PEOPLE OF MI V PHILLIP OLIVER WARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 10, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286418
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 07-000423-FH
PHILLIP OLIVER WARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Cavanagh and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction by a jury of first-degree home invasion. See
MCL 750.110. The trial court sentenced defendant as a habitual second offender, MCL 769.10,
to serve 51 to 360 months in prison. Because we conclude that there were no errors warranting
relief, we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
evidence seized from an apartment where he resided as an overnight guest. We review de novo a
trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, but we review its factual findings with
respect to that decision for clear error. People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 319; 614 NW2d
647 (2000).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress items of clothing seized from an apartment
where defendant resided as an overnight guest. The trial court found that the apartment owner
gave police officers valid consent to search the apartment and that the evidence was in plain
view. The trial court then determined that the police officers validly seized the evidence and, for
that reason, denied the motion. At trial, prior to opening arguments, the prosecutor sought
clarification regarding the continued admissibility of the evidence in light of defendant’s new
argument that any testimony regarding the owner’s consent would violate his constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against him. Without the owner’s testimony, defendant argued, the
prosecution could not lay the proper foundation to admit the evidence. The trial court agreed and
suppressed the evidence. In light of the trial court’s ultimate decision to suppress the evidence,
even if we were to agree with defendant that the trial court erred when it denied his initial
motion, he would not be entitled to any relief.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial.
Defendant moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor admitted that he incorrectly paraphrased an
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argument defense counsel made during opening arguments, which resulted in the admission of
evidence the court had previously suppressed. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a
motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 390; 605
NW2d 374 (1999).
This Court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis in context
to determine whether the remarks denied defendant a fair and impartial trial. People v Thomas,
260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004); People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732
NW2d 546 (2007). A trial court should grant a motion for a mistrial only when the prejudicial
effect of an error cannot be cured in any other way. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 36; 755
NW2d 212 (2008).
Again, the trial court suppressed all of the evidence seized from the apartment where
defendant resided as an overnight guest, and prohibited the parties from introducing any
evidence regarding what occurred in the apartment after police entered the apartment. Following
defendant’s opening arguments, the prosecutor successfully argued that defendant opened the
door to the admission of the black coat when defense counsel allegedly told jurors that there was
no blood found on defendant’s coat. On the final day of trial, defendant moved for a mistrial
because he believed that the introduction of the black coat was so prejudicial that it deprived him
of a fair trial. During his argument opposing the motion, the prosecutor informed the trial court
that he had learned, after reviewing the trial record, that he had incorrectly paraphrased
defendant’s trial counsel’s opening arguments. Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court
denied defendant’s motion because it did not believe that the prejudicial effect from the
introduction of the black coat was so great as to warrant a mistrial.
It is undisputed that defendant’s trial counsel did not state during his opening arguments
that no blood was found on defendant’s coat. Nonetheless, it is well settled that a prosecutor’s
good faith effort to admit evidence does not constitute misconduct. See Dobek, 274 Mich App at
70. And there is no record evidence that the prosecutor’s mischaracterization was not made in a
good faith belief that defendant’s trial counsel had made the statement alleged. Consequently,
there was no misconduct.
In addition, we agree with the trial court’s determination that any error in the admission
does not warrant a new trial.1 The trial court gave a curative instruction that sufficiently
protected defendant’s rights. See Horn, 279 Mich App at 36. Moreover, during its final
instructions to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that it could only base its decision
regarding defendant’s guilt on the evidence properly admitted. The trial court also instructed the
jury that attorney’s questions and statements are not evidence. Juries are presumed to follow
their instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
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We express no opinion as to whether the trial court properly determined that the items found in
the apartment could not be admitted at trial. Rather, for purposes of this appeal, we shall assume
that the coat was not admissible.
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In addition, assuming that the coat was improperly admitted, any prejudice was harmless.
Officers using a police dog tracked a suspect matching defendant’s physical characteristics to the
apartment where defendant was found. Testimony also established that, when defendant was
arrested, he had what appeared to be several fresh cuts on his hands and wrists. And there was
an envelope found at the crime scene that had defendant’s blood on it. Therefore, there was
compelling evidence that connected defendant to the crime other than the coat. In light of this
evidence and the other evidence produced at trial, we conclude that any error in the admission of
the coat would not warrant relief. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to repay his courtappointed legal fees without considering his ability to pay. Specifically, defendant argues that
the trial court had to state on the record that it had considered defendant’s ability to pay his
court-appointed legal fees under the rule stated in People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240; 690
NW2d 476 (2004). However, our Supreme Court has since held that a trial court is not required
to consider a defendant’s ability to pay his or her court-appointed legal fees before it can order a
defendant to do so. People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271, 298; 769 NW2d 630 (2009). Rather, a trial
court is only required to consider whether a defendant has the ability to pay his or her courtappointed legal fees at the time the order is enforced, but only if the defendant argues he or she
does not have the ability to pay. Id. The Jackson Court further noted that a trial court should not
entertain a defendant’s challenges to his or her ability to pay a court imposed fee until the court
attempts to enforce that fee. Id. at 292.
Here, while the trial court ordered defendant to reimburse the county $300 for his courtappointed legal fees at defendant’s sentencing, efforts to collect that fee did not occur until
August 5, 2008, when the trial court filed a form approved by the Supreme Court Administrative
Office, which ordered the enforcement of the fees imposed. In accord with MCL 769.1l, the
court ordered defendant to remit a portion of his prisoner’s funds to pay the fees. Because
defendant has yet to contest his ability to pay his court-appointed legal fees, we decline to further
consider the issue.
There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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