PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN TIMOTHY MCKINNEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283025
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-211600-FH
BRIAN TIMOTHY MCKINNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Borrello and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of possession with intent to
deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(ii), one count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and one count of driving while license
suspended (DWLS), MCL 257.904(1). He was sentenced to time served for the DWLS
conviction and to prison terms of one to four years each for the marijuana convictions, with one
of those sentences to be served consecutively to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Background
On June 9, 2006, defendant was arrested for DWLS after Bloomfield Township police
officers conducted a traffic stop of defendant’s Cadillac Escalade, which was occupied solely by
defendant. During a protective pat-down search of defendant before he was placed in a patrol
vehicle, $1,145 in cash was found in his pockets. Because the vehicle was being impounded, it
was also searched. A gun was seized from the center console of the vehicle. In addition, five
gallon-size ziplock bags full of marijuana were found inside a “Louis Vuitton” box in the rear
hatch of the Escalade.
Bloomfield Township Detective James Gallagher, a member of the Oakland County
Narcotics Enforcement Team, determined that the vehicle was registered to Michael Davis.
Gallagher also interviewed defendant, who stated that the vehicle was owned by a cousin, Darien
Johnson, and that he had a permit for the gun.
After the interview, police officers executed a search warrant for drug-trafficking records
and other evidence at the two-story home where defendant said he resided with his girlfriend. A
woman was present in the house when the search warrant was executed. Because marijuana was
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observed in plain view in the basement, a second search warrant was obtained to search the
house for narcotics. Approximately seven pounds of marijuana, which was packaged similarly
to the marijuana found in the vehicle, was found in the basement. An additional 35 grams of
marijuana was found in a laundry room. Among other items found in the house were “Louis
Vuitton” boxes, a box containing $3,482, a cash counting machine, and a digital scale. Although
there was no evidence that marijuana was being grown on the premises, a book entitled “Indoor
Marijuana Horticulture” was found in the master bedroom.
Defendant testified that he resided with his girlfriend, Cory Hardaway, at the time of his
arrest, but that a friend, Cedrick Leonard, also stayed in the home. Defendant denied any
knowledge of the marijuana found in the Escalade and in his home. He testified that Leonard
used the Escalade shortly before he drove it and was stopped by the police. Leonard testified
that he used the vehicle to pick up 12 pounds of marijuana before defendant was arrested. He
claimed that, after returning to defendant’s home, he took the marijuana to the basement. He
stated that he then put five pounds in a “Louis Vuitton” box that he found in the basement and
placed it in the Escalade, without defendant’s knowledge. Leonard denied having any drugs in
the laundry room in the house.
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues that reversal is required because of numerous instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. In general, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is a constitutional question that we
review de novo. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). Any factual
findings made by the trial court are reviewed for clear error. Id. Where a defendant fails to
make a contemporaneous objection and request for a curative instruction with respect to the
alleged misconduct, we limit our review to whether defendant has shown plain error affecting his
substantial rights, i.e., affecting the outcome of the proceedings. People v Unger, 278 Mich App
210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008); see also People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d
130 (1999), and People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000), abrogated on
other grounds in Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).
“The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial
trial.” Brown, 279 Mich App at 134.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor impinged on his Fifth Amendment right to
refrain from self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by eliciting testimony
from Detective Gallagher regarding his request for a lawyer at the end of the custodial interview.
Because defendant failed to object to the testimony, we review this issue under the plain-error
doctrine. A plain error is an error that is clear or obvious. Schutte, 240 Mich App at 720.
Where alleged misconduct is based on evidentiary matters, the appropriate focus is whether the
prosecutor acted in bad faith. See People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 70; 732 NW2d 546
(2007).
[P]rosecutorial misconduct cannot be predicated on good-faith efforts to
admit evidence. The prosecutor is entitled to attempt to introduce evidence that
he legitimately believes will be accepted by the court, as long as that attempt does
not prejudice the defendant. [People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660-661; 608
NW2d 123 (1999) (citation omitted).]
