IN RE ADRIENNE GIERMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Adrienne Gierman
YVONNE WILCOX,
UNPUBLISHED
March 11, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 288264
Ionia Probate Court
LC No. 06-000215-GA
JACQUELINE HOLM, Conservator,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J. and Whitbeck and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right orders of the probate court denying plaintiff’s petition to
terminate or modify defendant’s conservatorship of Adrienne Gierman, and allowing defendant’s
first annual account of Gierman’s estate. We affirm.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to continue as conservator,
determining that plaintiff was not an interested person with the authority to contest the account,
and allowing the account. Appeals from a probate court decision are on the record, not de novo.
In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App 122, 128; 748 NW 2d 265 (2008). The factual
findings of the probate court are reviewed for clear error, while the court’s dispositional rulings
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous
when there is no supporting evidence for the findings or the reviewing court is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Hill v Warren, 276 Mich App 299, 308; 740
NW2d 706 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision results in an outcome falling
outside the range of principled outcomes. Woods v SLB Prop Mgt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622,
625; 750 NW2d 228 (2008).
Adrienne Gierman moved from Florida to Michigan in April 2004 to reside with her
daughter, defendant. Gierman had been having difficulty at her work as a nurse in Florida as a
result of cognitive impairment, and also apparently wished to aid defendant with caring for her
children. Gierman attempted to work in Michigan, but was granted disability in September
2004. Gierman granted defendant power of attorney in October 2005, and defendant was then
granted guardianship and conservatorship over her mother in October 2006 due to the
increasingly debilitating symptoms of Gierman’s Alzheimer’s disease. Gierman was moved to a
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care facility around February 2007. Gierman’s sister, plaintiff, was residing in Florida and
became concerned with defendant’s decisions regarding Gierman’s health care and finances.
Plaintiff filed a petition seeking to remove defendant as guardian and conservator of Gierman,
and attempted to object to defendant’s first annual accounting of Gierman’s estate.
The Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., governs this
dispute because these proceedings were commenced after EPIC’s effective date of April 1, 2000,
and no accrued rights will be impaired by its application. In re Duane v Baldwin Trust, 274
Mich App 387, 391 n 2; 733 NW2d 419 (2007). By statute, the probate court has exclusive
subject-matter jurisdiction over “a proceeding that concerns a guardianship, conservatorship, or
protective proceeding.” MCL 700.1302(c). The court may appoint a conservator if an individual
is unable to manage property and business affairs effectively for reasons including mental illness
or deficiency, as is the case here. MCL 700.5401(3). A person “interested in the welfare of an
individual for whom a conservator is appointed” may file a petition to remove a conservator and
appoint a successor conservator. MCL 700.5415(1)(d). After a hearing establishing good cause,
the court may remove a conservator and may appoint a successor conservator. MCL 700.5414.
Plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in denying her petition because
defendant was indifferent to Gierman’s interests and engaged in “self-dealing” with regard to the
funds from Gierman’s accounts. There was testimony that defendant used Gierman’s funds to
pay $1,193 in gas and electric bills at defendant’s home, where Gierman was residing, from
November 2006 through January 2007, and to pay a moving company $1,582 of the $4,655 total
cost when defendant moved to a new location in April 2007. The court noted that Gierman’s
personal property was valued at only $200 in the initial inventory. Defendant also paid her
husband $6,350 for five months of “in-home care” of Gierman before she was moved to a
facility.
Plaintiff also protests alleged deficiencies in defendant’s accounting.1 Plaintiff noted
that, according to bank records, Gierman’s condominium was sold in January 2006 and $58,228
deposited in Gierman’s account, but only $2,817 remained in the account when defendant filed
an initial inventory as conservator. However, these transactions took place before defendant was
appointed as conservator, and the court considered them irrelevant to its consideration of the
petition. Plaintiff also noted that the accounting shows the questioned expenses for moving,
utilities, and in-home care, as well as $1,090 in unexplained miscellaneous expenses and $1,616
in checks that defendant was researching because she did not recall writing them.
