special Olympics practice sessions one of “the special services that [the Lamphere Public
Schools] were paid for by the state to provide to [the decedent]” as defense counsel argued.
There is simply no evidence in the record to substantiate any of these representations by defense
counsel. Indeed, after making these assertions and being further questioned by this Court,
defense counsel finally admitted that the Special Olympics swimming practice sessions were
“not affiliated with the school” and were “not a part of our [physical education] requirement.”
We remind defense counsel that attorneys have a duty of candor toward the tribunal, MRPC 3.3,
and that this Court may, on its own initiative, sanction a party or take other disciplinary action
upon a determination that an “argument . . . was grossly lacking in the requirements of
propriety . . . or grossly disregarded the requirements of a fair presentation of the issues to the
court,” MCR 7.216(C)(1)(b).
However, even though the Special Olympics swimming practice sessions were not part of
the school’s regular curriculum, we must nonetheless conclude that defendant Lamphere Public
School System was engaged in the exercise of a governmental function when it loaned out its
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facilities to the Special Olympics and allowed their use for swimming practice sessions. It is
true, as plaintiff asserts, that an activity does not rise to the level of a “governmental function”
merely because it occurs on school time and on school premises. See Galli v Kirkeby, 398 Mich
527, 537-538; 248 NW2d 149 (1976) (opinion of WILLIAMS, J.). But our courts have uniformly
held that when a school district engages in an activity that is expressly or impliedly authorized by
the Revised School Code, MCL 480.1 et seq., the district is engaged in the exercise of a
“governmental function” for purposes of governmental immunity. See, e.g., Ross v Consumers
Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 649-650; 363 NW2d 641 (1984) (holding that because
the Revised School Code authorizes a school district to provide building trades classes, and to
instruct, warn, and supervise its students during such classes, the offering of a building trades
class constituted a “governmental function” and the defendant school district was immune from
tort liability for injuries that occurred during the class); Jones v Williams, 172 Mich App 167,
173; 431 NW2d 419 (1988) (observing that the alleged transfer of a high school student from
special education classes to regular classes so that the defendant school district could exploit his
athletic talent was a function authorized by the constitution and the Revised School Code, and
was therefore a “governmental function” entitling the district to immunity from tort liability);
Eichhorn v Lamphere School Dist, 166 Mich App 527, 538; 421 NW2d 230 (1988) (holding that
the Revised School Code impliedly authorized the defendant school district to sponsor a
homecoming parade, and that the district was therefore immune from liability with respect to any
negligence claims arising out of the parade); Willoughby v Lehrbass, 150 Mich App 319, 347;
388 NW2d 688 (1986) (observing that because the Revised School Code specifically authorizes
school districts to hire and contract with teachers, the defendant school district’s act of hiring a
teacher and continuing his employment was a governmental function entitling it to immunity
from negligent hiring and supervision claims); Davis v Homestead Farms, Inc, 138 Mich App
152, 154-155; 359 NW2d 1 (1984) (observing that because the Revised School Code formerly
required school districts to teach their pupils about the humane treatment of animals, the
defendant school district “was fulfilling [a] curriculum requirement by taking kindergartners on
[a] field trip to [a] farm,” and was consequently immune from liability when one of the
kindergarteners was bitten by a horse during the trip); Weaver v Duff Norton Co, 115 Mich App
286, 292-293; 320 NW2d 248 (1982) (holding that the operation of the defendant school
district’s vocational education program, which was specifically authorized by the Revised School
Code, was a governmental function giving rise to immunity from negligence claims); Cobb v
Fox, 113 Mich App 249, 256-257; 317 NW2d 583 (1982) (holding that because the Revised
School Code authorizes school districts to provide transportation for pupils and regulates the
issue of bussing, “the maintenance and operation of a school bus system by a school district
constitutes an immune governmental function”); Smith v Mimnaugh, 105 Mich App 209, 212;
306 NW2d 454 (1981) (observing that because the Revised School Code authorizes a school
district to acquire or construct pedestrian overpasses for the safe conduct of pupils to and from
school, the defendant school district’s decision not to provide an overhead walkway was a
governmental function and the district was entitled to immunity from the plaintiff’s negligence
claims).4
4
Although some of these cases were decided before the enactment of MCL 691.1401(f) by way
of 1986 PA 175, the pre-1986 definition of “governmental function” was substantially similar to
(continued…)
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With respect to the matter at issue in the present case, the Revised School Code
specifically authorizes a public school district to convey, maintain, or dispose of school district
property, facilities, and equipment. MCL 380.11a(3)(c). The Revised School Code further
explicitly authorizes a school district to exercise any “power implied or incident to a power
expressly stated in this act . . . .” MCL 380.11a(3). We believe that the loaning out of school
district athletic facilities to a private nonprofit organization such as the Special Olympics is fairly
encompassed within this power to convey, maintain, or dispose of school district property,
facilities, and equipment. Providing further support for our conclusion is MCL 380.11a(3)(a),
which states that in addition to educating pupils in grades K-12, a school district is authorized to
sponsor or operate “lifelong education, adult education, community education, training,
enrichment, and recreation programs for other persons.” (Emphasis added.) It cannot be denied
that by making available its facilities and staff members for Special Olympics swimming
practice sessions, defendant Lamphere Public School System was acting within the scope of its
broad power to sponsor or operate “recreation programs for other persons.” MCL 380.11a(3)(a).
