JOHN M HALL V MICHELE J HALL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN M. HALL,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 2010
Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee,
v
No. 288241
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 07-039178-DM
MICHELE J. HALL,
Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a circuit court order entering a consent judgment of
divorce. We affirm.
In August 2007, plaintiff filed a divorce complaint seeking to conclude the parties’ 30year marriage. Plaintiff and defendant executed a settlement agreement in mid-September 2007
and a consent judgment of divorce in October 2007. The settlement agreement contemplated no
spousal support and precluded defendant from obtaining any of plaintiff’s pension benefits.
Plaintiff moved to enter the consent judgment, and defendant responded that she had signed the
agreement under duress and asked the court to set aside the settlement agreement.
After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found nothing illegal with respect to
plaintiff having used evidence of defendant’s sexual acts to pressure her to sign the settlement
agreement, and that defendant did not lack mental capacity when she agreed to the settlement.
The court emphasized that in the days between defendant’s signings of the settlement agreement
and the consent judgment, defendant no longer lived with plaintiff and remained free to do
whatever and contact whomever she pleased. The circuit court also noted defendant’s
acknowledgement that she comprehended all provisions of the settlement agreement, further
signifying that defendant willingly opted to release her interest in plaintiff’s property to shield
her children and the public from disclosure of her online sexual communications. The court thus
concluded that no duress existed and entered the consent judgment.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s finding “concerning the validity of the
parties’ consent to a settlement agreement.” Keyser v Keyser, 182 Mich App 268, 269-270; 451
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NW2d 587 (1990). What constitutes duress is a question of law, and whether duress exists in a
particular case is a question of fact. Clement v Buckley Mercantile Co, 172 Mich 243, 253; 137
NW 657 (1912). We review for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact. Ross v Auto Club
Group, 481 Mich 1, 7; 748 NW2d 552 (2008). Clear error occurs “when the reviewing court is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted).
Our Supreme Court has explained that duress generally “exists when one by the unlawful
act of another is induced to make a contract or perform some act under circumstances which
deprive him of the exercise of free will,” and that “[m]oral duress consists in imposition,
oppression, undue influence, or the taking of undue advantage of the business or financial stress
or extreme necessities or weakness of another,” where “in equity and good conscience” the party
profiting “ought not . . . be permitted to retain” what he gained. Norton v State Hwy Dep’t, 315
Mich 313, 319-320; 24 NW2d 132 (1946) (internal quotation omitted). A court also may set
aside a settlement agreement between the parties if the party challenging the agreement
demonstrates that she lacked mental capacity to enter the binding agreement. Van Wagoner v
Van Wagoner, 131 Mich App 204, 213; 346 NW2d 77 (1983).
The well-settled test of mental capacity to contract . . . is whether the
person in question possesses sufficient mind to understand, in a reasonable
manner, the nature and effect of the act in which he is engaged. However, to
avoid a contract it must appear not only that the person was of unsound mind or
insane when it was made, but that the unsoundness or insanity was of such a
character that he had no reasonable perception of the nature or terms of the
contract . . . . Emotional disorders, alone, will not invalidate a contract. [Id. at
214 (internal quotation omitted).]
The circuit court in this case correctly found that defendant did not enter the settlement
agreement under duress. The parties described that they had entered the settlement agreement
shortly after plaintiff learned that defendant was exchanging sexually explicit emails with other
men and advertising sexual services online. If the question of property division had gone to trial,
the circuit court would have considered the factors set forth in Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141,
159-160; 485 NW2d 893 (1992), which include the “past relations and conduct of the parties . . .
and . . . general principles of equity.” Plaintiff thus did nothing illegal to the extent that in
reaching the settlement agreement with defendant he relied on admissible evidence of her past
relations and conduct. And the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the record
substantiated no other unduly coercive behavior or conduct by plaintiff. Consequently, we
conclude that the circuit court correctly found nothing inequitable in defendant’s decision to
forego spousal support in exchange for the keeping of her sexual activities from becoming
public.
Furthermore, the circuit court correctly characterized the record as containing no
evidence suggesting that defendant suffered from stress that amounted to a mental incapacity.
Defendant recounted having some depression and sleep loss. But defendant also conceded that
she otherwise successfully performed her requisite daily activities even during these periods, and
as the circuit court noted, defendant had more than a week to contemplate the terms of the
settlement agreement and consider whether to retain legal counsel to review the settlement
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agreement. In summary, we detect no clear error in the circuit court’s findings that defendant
knew what she was giving up in signing the settlement agreement and that she had awareness of
the reasons why she had decided to enter the agreement.
Defendant further claims on appeal that the circuit court “erred in not considering a
modification of the child support or spousal support provisions, even if the settlement were
otherwise deemed valid.” Because defendant has not identified in her brief any allegedly
erroneous ruling of the circuit court related to spousal support or child custody, we simply cannot
address the merits of her contention. McIntosh v McIntosh, 282 Mich App 471, 484-485; 768
NW2d 325 (2009). Moreover, our review of the record reveals no support- or custody-related
request by defendant that the circuit court refused to consider.1
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
The parties originally agreed, as reflected in the initial consent judgment of divorce entered by
the circuit court, that defendant would have primary physical custody of two of the parties’ three
children, plaintiff would have primary physical custody of the parties’ third child, and plaintiff
would pay defendant $800 in monthly child support. Plaintiff later sought a change in this
custodial arrangement and cancellation of his child support obligation, averring that defendant
had contacted him to advise “that he needed to come pick-up his son and take him since she did
not have the money or ability to support or care for him.” Without any objection of record by
defendant, the circuit court entered an “Order granting plaintiff’s motion to change custody and
terminating support.” This order expressly envisions that defendant “may re-petition the Court
to change custody, if she so chooses.”
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