A conservator must keep suitable records of the estate administration and exhibit those
records on the request of an interested person. MCL 700.5417(2). A conservator is a fiduciary
of an estate, subject to the same obligations and standards of care as a trustee. MCL
1
The court found that defendant had not filed the annual accounting that was due in October
2007 until April 2008, and then it was sent back for amendment because the initial balance of the
accounting did not match the value of the initial inventory. During an August 5, 2008 hearing,
the court found that a first amended accounting was received and sent to defendant’s siblings, but
not to Gierman’s appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) or plaintiff.
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700.1104(e); MCL 700.5416.
fiduciary as such:
MCL 700.1212(1) describes the duties and obligations of a
A fiduciary stands in a position of confidence and trust with respect to
each heir, devisee, beneficiary, protected individual, or ward for whom the person
is a fiduciary. A fiduciary shall observe the standard of care described in section
7302 and shall discharge all of the duties and obligations of a confidential and
fiduciary relationship, including the duties of undivided loyalty; impartiality
between heirs, devisees, and beneficiaries; care and prudence in actions; and
segregation of assets held in the fiduciary capacity. With respect to investments,
a fiduciary shall conform to the Michigan prudent investor rule.[2]
There is a breach of fiduciary duty when a position of influence has been acquired and abused, or
when confidence has been reposed and betrayed. Baldwin Trust, 274 Mich App at 401.
Courts will strictly enforce a trustee’s duty to keep and render a full and accurate
accounting of his trusteeship. In re Goldman Estate, 236 Mich App 517, 523; 601 NW2d 126
(1999). Here, the first annual accounting was submitted six months late, and was amended three
months later. MCR 5.409(C)(1) and (5) state that conservators must file an annual accounting
with a copy of corresponding financial institution statements or a verification of funds on
deposit. Additionally, MCR 5.310(C)(2)(c) requires that the content of the accounting include
the following:
All accountings must be itemized, showing in detail receipts and
disbursements during the accounting period, unless itemization is waived by all
interested persons. A written description of services performed must be included
or appended regarding compensation sought by a personal representative. This
description need not be duplicated in the order. The accounting must include
notice that (i) objections concerning the accounting must be brought to the court’s
attention by an interested person because the court does not normally review the
accounting without an objection; (ii) interested persons have a right to review
proofs of income and disbursements at a time reasonably convenient to the
personal representative and the interested person; (iii) interested persons may
object to all or part of an accounting by filing an objection with the court before
allowance of the accounting; and (iv) if an objection is filed and not otherwise
resolved, the court will hear and determine the objection.
2
MCL 700.7302 states:
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee shall act
as would a prudent person in dealing with the property of another, including
following the standards of the Michigan prudent investor rule. If the trustee has
special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representation of special skills or
expertise, the trustee is under a duty to use those skills.
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MCR 5.310(C)(2)(d) also requires that conservators make “proofs of income and disbursements
reasonably available for examination by any interested person who requests to see them or as
required by the court.”
Plaintiff states broadly that the GAL and the court did not require defendant to comply
with the court rules. However, defendant’s accounting was eventually filed and accepted, and
contains sufficient itemized attachments of receipts and disbursements.
Defendant’s fiduciary duties have also included a restraint from self-interest. In re
Messer Trust, 457 Mich 371, 380 n 9; 579 NW2d 73 (1998). EPIC also addresses potential
conflicts of interests between the conservator and the person the conservator is protecting. MCL
700.5421 states:
A sale or encumbrance to a conservator, to the conservator’s spouse,
agent, or attorney, or to a corporation, trust, or other organization in which the
conservator has a substantial beneficial interest, or a transaction involving the
estate being administered by the conservator that is affected by a substantial
conflict between fiduciary and personal interests, is voidable unless the
transaction is approved by the court after notice as directed by the court.
Transactions involving self-dealing should be closely scrutinized and courts should look to see
whether the trustee’s actions indicated any fraud, bad faith or overreaching on the part of the
trustee. In re Green Charitable Trust, 172 Mich App 298, 314; 431 NW2d 492 (1988).