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We find no merit to defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s questioning of Detective
Gallagher implicated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Indeed, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of adversarial judicial
proceedings. People v Hickman, 470 Mich 602, 607; 684 NW2d 267 (2004). However, it may
constitute a denial of due process under Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610; 96 S Ct 2240; 49 L Ed 2d 91
(1976), for the prosecutor to use a defendant’s post-arrest silence where a defendant has been
given his Miranda1 warnings. People v Borgne, 483 Mich 178, 184-188; 768 NW2d 290 (2009),
aff’d on reh ___ Mich ___; 771 NW2d 745 (September 11, 2009). Under Miranda, the police
must advise a suspect of his right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of counsel during questioning. People v Dennis,
464 Mich 567, 572-573; 628 NW2d 502 (2001).
In this case, the prosecution asserts that the rule of completeness justified Detective
Gallagher’s testimony regarding how the interview ended. It is appropriate for a police officer to
delineate both the beginning and the end of an interview so that the jury will know that the
testimony is complete. See People v McReavy, 436 Mich 197, 214-216; 462 NW2d 1 (1990).
However, there is a distinction between eliciting testimony regarding the fact that the defendant
ended an interview and eliciting testimony that the defendant expressly asserted a Miranda right
to do so. Although silence may be interpreted in different ways, an affirmative assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination raises a clear inference of culpability and is necessarily more
prejudicial than simply noting that a defendant stopped answering questions. United States v
Andujar-Basco, 488 F3d 549, 556 (CA 1, 2007). The court in Andujar-Basco stated that
“Miranda draws no distinction between a mid-interrogation assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination and an immediate post-arrest assertion” and that “the words the defendant uses
to assert the privilege are themselves protected by it.” Id. at 557. The court went on to hold that
the Fifth Amendment barred testimony concerning an explicit mid-interrogation assertion of
Miranda rights, but that the error arising from the testimony did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights. Id. at 557-558.
Similarly, under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor committed plain error by
eliciting Detective Gallagher’s testimony regarding defendant’s explicit words to invoke his
Miranda right to counsel. Nonetheless, defendant has not established that the error affected his
substantial rights. Borgne, 483 Mich at 197. Factors that we consider in evaluating prejudice
include the extent of the prosecutor’s comments, the extent to which the prosecutor attempted to
tie the improper testimony to defendant’s guilt, and the relative strength of other evidence
against defendant. Id. at 197-198.
Here, the evidence against defendant was strong and the prosecutor’s questioning was
brief. Further, the prosecutor did not make any attempt to tie Detective Gallagher’s testimony
regarding how the interview ended to defendant’s guilt. Additionally, we note that defense
counsel also elicited from defendant why he requested a lawyer. Defendant testified that he
wanted a lawyer because another officer, who was present during the interview, went into a
“tirade” about selling drugs after he said that the “marijuana was not mine.” Examined in its
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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entirety, the record does not support a finding that defendant was prejudiced by Detective
Gallagher’s earlier testimony that defendant requested a lawyer. Therefore, we find no error
requiring reversal.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly attempted to shift the burden of
proof to him by asking him on cross-examination whether his girlfriend and Johnson would be
coming in to testify on his behalf. This claim of misconduct is unpreserved because it was not
raised until after the prosecutor elicited defendant’s “no” responses to whether the girlfriend and
Johnson would be testifying. “[T]o be timely, an objection should be interposed between the
question and the answer.” People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662 NW2d 376 (2003).
Further, defendant has shown neither bad faith nor prejudice arising from the
prosecutor’s cross-examination, at least with respect to the question about Johnson. Noble, 238
Mich App at 660-661. Although it is impermissible for a prosecutor to attempt to shift the
burden of proof to a defendant, People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 273; 662 NW2d 836
(2003), “[w]here a defendant’s testimony alludes to the possibility that an absent ‘witness’ would
exculpate the defendant, the prosecutor is entitled to explore the credibility of such testimony,”
People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 108; 538 NW2d 356 (1995).2
Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s questioning concerning whether Johnson
would be telling the jury that the Escalade was his vehicle. It appears that the prosecutor was
attempting to undermine defendant’s claim on direct examination that he came into possession of
the Escalade from Johnson, a longtime friend. Although the prosecutor also asserted in response
to the objection that the questions were intended as “discovery,” it is not apparent that the
prosecutor’s purpose was to shift the burden of proof, or that she otherwise acted in bad faith.
