CHARLES WILLIAMS V CITY OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHARLES WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 25, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 290255
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-014804-NO
CITY OF DETROIT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Cavanagh and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff fell on a paved walkway and injured his ankle. The walkway at issue runs
immediately next to the river, parallel to Jefferson Avenue but separated from Jefferson by a
wide field and a wire fence. Perpendicular paved walkways at either end connect the walkway
with a sidewalk that is immediately adjacent to Jefferson, but there is no paved sidewalk adjacent
to Jefferson where the field is located. Thus, a person walking along Jefferson must make a rightangle turn at each end of the field in order to stay on the pavement, which then leads the person
over to the river, continues alongside the river, then right-angles back to Jefferson when the
person reaches the other end of the field.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he “tripped over a defect which was on the sidewalk/
walkway adjacent to the River, parallel (100 yards south of) Jefferson west of 8th street
approximately 230 feet and east of 10th street [sic].” All other references to the walkway in the
complaint say “sidewalk.” Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Plaintiff’s response argued both that the walkway was a sidewalk and that it was a trailway and
thus, the highway exception to governmental immunity applied. The trial court disagreed and
granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we also consider de novo on appeal. Detroit v
Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008).
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The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., controls these
proceedings. It sets forth six exceptions to immunity. Lash v Traverse City, 479 Mich 180, 195
n 33; 735 NW2d 628 (2007). The “highway exception” holds that a governmental agency can be
liable for damages caused by an unsafe highway. MCL 691.1402. Exceptions to immunity are
to be narrowly construed. Maskery v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 468 Mich 609, 614; 664
NW2d 165 (2003). Specifically, the highway exception to governmental immunity states:
Except as otherwise provided in section 2a, each governmental agency having
jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so
that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. A person who sustains
bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a
governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair
and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages
suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. The liability, procedure,
and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission
shall be as provided in section 21 of chapter IV of 1909 PA 283, MCL 224.21.
The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain
highways, and the liability for that duty, extends only to the improved portion of
the highway designed for vehicular travel and does not include sidewalks,
trailways, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of
the highway designed for vehicular travel.
In this case, there is no question that defendant is a governmental agency, that it was
engaged in a governmental function, and that it had jurisdiction over the walkway. The only
issue here is whether the walkway qualifies as a “highway” under the statutory definition. The
cases cited by defendant, Haaksma v Grand Rapids, 247 Mich App 44; 634 NW2d 390 (2001),
and Stabley v Huron Clinton Metro Park Auth, 228 Mich App 363, 368-369; 579 NW2d 374
(1998), support defendant’s argument that this is not a “sidewalk” because it is not adjacent to
the street. In Stabley, 228 Mich App at 367, this Court looked at dictionary definitions that
variously defined “sidewalk” as being “along the side of a street,” “along the side of a road,” “at
the side of a roadway,” and “part of a public street or highway.” This Court concluded, “that
linking the word ‘sidewalk’ with an adjacent road is in accord with the common and approved
usage of the word.” Id. at 369. In Haaksma, this Court applied Stabley and held that the
highway exception did not apply to a sidewalk that ran “between, not alongside” two city streets;
that is, it provided a pedestrian connection between two somewhat parallel streets. Haaksma,
247 Mich App at 55. A private building was on one side of the walk and a city parking lot was
on the other side. The Haaksma Court stated, “[B]ecause the sidewalk does not run alongside or
adjacent to a public roadway, the highway exception does not apply.” Id. While there are no
structures between the walkway here and the street, the photographs show it is quite far away,
and there is a fence between it and the street. It more properly might be called a “riverwalk.” It
runs along the river, not along Jefferson Avenue.
In making his argument that the walkway is a trailway, plaintiff states that the walkway is
within the definition provided in the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act
(NREPA), at MCL 324.72101(g), which states, “‘Trailway’ means a land corridor that features a
broad trail capable of accommodating a variety of public recreation uses.” Plaintiff further
argues that our Supreme Court looked to the Motor Vehicle Code to define terms in the GTLA in
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Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 338-340; 408 NW2d 783 (1987); looking to the
NREPA would involve a similar analysis.
In response, defendant argues, without citing case support, that the modifier “on the
highway” applies to all the structures listed in the statute. But that assertion is not in accord with
case law construing similarly-structured statutes.
As this Court has noted, “The drafters of statutes are presumed to know the rules of
grammar, and statutory language must be read within its grammatical context unless a contrary
intent is clearly expressed.” Greater Bethesda Healing Springs Ministry v Evangel Bldrs &
Constr Mgrs, LLC, 282 Mich App 410, 414; 766 NW2d 874 (2009) (citing Stanton v Battle
Creek, 466 Mich 611, 616; 647 NW2d 508 (2002)). “The ‘last antecedent’ rule of statutory
construction provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is
confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the
statute requires a different interpretation.” Id. Applying that rule to the statute here in question
leads to the conclusion that “on the highway” modifies only “culverts.” Accord, Adell
Broadcasting Corp v Apex Media Sales, Inc, 269 Mich App 6, 10; 708 NW2d 778 (2005); Twp
of Homer v Billboards by Johnson, Inc, 268 Mich App 500, 503; 708 NW2d 737 (2005).
Therefore, we hold that the proper interpretation of the definition provided by MCL
691.1401(e) does not limit defendant’s liability only to trailways “on the highway,” that is,
adjacent to the road. The walkway where plaintiff fell fits the statutory definition of “trailway,”
and therefore the exception to immunity applies here. Defendant cannot avoid liability for
injuries arising from its alleged negligent repair and maintenance of the walkway.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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