IN RE ROBINSON/CARD MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JAZMYNE TONYA ROBINSON
and MICHAEL EDWARD CARD III, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 290890
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2008-000510-NA
LC No. 2008-000511-NA
DEMETRIUS EARL ROBINSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JULIA MARIE ROBINSON and MICHAEL
EDWARD CARD II,
Respondents.
In the Matter of JAZMYNE TONYA ROBINSON
and MICHAEL EDWARD CARD III, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 290891
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2008-000510-NA
LC No. 2008-000511-NA
JULIA MARIE ROBINSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DEMETRIUS EARL ROBINSON and MICHAEL
EDWARD CARD II,
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Respondents.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fort Hood and Stephens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent Demetrius Robinson appeals by right from the
trial court order terminating his parental rights to Jazmyne Robinson, and respondent Julia
Robinson appeals by right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to both of the
minor children. Because the grounds for termination were proved by clear and convincing
evidence, and termination is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
Termination of parental rights is appropriate where the petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence at least one ground for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Once this has occurred, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless it
finds that the termination is clearly not in the best interests of the child. Id. at 364-365. We
review both the trial court's decision that a ground for termination of parental rights has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence and the trial court's decision regarding the child's best
interests for clear error. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
The trial court terminated the respondents’ parental rights pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii),(3)(g), and (3)(j). MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) provides that parental rights may
be terminated if the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The child has been deserted under any of the following circumstances:
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(ii) The child's parent has deserted the child for 91 or more days and has not
sought custody of the child during that period.
Here, the evidence established that respondents deserted the children for 91 days or more and
failed to seek custody during that time. The record indicates that respondents visited the children
for the last time on September 22, 2008, and then failed to contact them in any way for the next
five months. Respondents additionally failed to contact either the DHS or their attorneys during
that time, and were thought to have moved to another state. Based upon the above, the trial court
did not clearly err in finding that the statutory ground for termination under MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re
Trejo, supra.
Although only one ground for termination need be established, the evidence also
established that respondents were unable to provide proper care and custody for the children
even before abandoning them, and that there was no reasonable expectation that they would be
able to do so within a reasonable time. In addition to experiencing respondent-father’s domestic
violence against their mother and threats to their own physical safety, the children were left with
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relatives without adequate preparations and with no way to contact their parents in case of an
emergency. Evidence established that respondent-mother intended to stay with her abusive
husband in Chicago, and that the domestic violence was still occurring. The trial court did not
clearly err in terminating respondents’ parental rights to the children pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) and (j).
Further, the evidence established that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in
the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). Testimony established that the children feared
respondent-father, and for good reason: they witnessed him beating their mother, he pinched
them as they slept, he threatened to beat Michael, he hit Michael, and once he held a knife to
Michael’s throat. Although the children loved their mother, other testimony demonstrated that
she was unwilling or unable to provide for their basic needs, such as the need to be safe, and feel
safe, in their home. Testimony established that the children had obtained stability and
permanency in their temporary placement, and they had been referred for counseling, which
assisted them in adapting to termination of respondents’ parental rights. Thus, the trial court did
not clearly err in holding that termination of respondents’ parental rights to the children was in
the children’s best interests.
Finally, the trial court did not violate Mr. Robinson’s procedural due process rights to
notice or to an attorney. Mr. Robinson received more process than that to which he was due
under the court rules, and the process was fundamentally fair.
The trial court determined at the preliminary hearing that Mr. Robinson was not the legal
father of either minor child. Mr. Robinson received the notice required for putative fathers under
MCR 3.921(D)(1), particularly for the first two hearings. His attendance indicates that he had
actual notice of the preliminary hearing, and he received personal service of the pretrial hearing.
By failing to appear at the pre-trial hearing, however, Mr. Robinson waived all right to further
notice. MCR 3.921(D)(3)(a). Finally, the trial court provided Mr. Robinson with an attorney,
but Mr. Robinson failed to maintain an ongoing attorney-client relationship with his attorney,
which would have operated as a waiver or relinquishment of the right to counsel. In re Hall, 188
Mich App 217, 222; 469 NW2d 56 (1991).
Mr. Robinson had actual knowledge that his parental rights were at stake from the
beginning of the proceedings, yet chose not to participate in the process in any way after the
preliminary hearing. Because there was nothing fundamentally unfair in the process afforded
Mr. Robinson in the trial court, his due process rights were not violated.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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