IN RE JOHNSON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TANIJAH MICHELLE JOHNSON
and JEREMIAH T’YSHON JOHNSON, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 18, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 292027
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-441476-NA
ANDREA REYSHIA-RASHEA JOHNSON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and O’Connell and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights to
the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), (j), and (l). We affirm.
The circuit court adjudicated respondent’s two eldest children, TJ and AJ, court wards in
2005, after TJ’s father severely abused AJ and respondent delayed seeking medical attention for
him, resulting in serious permanent injuries. The circuit court terminated respondent’s parental
rights to AJ in November 2005 because the court found that respondent lacked the maturity and
stability to care for a child with such demanding special needs. However, the court declined to
terminate respondent’s parental rights to TJ and instead allowed her to work on a treatment plan
to reunify her with TJ. JJ became a court ward shortly after his birth in November 2006.
The circuit court then afforded respondent about 2-1/2 years to avail herself of services,
but respondent did not participate in services with regularity or derive measurable benefit or
progress from the services. At a termination hearing in April 2008, the circuit court
acknowledged that statutory grounds existed warranting termination of respondent’s parental
rights to TJ and JJ. Again, however, the circuit court opted against terminating respondent’s
parental rights, opining that termination would not serve the children’s best interests because
respondent had only recently come to understand her need for psychiatric services. Despite that
the circuit court afforded respondent another nearly one-year period in which to demonstrate her
parenting abilities and to show that she could successfully complete the components of her
treatment plan, for a period of six months immediately after the April 2008 hearing respondent
ceased all contact with petitioner, failed to attend any visits, and neglected to participate in
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services or work toward any aspect of her treatment plan. In April 2009, the circuit court
terminated respondent’s parental rights to TJ and JJ.
Respondent now disputes that any of the statutory grounds invoked by the circuit court
warranted termination of her parental rights. The petitioner bears the burden of proving a
statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 712A.19b(3); In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Once a statutory ground for termination is
established by clear and convincing evidence, the circuit court must order termination if
“termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5). We review
for clear error a circuit court’s findings of fact, both with respect to the existence of a statutory
ground for termination and whether termination is in a child’s best interests. MCR 3.977(J); In
re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. “A finding is clearly erroneous if although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989) (internal
quotation omitted).
In light of the evidence of (1) respondent’s failures to comply with critical aspects of her
treatment plan and to exhibit consistent or substantial benefit from the services that respondent
did participate in after the circuit court terminated her parental rights to AJ in 2005, (2)
respondent’s six-month period of complete inactivity in 2008, immediately after the circuit court
afforded respondent a final opportunity to demonstrate her ability to comply with services, and
(3) respondent’s history of involvement in abusive relationships, the circuit court did not clearly
err in finding that petitioner had established several statutory grounds for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. Specifically, the evidence of record supported the circuit court’s
conclusions regarding MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (the “conditions that led to the adjudication
continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within
a reasonable time considering the child[ren]’s age”), (g) (a “parent, without regard to intent, fails
to provide proper care or custody for the child[ren] and there is no reasonable expectation that
the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering
the child[ren]’s age”), (j) (a reasonable likelihood exists, “based on the conduct or capacity of the
child[ren]’s parent, that the child[ren] will be harmed if . . . returned to the home of the parent”),
and (l) (a “parent’s rights to another child were terminated as a result of proceedings under
section 2(b) of this chapter”).1
1
We need not, and thus decline to, consider the circuit court’s invocation of MCL
712A.19b(a)(ii).
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Furthermore, considering the prolonged length of time the children resided in foster care,
respondent’s poor prognosis for improvement, and the children’s special needs and need for
stability, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental
rights enhanced the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356357.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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