IN RE ARIYANA HONESTI REED MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ARIYANA HONESTI REED,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 23, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293158
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-002444-NA
JASON JAMAAL REED,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JAMIE LEIGH KOPULUS,
Respondent.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Cavanagh and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Jason Jamaal Reed appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating
his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.
We review for clear error the trial court’s decision that a ground for termination of
parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, as well as the trial court’s
decision regarding the child’s best interests. MCR 3.977(J); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661
NW2d 216 (2003).
Respondent initially complains that he was not provided with psychiatric treatment or
medications, parenting classes, or “desperately needed” eyeglasses. This argument is not timely
because respondent did not request psychiatric treatment or eyeglasses at the time that the
treatment plan was adopted or soon afterward.1 Moreover, the evidence contradicts respondent’s
1
See In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000) (the requirement that the agency
make reasonable efforts to reunite a family is consistent with the directive that a parent’s
disabilities be accommodated, and any claim that the agency failed to accommodate a disability
-1-
argument. First, the evaluating psychologist found no psychiatric symptoms when he evaluated
respondent, so psychiatric treatment and medications were unwarranted. Second, it was the
child’s mother, not respondent, who was not provided parenting classes. Third, respondent
testified that he managed well enough without glasses and had not found it necessary in the past
two years to make efforts to obtain them. Therefore, no additional accommodations were
necessary.
Respondent next argues that the evidence was insufficient to warrant termination.
However, the evidence showed that respondent’s parenting skills were essentially non-existent at
the time of the permanent wardship hearing. In addition, respondent was not in compliance with
the treatment plan (except for his completion of the psychological evaluation). The
environmental condition of his home was consistently inappropriate for a child and, despite
receiving several referrals two months before the hearing on permanent wardship, respondent
had not attended any of those services. Therefore, it was clearly and convincingly established
that respondent had failed to provide proper care or custody for the minor child in the past. The
evidence also established that there was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able
to provide proper care and custody for the minor child within a reasonable time given her young
age. Respondent’s life was unstable to the point of being chaotic. His various relationships with
women included the mother of the minor child, a former girlfriend who was pregnant with a
child that may have been respondent’s, a current girlfriend, and a wife from whom he was
separated. Respondent’s housing was characterized as nomadic, and respondent testified
regarding an upcoming move. Furthermore, respondent had great difficulties in planning ahead,
organizing, and prioritizing (which were critical parenting skills). Both the evaluating
psychologist and the foster care case manager believed respondent was unable to consistently
assume the daily responsibilities of being a parent, so it was unlikely that respondent’s parenting
skills could be improved even if the rigorous, in-home training suggested by the evaluating
psychologist were implemented. As such, termination was properly based upon MCL
712A.19b(3)(g).
Termination was also properly based upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Given respondent’s
non-existent parenting skills and poor prognosis for improving those skills, there was a
reasonable likelihood that the minor child would be harmed if she were returned to respondent’s
home. Furthermore, the evaluating psychologist was concerned about respondent’s propensity
toward irritation and verbal hostility, and the possibility that the minor child would be exposed to
a number of people entering in and out of respondent’s unstable life.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in its best interests determination. MCL
712A.19b(5). Respondent had not seen the minor child since she was almost two months old,
and the foster care case manager testified that there was no bond between the minor child and
(…continued)
must be made in a timely manner).
-2-
respondent.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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