Even if the prosecutor’s line of questioning constituted plain error, the questioning with
regard to Johnson and the girlfriend ceased when the trial court sustained defense counsel’s
objection. Moreover, while the trial court found no need to explicitly repeat its earlier jury
instruction that defendant did not have the burden to produce evidence when sustaining the
objection,3 it later instructed the jury that “[t]he Prosecutor must prove each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not required to prove his innocence or to do
anything.” The court’s instructions were adequate to dispel any prejudice arising from the
questioning. “Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to
cure most errors.” Abraham, 256 Mich App at 279.
We also reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct in her
questioning of Detective Gallagher with respect to a Lasermax box for a weapon’s laser sight,
2
We also note that in general, otherwise improper prosecutorial remarks do not require reversal
where they are responsive to issues raised by defense counsel. Schutte, 240 Mich App at 721.
3
The court somewhat reiterated the instructions when sustaining the objection. It stated: “Well,
I’ve already instructed the jury that the defendant does not have to produce any evidence. That
the burden is on the Prosecutor and that instruction will also be given to you before you
deliberate.”
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which was found during the search of defendant’s home. We consider this issue unpreserved
because defense counsel only objected to the prosecutor’s offer to admit a photograph of the
Lasermax box. “An objection based on one ground at trial is insufficient to preserve an appellate
attack based on a different ground.” People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 398; 551 NW2d 478
(1996), lv den 455 Mich 869 (1997).
The only testimony elicited by the prosecutor before defense counsel’s objection was
Detective Gallagher’s description of a laser sight as something that is installed on a weapon. He
testified that “you’ll see it in a lot of movies. You can just point a gun at somebody or at a wall
or whatever it is and you’ll see a red dot where the bullet’s gonna go.” Defendant has not
established that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or that he was prejudiced by the brief
questioning. Noble, 238 Mich App at 660-661. Indeed, the record shows that defense counsel
later elicited from defendant that he purchased the gun found in the Escalade, along with a laser
sight and an extra clip, for his protection because his investment company purchases properties
in areas that are not safe. Defendant testified that he “got kinda carried away. I was in the store
and the guy was telling me all the little gadgets that could go on it, so I was like what the heck,
just put it on there. I mean it didn’t hurt.” Although the prosecutor’s theory was that defendant
carried the gun for a different purpose, considering the record as whole, we are unable to
conclude that the prosecutor’s earlier questioning of Detective Gallagher regarding the laser sight
amounts to outcome-determinative plain error. Unger, 278 Mich App at 235; Schutte, 240 Mich
App at 720.
Defendant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by suggesting in closing argument that the jury take the marijuana evidence that was
seized from the Escalade during the traffic stop and smell it during deliberations. Defendant
suggests that this was impermissible because there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the
marijuana smelled the same at trial as it did when seized. While the prosecutor did not point out
all of the possible differences in the odor-producing circumstances of the marijuana, the
prosecutor did argue, based on Detective Perry Dare’s testimony, that the odor of marijuana
becomes more faint over time. The prosecutor asked the jury to “[s]mell the marijuana, go
through the packaging material, look at everything.”
The prosecutor was free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from
it as it related to her theory of the case. Schutte, 240 Mich App at 721. We are not persuaded
that differences in the odor-producing circumstances of the marijuana in the courtroom and the
Escalade rendered the odor extrinsic evidence. See United States v Dunn, 961 F Supp 249, 251252 (D Kan, 1997) (federal district court found a defendant’s claim that odor of properly
admitted marijuana evidence constituted extraneous information to be unsupported, and found
that the presence of the evidence created no unfair prejudice where the defendant was able to
argue differences in the odor-producing circumstances to the jury). Defendant has not met his
burden of establishing error, let alone an outcome-determinative plain error. Unger, 278 Mich
App at 235; Schutte, 240 Mich App at 720. Indeed, we simply cannot conclude that this “odor
evidence” affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by cross-examining
defense witness Leonard regarding his alleged prior criminal record. Defendant’s failure to show
that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or that he was prejudiced by the cross-examination is
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dispositive of this unpreserved claim. Noble, 238 Mich App at 660-661. As defendant concedes,
MRE 609(a)(1) provides that
[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall not be admitted unless the evidence
has been elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross
examination, and . . . the crime contained an element of dishonesty or false
statement . . . .
