PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY JEROME EDWARDS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 5, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 287944
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-005590-FH
TIMOTHY JEROME EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, C.J., and Jansen and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his bench-trial convictions of felon in possession of a firearm
(felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to two years in prison for the felonyfirearm conviction, and two years’ probation for the felon-in-possession conviction. We affirm.
This appeal has been decided without oral argument. MCR 7.214(E).
The prosecuting attorney presented evidence that police officers executed a search
warrant at a residence on Greenview Street in Detroit, and there found defendant in the dining
room. In a bedroom the police found two firearms, a scale, two knotted plastic bags of suspected
marijuana, and several pieces of mail addressed to defendant at the Greenview Street address.
Defendant’s mother and brother both lived at the house. Defendant testified that he
actually lived elsewhere, but had been sleeping at the Greenview residence because of marital
difficulties. Defendant testified that his mother slept in the room where the guns were found, but
that he did not know if the guns belonged to her. In contrast, a police officer testified that, when
the warrant was executed, defendant stated that he lived at the Greenview address and made no
mention of any other residence.
In finding defendant guilty, the trial court credited the police officer’s testimony and
noted that the mail addressed to defendant at the Greenview address included recent and
important tax and medical documents. The court further noted that possession could be actual or
constructive, sole or joint.
Defendant, through substitute counsel, filed a posttrial motion for an evidentiary hearing
to develop a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). The matter was heard and decided at sentencing. Defendant
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argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call as witnesses his wife and mother, who
would have testified that he was only happenstantially present at the Greenview Street residence
at the time in question and bore no responsibility for anything found in the home. The trial court
declined to proceed with an evidentiary hearing, noting that defendant claimed only that trial
counsel should have called his wife and mother to testify, and explaining as follows:
The Court certainly can make some assumptions that their testimony as a
mother and wife [would] corroborate [defendant’s] position. That’s no great
secret. But the Court is well aware and has great recollection of the other
overwhelming evidence presented as to guilt, and the Court has confidence in its
decision . . . .
A trial court’s decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See People v Mischley, 164 Mich App 478, 482; 417 NW2d 537 (1987). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside a “principled range of
outcomes.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
Defendant twice asked this Court to remand for a Ginther hearing. This Court first
denied the motion but expressed a willingness to consider another such motion if it was
“supported by affidavits of the proposed witnesses to show the testimony they could have given
and show that defense counsel knew or should have known of their ability to so testify,” along
with “a more complete statement of the trial testimony and evidence to support the assertion that
it is reasonably likely that the proffered testimony and evidence would have changed the
outcome of the trial . . . .” Defendant responded as advised, providing offers of proof that his
wife, mother, and now brother would all testify favorably. This Court nonetheless again denied
the motion.
Now, having given the matter plenary consideration in this claim of appeal, we remain
unpersuaded that a remand is in order. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that the representation so prejudiced the defendant as to result in deprivation of a fair trial.
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688, 690; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984);
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The defendant must further
show that the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, and that but for
counsel’s poor performance the result would have been different. People v Messenger, 221 Mich
App 171, 181; 561 NW2d 463 (1997). The defendant must overcome a strong presumption that
counsel employed sound trial strategy. People v Henry, 239 Mich App 140, 146; 607 NW2d 767
(1999).
In this case, we are mindful that the trial court sat as the trier of fact and expressed great
confidence in its verdict, characterizing the evidence against defendant as “overwhelming.” The
court, quite reasonably, deemed it predictable that defendant’s family members would support
defendant’s account.
We note that defendant offered to present his wife and mother when initially moving for
a Ginther hearing, and now adds his brother to the list of relatives who would have offered
favorable testimony. Defendant does not explain why he did not offer his brother’s testimony
earlier. However, given how readily the trial court was prepared to hear, and likely discredit,
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favorable testimony from two relatives, it seems unlikely that testimony from a third relative
would make any difference.
Because defendant has failed to show that any testimony from the three proposed
additional witnesses would have changed the result below, we conclude that he has failed to put
forward a sufficiently plausible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Messenger, supra
at 181. Accordingly, we conclude that no evidentiary hearing was warranted and that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold one.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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