IN RE EMONI ROZLYN GOINS MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of EMONI ROZLYN GOINS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291891
Monroe Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 09-020994-NA
ELIZABETH MARIE ALLEN,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (i), and (j). We affirm.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights under
§ 19b(3)(b)(i) because she did not intentionally harm Lakendrick, her fifth child, by ingesting a
bag of cocaine before his birth. She contends that she was unaware of the potential effects of
cocaine on her unborn child. The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under this
subsection, reasoning that Emoni’s half-sibling “suffered injury as a result of the respondent’s
ingesting cocaine when that sibling was in utero.” The trial court’s reasoning assumes that
respondent’s cocaine ingestion while pregnant with Lakendrick necessarily caused “physical
injury” to him within the meaning of § 19b(3)(b)(i). We need not resolve this issue, however,
because the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was justified under §§ 19b(3)(g), (i), and (j). MCR 3.977(J); In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286,
296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). Petitioner was required to prove only one statutory basis for
termination in order to justify terminating respondent’s parental rights. In re Trejo, 462 Mich
341, 355-356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Respondent’s parental rights to her first five children were terminated only days before
Emoni’s birth because of respondent’s failure to comply with her case service plan. The
evidence presented during the previous termination proceedings, of which the trial court took
judicial notice, showed that Emoni’s half-siblings all suffered neglect, as well as physical and
sexual abuse, before their removal from respondent’s care.
-1-
A primary issue in this case, and in the previous proceedings, was respondent’s criminal
behavior. Despite receiving services and completing parenting classes and individual therapy,
respondent pleaded no contest to possessing cocaine in June 2008, and was sentenced to three
years’ probation and 178 days in jail. Because of her criminal activity, respondent was unable to
be a part of Emoni’s life for at least 178 days beginning shortly after Emoni’s birth.
Respondent continues to deny that she has a substance abuse problem despite her
previous cocaine-related convictions and drug test results. Although respondent was taking a
substance abuse class while incarcerated, she testified that she took the class only because she
knew that substance abuse would be an issue in the court proceedings regarding Emoni and
because it was a requirement of her probation. She denied having a substance abuse problem,
stating that she had not used controlled substances for more than two years and had not tested
positive for marijuana or cocaine for two years. She also testified, however, that she did not
consider a diluted drug screen to be a positive screen. Nor did she believe that attending AA/NA
meetings was important to maintain her sobriety. Indeed, she had failed to attend a minimum of
three meetings each week, contrary to her therapist’s recommendation.
Further, respondent’s caseworkers testified that it would take at least one year after
respondent’s release from jail for her to complete a service plan and address the issues necessary
to reunite her with Emoni. Respondent’s service plan would include substance abuse counseling,
AA/NA meetings, abstaining from criminal activity, individual therapy, and obtaining stable
employment and housing. Based on respondent’s failure to comply with her previous service
plan and the fact that the only thing that had changed since the previous termination of her
parental rights was that she was incarcerated, there was no reasonable expectation that she would
be able to address the issues that led to Emoni’s placement within a reasonable time.
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent had failed to provide proper
care or custody for Emoni and that there was no reasonable expectation that she would be able to
do so within a reasonable time. Nor did the trial court clearly err by finding that respondent’s
parental rights to her five older children had been terminated because of serious and chronic
neglect or abuse, and that there existed a reasonable likelihood of harm if Emoni was returned to
respondent’s care.
We further conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); see also In re
Trejo, supra at 356-357. The evidence suggested that it would take at least one year for
respondent to complete a service plan and rectify the conditions that led to Emoni’s removal.
Respondent was incarcerated at the time of the termination proceedings in this case and would
not be able to begin working on a service plan until after her release. Emoni was placed in foster
care the day after her birth and respondent visited Emoni only once before beginning her jail
sentence. Thus, there existed no appreciable parent-child bond between respondent and Emoni.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