There is record evidence that the prosecutor did not learn that Leonard would testify as a
defense witness until the day before trial. Although the record does not indicate that the
prosecutor acquired any public records regarding Leonard’s alleged criminal history, the
prosecutor’s cross-examination indicates that she made use of LEIN (Law Enforcement
Information Network) information in an effort to elicit Leonard’s admission that he was
convicted on July 30, 2007, for making a false report of a misdemeanor to the police. While
Leonard denied the conviction, he admitted that he “gave police a false name.”4
Considering that the prosecutor had LEIN information to conduct the cross-examination,
we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor acted in bad faith by attempting to elicit Leonard’s
admission to the alleged prior conviction. Moreover, even if the prosecutor committed plain
error when questioning Leonard or in commenting on his testimony, we would not reverse.
Regardless of any prior conviction, Leonard’s admission that he gave a prior false statement was
admissible to undermine his credibility. Considered in light of the other evidence introduced by
the prosecutor to attack Leonard’s credibility, the strong evidence linking defendant to the
marijuana, and the jury instructions provided by the trial court, defendant has not established the
requisite outcome-determinative plain error to warrant appellate relief. Unger, 278 Mich App at
235; Schutte, 240 Mich App at 720.
We also reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument regarding
Leonard’s possible motives to falsely claim ownership of the marijuana warrants reversal.
“Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments
and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.” Schutte, 240 Mich App at 721.
4
While this aspect of the issue is not addressed by defendant, we further note that the
prosecution concedes on appeal that Leonard’s alleged prior conviction was referred to in both
closing and rebuttal argument. The prosecutor asserted in closing argument that Leonard was
“convicted in 2007 of filing a false police report. . . . Lying about something to the police.”
While defense counsel did not object, he responded in his closing argument that “it also is clear
that he [Leonard] gave a name that was not his own, a misdemeanor.” The prosecutor replied in
rebuttal by proposing to clarify that “[h]e was convicted for false report of a misdemeanor.
Alleging that something happened, that did not happen.” Although there is evidence that the
prosecutor argued facts not in evidence, the trial court later instructed the jury that “[t]he lawyers
statements and arguments are not evidence” and “[t]he lawyer’s questions to the witnesses are
also not evidence. You should consider the questions only as they give meaning to the witness’
answers.”
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In general, otherwise improper prosecutorial remarks do not require reversal where they are
responsive to issues raised by defense counsel. Id. “The doctrine of invited response is used as
an aid in determining whether a prosecutor's improper remarks require the reversal of a
defendant's conviction. It is used not to excuse improper comments, but to determine their effect
on the trial as a whole.” Jones, 468 Mich at 353. Under this doctrine, “the proportionality of the
response, as well as the invitation, must be considered to determine whether the error, which
might otherwise require reversal, is shielded from appellate relief.” Id.
It is apparent that the prosecutor’s challenged remarks were responsive to and, in fact,
invited by defense counsel’s following argument:
[Y]ou can bet that as soon as [Leonard] left this Courtroom he was
arrested. He didn’t have to. Why? What was in it for him, except for what he
knew. Now, I’m not gonna tell you that [the prosecutor] can’t get up here and
speculate what was in it for him. Maybe he did it because he was paid to do it. . .
. Maybe he’s an underling. Maybe he’s not a big time dope dealer and he’s just
here faking it. They’re gonna hear maybes.
Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the prosecutor did not respond by arguing that
Leonard was in fact bribed or intimidated to provide testimony; instead, she suggested that
Leonard might have been paid or threatened.
This case is distinguishable from People v Tyson, 423 Mich 357, 376, 377 NW2d 738
(1985), in which the Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s conviction because the prosecutor
attacked the credibility of a defendant’s expert witness on a critical issue in closing argument by
arguing that the witness was paid to testify, without any evidentiary support for the argument.
The speculative nature of the prosecutor’s remarks in this case were made known to the jury.
Considering their responsive nature, this unpreserved claim affords no basis for reversal.
Schutte, 240 Mich App at 721.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly engaged in gamesmanship by
asking Detective Gallagher whether he saw defendant talk to individuals who were seated in the
courtroom on the first day of the trial. The record reflects that Detective Gallagher did nothing
more than indicate that he saw defendant talk to “a couple” during a break. Defense counsel
thereafter objected to the relevancy of the prosecutor’s line of questioning, and the trial court
instructed the prosecutor to move on. The prosecutor remarked that the questions were intended
to “confirm in the event any of those people testified that the Defendant had discussions with
them during the trial.” Given the brief nature of the exchange, we are not persuaded that the
prosecutor’s conduct amounts to an outcome-determinative plain error. Schutte, 240 Mich App
at 720.
