PEOPLE OF MI V EVAN THOMAS DESJARDINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 286617
Isabella Circuit Court
LC No. 07-001863-FH
EVAN THOMAS DESJARDINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Murphy, C.J., and Zahra, J.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of burning real property, MCL 750.73 (arson), preparation to
burn property over $20,000, MCL 750.77(1)(d)(i), and larceny in a building, MCL 750.360. He
was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 13 to 25 years’ imprisonment each
for the arson and preparation to burn convictions and 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the larceny
conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutive to an earlier sentence from which
defendant was on parole. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Proceedings
At 4:30 a.m. on September 16, 2007, members of the Mount Pleasant Fire Department
responded to a fire at the Pizza King restaurant in Mount Pleasant. The fire was later determined
to be arson, and resulted in the total loss of the Pizza King and substantial damage to two
adjacent businesses. Defendant was a manager at the Pizza King and had worked at the
restaurant for approximately one year. He had a key to the Pizza King. At trial, witnesses
testified to seeing a car similar to the car owned by defendant near the Pizza King at the time of
the fire. Also, a security recording of inside the Pizza King around the time of the fire was
recovered. The owner of the Pizza King and several of his employees viewed the recording and
identified defendant as the person inside the Pizza King starting the fire. Defendant denied that
he was the person in the recording.
II. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant first argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
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A. Standard of Review
Our review of this unpreserved claim is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.
People Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). The denial of effective
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law, which are reviewed,
respectively, for clear error and de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246
(2002).
B. Analysis
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that (1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms; (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
the proceedings would have been different; and (3) counsel’s errors rendered the resultant
proceedings fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645
NW2d 294 (2001). Defendant must also overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s actions
were the product of sound trial strategy. See People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d
884 (2001).
Defendant argues that trial counsel erred in failing to have him evaluated by a medical
professional to determine whether he could present an insanity or temporary insanity defense
based on possible mental illness or involuntary intoxication. “A defendant is entitled to have his
counsel investigate, prepare, and present all substantial defenses.” In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8,
22; 608 NW2d 132 (1999). When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on the
failure to present a defense, the defendant must show that he or she made a good faith effort to
avail himself of the right to present that defense and that the defense was substantial. Id. A
substantial defense is one that might affect a trial’s outcome. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524,
526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).
A person is legally insane if, “as a result of mental illness . . . that person lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or
to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.” MCL 768.21a(1). Further,
“mental illness . . . does not otherwise constitute a defense of legal insanity.” Id.
Defendant argues there was evidence that he had a history of alcohol and substance abuse
that could lead to a finding that he was involuntarily intoxicated. We note that the PSIR
indicates a history of drug use through 2003, and that defendant abused through the date of the
fire. However, defendant testified that on the night of the fire he consumed “I don’t know, three
mixed drinks, maybe,” at a friend’s house and that “I don’t think I was impaired in any way.”
The record does not support defendant’s claim that he was intoxicated, involuntarily or
otherwise.
Moreover, defendant has not alleged that his mental illness or substance abuse issues
resulted in the lack of capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the law, as required by MCL 768.21a. Because there is no basis for concluding that
an insanity defense was a substantial defense, defendant cannot establish his claim for ineffective
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assistance of counsel on the basis of any failure to pursue it. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App
393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000) (defense counsel is not required to advocate a meritless
position).
III. Sentencing Errors
Defendant next contends that the trial court committed several errors in sentencing
defendant.
A. Standards of Review
A defendant can preserve an issue challenging the scoring of the guidelines or
challenging the accuracy of the information relied upon in determining a sentence by raising an
objection at sentencing. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004). Although
there is no general preservation requirement concerning appellate objections to a trial court’s
decision to depart from the guidelines range at sentencing, see id. at 311-312, defendant did not
bring any mitigating factors to the trial court’s attention during sentencing, nor did he argue that
the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative potential, that the sentence imposed constituted
cruel and unusual punishment as a result, or that the principle announced in Blakely was violated.
Therefore, these aspects of his argument are unpreserved. We review unpreserved allegations of
sentencing errors for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Sexton,
250 Mich App 211, 227-228; 646 NW2d 875 (2002).
B. Impermissible Fact-Finding
Defendant argues that his sentence is constitutionally invalid according to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed
2d 403 (2004). Specifically, defendant claims the trial court engaged in impermissible factfinding and based defendant’s sentence on facts that had not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury. However, our Supreme Court has clearly and consistently held that Blakely does
not apply to Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672,
683; 739 NW2d 563 (2007); People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006);
People v Claypool, 470 Mich 715, 730 n 14; 684 NW2d 278 (2004). Although defendant argues
that these cases were wrongly decided, this Court is bound to follow the decisions of our
Supreme Court. See People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 713; 703 NW2d 204 (2005).
C. Mitigating Factors
We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court impermissibly failed to consider
mitigating factors. Defendant fails to identify any mitigating factor that the trial court should
have considered. An appellant may not merely announce a position and then leave it to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claim. Matuszak, supra at 59.
D. OV 4
Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly scored OV 4 at 10 points. We need not
address this claim because it was specifically waived at sentencing when defense counsel
expressly agreed with the scoring. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
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See also MCL 769.34(10); MCR 6.429(C). In any event, a court must assess 10 points under OV
4 if serious psychological injury occurred to the victim that may require professional treatment,
although treatment need not actually be sought in order for these points to be assessed. MCL
777.34(2). Defendant’s claim on appeal disregards the above language providing that treatment
is not necessary. Levi Henning testified that he had considered defendant his friend. He testified
that upon seeing the security recording he was shocked and felt utterly betrayed. At trial,
Henning began crying as he testified that he had “lost everything,” and that defendant had
“ruined his life.” Henning’s victim impact statement indicates that he experienced emotional
injury and that his ensuing financial difficulties caused additional stress. There was sufficient
evidence to support the assessment of 10 points for OV 4.
