IN RE SHA'MARRI NA'SHONE SPENCER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SNS, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 293693
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-052395-NA
JENNIFER BONITA BOUIE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LAMARR SPENCER,
Respondent.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Meter and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental
rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g).1 We affirm.
On appeal, respondent does not challenge the existence of at least one statutory ground
for terminating her parental rights. Rather, she argues that termination of her parental rights was
not in the best interests of SNS. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence and that termination is in the best interest of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Sours,
459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
1
The parental rights of the child’s father, Lamarr Spencer, were also terminated but he is not a
party to this appeal. References to “respondent” in the singular throughout this opinion are to
respondent mother only.
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The trial court did not clearly err in its best interest determination because there is no
evidence of a strong bond between respondent and SNS. There was testimony that, at a recent
visit, SNS exhibited stranger anxiety with respondent. When respondent was given the
opportunity to develop her relationship with SNS through parenting time, she disappeared and
stopped visiting for four months, jeopardizing any bond they may have had.
Furthermore, it is in SNS’s best interest to be raised in a drug free, stable environment,
which respondent is unable to provide. Respondent’s substance abuse and untreated mental
illness would put SNS at risk of harm. In minimizing her drug addiction and contending that her
substance abuse was not severe enough to endanger SNS, respondent demonstrates her lack of
suitability to parent.
Furthermore, it is also in SNS’s best interest to be cared for by someone who can provide
for her basic needs. By the time of the permanent custody hearing, respondent did not have
housing or employment. There is no evidence that respondent can provide a suitable home for
SNS or that she has the financial means to support her. “‘If a parent cannot or will not meet her
irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over the needs
of the parent.’” In re Terry 240 Mich App 14, 28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000), quoting In re AP,
1999 PA Super 78; 728 A2d 375, 379 (1999). Thus, there was no evidence to show that the
court clearly erred in its best interest determination.
In addition, contrary to respondent’s assertion, SNS’s removal was necessary due to the
risk of harm her severe drug problem and mental illness posed to SNS. Respondent contends the
trial court “sabotaged” her by removing SNS from her care and blames the court for her failure
to comply with the treatment plan. In not taking responsibility for herself and not demonstrating
a commitment to SNS by participating in services, respondent showed that she was not a fit
parent. Moreover, even if she had been fully compliant with her treatment plan, she could not
safely parent SNS until she stopped using drugs.
Respondent also argues the trial court erred in determining that petitioner had made
reasonable efforts to prevent SNS’s removal from her care and custody. MCL 712A.18f; MCR
3.965(D)(1). Respondent’s argument is contrary to the trial record. Respondent had multiple
prevention services, including parenting classes, but SNS could not safely be maintained in
respondent’s care once her drug addiction became apparent. Respondent also argues that
petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to prevent termination of her parental rights. After a
child has been removed, petitioner must make reasonable efforts to reunite a respondent and her
child through a treatment plan and referrals. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d
192 (2005). Following SNS’s removal, the caseworkers repeatedly attempted to meet with
respondent, referred her for services, and offered their help but respondent was disinterested and
unmotivated.
Respondent contends that given her mental health issues, more than routine referrals
needed to be made to assist her. “[I]f the [DHS] fails to take into account the [parent’s]
limitations or disabilities and make any reasonable accommodations, then it cannot be found that
reasonable efforts were made to reunite the family.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610
NW2d 563 (2000). Despite respondent’s assertion, the evidence showed that the caseworkers
were aware that her mental health was a priority and were doing everything they could to get her
to seek therapy and treatment and to take her medication. To that end, in addition to making
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referrals, they assisted her in scheduling appointments. Also, respondent was given a psychiatric
evaluation and prescribed medication in November 2008 to assist in stabilizing her moods.
Against medical opinion, she discontinued taking her prescribed medication. Thus, respondent’s
limitations were taken into account, but she chose not to make the necessary effort and
compromised herself.
Finally, the absence of reasonable efforts by the petitioner has only been relevant to
assessing whether the statutory grounds for termination were established. See, e.g., In re
Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 65-68; 472 NW2d 38 (1991). Here, the trial court did not clearly err
in terminating respondent’s parental rights under two statutory bases because she failed to take
advantage of the services offered to her and not because of petitioner’s failure to make efforts.
Also, respondent does not suggest what services were denied to her or what other efforts could
have been made while SNS was in foster care. Moreover, petitioner could not have facilitated
services from December 2008 through April 2009 because respondent disappeared and never
disclosed her whereabouts to petitioner. And, had respondent felt that petitioner was not
properly servicing the case, the trial court’s orders should have been challenged by the filing of
an application for leave pursuant to MCR 3.993(B). In this case, the evidence showed petitioner
consistently made reasonable efforts to prevent SNS’s removal and to facilitate reunification, but
respondent did not avail herself of services or sufficiently benefit from them. Thus, the trial
court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner had made reasonable efforts to assist
respondent.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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