PEOPLE OF MI V JIM THEODORE RUCINSKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288143
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-023198-FH
JIM THEODORE RUCINSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Stephens and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of manufacture of a controlled
substance—marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(iii), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to
five years’ probation for the manufacture of marijuana conviction and two years in prison for the
felony-firearm conviction. Because we conclude that there were no errors warranting relief, we
affirm.
I. Basic Facts
Officer Burke Lange testified that in August 2007 he was working in defendant’s
neighborhood when he received a radio call from another officer about a suspect who was
fleeing on foot. Lange responded to the call and met with the officer. The officer described the
suspect and indicated which direction he fled. Lange proceeded through backyards in search of
the suspect. While doing this, Lange came across a six-foot wooden fence, which he could not
see over. Lange climbed the fence to see if the suspect was hiding behind it. After jumping on
the fence and looking into the yard below, Lange saw marijuana growing in the backyard.
Lange went to the front of the house where he encountered defendant. He asked
defendant if he was the homeowner and defendant responded that he was. Lange then asked
defendant if he knew that there was marijuana growing in his backyard. According to Lange,
defendant responded that he knew about the marijuana and was growing it for himself and a
friend. He then asked defendant if he could search his home and defendant consented to the
search. Lange waited for two other officers to arrive before he searched defendant’s home.
The three officers first searched the backyard. Lange testified that there were over thirty
marijuana plants growing in defendant’s backyard. The state forensic lab tested eleven plants
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and confirmed that they were marijuana. The officers then searched the detached garage. In the
garage, the officers found a bag of marijuana, sandwich bags, a triple beam scale, a vial
containing marijuana seeds, and a vial containing marijuana. They next searched the residence.
Just inside the backdoor, on top of a washer or dryer, Lange found a loaded handgun. Lange
continued to search the house and found more handguns and rifles in the closet of defendant’s
bedroom. All the guns were registered to defendant.
The prosecution eventually charged defendant as noted above and the jury found
defendant guilty.
II. Erroneous Admission of Suppressed Statements
A. Standard of Review
We shall first address defendant’s argument that the trial court erred when it permitted
officer Lange to testify about a statement that defendant made at the time of his arrest.
Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it permitted Lange to testify about
statements that defendant made after he was in custody in contravention of its earlier order of
suppression.
This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. People
v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 353; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). However, it is an abuse of discretion to
admit evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. Id. To the extent that this issue involves
determining the scope of the trial court’s order suppressing defendant’s statements, this Court
reviews the proper interpretation of a court order de novo. Silberstein v Pro-Golf of America,
Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 460; 750 NW2d 615 (2008).
B. Procedural History
Before trial, defendant moved to have the statements he made to the officers on the day
of his arrest suppressed. In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that Lange took him into
custody the moment he admitted to being the owner of the home. Further, because Lange failed
to advise him of his right to remain silent, defendant argued that the statements he made
thereafter could not be admitted against him.
At the hearing concerning defendant’s motion to suppress, defendant testified that Lange
approached him and asked whether he owned the home. Defendant said that he told Lange that
he did own the home, after which Lange reached for his arms and placed him in handcuffs.
Defendant stated that, as Lange reached for him and placed him in handcuffs, Lange asked
whether he knew about the marijuana in the backyard. Defendant said that he admitted that he
owned the marijuana. Lange disagreed with defendant’s version of events and testified that he
did not place defendant into custody until after he and the other officers searched the backyard.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that Lange began to place defendant in
custody simultaneously with the question and answer regarding whether defendant knew about
the marijuana. For that reason, the trial court suppressed any statement that defendant might
have made after the answer to Lange’s question regarding whether defendant knew about the
marijuana. The trial court issued an opinion and order granting in part the motion to suppress
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defendant’s statements to the officers. Specifically, the trial court ordered the suppression of
“any statements which were made by the defendant subsequent to the defendant’s initial
admission that he knew of the marijuana growing in his backyard . . . .”
At trial, the prosecutor requested clarification concerning the proper scope of Lange’s
testimony regarding defendant’s admission that he knew about the marijuana in the backyard.
The prosecutor said that Lange would testify that, after he asked defendant about whether he
knew about the marijuana in his backyard, defendant responded yes and said he was growing it
for himself and a friend. The prosecutor argued that, because the trial court already determined
that defendant was not yet in custody when he answered Lange’s question about whether he
knew about the marijuana in his backyard, Lange should be permitted to testify about
defendant’s complete answer. Defendant’s trial counsel disagreed and argued that the trial
court’s order suppressing defendant’s statements applied to all statements made after defendant
acknowledged that he knew about the marijuana. After hearing the arguments, the trial court
clarified that its order of suppression applied to only those statements that defendant made after
his answer to Lange’s question concerning whether defendant knew about the marijuana. The
trial court stated that his order did not limit Lange from testifying about the full answer given by
defendant. For that reason, the trial court indicated that Lange would be permitted to testify that
defendant responded that he knew about the marijuana and was growing it for himself and a
friend.
