INDUSTRIAL QUICK SEARCH INC V CHRISTOPHER M TERRYN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
INDUSTRIAL QUICK SEARCH, INC.,
MEIRESONNE & ASSOCIATES, INC., and
MICHAEL MEIRESONNE,
UNPUBLISHED
February 11, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellants/CrossAppellees,
v
No. 284163
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 07-011074-CZ
CHRISTOPHER M. TERRYN,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Whitbeck and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs1 appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor
of defendant, Christopher M. Terryn, and dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendant crossappeals as of right the same order. We affirm.
A brief summation of the factual and procedural history of this litigation is particularly
relevant to our analysis. We adopt the description of the proceedings leading up to this appeal
from the trial court’s opinion:
On August 3, 2006, Judge Robert Owen of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York entered a default judgment on the issue of
copyright infringement against this case’s plaintiffs, who were the defendants
there, in Thomas Publishing Co v Industrial Quick Search, Inc, Docket No. 02CIV-3307(RO). He did so because he found that Industrial Quick Search, Inc.,
and its principals (hereinafter collectively “IQS”) had directed Mr. Terryn, its
then-employee, and had shown him how, to plagiarize for its commercial benefit
valuable materials copyrighted by the Thomas Publishing Company and by
1
Industrial Quick Search, Inc. (hereinafter IQS), Meiresonne & Associates, Inc. and Michael
Meiresonne (hereinafter collectively referred to as “plaintiffs”).
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Product Information Network, Inc. (hereinafter collectively “TPC”); that Mr.
Terryn had followed the instructions given to him; and that, to thwart discovery,
IQS had deliberately destroyed numerous documents critical to determining the
scope and effect of its plagiarism. In other words, Judge Owen found so-called
“spoliation” which was severe enough to warrant the sanction of a default
judgment.
A year later, IQS filed this case here, claiming that Mr. Terryn had
defamed it by falsely reporting to TPC that his plagiarism had occurred at the
direction of IQS. An e-mail by Mr. Terryn had prompted the New York case, and
he testified in it. This case seeks indemnification or contribution from Mr.
Terryn. After Judge Owen’s spoliation ruling, IQS had settled the New York case
for $2.5 million. IQS also seeks consequential damages. In lieu of an answer,
Mr. Terryn filed a motion to dismiss, in actuality, a motion for summary
disposition. He contends that, in light of the finding in New York that he had
been directed by IQS to plagiarize TPC’s material, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel precludes this case. IQS responds that collateral estoppel is not available
for a variety of reasons.
In addition, following our review of the record, we note as pertinent the fact that Terryn, while a
paid employee, was only retained for a two-month period, working as a college intern in April
and May 2001 with plaintiffs. Further, given the allegations in this action, we find it suspect that
plaintiffs never sought, in the preceding federal district court action, to either join Terryn as a
party or identify him as a non-party at fault. When Terryn agreed to provide testimony for TPC
in the original federal district court action, TPC provided him with a waiver or release of any
liability for his involvement in the acts of plagiarism by plaintiffs and agreed to indemnify him.
Consequently, it appears to this Court that plaintiffs are attempting, in a convoluted manner, to
collaterally attack the federal court ruling of liability and are brazenly seeking compensation for
their own wrongdoing from the victim of their plagiarism, through TPC’s indemnification
agreement with Terryn. Such an abuse of the legal process cannot be sanctioned or tolerated.
While we do not specifically disagree with the lower court’s reasoning, based on the principle of
Occam’s razor2, we believe it is only necessary to consider plaintiffs’ own wrongful conduct in
justifying the dismissal of this action.
As a starting point for our analysis:
[W]e note the legal context that gives rise to the question. In Michigan, it is an
established principle that “a default settles the question of liability as to wellpleaded allegations and precludes the defaulting party from litigating that issue.”
Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 578; 321 NW2d 653 (1982); see also American
Central Corp v Stevens Van Lines, Inc, 103 Mich App 507, 512; 303 NW2d 234
(1981) (“Entry of a default is equivalent to an admission by the defaulting party as
2
Also referred to as the law of parsimony; usually interpreted to mean the simpler the
explanation, the better.
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to all well-pleaded allegations.”) In other words, where a trial court has entered a
default judgment against a defendant, the defendant’s liability is admitted and the
defendant is estopped from litigating issues of liability. [Kalamazoo Oil Co v
Boerman, 242 Mich App 75, 78-79; 618 NW2d 66 (2000).]
