PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER BRANDON LATIMER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 2, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 287791
Mason Circuit Court
LC No. 07-001878-FC
CHRISTOPHER BRANDON LATIMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree felony murder,
MCL 750.316(1)(b),1 armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery,
MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.529. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of life
for felony murder, and 11 years and 6 months to 40 years in prison for each of the armed robbery
and conspiracy convictions. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the murder of Jarrett Barnard, during a robbery
attempt perpetrated by defendant, Donquez Haynes (defendant’s brother), Anthony Southwell
and William Cockream, who conspired to commit the robbery in order to obtain marijuana. The
plan called for Southwell to feign the robbery of defendant and Haynes, using defendant’s BB
gun, while Cockream robbed the intended victim. Before the robbery attempt, defendant
provided the BB gun, which resembled a pistol, to Southwell and gave money to Haynes to be
surrendered during the feigned robbery, traveled with Southwell and Cockream to retrieve
Cockream’s gun, made telephone calls to inquire about purchasing marijuana, entered Barnard’s
residence, with Haynes, to verify the presence of marijuana, and then reentered Barnard’s
residence with Southwell, Haynes and Cockream, to steal the marijuana from Barnard, at which
point Cockream shot Barnard.
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Defendant was charged with open murder. MCL 750.318.
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On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed
verdict, and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of felony murder, because the
evidence did not establish that defendant aided or abetted a murder. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict de novo,
considering the evidence presented by the prosecutor up to the time the motion was made in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find
that the essential elements of the charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006); People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 633-634;
476 NW2d 129 (1998); People v Gould, 225 Mich App 79, 86; 570 NW2d 140 (1997). This
Court also reviews claims of insufficient evidence de novo, viewing all of the evidence presented
at trial in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618; 751 NW2d 57 (2008); People v Hawkins, 245 Mich
App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001); People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641
(1997). All conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the prosecution. Kanaan, 278 Mich
App at 619; Terry, 224 Mich App at 452. And, when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence
presented, this Court must “draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in
support of the jury verdict.” People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 640-641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003).
A prosecutor is not charged with disproving every reasonable theory consistent with a
defendant’s innocence, but must introduce sufficient evidence to “convince [a reasonable] jury
‘in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide.’” People v Nowack,
462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000), quoting People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 273, n 6;
536 NW2d 517 (1995).
Initially, we note that defendant’s arguments on appeal are premised on a fundamental
misconception about the theory of culpability argued by the prosecutor at trial. While the
prosecutor argued that defendant could be found guilty of armed robbery and second-degree
murder on an aiding and abetting theory, the first-degree murder charge was not so argued.
Rather, the prosecutor argued that defendant was guilty of felony murder based on his direct
participation in the armed robbery that resulted in Barnard’s death. Thus, defendant’s assertion
that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the murder charge, and
that there was insufficient evidence presented to support his conviction of felony-murder,
because the evidence did not support a finding that he possessed the requisite intent of an aider
and abettor to felony murder is misguided.
“The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent
to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with
knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice], (3) while
committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies
specifically enumerated in [the statute, including armed robbery].” People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 759; 597 NW2d 103 (1999), quoting People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 566; 540 NW2d
728 (1995) (alteration in Carines). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
from it may be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime, People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695,
702; 635 NW2d 491 (2001), including malice, Carines, 460 Mich at 759. A jury may infer
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malice from evidence that the defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death
or great bodily harm. Id. Malice can also be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. Id.
In People v Bulls, 262 Mich App 618, 626-627; 687 NW2d 159 (2005), this Court found
that a jury could conclude that a series of events, set in force by the defendant, was likely to
cause death or great bodily harm where the defendant instigated a criminal transaction by
inviting a conspirator to participate in a robbery and encouraging him to use a shotgun during the
robbery. The Bulls Court found that even though evidence did not show that the defendant
handled the weapon during the robbery, he nevertheless “used” the weapon with a conspirator’s
help to perpetrate the crime, and such “use” supported an inference of malice. Id. at 627. The
Bulls Court thus concluded that the defendant acted with malice, even if he did not know that the
conspirator intended to kill the victim, because “defendant intentionally set in motion a force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” Id.
Here, the evidence demonstrates that defendant planned to rob the victim by having his
accomplices feign an armed robbery of defendant and his brother, while also committing an
actual armed robbery of the intended victim, who defendant knew and who could, therefore,
identify defendant. Plainly, this plan called for a second gun in the hands of Cockream, which
Cockream and Southwell retrieved from Southwell’s residence while defendant and Haynes
waited in the car. Even though there was no testimony that defendant saw Cockream with a gun,
Southwell testified that the men specifically went to his home to get the gun before they went to
the location of the crime. As explained in Bulls, 262 Mich App at 626-627, the requisite
malicious intent may be inferred from evidence that the defendant intentionally set in motion a
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, including by inviting Cockream and Southwell
to participate in the robbery during which it was necessary that Cockream be armed, and the
nature of the killing established that it was neither accidental nor done without malice.
Therefore, the evidence presented here was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that
defendant acted with the requisite malice. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion for a directed verdict.
For the same reasons, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree felony murder. Kanaan, 278
Mich App at 618-619; Terry, 224 Mich App at 452. Again, testimony established that defendant
planned an armed robbery that required the use of two weapons, gave Southwell a BB gun that
looked like a pistol in furtherance of the plan, and was with Southwell and Cockream when the
second weapon was obtained. Additional testimony established that defendant made multiple
preparatory telephone calls and visited the victim on the day of the killings, permitting a
reasonable inference that defendant actively participated in enacting the plan. While defendant
denied specific knowledge of the gun used by Cockream, Cockream’s possession of the weapon
was required to carry out the planned robbery, defendant went with Southwell and Cockream to
retrieve that gun, and two witnesses placed him inside the apartment when Cockream drew his
weapon. It is for the trier of fact rather than this Court to determine what inferences can be fairly
drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded to the inferences. People v
Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002); People v Passage, 277 Mich App 175,
177; 743 NW2d 746 (2007).
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Finally, trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to object to the court’s failure to
provide an adding and abetting instruction along with the elements of first-degree felony murder.
Such an instruction would have been at odds with the prosecution’s presentation of the case, and
there is no evidence that defendant asked for such an instruction. “Trial counsel cannot be
faulted for failing to raise an objection or motion that would have been futile.” People v Fike,
228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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