C. Analysis
“A statement obtained from a defendant during a custodial interrogation is admissible
only if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment
rights.” People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 564; 675 NW2d 863 (2003), citing Miranda v
Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966) and People v Daoud, 462 Mich
621, 632-639; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). In this case, the trial court determined that Lange did not
place defendant in custody until after he asked defendant whether he knew about the marijuana
in his backyard. For that reason, the trial court determined that defendant was not entitled to be
advised of his rights before Lange asked that question. See Daoud, 462 Mich at 632-633 (noting
that a defendant must be advised of his rights before being subjected to custodial interrogation).
Moreover, the trial court determined that, because there “was no obligation on the part of the
police at that juncture to have given the Miranda warnings to [defendant] before that affirmative
answer,” defendant’s admission that he knew the marijuana was growing in his backyard was
admissible.
On appeal, defendant has not challenged these determinations. Rather, he argues that the
trial court erred when it later permitted Lange to testify that defendant not only acknowledged
that he knew about the marijuana, but also volunteered that he was growing it for himself and a
friend. Defendant argues that this decision was contrary to the trial court’s order of suppression
because defendant’s statement that he was growing it for himself and a friend came after the
point where the trial court had determined that Lange took defendant into custody. We do not
agree that the trial court’s decision to permit Lange to testify about the latter statement
contravened its earlier order of suppression.
At the suppression hearing, defendant asked the trial court to suppress all the statements
he made on the day of his arrest after he acknowledged being the homeowner because he was
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taken into custody immediately after answering that question. The trial court agreed that Lange
took defendant into custody shortly after he began to speak with defendant, but determined that
any custodial interrogation occurred after Lange asked defendant whether he knew about the
marijuana growing in his backyard. For that reason, the trial court suppressed every statement
that defendant made after acknowledging the existence of the marijuana, but specifically
permitted Lange to testify that defendant admitted to knowing about the marijuana. However,
neither defendant nor the prosecution presented evidence about the specific content of
defendant’s acknowledgment or otherwise asked the trial court to decide whether and to what
extent the order might limit Lange’s ability to testify about the exact wording used by defendant
when he answered Lange’s question. That issue did not arise until trial; and, as noted above, the
trial court determined that Lange could testify about the actual words used by defendant
consistent with the order of suppression.
We conclude that the trial court properly determined that its earlier order of suppression
did not preclude Lange from testifying about the exact wording of defendant’s
acknowledgement. Although the trial court referred to defendant’s admission in its ruling, it is
clear from the context that the trial court’s earlier order suppressing defendant’s statements
applied to every statement that defendant made after he answered Lange’s question concerning
whether defendant knew about the marijuana. That is, because defendant was not entitled to be
advised of his Miranda rights until after he answered Lange’s question regarding whether he
knew about the marijuana, the order did not apply to that answer. Accordingly, to the extent that
this statement included an admission that was broader than mere knowledge that the marijuana
was growing in his backyard, that statement was nevertheless admissible under the trial court’s
earlier order.
The trial court did not err when it permitted Lange to testify about the exact wording of
defendant’s answer to the question concerning whether he knew about the marijuana.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of Review
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
This Court reviews de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Martin, 271
Mich App 280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). This Court reviews the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecutor and determines whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Cline, 276
Mich App 634, 642; 741 NW2d 563 (2007).
B. Manufacturing a Controlled Substance
The elements of manufacturing of a controlled substance are (1) the defendant
manufactured a substance; (2) the substance manufactured was the controlled substance at issue;
and (3) the defendant knowingly manufactured it. People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 619;
696 NW2d 754 (2005). The manufacture of a controlled substance includes the production,
preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance,
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means
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of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and synthesis. MCL 333.7106(2);
People v Hunter, 201 Mich App 671, 676; 506 NW2d 611 (1993).
Defendant told the officers that he was the owner of the home where the marijuana was
found and he was aware of the marijuana on his property. Defendant also told the officers that
he was growing the marijuana for himself and a friend. Further, the evidence from the garage—
the sandwich bags, scale, and seeds—strongly suggests that the marijuana from the backyard was
being processed in defendant’s garage. This evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s
conviction for manufacturing marijuana. Further, we do not agree that Brian Michie’s testimony
alters this conclusion.