The money that defendant expended from Gierman’s estate that went to defendant’s
husband and the expenses that contributed to payment of bills in defendant’s name provided
benefit to defendant as well as benefiting Gierman. A transaction involving the estate being
administered by the conservator that is affected by a substantial conflict between fiduciary and
personal interests is voidable unless the court approves the transaction. MCL 700.5421. On the
record provided, there was no scrutiny of these expenses. This Court could find that a lack of
inquiry by the court into the transactions that involve both the fiduciary and personal interests of
defendant was an abuse of discretion.
However, EPIC authorizes conservators to expend money from the protected individual’s
estate to care for and benefit them. MCL 700.5425 provides, in part, as follows:
A conservator may expend or distribute estate income or principal without
court authorization or confirmation for the support, education, care, or benefit of
the protected individual or the protected individual’s dependents in accordance
with the following principles:
(a) The conservator shall consider a recommendation relating to the
appropriate standard of support, education, and benefit for the protected
individual or a dependent made by a parent or guardian, if any. The conservator
shall not be surcharged for money paid to a person or organization furnishing
support, education, or care to the protected individual or a dependent in
compliance with the recommendation of the protected individual’s parent or
guardian unless the conservator knows that the parent or guardian derives
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personal financial benefit from that payment, including a benefit by relief from a
personal duty of support, or that the recommendation is clearly not in the
protected individual’s best interests.
(b) The conservator shall expend or distribute money reasonably necessary
for the support, education, care, or benefit of the protected individual or a
dependent with due regard to all of the following:
(i) The estate size, the conservatorship’s probable duration, and the
likelihood that the protected individual, at some future time, may be fully able to
be wholly self-sufficient and able to manage business affairs and the estate.
(ii) The accustomed standard of living of the protected individual and the
dependents.
(iii) Other money or sources used for the protected individual’s support.
Arguably, it was reasonably necessary for defendant to expend estate assets to pay for the
utilities and in-home supervision required for Gierman’s support and care. Defendant testified
that, based on her brief research, bringing someone else into the home to care for Gierman for
required daily care or sending her to a day care facility was more expensive than paying her
husband to perform this task. Defendant also explained that she had Gierman’s account pay onethird of those utility bills because there were three adults in the home. Additionally, it could
have been reasonably necessary to pay for moving Gierman’s belongings when defendant’s
family moved to a new location. Defendant also stated that the portion of the moving costs
attributed to Gierman was defendant’s estimation based on weight of Gierman’s possessions, and
that Gierman had heavy furniture as well as boxes of books and magazines that Gierman wanted
to keep. It is not necessary that the court approve or confirm these reasonably necessary
expenses to support and care for Gierman. Trustees are not liable for mistakes or errors of
judgment where they act in good faith within the limits of the law and the trust. In re Harold S
Ansell Family Trust, 224 Mich App 745, 748-749; 569 NW2d 914 (1997).
The court had reserved its ruling on the petition to remove defendant as conservator until
the accounting was reviewed, and then denied the petition after the accounting was not objected
to by the GAL or Gierman’s children. The court did not find that defendant’s actions indicated
any fraud, bad faith, or overreaching that would require scrutinizing the transactions, and
approved the transactions by accepting the first annual accounting as approved by the interested
parties. See MCL 700.5421; In re Harold S Ansell Family Trust, at 748-749. The denial of the
petition under these circumstances was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
Next, plaintiff argues that the probate court placed the interests of Gierman’s children
above her own, ignored statements previously made by Gierman protesting the way her money
was spent, and allowed Gierman’s resources to be unnecessarily depleted. Plaintiff appears to
argue that, in refusing to remove defendant as conservator, the trial court chose to benefit
Gierman’s children at Gierman’s expense.
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In support of this charge, plaintiff suggests that the court refused to consider evidence of
gifts to Gierman’s family and statements that Gierman made to plaintiff about her finances.