This is true even when, such as in this case, the basis for entry of the default is “as a sanction for
discovery abuses.” Id. at 79. Because plaintiffs’ liability has been conclusively established by
the default judgment entered in the underlying action in federal district court, they have lost their
“standing to contest the factual allegations” set forth by TPC, Ackron Contracting Co v Oakland
Co, 108 Mich App 767, 775; 310 NW2d 874 (1981), and are, therefore, properly subject to the
wrongful conduct rule and dismissal of their claims against Terryn.
We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Al-Shimmari v Detroit Medical Ctr, 477 Mich 280, 287; 731 NW2d 29 (2007). In accordance
with the wrongful conduct rule, a plaintiff’s claims are generally precluded if they are based on
conduct by the plaintiff that is “prohibited or almost entirely prohibited under a penal or criminal
statute.” Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 561; 537 NW2d 208 (1995).
At the outset, we note that the wrongful conduct rule is construed to be an affirmative
defense because it does not rebut a plaintiff’s prima facie case. Instead, the wrongful conduct
rule serves to preclude or foreclose a plaintiff from proceeding for reasons which are unrelated to
their prima facie case. Campbell v St John Hosp, 434 Mich 608, 615-616; 455 NW2d 695
(1990). Although typically the burden is on a defendant to establish the existence of an
affirmative defense, Nationwide Mut Ins Co v Quality Builders, Inc, 192 Mich App 643, 646;
482 NW2d 474 (1992), when a complaint demonstrates on its face that relief is barred by an
affirmative defense, a trial court can enter a dismissal based on the failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, Glazier v Lee, 171 Mich App 216, 219-220; 429 NW2d 857 (1988).
The basic premise underlying the wrongful conduct rule is that a plaintiff’s claim will be
barred if it is based, either in whole or in part, on the plaintiff’s own illegal conduct. Orzel,
supra at 558. The rule is applicable even when the defendant has been an equal participant in the
illegal activity or conduct. Id. Our Supreme Court elucidated the rule in Manning v Bishop of
Marquette, 345 Mich 130, 133; 76 NW2d 75 (1956), stating in relevant part: “Our doors are
open to both the virtuous and the villainous. We do not, however, lend our aid to the furtherance
of an unlawful project, nor do we decide, as between 2 scoundrels, who cheated whom the
more.” (Citation omitted.) In Orzel, the Court elaborated on the public policy considerations
supporting the wrongful conduct rule, explaining,
If courts choose to regularly give their aid under such circumstances, several
unacceptable consequences would result. First, by making relief potentially
available for wrongdoers, courts in effect would condone and encourage illegal
conduct. Second, some wrongdoers would be able to receive a profit or
compensation as a result of their illegal acts. Third, and related to the two
previously mentioned results, the public would view the legal system as a
mockery of justice. Fourth, and finally, wrongdoers would be able to shift much
of the responsibility for their illegal acts to other parties. [Orzel, supra at 559-560
(citations omitted).]
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We find the underlying rationale for the wrongful conduct rule particularly apt given the factual
and procedural history of this litigation.
Application of the wrongful conduct rule is subject to two identified limitations. First, a
plaintiff’s conduct is required to be mostly or entirely prohibited by a penal or criminal statute
and must be “serious in nature.” Hashem v Les Stanford Olds, 266 Mich App 61, 89; 697 NW2d
558 (2005), citing Orzel, supra at 561. Second, “a sufficient causal nexus must exist between the
plaintiff’s illegal conduct and the plaintiff’s asserted damages.” Id. at 564. We can easily
address and dispense with these limitations.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs were found to be liable of all claims included in Thomas
Publishing’s underlying complaint through the default judgment. Plaintiffs’ conduct in
plagiarizing material constituted a violation of 17 USC 506(a)(1), which precludes copyright
infringement, and a person who violates that section shall be imprisoned for not more than 5
years if the copyrighted works have a total retail value of more than $2,500 (1 year imprisonment
for copyrighted works with lesser value). 18 USC 2319(b)(1) and (3). As such, plaintiffs’
conduct is clearly prohibited by a criminal or penal statute. In addition, a sufficient nexus exists
between plaintiffs’ breach of the law and the losses incurred. Plaintiffs’ illegal conduct in
plagiarizing material from TPC, combined with efforts to conceal the conduct through
establishment of a “shadow” corporation and subsequent destruction of discovery materials, was
the cause of the losses incurred. In other words, plaintiffs’ claims are both directly and causally
related to their decision to plagiarize TPC’s material and not accept responsibility for that
behavior.
