PEOPLE OF MI V RAYMOND CHARLES FAIRFIELD JR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 5, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 287087
Ionia Circuit Court
LC No. 07-013625-FH
RAYMOND CHARLES FAIRFIELD, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of stalking a minor, MCL
750.411h(2)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.11,
to two to 7-1/2 years in prison. We affirm.
Defendant insists that the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict
because insufficient evidence supported his conviction. In response to the directed verdict
motion, the trial court expressed in strong terms that if it were the trier of fact, it would find
defendant not guilty given the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses. However, the court ultimately determined that, in light of the liberal standard applied
to directed verdict motions, enough evidence justified submission of the case to the jury.
Defendant now asserts that the trial court should not have considered the falsehood-tainted
evidence.
In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider in
the light most favorable to the prosecutor the evidence presented by the
prosecutor up to the time the motion is made and determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising therefrom can sufficiently establish the elements of a crime. However, it
is not permissible for a trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses in
deciding a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, no matter how inconsistent or
vague that testimony might be. [People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695, 702; 635
NW2d 491 (2001) (internal quotation omitted, emphasis added).]
Questions regarding witness credibility belong to the trier of fact. People v Peña, 224 Mich App
650, 659; 569 NW2d 871 (1997), mod in part on other grounds 457 Mich 885 (1998). The same
-1-
standards govern review of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. People v Passage, 277 Mich
App 175, 177; 743 NW2d 746 (2007).
To establish stalking of a minor under MCL 750.411h(2), the prosecutor had to prove that
the victim was younger than 18 years of age, and that a person at least five years older than the
victim undertook
a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of
another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes
the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested. [MCL 750.411h(1)(d).]
Pursuant to MCL 750.411h(4),
In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant
continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented
contact with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue
the same or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any
further unconsented contact with the victim, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
that the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
The statute defines a “course of conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2 or
more separate noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.” MCL 750.411h(1)(a).
In this case, the parties agree that the victim was 17 years of age and that defendant, who
was more than 20 years older than the victim, received service of a personal protection order
(PPO) on December 21, 2006. Defendant thus undisputedly had notice that any further contact
would contravene the victim’s desires or wishes. Our review of the record reveals that while
cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, defense counsel successfully unearthed discrepancies
among the trial accounts of the primary prosecution witnesses and within the prior statements
and testimonies by these primary witnesses, especially with respect to the occurrence or timing
of various alleged contacts of the victim by defendant. But the record also reflects the testimony
of several prosecution witnesses similarly describing that (1) on January 30, 2007 or January 31,
2007, the victim or her father’s girlfriend discovered inside a console in the victim’s car a plastic
bag containing an audiocassette recorded by defendant together with a handwritten letter, and (2)
defendant came to the victim’s residence in April 2007. Defendant testified that he had placed
the audiotape in the victim’s car well before he learned of the PPO and disputed ever visiting the
victim’s house in April 2007. However, viewing in the light most favorable to the prosecution
the evidence concerning defendant’s January 2007 placement of the audiocassette and letter in
the victim’s car and his April 2007 visit to the victim’s residence, and resolving the relevant
“credibility choices in support of the jury verdict,” this evidence supports the jury’s finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had repeated and unconsented contact with the victim
notwithstanding his receipt of notice that she did not consent to these contacts. People v
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Consequently, the trial court correctly
denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
-2-
Defendant next maintains that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. “[T]he test for
prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. A
defendant’s opportunity for a fair trial can be jeopardized when the prosecutor interjects issues
broader than the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63-64; 732
NW2d 546 (2007). “Review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is precluded unless the
defendant timely and specifically objects, except when an objection could not have cured the
error or a failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.” People v Unger,
278 Mich App 210, 234-235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). Absent a
contemporaneous objection or request for a curative instruction, appellate review of claims of
prosecutorial misconduct is limited to ascertaining whether plain error affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). Reversal is
warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent person or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Unger, 278
Mich App at 235.
Defendant first takes issue with the prosecutor’s opening statement reference to the fact
that he was in jail before he appeared at the victim’s residence in April 2007, and that a condition
of his bond mandated that he stay away from Lyons, where the victim lived. Defendant offered
no objection at trial to the prosecutor’s comment, but now asserts that no evidence at trial
supported the statement.
It is a rule that where in an opening statement the prosecutor makes
statements which may not be substantiated at trial by the evidence, we will not
reverse for that fact alone in the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of
the prosecutor or prejudice to the defendant. [People v Wolverton, 227 Mich App
72, 77; 574 NW2d 703 (1997), quoting People v Davis, 343 Mich 348, 357; 72
NW2d 269 (1955)].
Before the final prosecution witness testified, the prosecutor sought to introduce the bond to
show that defendant knew that he had to stay away from the victim and out of Lyons entirely.