Plaintiff testified, despite defendant’s objection, that Gierman reported to her that she had
concerns with defendant’s management of her money. However, the only concern on the record
was that defendant was “stingy with her money,” and that Gierman wished to buy her son a car
after she sold her residence in Florida. Additionally, this transaction occurred while defendant
was Gierman’s power of attorney, prior to defendant’s appointment as conservator, which is the
subject of the instant petition.3
Plaintiff also raises an issue with the court’s repeated mention of Gierman’s children.
Plaintiff specifically cites the statement, “I know [plaintiff] is concerned with the welfare of her
sister but the children have priority here.” However, this statement was made in the context of
determining whether plaintiff had standing as an interested person to object to defendant’s
account. The court indicated that defendant’s siblings had standing as heirs to object and was
noting that they did not object to the account. Also during this exchange the court noted that the
GAL had been appointed to represent Gierman’s interests, and that the court was interested in
reviewing the GAL’s findings before the court made a determination on the petition.
Throughout the proceedings below, the court relied on the findings of the GAL. After
defendant petitioned for guardianship, the GAL testified that he supported a psychiatrist’s
diagnosis that Gierman had dementia and needed someone to make informed decisions with
regard to her residence, supportive services, financial matters, and medical treatment. The GAL
stated that defendant’s home was very appropriate, that defendant was looking out for the best
interests of Gierman, and that he supported the granting of defendant’s petitions for guardianship
and conservatorship.
The court recommended that plaintiff relay her concerns to the GAL so he could
investigate them, and did not dismiss plaintiff’s petitions for lack of standing because he wanted
the GAL to investigate the allegations. The court only made its final disposition on the petition
to replace defendant as conservator after reviewing the report of the GAL, in which the GAL
stated that defendant was acting in Gierman’s best interests and that plaintiff’s accusations were
unfounded, or even frivolous. Despite plaintiff’s suggestion that it would be more beneficial to
Gierman if plaintiff cared for her in Florida, the GAL concluded that defendant was meeting
Gierman’s needs and recommended that defendant remain the guardian and conservator.
In sum, the record establishes that the probate court retained exclusive jurisdiction to
determine how Gierman’s estate was managed and expended for the use of Gierman. MCL
700.5402(b). After considering the interests of Gierman, as represented by the GAL, the other
interested parties (Gierman’s children) and plaintiff, the court concluded that there was no
evidence to indicate that defendant, as guardian, was not exercising reasonable care in the
discharge of her duties. The court then expressed concern about expenditures of defendant as
conservator, waited for more inquiry into the matter, and denied plaintiff’s petition regarding
3
Defendant did testify that she gave Gierman’s sister Joanne $500 for expenses when Gierman
stayed with her. However, there was no evidence provided on when this occurred.
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conservatorship after those concerns were considered. The court did not commit clear error in its
findings or abuse its discretion in so holding. Hill, 276 Mich App at 308; Woods, 277 Mich App
at 625.
Plaintiff next argues that the probate court erred when it ruled that plaintiff did not have
standing to object to the account filed by defendant. EPIC requires that a person be interested in
an estate in order to have the authority to take certain actions. Specifically, MCL 700.5415
provides as follows:
(1) A person interested in the welfare of an individual for whom a
conservator is appointed may file a petition in the appointing court for an order to
do any of the following:
(a) Require bond or security or additional bond or security, or reduce
bond.
(b) Require an accounting for the administration of the trust.
(c) Direct distribution.
(d) Remove the conservator and appoint a temporary or successor
conservator.
(e) Grant other appropriate relief.
The court rules provide for the authority to determine interested persons in the examination of
the account. MCR 5.125(6) states:
The persons interested in a proceeding for examination of an account of a
fiduciary are the
(a) devisees of a testate estate, and if one of the devisees is a trustee or a
trust, the persons referred to in MCR 5.125(B)(3),
(b) heirs of an intestate estate,
(c) protected person and presumptive heirs of the protected person in a
conservatorship,
(d) ward and presumptive heirs of the ward in a guardianship,
(e) claimants,
(f) current trust beneficiaries in a trust accounting, and
(g) other persons whose interests would be adversely affected by the relief
requested, including insurers and sureties who might be subject to financial
obligations as the result of the approval of the account.
