IN RE JA'MARRIANNA OLIVIA TAYLOR MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JA’MARRIANNA OLIVIA
TAYLOR, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 9, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293778
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-031341-NA
ALFONSO DUPREE TAYLOR,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
STACI LYNN TAYLOR,
Respondent.
In the Matter of JA’MARRIANNA OLIVIA
TAYLOR, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293801
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-031341-NA
STACI LYNN TAYLOR,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ALFONSO DUPREE TAYLOR,
Respondent.
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Before: Beckering, P.J., and Markey and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court’s order
terminating his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (i), (j), and
(l). Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm.
On appeal, respondents do not challenge the existence of at least one statutory ground for
terminating their parental rights. Rather, they argue that termination of their parental rights was
not in the child’s best interests. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence and that termination is in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re
Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
The trial court did not clearly err in its best interests determination because it is in the
child’s best interests to be protected from risk of harm. Given respondents’ failure to explain the
non-accidental injury sustained by their infant son, which was the basis for respondent-father’s
April 2009 criminal conviction of first-degree child abuse, the child would be at risk of harm if
placed in respondents’ care. Moreover, it is in the child’s best interests to be in a stable home
with caregivers committed to her well-being. There is no indication in the record that the child
will have the assurance of safety and stability that she needs with either respondent.
Respondents have a history of sporadic participation in counseling, lack of progress in parenting
skills, and the continued minimization of the son’s injury, which ultimately led to a prior
termination of their parental rights.
Respondent-mother demonstrated the inability to put her children before herself by
maintaining her marriage to respondent-father despite his criminal conviction and the restrictions
of his probation that prevent him from caring for a young child. Likewise, given their histories,
respondents’ lack of commitment to the services provided in their prior case less than one year
earlier and their failure to independently seek services during respondent-mother’s pregnancy
with the child in anticipation of her birth demonstrates their lack of commitment to proper
parenting.
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in not giving her credit for the recent
progress she made following the child’s removal as she never missed a counseling appointment,
was actively participating in therapy, and maintained an appropriate home. Respondentmother’s argument demonstrates her lack of understanding of the severity of the situation
involving the infant son’s fractured femur. Respondent-mother’s recent attendance in therapy
and the suitability of her home are necessary, but not sufficient by themselves, for her to be able
to properly provide for her child. They alone are not indicative of her ability to safely parent and
are not more important than her willingness to protect her children by explaining the son’s
injuries or ending her relationship with respondent-father. Respondent-mother’s active
participation in therapy and suitable housing do not undermine the trial court’s best interests
finding.
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Furthermore, although respondent-father argues that there has been no demonstration of
impropriety particular to the child, a parent’s treatment of one child is probative of his proclivity
to abuse other children. In re Parshall, 159 Mich App 683, 689; 406 NW2d 913 (1987); In re
Youmans, 156 Mich App 679, 689; 401 NW2d 905 (1986); see In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich
App 219, 222; 263 NW2d 37 (1977); In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 392; 210 NW2d 482
(1973). Given the history of abuse, respondents’ failure to explain the infant son’s nonaccidental injury and protect their children, the trial court did not err in its best interests
determination.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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