ROBERT DAVIS V MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASS'N INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT DAVIS,
UNPUBLISHED
January 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 287623
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-116391-PZ
MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLECTIC
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order for payment of costs to defendant in the amount of
$6,076.60 for the filing of a frivolous action in this declaratory judgment action. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by sua sponte imposing sanctions. Plaintiff
contends that the trial court did not have authority to impose sanctions against plaintiff under
MCR 2.114(F), MCR 2.625(A)(2), or MCL 600.2591 because defendant did not file a formal
motion seeking sanctions for the filing of a frivolous lawsuit. The trial court imposed sanctions
on plaintiff because his complaint presented a “frivolous cause of action.” Although the trial
court did not state at the hearing the legal grounds upon which it relied to impose sanctions on
plaintiffs, a trial court can impose sanctions sua sponte on a party for filing a frivolous
complaint. See MCR 2.114(E). Thus, the trial court had authority to impose sanctions against
plaintiff.1
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in finding that his action was frivolous
because he made three arguments that supported his position and cited appropriate case law. We
disagree.
1
Although the order is labeled “Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and with MCL 600.2591
Cost and Fees,” sanctions are appropriate under MCR 2.114, rather than MCL 600.2591,
because the trial court sua sponte imposed the sanctions. It is the substance of the trial court’s
order, rather than its label, that steers this Court’s review.
-1-
MCR 2.114(D)(2) provides, in part, that a party, by signing a document, certifies, “to the
best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the
document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” The purpose of imposing sanctions
under MCR 2.114 is to deter parties and attorneys from filing documents or asserting claims and
defenses that have not been sufficiently investigated and researched or which are intended to
serve an improper purpose. FMB-First Michigan Bank v Bailey, 232 Mich App 711, 719; 591
NW2d 676 (1998). Whether the inquiry was reasonable is determined by an objective review of
the effort taken to investigate the claim before filing suit. Attorney Gen v Harkins, 257 Mich
App 564, 576; 669 NW2d 296 (2003). If a violation of MCR 2.114 is found, sanctions are
mandatory. MCR 2.114(E).
Plaintiff’s arguments consisted of his contention that language in defendant’s 2008-2009
membership resolution violated MCL 380.11a(4). Specifically, he argued that the language
requiring that (1) school districts be members of defendant for one year, (2) school districts only
belong to associations who have the same rules as defendant, and (3) school districts pass the
resolution without amendment all violated MCL 380.11a(4) and Breighner v Michigan High
School Athletic Association, Inc, 471 Mich 217; 683 NW2d 639 (2004).
Under MCL 380.11a(4), “A general powers school district may enter into agreements or
cooperative arrangements with other entities, public or private, or join organizations as part of
performing the functions of the school district. . . .” Plaintiff also cited to portions of Breighner,
supra at 230-231, which states:
The MHSAA is now a private corporation that is wholly self-regulated.
Membership is, by statute, completely voluntary. See MCL 380.11a(4)
(providing that [a] ... school district may join organizations as part of performing
the functions of the school district). In short, the MHSAA in its current form is
not “created by state or local authority.”
We further note that our comment in Kirby-that the MHSAA is a creature
of its members, with no independent authority over schools or students-merely
lends further credence to our conclusion that the MHSAA is not a public body.
Michigan schools are in no way obligated to join the MHSAA, and they remain
free to join other athletic organizations in lieu of, or in addition to, the MHSAA.
Member schools do not relinquish authority or decision-making capacity to the
MHSAA, nor does the MHSAA have any independent authority over its
members. [Id. (internal quotations omitted).]
It is undisputed that the Highland Park School Board, of which plaintiff is a member,
voluntarily adopted the 2008-2009 membership resolution of defendant and thereby agreed not to
amend the resolution, to abide by its terms for one year, and to adhere to defendant’s rules and
regulations.
Plaintiff’s perplexing arguments contend that it is illegal for defendant to set uniform
standards for becoming a member of its association. However, plaintiff’s pleadings cite no
authority supporting this position. What is vexing about plaintiff’s arguments is that plaintiff
instead cites to authority that is directly in opposition to his position.
-2-
Plaintiff argues that by not permitting amendments to the resolution defendant is in
violation of Breighner because schools are forced to relinquish authority and decision-making
capacity to defendant. This argument is misplaced. Defendant sets the terms of membership,
and a school board’s decision whether to join defendant is entirely voluntary. Nothing in the
language of the membership resolution restricts a school’s membership solely to defendant’s
organization. Plaintiff’s arguments simply have no support in the law, and therefore sanctions
were warranted under MCR 2.114(D)(2).
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court violated his due process rights as a litigant
proceeding in propria persona because he did not have notice that sanctions could be issued and
he did not have an opportunity to be heard.2 We disagree.
MCR 2.114 does not provide a procedure to be followed before sanctions can be
imposed. Hicks v Ottewell, 174 Mich App 750; 436 NW2d 453 (1989). However, this Court has
held with regard to MCR 2.114 that a party must receive some type of reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard before the imposition of sanctions. In Hicks, the trial court, on its own
motion, imposed sanctions on an attorney and an accountant for having signed pleadings on
behalf of a co-attorney without having received the authority to do so. Id. On appeal, the
sanctioned parties argued that the trial court did not provide them with advance notice of the
charges against them. This Court found no due process violation occurred because the
sanctioned parties were given ample opportunity to be heard at a hearing prior to the trial court’s
imposition of sanctions. Id.
Plaintiff was afforded notice that sanctions were being sought because defendant, in its
answer, requested sanctions under MCR 2.114. At the hearing on the motion for declaratory
judgment, plaintiff extensively argued the merits of his motion. At this hearing, the trial court
was able to assess the motives of the litigants and determine the factual and legal basis
supporting the claim. The trial court concluded, based on plaintiff’s arguments and pleadings,
that the action was frivolous. The court was not required to conduct a separate hearing where it
was satisfied that it has been able to assess the compliance or lack of compliance with MCR
2.114. Plaintiff was afforded minimal due process protections through the court’s motion
procedure.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for declaratory
judgment because defendant’s membership resolution violated MCL 380.11a and Breighner.
This Court reviews de novo both questions of law arising from a declaratory judgment action and
questions of statutory interpretation. Guardian Environmental Services, Inc v Bureau of
Construction Codes and Fire Safety, 279 Mich App 1, 5-6; 755 NW2d 556 (2008). This Court
2
Plaintiff’s additional argument that the trial court did not take his ability to pay into account
when imposing sanctions, as required by People v Harerra, 204 Mich App 333; 514 NW2d 543
(1994), is misplaced. A determination regarding plaintiff’s ability to pay is not necessary
because such a finding is only required when a prisoner in question is challenging the propriety
of his conviction. Id. at 339.
-3-
also reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory relief for an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 6.
As discussed above, the trial court did not err in concluding that plaintiff’s cause of
action was frivolous. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff’s
motion for declaratory judgment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark D. Cavanagh
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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