By loaning its athletic facilities to the Special Olympics and by making available its staff
members to supervise the Special Olympics swimming practice sessions, defendant Lamphere
Public School System was acting within the scope of its broad powers under the Revised School
Code and was accordingly engaged in the exercise of a governmental function. MCL
691.1401(f); Eichhorn, 166 Mich App at 538. As a consequence, defendant Lamphere Public
School System is immune from liability as a matter of law with respect to any negligence claims
arising out of the Special Olympics swimming practice sessions. MCL 691.1407(1). The circuit
court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of defendant Lamphere Public School
System. MCR 2.116(C)(7).
IV
We now consider the potential liability of individual defendants Penn, Nichols, and
Marshall. Under the GTLA, an “employee of a governmental agency” or a “volunteer acting on
behalf of a governmental agency” is immune from tort liability (1) if he or she was “acting or
reasonably believe[d] he or she [wa]s acting within the scope of his or her authority,” (2) if “[t]he
governmental agency [wa]s engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function,”
and (3) if his or her conduct “does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of
the injury or damage.” MCL 691.1407(2)(a), (b), and (c). As noted previously, the circuit court
concluded that Penn, Nichols, and Marshall were either governmental employees or
governmental volunteers acting within their authority, see MCL 691.1407(2)(a), that the school
district was engaged in the exercise of a governmental function at the time of the decedent’s
death, see MCL 691.1407(2)(b),5 and that it was beyond genuine factual dispute that Penn,
Nichols, and Marshall had not been grossly negligent, see MCL 691.1407(2)(c).
(…continued)
the definition ultimately adopted by the Legislature. See Ross, 420 Mich at 620. By adopting
MCL 691.1401(f), the Legislature adopted and “put its imprimatur on” the existing common-law
definition of “governmental function” that had been developed by our courts. See Reardon v
Dep’t of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 412; 424 NW2d 248 (1988).
5
For the reasons stated above in Part III, we agree with the circuit court that defendant Lamphere
(continued…)
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However, in reaching these conclusions, the circuit court overlooked a critical step in the
inquiry. Before proceeding to consider whether a purported governmental employee or
governmental volunteer is immune from tort liability under the GTLA, it is first necessary to
determine whether the person is, in fact, an “employee of a governmental agency” or a
“volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental agency” within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(2).
Indeed, as our Supreme Court has specifically observed, MCL 691.1407(2) “mandates an
examination of the . . . status of the individual seeking immunity.” Vargo, 457 Mich at 67-68
(emphasis in original). This step in the inquiry is particularly important because if an individual
defendant is found not to be a governmental “employee” or “volunteer” within the meaning of
the GTLA, or if the individual defendant is found to have been simultaneously serving both a
governmental agency and a private entity, the governmental immunity conferred by MCL
691.1407(2) does not apply to that individual, and he or she may be held liable for mere ordinary
negligence. See Vargo, 457 Mich at 71.
In the present case, the circuit court wholly failed to undertake such an examination of
the individual defendants’ status. The court merely concluded without explanation that Penn,
Nichols, and Marshall qualified for immunity under MCL 691.1407(2), never addressing
whether they were actually governmental “employee[s]” or “volunteer[s]” within the meaning of
the statute, or alternatively, whether they were simultaneously serving both a governmental
agency and a private entity. This was erroneous. Whether an individual qualifies as an
“employee of a governmental agency” or a “volunteer acting on behalf of a governmental
agency” within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(2) is generally a question of fact for the jury,
Rakowski, 269 Mich App at 626, and must typically be determined through reference to
common-law agency principles, Vargo, 457 Mich at 69-71; see also Ross, 420 Mich at 624 n 38.6
(…continued)
Public School System was “engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function”
with respect to the activities giving rise to the decedent’s death. MCL 691.1407(2)(b).