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Plaintiff argues that she is an interested person under this rule because she is a
presumptive heir and a beneficiary of Gierman’s pension. However, because Gierman had three
children living at the time of the action, plaintiff was not a presumptive heir.4 Additionally there
was no evidence presented that Gierman had a will naming plaintiff as a devisee. There was also
no evidence that plaintiff was a beneficiary under a trust as referenced in MCR 5.125(6)(f), the
only reference to beneficiaries in the rule. Arguably, plaintiff may be an “other person” under
MCR 5.125(6)(g), whose interest would be affected because she was one of the beneficiaries of
the pension. However, evidence was not presented that the pension could be depleted by
defendant’s administration, and plaintiff did not make this argument or include this provision of
the court rule in her brief on appeal. Therefore, the trial court correctly held that plaintiff was
not an interested person for purposes of examining and objecting to defendant’s accounting.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the probate court erred in finding that it had to accept the
annual account of defendant if no objections were filed. We disagree. Procedures for the
conservator’s accounting are contained in the court rules. After serving the account on interested
persons, the court may require, or an interested person may request, an examination of proofs of
income and disbursements that the conservator must make reasonably available. MCR
5.310(C)(2)(d). MCR 5.409(C)(1) states that the copy of the account provided to interested
persons must include notice that any objections to the account should be filed with the court and
noticed for hearing. An interested person may then object to the account, but the court may then
order that they examine the proofs in attempt to resolve the objection before a hearing is held.
MCR 5.310(C)(2)(c)(iii); MCR 5.310(C)(2)(d). MCR 5.310(C)(2)(c)(iv) provides that if an
objection is filed and not otherwise resolved, the court will hear and determine the objection.
4
MCL 700.2103 sets forth the following order of intestate succession:
Any part of the intestate estate that does not pass to the decedent’s
surviving spouse under section 2102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no
surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the following individuals who
survive the decedent:
(a) The decedent’s descendants by representation.
(b) If there is no surviving descendant, the decedent’s parents equally if
both survive or to the surviving parent.
(c) If there is no surviving descendant or parent, the descendants of the
decedent’s parents or of either of them by representation.
Because Gierman had three surviving descendants at the time plaintiff filed her petition, plaintiff
was not an heir at that time. Accordingly, plaintiff was not an interested person by means of
being an heir.
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MCR 5.409(C)(6) instructs the court to either review or allow accounts annually, and
have a hearing at least once every three years to determine whether the accounts will be allowed.
MCR 5.310(C)(2)(a) authorizes the court to order an interim accounting at any time the court
determines that it is necessary. MCR 5.310(C)(2)(e) states, “Hearing on each accounting may be
deferred in the discretion of the court. The court in any case at any time may require a hearing
on an accounting with or without a request by an interested person.” Further, MCL
700.5407(2)(c) empowers the court directly, or through the conservator, with “all the powers
over the estate and business affairs that the individual could exercise if present and not under
disability, except the power to make a will.” Thus, the court had the discretion to hold hearings
and review accounts even when an objection was not filed.
However, it is not evident that the court in this instance believed that it could not hold a
hearing without an objection. MCR 5.310(C)(2)(c)(i) requires that the accounting served on
interested parties must include notice that objections to the accounting must be brought to the
court’s attention because the court does not normally review the accounting without an objection.
The Court is required to hold a hearing when there is an unresolved objection, MCR
5.310(C)(2)(c)(iv), but retains the discretion to hold a hearing when there are no objections,
MCR 5.310(C)(2)(e). The court’s statement that, in essence, an account is approved unless
objections are filed was presumably a reflection upon its authority to allow the account if it is not
objected to according to MCR 5.409(C)(6), and the court rule’s observation that accounts are not
typically reviewed absent an objection. The statement was not a definitive statement of law that
the court had surrendered its discretion to review the account or hold a hearing at any time. The
court exercised its discretion not to review the account in detail when, following the receipt of
waivers and consents to the allowance of the account by all interested parties, it held that “[t]he
first annual account appears to be correct and ought to be allowed.” The court’s determination
was not erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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