PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES HAWKINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 25, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289181
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-008911-FC
CHARLES HAWKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Cavanagh and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was
sentenced as a third-habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 50 to 75 years
for the second-degree murder conviction, and six to ten years each for the felon in possession
and CCW convictions, and a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm
conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues through both appellate counsel and in a pro se supplemental brief that
the evidence was insufficient to prove the requisite intent for second-degree murder, or to rebut
his claim of self-defense. We disagree. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review de novo the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Harrison, 283 Mich App 374, 377-378; 768 NW2d
98 (2009). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence
can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App
594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008).
To establish second-degree murder, the prosecution must prove: (1) a death, (2) that the
death was caused by an act of the defendant, (3) that the defendant acted with malice, and (4) the
defendant did not have a lawful justification or excuse. People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70; 731
NW2d 411 (2007). The intent, or malice, necessary to support a conviction of second-degree
murder is described in People v Roper, 286 Mich App 77, 84; ___ NW2d ___ (2009), as follows:
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“Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily
harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood
that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.”
Malice may be “inferred from evidence that the defendant ‘intentionally set in
motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.’” “The offense of
second-degree murder does not require an actual intent to harm or kill, but only
the intent to do an act that is in obvious disregard of life-endangering
consequences.” [Id. at 84 (citations omitted).]
Intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances. Kanaan, supra at 622. “Once
evidence of self-defense is introduced, the prosecutor bears the burden of disproving it beyond a
reasonable doubt.” People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 20; 507 NW2d 763 (1993).
Several witnesses testified that defendant shot at the victim with a large caliber gun as the
victim ran toward his house. Many of the witnesses were in close proximity to the victim when
defendant shot at him. According to several witnesses, defendant continued to follow the victim
and aimed at him again before firing a second shot. The jury could reasonably infer that
defendant’s act of firing a large caliber gun at the victim under these circumstances represented
an obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences. Further, although defendant presented
witnesses who claimed that defendant produced his gun after seeing the victim reach for a gun,
several other witnesses testified that defendant was the only person who had a gun, and that the
victim did not motion like he had a gun before he was shot. “The credibility of witnesses and the
weight accorded to evidence are questions for the jury, and any conflict in the evidence must be
resolved in the prosecutor’s favor.” Harrison, supra at 378. Therefore, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s intent to
commit second-degree murder, and to disprove defendant’s claim of self-defense, beyond a
reasonable doubt.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective
for not investigating or presenting evidence regarding the possibility that the victim may have
lived had he or others acted differently after he was shot. Because defendant did not raise an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the trial court, review is limited to mistakes apparent on
the record. People v Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance
denied him the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and there was a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People v
Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007). The failure to present evidence can
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only when it deprives the defendant of a substantial
defense. People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), vacated in part on
other grounds 453 Mich 902 (1996). A substantial defense is one that might have made a
difference in the outcome of the trial. Id.
Although defendant’s argument is not clearly presented, he seems to suggest that defense
counsel should have consulted a medical expert to determine whether the victim would have died
if he had not paced back and forth after he was shot. This argument implicates the causation
element of murder. As indicated previously, causation is an essential element of second-degree
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murder. Smith, 478 Mich at 70. The causation element is comprised of two components: factual
cause and proximate cause. People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 435; 703 NW2d 774 (2005),
overruled in part on other grounds in People v Derror, 475 Mich 316, 334; 715 NW2d 822
(2006). Here, defendant’s argument does not implicate the factual cause component of
causation. That is, defendant does not challenge the evidence that he shot the victim in the leg,
striking the victim’s femoral artery, nor does he dispute that this act resulted in the victim’s
death, i.e., that the victim would not have died but for being shot in the leg. See Schaefer, supra
at 435-436. Instead, defendant’s argument implicates the proximate cause component of
causation. Defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present
evidence that conduct by the victim or others after the victim was shot somehow aided in the
victim’s death. In Schaefer, the Court explained:
For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the
victim’s injury must be a “direct and natural result” of the defendant’s actions. In
making this determination, it is necessary to examine whether there was an
intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal
link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken. If an
intervening cause did indeed supersede the defendant’s act as a legally significant
causal factor, then the defendant’s conduct will not be deemed a proximate cause
of the victim’s injury.
The standard by which to gauge whether an intervening cause supersedes,
and thus severs the causal link, is generally one of reasonable foreseeability. For
example, suppose that a defendant stabs a victim and the victim is then taken to a
nearby hospital for treatment. If the physician is negligent in providing medical
care to the victim and the victim later dies, the defendant is still considered to
have proximately caused the victim’s death because it is reasonably foreseeable
that negligent medical care might be provided. At the same time, gross
negligence or intentional misconduct by a treating physician is not reasonably
foreseeable, and would thus break the causal chain between the defendant and the
victim.
The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis, therefore, is whether the
intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of
reasonableness. If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the defendant’s conduct
will be considered a proximate cause. If, however, the intervening act by the
victim or a third party was not reasonably foreseeable—e.g., gross negligence or
intentional misconduct—then generally the causal link is severed and the
defendant’s conduct is not regarded as a proximate cause of the victim’s injury or
death. [Id. at 436-438 (footnotes omitted).]
In this case, defendant has not identified any conduct or event that might qualify as an
intervening, superseding cause that would sever the causal link between defendant’s conduct and
the victim’s death. The only act or event that defendant alludes to in his brief is the victim’s
conduct of pacing back and forth after he was shot. This involves ordinary, foreseeable conduct;
it does not rise to a level that it could be considered either gross negligence or misconduct that
would constitute a superseding event. Id. at 438-439. Defendant does not identify any other act
or event involving either the victim or a third party that he contends might qualify as an
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intervening, superseding event. Because defendant has failed to show the existence of an act or
event that might qualify as a possible superseding cause of the victim’s death, there is no basis
for concluding that defense counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate or present
evidence on this issue.
Furthermore, even if the victim’s conduct of pacing back and forth could be considered a
possible superseding event, defendant has not offered any evidence that this conduct actually had
any contributory effect on the victim’s death. The burden is on defendant to produce factual
support for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594
NW2d 57 (1999). Because defendant has not provided any factual support for his claim that the
victim’s act of pacing contributed to his death, he has not shown that he was prejudiced by
defense counsel’s failure to investigate or present evidence on this issue.
For these reasons, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot succeed.
III. Sentencing
Lastly, defendant’s appellate attorney argues that even though defendant was sentenced
within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, his sentences for second-degree murder and
felony-firearm constitute cruel or unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII, and Const
1963, art 1, § 16, because they are effectively a life sentence given his age.1 We disagree. A
sentence within the appropriate guidelines range is presumptively proportionate, and a
proportionate sentence is not cruel or unusual punishment. People v Powell, 278 Mich App 318,
323; 750 NW2d 607 (2008). Defendant has not demonstrated any unusual circumstances to
overcome the presumptive proportionality of his sentences. Neither the mere fact that defendant
committed his crimes at an older age and, as such, may spend the remainder of his life in prison,
nor the consecutive nature of his sentences render them disproportionate. See People v Lemons,
454 Mich 234, 258-259; 562 NW2d 447 (1997), People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 95; 559 NW2d
299 (1997), and People v Merriweather, 447 Mich 799, 809-811; 527 NW2d 460 (1994). Thus,
defendant’s sentences do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Alton T. Davis
1
“Although MCL 769.34(10) provides that a sentence within the guidelines range must be
affirmed on appeal unless the trial court erred in scoring the guidelines or relied on inaccurate
information, this limitation on review is not applicable to claims of constitutional error.” People
v Powell, 278 Mich App 318, 323; 750 NW2d 607 (2008).
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