E. Failure to Downwardly Depart from Sentencing Guidelines
In this case, the guidelines recommendation for defendant’s minimum sentence for the
arson conviction was 34 to 134 months’ imprisonment. The minimum actually imposed, 13
years, or 156 months, thus exceeded the guidelines range by 22 months. However, defendant
does not argue on appeal that the factors the trial court relied on in deciding to depart from the
guidelines were not substantial and compelling, or that the factors were not objective and
verifiable. Instead, defendant argues the trial court should also have considered substantial and
compelling reasons to depart downward from the sentencing guidelines, i.e. defendant’s
addictions to alcohol and other drugs, his expressions of remorse, and his strong family support.
This argument is not persuasive.
A substantial and compelling reason to depart from the guidelines “exists only in
exceptional cases,” and is one that “keenly or irresistibly grabs” the attention and is “of
considerable worth in deciding the length of a sentence.” Babcock, supra at 258. Assuming
without deciding that defendant suffered from a substance abuse problem, felt remorse for his
actions, and benefited from strong family support, we nonetheless cannot regard those factors as
occurring in only exceptional cases. Nor do we deem them particularly compelling.
Accordingly, they would not qualify as a substantial and compelling reason to depart downward.
F. Individualized Sentence and Proportionality
Defendant also contends that the sentence imposed violates the principle of
proportionality, and is invalid because the trial court did not explain how it determined the
minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment imposed. This argument is not persuasive.
A sentence must be individualized such that the specific details of the crime, and the
characteristics of the offender, are taken into account. Babcock, supra at 264. In this case, the
sentencing transcript reveals that the instant sentence was individualized. The trial court noted
that defendant had an extensive criminal history, and that his actions resulted in the end of three
area businesses. The trial court also made clear that defendant’s actions constituted a serious
violation of trust. We conclude the trial court adequately explained how the sentence imposed
was proper under the facts and circumstances. We further conclude that the sentence imposed
did not violate the rule of proportionality. The trial court properly took both the offense and
offender into account in imposing the sentence.
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G. Incomplete PSIR
Defendant’s alternatively argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court
relied on incomplete information. We disagree. Defendant specifically argues that the trial court
should have conducted an assessment of his rehabilitative potential. MCR 6.425(A)(5) requires
that, before sentencing, a written report be submitted to the court which includes “the
defendant’s medical history, substance abuse history, if any, and, if indicated, a current
psychological or psychiatric report.” Although no current psychological or psychiatric report
was included in defendant’s PSIR, the court rule requires such a report only “if indicated.”
There is nothing in the PSIR indicating that a psychological or psychiatric report was necessary
in the instant case. A PSIR is presumed to be accurate, and a trial court may rely upon the report
unless effectively challenged by the defendant. People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 334; 662
NW2d 501 (2003). Defendant did not challenge the accuracy of the PSIR at sentencing and the
accuracy of the PSIR has not been challenged on appeal. The trial court did not err in
proceeding without any special assessment of his rehabilitative potential. Accordingly,
resentencing is not required.
H. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Defendant next argues that the sentence imposed amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment. See US Const, Am VIII; Const 1963, art 1, § 16. A defendant’s claim that his
sentence violates constitutional principles is not subject to the limitation on review set forth in
MCL 769.34(10). However, as noted above, the sentence was proportionate to the crime
committed. A proportionate sentence does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.
People v Colon, 250 Mich App 59, 65-66; 644 NW2d 790 (2002).
I. Jail Credit
Defendant next argues that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s
refusal to award jail credit. We disagree.
We review this unpreserved claim for clear error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
People v McNally, 470 Mich 1, 5; 679 NW2d 301 (2004). MCL 769.11b governs jail credit, and
provides that a defendant is entitled to jail credit when any time in jail has been served prior to
sentencing “because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense for which he is
convicted.” However, “When a parolee is arrested for a new criminal offense, he is held on a
parole detainer until he is convicted of that offense, and he is not entitled to time served in jail on
the sentence for the new offense.” People v Seiders, 262 Mich App 702, 705; 686 NW2d 821
(2004). The jail credit is applied only to the sentence from which parole was granted. People v
Stead, 270 Mich App 550, 552; 716 NW2d 324 (2006).
Moreover, our Supreme Court has squarely rejected the position that defendant
advocates:
[U]nder MCL 791.238(2), the parolee is “liable, when arrested, to serve out the
unexpired portion of his or her maximum imprisonment” and actually resumes
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serving that term of imprisonment on the date of his availability for return to the
DOC, which in this case is synonymous with the date of his arrest. The parolee is
not incarcerated “because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the
offense of which he is convicted . . . .” MCL 769.11b. Because the parolee is
required to remain in jail pending the resolution of the new criminal charge for
reasons independent of his eligibility for or ability to furnish bond for the new
offense, the jail credit statute does not apply. [People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549,
566-567; ___ NW2d ___ (2009).]
For these reasons, we must reject this claim of error.
K. Sufficiency of Evidence
Defendant’s also alleges in his statement of questions presented that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction for preparation to burn. However, the
corresponding argument section of his brief maintains that his convictions for arson and
preparation to burn violate double jeopardy. In regard to double jeopardy we merely note that
preparation to burn contains elements that arson does not; specifically, the placement or
arrangement of explosive or combustible materials to set a fire. See Blockburger v US, 284 US
299, 304; 52 S Ct 180, 182; 76 L Ed 306, 309 (1932). Defendant has not otherwise provided
argument or citation of authority to support his insufficient evidence claim, and thus has
abandoned this issue on appeal. See People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d
480 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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