IN RE SEAN CHARDERRICK DANIELS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SEAN CHARDERRICK
DANIELS, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291828
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-482876
SEAN CHARDERRICK DANIELS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Bandstra and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, respondent, a juvenile, was adjudicated guilty of assault with
intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
At trial, Ricky Campbell testified that he confronted respondent and his brothers about an
earlier assault against Campbell’s nephew. According to Campbell, respondent and his brother
both started shooting at him. The trial court adjudicated respondent guilty of assaulting
Campbell by firing a gun at him with the intent to commit murder.
On appeal, respondent argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity
as one of the persons who shot at Campbell. We disagree. When reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence at a bench trial, we review the record de novo, viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether the trial court could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wilkens,
267 Mich App 728, 738; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved
in favor of the prosecution. Id. at 738. The reasonable doubt standard also applies in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. MCR 3.942(C); People v Hana, 443 Mich 202, 211 n 31; 504 NW2d
166 (1993); In re Weiss, 224 Mich App 37, 42; 568 NW2d 336 (1997).
In this case, respondent’s identification as one of the shooters is supported by the
testimony of three eyewitnesses. Their testimony, viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient to establish respondent’s identity beyond a reasonable doubt. The
credibility of their testimony was for the trial court, as the trier of fact, to resolve. People v
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Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000). This case presents no exceptional
circumstances to remove the credibility issue from the trial court. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich
625, 642-644; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
To the extent respondent suggests that the witnesses’ identification testimony should
have been suppressed because it lacked an independent basis, this evidentiary issue is
unpreserved because respondent did not move to suppress the testimony below. Davis, supra.
Therefore, our review of this issue is limited to plain error affecting respondent’s substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); see also MCR 3.901(B)(1)
and MCR 3.902(A) (limitations on the correction of error in a delinquency proceeding are
governed by MCR 2.613), and MCR 2.613(C) (evidentiary error is not a ground for disturbing a
judgment or order unless refusal to take action appears inconsistent with substantial justice).
The need for an independent basis for a witness’s in-court identification arises only
where an individual has been subjected to an invalid pretrial identification procedure. People v
Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111-115; 577 NW2d 92 (1998); People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 675;
528 NW2d 842 (1995). In this case, although respondent argues that the witnesses’
identification testimony was not reliable, he has not shown that any of the witnesses were
subjected to an improper identification procedure. As indicated previously, the reliability of the
witnesses’ identification testimony was for the trier of fact to resolve. Respondent has not shown
any plain error in its admission. Davis, supra at 702-703. Indeed, Tremicka Harris testified that
she was familiar with respondent because he lived across the street from her house and she had
seen him “a lot of times.” Although Campbell was not as familiar with respondent, he indicated
that he was engaged in a conversation with respondent and his brother before the assault started,
giving him ample opportunity to observe respondent. Accordingly, we reject this claim of error.
We also reject respondent’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish his
intent to kill Campbell. Because it is difficult to prove a person’s state of mind on issues such as
knowledge and intent, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the state of
mind, “which can be inferred from all the evidence presented.” People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App
594, 622; 751 NW2d 57 (2008); see also People v Warren (After Remand), 200 Mich App 586,
588; 504 NW2d 907 (1993) “The use of a lethal weapon is the kind of evidence which will
support an inference of an intent to kill.” People v Turner, 62 Mich App 467, 470; 233 NW2d
617 (1975). Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence that both shooters
fired at Campbell, and that a police officer found a bullet hole in a garbage can that Campbell
used to take cover, was sufficient to enable the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
respondent shot at Campbell with the intent to commit murder.
Further, contrary to respondent’s argument on appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact
were sufficient to support its decision. The findings are sufficient to reveal that the court was
aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied the law. People v Armstrong, 175 Mich App
181, 185; 437 NW2d 343 (1989); see also People v Wardlaw, 190 Mich App 318, 320-321; 475
NW2d 387 (1991). In addition, the trial court’s finding that respondent committed the assault on
Campbell with the intent to commit murder is not clearly erroneous. In re Hardin, 184 Mich
App 107, 108-109; 457 NW2d 347 (1990); see also People v Lanzo Constr Co, 272 Mich App
470, 473; 726 NW2d 746 (2006).
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Respondent also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the
appointment of an expert on eyewitness identification. Because respondent did not raise this
issue in an appropriate motion in the trial court, our review is limited to errors apparent from the
record. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 453; 709 NW2d 152 (2005). To prevail on this claim,
respondent has the burden of showing both deficient performance and prejudice. In re Ayres,
239 Mich App 8, 21; 608 NW2d 132 (1999). Although identity was the principal issue at trial,
respondent has not overcome the presumption that counsel declined to request an identification
expert as a matter of trial strategy where some of the witnesses were already familiar with him
before the day of the offense. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004).
Further, respondent has not presented any offer of proof showing that an expert witness was
available who could have provided favorable testimony. See People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App
434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Therefore, respondent has failed to establish that defense
counsel was ineffective.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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