The trial court ruled the bond inadmissible. Notably, though, by this point a deputy had already
testified without objection that a jail release bond condition in place forbade defendant from
contacting the victim. Therefore, contrary to defendant’s contention, the prosecutor did elicit
evidence supporting her opening statement comments concerning his bond on release from jail.
And we detect no support for defendant’s related appellate contention that the prosecutor
“improperly led the jury to believe that the defendant was already convicted of some [unrelated]
crimes,” especially given that the prosecutor subsequently elicited at trial, again without
objection, testimony from a deputy regarding his arrest of defendant on January 30, 2007 or
January 31, 2007 for allegedly violating the PPO, for which the deputy placed defendant in jail.
In conclusion, we find nothing in the prosecutor’s opening statement for which she failed to
present an evidentiary foundation at trial, and no impropriety relating to the bond reference that
rises to the level of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Defendant next complains that the prosecutor improperly questioned the victim with
respect to whether she knew defendant “was in jail after” February 16, 2007. The record shows
that the prosecutor established that the victim knew defendant was in jail at the time of a
February 16, 2007 PPO violation hearing, and then inquired if she knew whether he had
remained in jail after this hearing, to which the victim responded negatively. Although
-3-
defendant failed to object to this questioning at trial, he now posits that these questions amounted
to an unwarranted attempt to substantiate the opening statement remark that he had been
incarcerated. But given the victim’s negative response, the additional evidence admitted without
objection regarding defendant’s late January 2007 arrest and incarceration, and the other
properly admitted evidence establishing defendant’s guilt of stalking the victim, we find no
prejudice, let alone any plain error affecting a substantial right, arising from the prosecutor’s
brief disputed questioning of the victim.
Defendant additionally suggests that the prosecutor failed “to make reasonable efforts to
preserve material evidence that could have been inferred by the jury to be favorable to the
defendant.” In support of defendant’s position, he quotes a portion of the prosecutor’s
examination of an officer about why he had not brought to court a letter allegedly left on the
victim’s windshield; the officer replied that defendant had been charged with misdemeanor
stalking and that once “there was no appeal,” the evidence was destroyed. Without any defense
objection, the trial court sua sponte immediately instructed the jury at some length to disregard
the officer’s improper remark:
Members of the jury . . . . [w]hat the officer said was completely wrong.
He should not have said it and I would expect much more from someone who’s
been on the force for ten years. There was no conviction. There was nothing that
involved any type of appeal. Mr. Fairfield has not been convicted of any type of
misdemeanor stalking. I don’t know how else to say that to you but you should
disregard everything the officer said in that regard[]. And, in fact, if you want to
use that in some way against the People, you certainly can. I can’t indicate how
wrong that was. We’ve talked before, everyone is presumed innocent. The
People have the burden of proof. And it is completely improper to imply to you
that somebody has been convicted of something when it is not even true. It’s not
even close to being true. So again, please disregard everything he said there.
Know that it was wrong and if you want to hold that against the People for the
unsatisfactory nature of this evidence then you may do that. Again, I want you
please to understand all of you that there was no conviction, nothing involving
any type of appeal. If the officer has lost evidence then that is not an explanation
for that.
Even were we to assume that the prosecutor failed to preserve evidence, we ascertain no plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights with respect to this prosecutorial misconduct
contention given (1) defendant’s failure to elaborate the manner in which the letter had
materiality to his defense, (2) the trial court’s extensive and correct instructions that the jury
should disregard the officer’s proffered explanation of the letter’s disappearance and that the jury
could draw an inference favorable to defendant from the prosecutor’s failure to present the letter,
and (3) the substantial properly admitted evidence of defendant’s guilt. People v Watson, 245
Mich App 572, 591-592; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
-4-
Defendant’s last claim of misconduct pertains to a closing argument reference about him
having resided in jail.1 Contrary to defendant’s assertion that this statement referred to his
incarceration after the April 2007 PPO violation, our reading of the prosecutor’s remark plainly
reflects that she was referring to the trial testimony concerning an arrest of defendant and
incarceration that took place before April 2007. We detect nothing in the challenged portion of
the prosecutor’s closing argument unsupported by the trial evidence. Even assuming some
impropriety or inaccuracy in the prosecutor’s challenged statements, we find no substantial
prejudice to defendant in light of (1) the trial court’s final instructions that the arguments or
statements by the attorneys did not constitute evidence, and (2) the substantial properly admitted
evidence supporting the stalking a minor conviction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
1
The prosecutor’s remark identified by defendant states the following:
The fact is the man who had been sitting in jail all that time [before his
April 2007 visit to the victim’s residence], the man whose [sic] been told by
numerous people to stay away from her, who have had contact with the police,
had a PPO served on him, got released from jail, as you heard Officer Thome say,
and had a bond put on him saying stay away from her has now showed up on her
doorstep [i]n April . . . 2007 because he is just not getting it.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.