PEOPLE OF MI V SALVADOR JONATHAN RIDLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 14, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 287921
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-220581-FC
SALVADOR JONATHAN RIDLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Hoekstra and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant Salvador Ridley of armed robbery.1 The trial court sentenced
Ridley to 68 to 120 months’ imprisonment. Before sentencing, Ridley filed a motion for a new
trial based on alleged juror misconduct. The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing after
which it denied Ridley’s motion for a new trial. Ridley now appeals as of right. We affirm. We
have decided this appeal without oral argument.2
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
This case arises out of a robbery at the Fun and Fantasy store in Royal Oak in November
2007. During jury selection, prospective jurors were asked whether they had any family or
friends who were current or past law enforcement personnel. Throughout the course of jury
selection, nine prospective jurors indicated that they had some form of connection to law
enforcement officers. Ridley’s counsel and the prosecutor excused several of these prospective
jurors. However, the jury did include four jurors that had some relationship to law enforcement
personnel. Juror #61 had familial ties that included her husband as a reserve officer for Keego
Harbor and a son that was a former White Lake Township police officer. Jurors #5 and #18 had
friends who served on the Monroe Police Department and as a Michigan State Trooper,
respectively. The fourth seated juror with ties to law enforcement personnel was Juror #181.
When the trial court initially questioned her, Juror #181 stated that her cousin was the
undersheriff for Oakland County and that she had several cousins who were sheriffs, including
1
MCL 750.529.
2
MCR 7.214(E).
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some who were retired. Nevertheless, she felt that she “absolutely” could set aside her
relationships with them and make her decision based on what was presented in court.
The prosecutor later inquired further into Juror #181’s relationship with the undersheriff:
Q. Okay. [Juror #181], have you had any kind of contact with the undersheriff,
the former undersheriff recently at all?
A. I think we had a family event a couple months ago.
Q. Okay.
A. A graduation.
Q. Ever talk to him about cases at all?
A. (Inaudible response)
Q. Okay. That’s a no?
A. (Inaudible response)
Q. All right. You can be fair and impartial in this case?
A. Yes.
When provided an opportunity to question the prospective jurors, defense counsel’s
questioning of Juror #181 consisted of whether she had ever mistaken someone for someone
else. No other in-depth probing of any of the jurors was made with respect to their relationships
with law enforcement personnel. Once the jury was empanelled, the jurors took an oath to
render a verdict only on the evidence introduced and in accordance with the instructions of the
court.
Sometime after the verdict, defense counsel learned that Juror #181 realized on the
second day of trial that her first cousin was the Chief of Police of the Royal Oak Police
Department but had failed to notify any court personnel. Ridley moved for a new trial, and the
trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, Juror #181 recalled being asked during jury selection about
her affiliation with any law enforcement personnel. She acknowledged that she had revealed that
she was related to the former undersheriff of Oakland County and that she had several other
cousins that were in law enforcement, but had unintentionally failed to disclose that she was also
related specifically to the Royal Oak Police Chief. She explained that she had six or seven
cousins that are police officers and that her uncle was a police chief, but that she did not know
where they all worked. Consequently, she did not know exactly where her first cousin, who was
then the Royal Oak Police Chief, was working at the time.
However, on about the second day of trial, Juror #181 realized from a conversation with
family that her cousin was the Royal Oak police chief. Juror #181 admitted that at no time did
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she disclose this to a court clerk or anyone involved in the trial. She explained that she did not
think it was important because she had already revealed that she was related to several law
enforcement officers. Juror #181 said that she was not trying to hide her relationship with the
Royal Oak police chief and would have informed the trial judge during jury selection, but noted
that she specifically indicated that her affiliation with law enforcement officers would have no
bearing on her ability to be fair and impartial.
Juror #181 stated that she was 10 years younger than her cousin and would only see him
once or twice a year at family functions. According to Juror #181, before the trial, it had been at
least a year since the last time she had seen her police chief cousin. Juror #181 stated that she
did not reveal to the other jurors her relationship with the police chief and that she did not let her
relationship with law enforcement officers influence her verdict. She said that the video played
at trial along with other the evidence led her to her verdict and not her relationship to the Royal
Oak police chief.