Next, the fact that the prosecutor cross-examined Leonard on the next day of trial
regarding whether he was in the courtroom during testimony, in violation of a sequestration
order, does not demonstrate misconduct, inasmuch as the trial court specifically permitted the
cross-examination when allowing Leonard to be called as a defense witness. Noble, 238 Mich
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App at 660-661. Further, considering Leonard’s testimony that a court clerk did not ask him if
he was a witness and that he was not present for any testimony on the first day of trial,5 we are
not persuaded that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by calling the clerk to rebut the
testimony and to show that Leonard was in the courtroom during at least the morning session.
Ultimately, the purpose of sequestering a witness is to prevent the witness from coloring
testimony to conform with other testimony and to aid in the detection of testimony that is not
candid. People v Meconi, 277 Mich App 651, 654; 746 NW2d 881 (2008). Considering the
record as a whole, defendant has not substantiated his unpreserved claim that the prosecutor
attempted to impeach the credibility of his defense without an evidentiary basis for doing so.
Moreover, we note that a prosecutor may argue that a witness is not worthy of belief. People v
Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). There being no plain error, we find no
basis for reversal on this ground. Schutte, 240 Mich App at 720.
In sum, defendant was not deprived of a fair and impartial trial. Whether considered
singularly or in the aggregate, we find no actual errors that warrant appellate relief. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 292 n 64; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective. Because defendant did not raise
this issue in a motion in the trial court, our review is limited to errors apparent from the record.
Unger, 278 Mich App at 253. There is a strong presumption of effective assistance. Id.
Defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and must also show prejudice. Brown, 279 Mich App at 140. “To demonstrate
prejudice, the defendant must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v Carbin, 463
Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). The defendant must also show that the result of the
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Poole, 218 Mich App 702, 718;
555 NW2d 485 (1996).
Defendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the
sequestration order was complied with. The record does not support this claim. Although
defense counsel indicated that he could not see what was happening behind him when he was
questioning a witness, the record discloses that defense counsel repeatedly took steps to ensure
that Leonard complied with the sequestration order by speaking with him and having him leave
the courtroom. Defendant has failed to establish that defense counsel’s efforts to ensure
compliance with the sequestration order fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Defendant next contends that defense counsel’s performance was deficient because
counsel failed to object to, and failed to request a curative instruction with respect to, the
testimony that defendant requested a lawyer during the interview conducted by Detective
Gallagher. We have already concluded that defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony.
5
Leonard admitted being in the courtroom during defendant’s testimony on the second day of
trial, before he was called to testify.
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Also, considering that defense counsel undertook to elicit from defendant a nonculpable
explanation for why he requested a lawyer, defendant has not overcome the strong presumption
that defense counsel’s performance consisted sound trial strategy. Carbin, 463 Mich at 600; see
also Unger, 278 Mich App at 242 (declining to raise an objection may be consistent with sound
trial strategy).
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for asking Detective
Gallagher a question that led him to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of possession. In
general, decisions regarding the questioning of witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial
strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). While Detective
Gallagher answered defense counsel’s questions regarding the post-arrest interview by
expressing his belief that the marijuana found in the Escalade belonged to defendant, we
conclude that defendant has not shown that the questions were unsound trial strategy. Further,
the record shows that defense counsel successfully moved to strike the testimony regarding
Detective Gallagher’s personal belief, and that the trial court later instructed the jury not to
consider stricken testimony. Under these circumstances, we cannot find either deficient
performance or prejudice.
Finally, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
various unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct discussed in section II, supra. In light of
our conclusion in section II that there were no errors that, singularly or cumulatively, operated to
deny defendant a fair trial, we likewise conclude that counsel’s failure to object did not deprive
defendant of the effective assistance of counsel.
IV. Search Warrant
Defendant next argues that his convictions should be reversed because the search warrant
for his home was invalid. In considering this issue, we find merit to the prosecution’s argument
that defendant has not sufficiently briefed this issue. MCR 7.212(C)(7) provides, in part:
As to each issue, the argument must include a statement of the applicable standard
or standards of review and supporting authorities. Facts stated must be supported
by specific page references to the transcript, the pleadings, or other document or
paper filed with the trial court.
