WEXFORD PARKHOMES CONDO ASSOCIATION V BRENDA L EDWARDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WEXFORD PARKHOMES CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION
UNPUBLISHED
February 9, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288862
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-090593-CH
BRENDA L. EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Markey and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying her motion to set aside
the default judgment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
On June 27, 2008, defendant was served with a complaint for foreclosure of a
condominium association lien and for money damages and unpaid assessments. Defendant’s
first filing in this case was a pro se motion on July 23, 2008, requesting an extension of time to
file an answer. The hearing on that motion was scheduled for August 6, 2008, but was not
conducted because defendant had not filed a proof of service with the court. Instead, the motion
was denied on August 6 due to the lack of service. The trial court also made the notation “too
late” on the order of denial. Defendant objected to that denial and a hearing concerning her
objection was heard on September 10, 2008.
At the September 10, 2008 hearing, plaintiff told the court that, despite being served with
defendant’s motions requesting an extension of time and objecting to the court’s denial of that
motion, it never received notice of the hearings related to those motions. The trial court denied
defendant’s objection to the denial of her extension request, stating that “when you [defendant]
brought your motion, you didn’t include a proof of service. That’s why the Court wouldn’t deal
with it. You have to notify the other side. And maybe you did notify the other side, but you
have to show proof of that to the Court before the Court will proceed to hear something.”
Defendant filed her answer to the complaint on September 30, 2008—three months after
she was initially served. Before that, plaintiff had filed an entry of default on August 7, 2008.
The trial court entered a default judgment on October 1, 2008, which was the final order and
which closed the case.
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Two weeks later, defendant filed a motion to set aside the entry of default and default
judgment. At that time, defendant also filed a notarized document titled “Meritorious Defense.”
At the conclusion of a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion, finding that she did not
show good cause or provide a meritorious defense to set aside the default judgment.
A trial court’s decision on a motion to set aside a default is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Shawl v Spence Bros, Inc, 280 Mich App 213, 220; 760 NW2d 674 (2008). Such
decision
should only be reversed on appeal when there is a clear abuse of that discretion.
An abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in judicial opinion.
Rather, an abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Moreover, although the
law favors the determination of claims on the merits, it has also been said that the
policy of this state is generally against setting aside defaults and default
judgments that have been properly entered. [Id., 220-221 (emphasis in original,
internal citations omitted).]
A motion to set aside a default or default judgment for reasons other than lack of jurisdiction
over the defendant “shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts
showing a meritorious defense is filed.” MCR 2.603(D)(1).
The following factors are to be considered when determining if a party has established
good cause for the purpose of setting aside a default judgment.
(1) whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the
deadline to file;
(2) if the party simply missed the deadline to file, how long after the
deadline the filing occurred;
(3) the duration between entry of the default judgment and the filing of the
motion to set aside the judgment;
(4) whether there was a defective process or notice;
(5) the circumstances behind the failure to file or file timely;
(6) whether the failure was knowing or intentional;
(7) the size of the judgment and the amount of costs due under MCR
2.603(D)(4);
(8) whether the default judgment results in an ongoing liability (as with
paternity or child support); and
(9) if an insurer is involved, whether internal policies of the company were
followed. [Shawl, 280 Mich App at 238.]
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The statute for setting aside a default requires that both good cause and a meritorious
defense be shown. MCR 2.603(D)(1).
In determining whether a defendant has a meritorious defense, the trial
court should consider whether the defendant’s affidavit of meritorious defense
contains evidence that:
(1) the plaintiff cannot prove or defendant can disprove an element
of the claim or a statutory requirement;
(2) a ground for summary disposition exists under MCR 2.116(C)(2),
(3), (5), (6), (7), or (8); or
(3) the plaintiff’s claim rests on evidence that is inadmissible.
[Shawl, 280 Mich App at 238.]
“[T]he negligence of either the attorney or the litigant is not normally grounds for setting
aside a default regularly entered.” Id. at 223. Additionally, a pro se defendant is not excused
from following the court rules. Bachor v Detroit, 49 Mich App 507, 512; 212 NW2d 302
(1973).
In this case, the default was entered because defendant did not timely file an answer after
being served with the complaint on June 27, 2008. Defendant did not actually file her answer
until September 30, 2008—more than three months after she was served with the complaint. Her
motion for an extension of time to answer was filed on July 23, 2008, and denied on August 6,
2008, because she did not provide any proof of service with her filing. Accordingly, the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s request for an extension of time to file an answer based on her
failure to follow procedural rules was not a substantial defect or irregularity in the proceedings
underlying the default.
Similarly, defendant did not provide a reasonable excuse for not complying with the
procedural requirements. A pro se litigant is required to follow the court rules and a litigant’s
negligence is not normally grounds to set aside a default. Shawl, 280 Mich App at 223; Bachor,
49 Mich App at 512.
Defendant did respond to the complaint, but it was in a procedurally defective manner.
The notice of hearing was defective on her initial motion for an extension of time and on
subsequent motions as well. Despite being able to file a motion for extension of time to answer
within 28 days after receiving the complaint and following up on that with other motions and
objections, defendant did not file her answer until three months after initially being served.
Defendant’s motion to set aside the default was filed two weeks after the default judgment was
entered.
The trial court’s determination that defendant failed to show good cause to set aside the
default was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes and therefore was not an
abuse of discretion. Even if the Shawl factors related to good cause could have been resolved in
defendant’s favor, there is a second part of the court rule that must be satisfied.
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To set aside a default, the defendant must show both good cause and a meritorious
defense. MCR 2.603(D)(1). Defendant’s notarized document titled meritorious defense did not
offer a defense to her lack of payment of condominium association fees. Defendant did not
provide any facts to show that she did not owe the fees, but rather defendant alleged that she, a
condominium owner, was forced into a contract with the condominium association. Defendant
also alleged that plaintiff’s bylaws were deficient. Nothing in defendant’s meritorious defense
suggests or supports a position that non-payment of association dues was appropriate or justified.
Accordingly, defendant has not shown the existence of a meritorious defense, and the trial
court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Defendant’s due process argument is also without merit. Defendant argues that she has
been denied due process because she was not allowed to argue the merits of her case before a
judge or jury. Procedural due process requires that “interested parties are given notice through a
method that is reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise them of proceedings that
may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests and afford them an opportunity
to respond.” Wortelboer v Benzie Co, 212 Mich App 208, 218; 537 NW2d 603 (1995). The file
and history of this case, with all of plaintiff’s filings and appearances in the trial court, plainly
show that defendant was apprised of the proceedings directly and adversely affecting her
interests. Further, defendant did in fact respond and appear before the trial court at multiple
hearings.
Affirmed. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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