In addition to the limitations applicable to the wrongful conduct rule, there exist two
recognized exceptions that will serve to preclude its application. The first exception is referred
to as the differing degrees of culpability exception. This is described as where the “plaintiff has
engaged in serious illegal conduct and the illegal conduct has proximately caused the plaintiff’s
injuries, a plaintiff may still seek recovery against the defendant if the defendant’s culpability is
greater than the plaintiff’s culpability for the injuries . . . .” Orzel, supra at 569. The second
exception, identified as the statutory basis for recovery exception, is deemed to be applicable
when a plaintiff contends that the defendant violated a statute, which implicitly or explicitly
permits the plaintiff to recover for injuries suffered as a result of that violation. Id. at 570.
Again, we find these exceptions inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.
First, plaintiffs suggest that Terryn was the more culpable party. The requirements to
meet this exception were discussed by this Court in Stopera v DiMarco, 218 Mich App 565, 571572 n 5; 554 NW2d 379 (1996), which provided in relevant part:
In its discussion of the applicability of the exception, the Orzel Court listed only
situations where a defendant was egregiously more at fault than a plaintiff, Orzel,
supra at 569, without suggesting that a slight difference in the degree of
culpability would be sufficient for its application. Further, to apply the culpability
exception in cases where a defendant is only slightly more blameworthy would
likely eviscerate the wrongful conduct rule entirely; presumably, a plaintiff will
almost always be able to argue that, if the allegations of a complaint are proved, a
defendant’s misconduct will be shown to be at least somewhat greater than the
plaintiff’s . . . . Hence, in order for plaintiffs to assert this exception, defendants
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must be significantly more culpable than plaintiffs for the losses suffered by
plaintiffs.
It cannot seriously be maintained that Terryn, a part-time intern for the limited period of two
months employment, could be more culpable than plaintiffs who initiated the illegal copying of
TPC’s materials a month before Terryn was formally engaged, with the continuation and
substantial expansion of the improper conduct into September 2001, four months after Terryn
left his job with plaintiffs. Further, to suggest that an intern was responsible for the initial
decision to plagiarize documents and the continuation of that conduct even after his absence
from plaintiffs’ employment is disingenuous at best and completely incredible at worst. Clearly,
any decision to continue and expand the practice of plagiarizing TPC’s materials is directly
attributable to plaintiffs, since it is plaintiffs that received the commercial and monetary benefit
and not Terryn. As such, there is no factual development that would serve to demonstrate or lead
this Court to conclude that Terryn was significantly more culpable than plaintiffs.
The remaining recognized exception to the wrongful conduct rule requires plaintiffs to
establish that Terryn violated a statute, which would permit them to recover for injuries they
suffered as a consequence of Terryn’s violation. Orzel, supra at 570. While Terryn also violated
copyright laws, any recompense available from violation of the statute would inure to TPC and
not plaintiffs. As such, this exception is clearly inapplicable.
Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint because this Court cannot
permit plaintiffs to recover given their own culpability and involvement in illegal conduct and
their subsequent attempts to conceal their behavior. To allow them to proceed with their claims
against Terryn would be contrary to, and seriously undermine, the wrongful conduct rule, which
is designed to avoid the condoning of criminal behavior and to preclude wrongdoers from
shifting the blame for their own illegal conduct onto others. We, therefore, affirm the trial
court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ action, albeit for a different reason.
Because we affirm the trial court’s ruling, we need not address the merits of the issues
raised by Terryn.
Nevertheless, we conclude plaintiffs’ claims for contribution and
indemnification cannot prevail. Plaintiffs are not entitled to contribution from Terryn, since he
was not a party to the federal court action or the settlement agreement and the settlement
agreement does not extinguish his potential liability. Other than plaintiffs’ self-serving
assertions, there exists no support in the record that Terryn was afforded a meaningful
opportunity to participate in the settlement negotiations. MCL 600.2925a(3)(a) and (c). Further,
plaintiffs are not entitled to indemnification from Terryn, because plaintiffs are not free from
liability. Paul v Bogle, 193 Mich App 479, 491; 484 NW2d 728 (1992).
Finally, we note that on cross-appeal, Terryn argues that he is entitled to sanctions,
because plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous. Although Terryn has abandoned this argument by
failing to brief the merits of his allegation of error, Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley, 259
Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351 (2003), this Court, sua sponte, orders actual and punitive
damages against plaintiffs and in favor of defendant in an amount to be determined by the trial
court in accordance with our authority pursuant to MCR 7.216(C)(1)(a), (2).
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Affirmed and remanded to the trial court for the determination of damages in accordance
with MCR 7.216(C)(2). We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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