Merely incorporating a motion or brief filed in the trial court, as defendant has done here, is
inadequate, especially where the record indicates that the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant
to Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978), to resolve defendant’s
claim that Detective Gallagher misrepresented information in the search warrant affidavit for the
first warrant executed at defendant’s home.
Nonetheless, this Court has discretion to address issues that have been inadequately
briefed. See Van Buren Charter Twp v Garter Belt, Inc, 258 Mich App 594, 632; 673 NW2d
111 (2003). Therefore, we shall consider defendant’s argument.
We review a trial court’s ruling at a suppression hearing for clear error, but conclusions
of law are reviewed de novo. Unger, 278 Mich App at 243. A search warrant may only be
issued based on probable cause. Id. at 244. An appellate court will review an issuing
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magistrate’s determination that probable cause exists by asking “only whether a reasonably
cautious person could have concluded that there was a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding of
probable cause.” Id., quoting People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 603; 487 NW2d 698 (1992). A
“substantial basis” requires a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found in a
particular place. People v Mullen, 282 Mich App 14, 22; 762 NW2d 170 (2008). Under Franks,
supra, the validity of the warrant may be challenged on the basis that a false statement necessary
to the finding of probable cause was knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
the truth, included in the supporting affidavit. Id. Material omissions may also result in the
warrant’s being invalid. Id. at 24.
Defendant’s motion challenged the probable cause for the first search warrant obtained
by Detective Gallagher on the ground that there was no evidence that he possessed the marijuana
found in the Escalade. However, the circumstances of the traffic stop set forth in Detective
Gallagher’s affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to believe that defendant possessed the
marijuana. Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive. People v Wolfe,
440 Mich 508, 520; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
Defendant’s motion also claimed that Detective Gallagher’s affidavit (1) falsely stated
that defendant was arrested for possession with intent to deliver marijuana and felony-firearm,
(2) falsely stated that Detective Gallagher is the “Officer in Charge of an on going narcotics
investigation” at a particular address in West Bloomfield Township, and (3) failed to mention
that defendant was not the registered owner of the Escalade. However, considering that the
focus of the Franks hearing and the trial court’s decision was on Detective Gallagher’s statement
regarding the ongoing investigation, and considering the way defendant has briefed this issue on
appeal, we shall limit our review to that claim.
We find no clear error in the trial court’s determination that defendant failed to sustain
his burden of showing that Detective Gallagher knowingly or recklessly made a false statement
essential to a finding of probable cause. Detective Gallagher explained at the Franks hearing
that he considered the traffic stop to be the start of the investigation. He was informed that a
narcotics arrest was made, and continued the investigation by interviewing defendant and
confirming his home address. He indicated that his training and experience, as set forth in the
affidavit, was a basis for his decision to further investigate the home by obtaining a search
warrant for drug-trafficking records and other evidence.
While it is clear from Detective Gallagher’s testimony that there was no investigation
being conducted of defendant’s home before the traffic stop, we must review a search warrant
affidavit in a commonsense and realistic manner. Mullen, 282 Mich App at 27. A reasonably
cautious person would not have concluded that the use of the word “ongoing” to describe the
nature of the investigation in the affidavit was material. Read in a commonsense and realistic
manner, the affidavit indicates that it was the discovery of the marijuana during the traffic stop,
and the investigation that followed, that formed the basis for probable cause. Moreover, it was
not necessary that the search warrant affidavit set forth direct evidence linking a crime to
defendant’s residence. See, e.g., United States v Whitner, 219 F3d 289, 297-298 (CA 3, 2000)
(explaining that evidence of drugs is likely to be found where dealers reside). The trial court
appropriately considered the information regarding Detective Gallagher’s experience to conclude
that probable cause existed, even if the statement regarding the ongoing investigation were
excluded. People v Darwich, 226 Mich App 635, 639-640; 575 NW2d 44 (1997). Considered
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along with the other facts and circumstances presented in the affidavit, we find no error in the
trial court’s decision to uphold the validity of the search warrant. Accordingly, it is unnecessary
to address the prosecution’s claim that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule adopted
in People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523; 682 NW2d 479 (2004), would apply if the search warrant
were to be deemed invalid.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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