In denying Ridley’s motion for a new trial, the trial court made the following findings:
The Court has taken into consideration her testimony and based on the
Court’s assessment of her voracity [sic], honesty, integrity, demeanor, vocal tones
and other indicia of reliability, I find that her testimony is extremely credible and
I give it enormous weight in light of—in connection with this motion before the
Court.
In light of that, I find that during voir dire she did disclose all the
relationships with the officers that she remembered at the time. She unfortunately
did not—actually, she did not know at that time that the chief of Royal Oak was . .
. her cousin, her first cousin. She had basically known that he was an officer and
she had disclosed that she had relatives that were officers and disclosed the
undersheriff . . . because she thought that was important.
Counsel certainly had the ability to inquire further in connection with the
other officers that she had disclosed generically had been involved (ph.). The
Court specifically asked her whether or not she would be able to evaluate the
credibility of—give the same scrutiny and the same consideration to the testimony
of lay witnesses as she would the testimony of police officers, she affirmatively
stated she could.
***
When she discovered on the second day of trial at night, because of a [sic]
unrelated conversation . . . that she was indeed related to the chief of the Royal
Oak Police Department, she registered that in her mind but did not disclose that to
any of the other jurors, nor did it affect her deliberations in connection with the
case.
Though able defense counsel has tried to raise issues with regard to her
credibility and her failure to disclose, I reject those contentions. She was a very
credible witness for the reasons I’ve already articulated.
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In light of that, her deliberations were not affected by the non-disclosure—
the non-disclosed information, nor did she mislead the Court or defense counsel
or the prosecutor purposefully, it was simply an omission because she didn’t
honestly know, but an omission of ignorance not of malice and she did not harbor
any intention of attempting to steer the jury’s verdict in one manner or another
because of the relationship she had with the first cousin.
Ridley now appeals.
II. Motion For New Trial
A. Standard Of Review
Ridley argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial jury
when it denied his motion for a new trial. We review the trial court’s decision on a motion for a
new trial for an abuse of discretion and its findings of fact for clear error.3
B. Legal Standards
A criminal defendant has a right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury.4 A juror’s failure
to reveal relevant information is prejudicial if the defendant was denied an impartial jury.5
Jurors are presumed to be impartial, and the burden is on the defendant to establish that a juror
was not impartial or at least impartiality is in reasonable doubt.6
C. Applying The Standards
Ridley has failed to establish that Juror #181 in question was partial. The trial court
heard Juror #181’s testimony, assessed her credibility, and found no evidence that her
relationship to the Royal Oak Police Chief in any way affected her impartiality or that of the
other jurors. Even if Juror #181’s failure to notify the trial court in mid-trial of the newly
realized relationship could be deemed “misconduct,” Ridley failed to present any evidence that
the “misconduct” affected the impartiality of the jury.7 The trial court’s finding that Ridley was
3
People v Miller, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008).
4
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; Miller, 482 Mich at 547.
5
Miller, 482 Mich at 548-549, 561, overruling People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1; 577 NW2d
179 (1998) (Miller overruled Daoust to the extent that Daoust held that a defendant is always
entitled to a new trial when the juror could have been properly excusable for cause had defense
counsel known of information potentially affecting a juror’s ability to act impartially). See
Miller, 482 Mich at 561 (“The proper inquiry is whether the defendant was denied his right to an
impartial jury.”).
6
Id. at 550.
7
See also People v Nick, 360 Mich 219; 103 NW2d 435 (1960) (juror failed to disclose that her
father was an attorney to whom defense counsel had referenced during trial).
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not denied an impartial jury is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Ridley’s motion for a new trial.
III. Shifting Of The Burden Of Proof
A. Standard Of Review
Ridley claims that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof by asking
Royal Oak Police Detective Keith Spencer questions regarding Ridley’s “alibi” and inability to
produce documentary evidence of such “alibi.” However, Ridley did not object at trial to the
prosecutor’s line of questioning or to Detective Spencer’s testimony. Our appellate review is
limited, therefore, to whether the alleged error was plain, whether it affected the outcome, and
whether it resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent person or seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.8
B. Underlying Facts
More specifically, Ridley claims for the first time on appeal that Detective Spencer’s
testimony regarding a conversation that he had with Ridley, in which Ridley hypothetically
referred to an alibi and supporting documents, effectively shifted the burden of proof to Ridley to
present evidence.