Michie testified that he was the one who planted the seeds and watered the plants, but he
also testified that he believed defendant had control over the plants and could do with them what
he wished. Michie testified that, when defendant asked him to remove the plants, he did not do
so because he thought defendant would remove them if wanted them gone. Michie also
disavowed any connection to the items found in defendant’s garage. Even if we were to view
Michie’s testimony in the light most favorable to defendant rather than the prosecution, the
evidence from the garage is circumstantial evidence that someone other than Michie processed
the marijuana plants, and the jury could reasonably have inferred that the other person was
defendant. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (2006). (noting that
circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are sufficient to
prove the elements of a crime). Accordingly, even if the jury had concluded that Michie planted
and tended the seeds, it could nevertheless still conclude that defendant had joint control over the
plants and processed them in the garage.
Defendant also contends that there was no evidence that the substances found in his
garage were marijuana. Specifically, defendant argues that Lange’s testimony could not be a
replacement for expert testimony concerning whether the substances found in the garage were
marijuana because Lange was not qualified to be an expert.
Police officers may testify about their opinions under MRE 701 if the opinions are not
dependant on scientific, technical or specialized knowledge. People v Oliver, 170 Mich App 38,
50; 427 NW2d 898 (1988). Under MRE 701, lay witnesses may testify about their opinions and
inferences so long as 1) the opinions and inferences are rationally based on the perception of the
witness and 2) the opinions and inferences are either helpful in understanding the witness’s
testimony or in determination of fact. MRE 701. In contrast, MRE 702 governs the
admissibility of expert testimony. Under this rule, expert evidence is admissible if it complies
with a three-part test. People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 711; 456 NW2d 391 (1990). First, the
expert must be qualified. Second, the evidence must provide the trier of fact a better
understanding of the evidence or assist in determining a fact in issue. Finally, the evidence must
be from a recognized discipline. Id.
In People v Williams, 198 Mich App 537, 542; 499 NW2d 404 (1993), this Court held
that a police officer who testified that evidence found in the defendant’s house was routinely
used to cut, weigh, package, and sell controlled substances was an expert within the meaning of
MRE 702. Drug related enforcement, this Court held, is a “recognized area of expertise.” Id.
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In this case, Lange was examined outside the presence of the jury to see if he could give
evidence regarding the nature of the substances found in the garage. He testified that he had seen
marijuana seeds on 100 or more occasions while executing search warrants. He had seen the
seeds at marijuana growing operations, in people’s cars, and on their persons. He also testified
that he had taken a class on marijuana seeds as part of his job. The trial court found that Lange
could testify about his opinion regarding the substances but could not “testify insofar as the
substance specifically being a particular item.”
We note that the prosecution did not have to prove that the substances found in the garage
were a controlled substance in order to convict defendant. The marijuana in the garage does not
form the basis for defendant’s conviction—the marijuana in defendant’s yard goes to the
manufacturing charge. Defendant stipulated to the fact that eleven plants found in his yard and
tested by the Michigan State Laboratory were marijuana. The marijuana and paraphernalia
found in the garage are circumstantial evidence that the plants were processed. And there was
adequate circumstantial evidence to permit the jury to consider whether the substances found
there were marijuana.
Lange testified that there was a bag of dried marijuana, a vial of seeds, a box of Baggies
and a scale in defendant’s garage and that this evidence often used to manufacture marijuana.
Moreover, Lange was qualified to testify as an expert. Lange has had significant experience in
law enforcement; he has executed over 100 search warrants related to marijuana possession and
delivery. He has found marijuana paraphernalia in growing operations, in cars, and on persons.
Moreover, drug enforcement is not in the general knowledge of a layperson and can form the
basis for expert testimony. As an expert, Lange’s testimony that the substances found in the
garage were marijuana and were part of defendant’s manufacturing of the marijuana helped the
trier of fact ultimately decide the issue. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for manufacturing marijuana.
C. Felony Firearm
Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felonyfirearm. The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the
commission of a felony. People v Taylor, 275 Mich App 177, 179; 737 NW2d 790 (2007). As
there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of manufacturing marijuana and numerous
guns were found in his home, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felonyfirearm.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his
trial counsel failed to call him as a witness. Because defendant did not establish a testimonial
record regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, our review is limited to mistakes
apparent on the record. People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Yost, 278 Mich App at 387.
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After carefully reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that defendant’s trial counsel’s
decision not to call defendant as a witness fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms. Defendant’s trial counsel provided defendant with a
substantial defense, vigorously cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses, and argued on
defendant’s behalf. Therefore, defendant’s trial counsel could legitimately conclude, as a matter
of trial strategy, that defendant’s testimony was unnecessary and may even prove harmful. And
this Court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Defendant has
failed to overcome the presumption that he had the effective assistance of counsel. See People v
LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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