ROBERT ADKINS V RUTLAND CHARTER TOWNSHIP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT ADKINS, JACQUELINE ADKINS,
WILLIAM BACON, RICHARD DEMING,
AUDREY DEMING, GARY DENSLOW,
PATRICIA DENSLOW, WALTER H.
FORSBERG, GREGORY E. THOMPSON,
BONNIE L. THOMPSON and ALGONQUIN
LAKE WATERFRONT OWNERS ALLIANCE,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
RUTLAND CHARTER TWP ZONING BOARD
OF APPEALS, RUTLAND CHARTER TWP, and
RUTLAND CHARTER TWP ZONING
ADMINISTRATOR,
No. 286888
Barry Circuit Court
LC No. 07-000210-AA
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Stephens, P.J., and Gleicher and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this zoning dispute, plaintiffs appeal by leave granted the trial court’s order affirming
defendant Rutland Charter Township Zoning Board of Appeal’s (the Board) interpretation of the
Rutland Township Zoning Ordinance (zoning ordinance). On appeal, the primary issue is
whether the zoning ordinance at issue prohibits the owners of riparian lots from allowing the
owners of non-riparian lots to use the riparian owners’ property to access the lake for seasonal
boating. We conclude that, under the plain and unambiguous language of the zoning ordinance,
multiple families may not use a single-family lot for access to the lake. For that reason, the
Board erred when it failed to enforce the ordinance as written and the trial court erred when it
affirmed the Board’s erroneous interpretation. For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s
decision, vacate its order affirming the Board, and remand for entry of an order reversing the
Board’s decision.
Rutland Township has promulgated regulations designed to limit access to lakes and
rivers within its boundaries. The relevant zoning ordinance is § 104.2029. This provision is
commonly referred to as the “anti-funneling” provision or “keyhole” provision and, in relevant
part, provides:
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a. In all zoning districts, there shall be at least one hundred feet (100’) of lake or
stream frontage . . . for each single-family home, dwelling unit, cottage,
condominium unit, site condominium unit, or apartment unit utilizing or accessing
the lake or stream frontage.
***
g. In addition to the above limitations, no easement, private park, common area,
lot, abutting or adjoining a lake or stream shall be used to permit access to the
lake or stream for more than one (1) single-family home, dwelling unit,
condominium unit, site condominium unit, apartment unit or any other use unless
such additional access use is approved as a special use or as a planned unit
development.
***
k. In the event this Section conflicts with any other section, this section shall
control.
Plaintiffs, owners of property abutting Algonquin Lake, filed an application for an
interpretation of the anti-funneling provision after several non-riparian landowners began
docking and mooring their boats on neighboring lakefront property lots with the permission of
the owners of those lots. Plaintiffs asked the Board to interpret and enforce the zoning ordinance
to prevent the non-riparian landowners’ use of the lakefront lots for lake access. After holding
two public hearings and conducting a survey, the Board determined that, under the preamble to
the ordinance, the anti-funneling provision applied only to developers and not residential
property owners. Thus, the Board determined that the riparian owners could permit non-riparian
owners to use the riparian lots for access to the lake. The trial court affirmed the Board’s
decision regarding the proper interpretation of the ordinance. Plaintiffs then appealed to this
Court.
This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision on an appeal from a zoning board,
but defers to the Board’s factual findings. Hughes v Almena Twp, 284 Mich App 50, 60; 771
NW2d 453 (2009). We will uphold a zoning board’s decision if: “(1) it comports with the law,
(2) was the product of proper procedure, (3) was supported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence on the record, and (4) was a proper exercise of reasonable discretion.”
Norman Corp v City of East Tawas, 263 Mich App 194, 198; 687 NW2d 861 (2004). This Court
also reviews de novo the proper interpretation of a zoning ordinance. Brandon Charter Twp v
Tippett, 241 Mich App 417, 427; 616 NW2d 243 (2000).
This Court applies the rules of statutory construction when construing a zoning
ordinance. Kalinoff v Columbus Twp, 214 Mich App 7, 10; 542 NW2d 276 (1995). “Therefore,
when the language used in an ordinance is clear and unambiguous, [this Court] may not engage
in judicial interpretation, and the ordinance must be enforced as written.” Id. (citations omitted).
While we construe an ordinance as a whole, see Winchester v W A Foote Mem Hosp, 153 Mich
App 489, 501; 396 NW2d 456 (1986), a preamble “‘is no part of the act, and cannot enlarge or
confer powers, nor control the words of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous. . . .’”
Nat’l Pride At Work, Inc, v Governor, 481 Mich 56, 79 n 20; 748 NW2d 524 (2008), quoting
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Yazoo & M V R Co v Thomas, 132 US 174, 188; 10 S Ct 68; 33 L Ed 302 (1889). “That is, a
‘preamble no doubt contributes to a general understanding of a [provision], but it is not an
operative part of the [provision],’ and ‘[w]here the enacting or operative parts of a [provision]
are unambiguous, the meaning of the [provision] cannot be controlled by language in the
preamble.’” Id., quoting Nat’l Wildlife Federation v EPA, 351 US App DC 42, 57-58; 286 F3d
554 (2002) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Board’s interpretation of the anti-funneling provision was contrary to the
unambiguous provisions of the anti-funneling provision and, therefore, contrary to the law.
Norman Corp, 263 Mich App at 198; MCL 125.3606(1). Under zoning ordinance § 104.2029g
(emphasis added), “no … lot, abutting a lake or stream shall be used to permit access to the lake
… for more than one (1) single-family home” unless otherwise approved. This language is
unambiguous and plainly limits the use of a given lakefront lot for access to the lake to the
owners of one single-family home—that is, § 104.2029 contemplates that the access provided
with a riparian lot will be linked to a single-family home and will include only the access
incidental to use by the owners of that single-family home. Further, there is no language within
the ordinance that specifically limits application of this language to developers, and we will not
read such a limitation into the ordinance. Rather, because this language is unambiguous, we
must enforce it as written. Kalinoff, 214 Mich App at 10.
Here, the riparian owners have permitted non-riparian lot owners to use the riparian
owners’ lakefront lots to regularly store, dock, or moor their boats and gain access to Algonquin
Lake. The riparian owners’ grant of semi-permanent access to non-riparian owners is not
incidental to the use of the lots as a single-family home. Rather, the lakefront lots are effectively
being used to provide access to the lake for more than one single-family home: they are
providing access for the single-family home on the lot itself and access for the owners of lots that
are non-riparian. Consequently, the lakefront lot owners who have allowed the docking, storage
or mooring of boats by non-riparian lot owners are acting in violation of the anti-funneling
provision of the zoning ordinance.
We also do not agree that the anti-funneling provision can be circumvented by classifying
the riparian owners’ grant of permission to use the lot for lake access as an accessory use of the
riparian owners’ lot. The anti-funneling provision of the zoning ordinance states that, “[i]n the
event this Section conflicts with any other section, this section shall control.” § 104.2029k
(emphasis added). Thus, even if the challenged conduct were an “accessory use” within the
meaning of § 104.2008 of the zoning ordinance, the prohibition stated in the anti-funneling
provision would control over the permissive uses described under § 104.2008.
In light of our conclusion with respect to the anti-funneling provision, we need not
address plaintiffs’ arguments that the Board’s decision was not a product of proper procedure
and was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record. For the
reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s decision, vacate its order affirming the Board’s
decision, and remand for entry of an order reversing the Board’s decision.
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Reversed and remanded for entry or an order reversing the Board’s decision. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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