Detective Spencer testified that he met with Ridley and asked him about the robbery at
the Fun and Fantasy Store. Detective Spencer also showed Ridley a photographic still from a
store surveillance video, and Ridley commented that, although it did look like him, it was not
him. In response to the prosecutor’s questioning, Detective Spencer testified as follows:
Q. When you spoke to [Ridley] in March, what did you say to him when you met
up with him?
A. I informed him of what I was investigating. I made sure that Mr. Ridley knew
he was not under arrest, and he was free to leave . . . . I informed him that I
was investigating an armed robbery at the Fun and Fantasy Store. Part of that
conversation with Mr. Ridley I asked him if he lived in the area. I asked him
if he had stayed in the area recently, to which he said no, but he does have a
sister that lives in the area. He informed me that he has not shopped at any of
the stores—stores in Royal Oak along Eleven Mile Road within the last year,
which is a question I had asked him. I also asked him what he thought—I
eventually took these photographs right here from—that I got from the
surveillance video, and I asked him is this you? And he said, “Well, that
looks like me, but it’s not me.”
***
8
Miller, 482 Mich at 559; People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
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A. Um, as we continued to speak, Mr. Ridley started presenting me with well
what if—what if I did take that stuff? What if—what—what if I did?
What—what would happen to me? What would—what could be—the
possible charges be? And I would explain to him. Um, this is an armed
robbery. The person that was involved in this thought you had a gun. When
I presented that to Mr. Ridley, Mr. Ridley said, “Well, I don’t own a gun.” I
said, “So you—are you telling me you didn’t—you didn’t mean to threaten
her with a gun?” “Well, I’m not saying anything.” Um, that was his
response.
***
A. Um, one of the things—I told him that it was—it was an armed robbery
charge, and during the course of that conversation, one of the things that he
was concerned about was whether or not he could be charged with selling
those items. When I asked—when I asked him if that’s what had occurred in
this case, he said, “I’m just saying what if,” in—in response to whether or not
he had sold these items. So there was no definite answer there.
***
A. Yes. He—he asked me, “What if I had an alibi?” And I asked him, “If you do
have an alibi, I’d like to hear about it, but I want to know what that is.” He
said, that—“No, I’m just saying what if I had an alibi.” I said, “Okay.”
As the conversation progressed, he said, “Well, what if I have five witnesses
that can say that I was in a particular location the day of this incident.” I said,
“I’d love to have their names. Let me have their names, and I’ll investigate
it.” And he said, “Well I’m just saying what if.” Okay.
***
Q. Let me ask you a quick different question. Did he indicate to you whether or
not he had a schedule or a calendar that he followed?
A. Yes. He—he had men—during the course of our interview, he said that,
“Well, I think I was somewhere else.” Something to the effect of, “I think I
was somewhere else the night of that incident.” And I said, “Well, how do
you know that?” “Well, I have a schedule.” “Well, can I see that schedule,”
is what I asked him. And he said, “Well, I just have one. I don’t have”—
he—he indicated to me that he had nothing physical he could present to me
that would say on Monday, lunch with mom or whatever. So . . . .
C. Analysis
Ridley’s argument is based on the assumption that Detective Spencer and the prosecutor
impermissibly commented on Ridley’s failure to present an alibi. However, because Ridley did
not file a notice of alibi pursuant to MCL 768.20, he is therefore not entitled to the judicial
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protection that precludes the prosecution from commenting on a statutory alibi notice prior to the
defendant testifying.9
Moreover, as set out above, Detective Spencer simply testified regarding a series of
hypothetical questions Ridley posed during their interview in which Ridley was seeking to
discern how the possible existence of an alibi might affect the case. Detective Ridley was not
testifying regarding any claim that Ridley did in fact have an alibi. Detective Spencer’s
testimony did not have the effect of shifting the burden of proof on Ridley because at no time did
Ridley ever actually claim to have any such evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that Ridley has
failed to demonstrate that plain error occurred, and he is not entitled to a reversal of his
conviction on this unpreserved allegation of error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
9
See, e.g., People v Holland, 179 Mich App 184; 445 NW2d 206 (1989); People v Dean, 103
Mich App 1; 302 NW2d 317 (1981); People v Shannon, 88 Mich App 138; 276 NW2d 546
(1979).
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