6
In Ross, which was decided before the enactment of MCL 691.1407(2), our Supreme Court
specifically stated that matters such as an individual tortfeasor’s status as a governmental
employee, governmental agent, or governmental volunteer should “generally be determined with
reference to common-law tort and agency principles.” Ross, 420 Mich at 567 n 38. After the
enactment of MCL 691.1407(2), our Supreme Court again suggested that the common law of
agency should govern inquiries concerning an individual defendant’s status as a governmental
employee, governmental agent, or governmental volunteer under the GTLA. Vargo, 457 Mich
at 69-71. It is true that at least one panel of this Court, in Rakowski, 269 Mich App at 624-626,
omitted any mention of the common law of agency in considering whether an individual
defendant was a governmental employee for purposes of the GTLA. The Rakowski panel
focused instead on the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “employee” in MCL
691.1407(2). Rakowski, 269 Mich App at 626. But we do not believe that this plain meaning
approach taken in Rakowski in any way conflicts with the dictates of Ross and Vargo. Surely,
many of the longstanding common-law principles of agency are encompassed within most
dictionary definitions of the word “employee.” See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed)
(incorporating elements of the common-law control test into the definition of “employee”). We
do doubt the appropriateness of the “economic-realities test,” which was used by the circuit
court to determine the individual defendant’s employment status in Rakowski. This is because
(continued…)
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Moreover, whether an individual defendant was simultaneously serving both a governmental
agency and a nongovernmental entity is generally a question of fact for the jury. Vargo, 457
Mich at 71.
In Vargo, our Supreme Court considered whether the defendant physician was immune
from liability on the plaintiff’s claim. The defendant physician was employed as a professor of
human medicine at Michigan State University, but also consulted and treated patients at a private
hospital with which Michigan State University was affiliated. Vargo, 457 Mich at 53-54. After
the plaintiff’s decedent died during childbirth at the private hospital, the plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant physician, alleging medical malpractice. Id. at 54. Our Supreme Court
determined that Michigan State University qualified as a governmental agency for purposes of
the GTLA and that the defendant physician was performing a governmental function at the time
of the alleged malpractice. Id. at 66-67. However, the Court was troubled by the fact that the
defendant physician had been working for both Michigan State University and the private
hospital at the same time. Indeed, the Vargo Court noted that “it is axiomatic that an individual
may serve two masters simultaneously,” and observed that “the definition of ‘governmental
agency’ [in MCL 691.1407(2)] does not include, or remotely contemplate, joint ventures,
partnerships, arrangements between governmental agencies and private entities, or any other
combined state-private endeavors.” Id. at 68. After reviewing the record evidence that had been
presented in the court below, our Supreme Court concluded that there remained a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to whether the defendant physician had an agency relationship with
the private hospital, a nongovernmental entity. The Court made clear that “there is no indication
that the [GTLA], when read in conjunction with its definitional sources, even remotely
contemplates a grant of immunity for agents who are simultaneously serving a private entity.”
Id. at 71.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Nichols and Penn were employees of defendant
Lamphere Public School System and that they supervised the Special Olympics swimming
practice sessions on school property during normal school hours. Similarly, it is clear from the
record that Marshall was a volunteer lifeguard for defendant Lamphere Public School System.
But as in the case of the defendant physician in Vargo, there existed genuine issues of material
fact concerning whether Penn, Nichols, and Marshall were simultaneously serving as agents of
the Special Olympics—a private entity—at the time of the decedent’s drowning. As noted
earlier, the GTLA does not “even remotely” contemplate “immunity for agents who are
simultaneously serving a private entity,” id. at 71, and such dual agents are therefore not entitled
to governmental immunity from tort liability pursuant to MCL 691.1407(2).
Because there remained genuine issues of fact with respect to the status of individual
defendants Penn, Nichols, and Marshall at the time of the decedent’s death, we must reverse the
grant of summary disposition in favor of the individual defendants and remand this matter to the
(…continued)
the economic-realities test is not based on the common law of agency, see Dole v Elliott Travel
& Tours, Inc, 942 F2d 962, 965 (CA 6, 1991), and its use to determine an individual defendant’s
status under MCL 691.1407(2) would therefore seem to undermine our Supreme Court’s
directives in Ross and Vargo. However, we need not definitively decide this matter for purposes
of the present appeal.
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circuit court for further proceedings with respect to their potential liability. We do not pass
judgment on the likely outcome of the proceedings on remand. We do note, however, that
although Penn, Nichols, and Marshall were apparently not paid for their services to the Special
Olympics, this does not mean that they could not have been serving as agents of that
organization. See 1 Restatement Agency, 3d, § 1.04, comment c, p 72.
V
We affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant
Lamphere Public School System. We reverse the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in
favor of individual defendants Penn, Nichols, and Marshall, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion concerning their potential liability.
In light of our conclusions, we need not consider whether individual defendants Penn,
Nichols, and Marshall were grossly negligent.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs under MCR 7.219, a public
question having been involved.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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