PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES EUGENE PORTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 287141
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-005240-FC
CHARLES EUGENE PORTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant Charles Eugene Porter was convicted of one count of seconddegree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(f) (personal injury to the victim). Defendant
was sentenced as a habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to 10 to 50 years’
imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised two peremptory challenges to dismiss the only
two black members of the jury array. Defendant, who is also black, objected and raised a
Batson1 challenge, arguing that the prosecutor dismissed the two black venirepersons solely on
the basis of race. The prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for dismissing each of the
potential jurors, and the trial court found that the explanations did not amount to pretext.
Consequently, it denied defendant’s Batson challenge. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial
1
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). In Batson, supra, the
United States Supreme Court established a three-factor test to determine whether a peremptory
challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause. People v Knight, 473 Mich 324, 336; 701 NW2d
715 (2005), citing Batson, supra at 96-98. First, the party challenging the peremptory dismissal
must make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Id. Second, if the challenger establishes a
prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the party exercising the peremptory
challenge to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. at 337. Finally, “if the
proponent provides a race-neutral explanation as a matter of law, the trial court must then
determine whether the race-neutral explanation is a pretext and whether the opponent of the
challenge has proved purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 337-338.
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court erred in finding that the prosecutor’s proffered explanation for exercising the peremptory
challenges did not amount to pretext. We disagree.
“Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a party may not
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror solely on the basis of the person’s
race.” People v Knight, 473 Mich 324, 335; 701 NW2d 715 (2005). The applicable standard of
review for a Batson challenge depends on which portion of the three-factor test articulated in
Batson is at issue. Knight, supra at 338. In this case, only the third factor, whether the
prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral explanation is a pretext and whether the party opposed to the
challenge proved purposeful discrimination, is at issue. We review the trial court’s findings with
regard to this issue for clear error. Knight, supra at 345.
In this case, we need not address whether the trial court improperly failed to apply the
first Batson factor because the trial court did not clearly err in ultimately concluding that the
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for dismissing the jurors was not pretext.2 The prosecutor
explained that she dismissed one juror because of his dissatisfaction with the outcome of a civil
case in which he was involved, because of his belief that he was treated unfairly, and because he
indicated that he may have a negative opinion of the court system in general depending on the
case. These reasons were unrelated to the juror’s race, and the prosecution had legitimate
concern that this juror may have held animosity toward the court system in general that could
have interfered with his duty to serve as a fair and impartial juror.
With regard to the second juror, the prosecutor indicated that she excused the potential
juror for several reasons, including 1) that juror’s indication that her past experience working
with juveniles at a detention center, where many of the young people made false accusations of
sexual abuse, would cause her to discredit the testimony of an alleged victim of sexual assault; 2)
the juror’s statement that she was a good decision maker except for certain things, such as
painting and interior decorating, combined with her indication that her husband would not agree
she was a good decision maker; 3) the juror’s assertion that she was displeased with the
authorities’ response to alleged sexual abuse involving her niece; and 4) the juror’s assertion that
she would have a problem with the trial court’s instruction that a conviction may be based on the
testimony of a single witness. None of these reasons related to the juror’s race, and they gave the
prosecutor legitimate concern that the juror may have had a predisposed bias against the
prosecution in this sexual assault case.
In sum, the trial court did not err in concluding that the prosecution’s proffered
explanation for dismissing these jurors did not amount to pretext, and in ultimately finding that
defendant failed to show purposeful discrimination.3
2
Defendant acknowledges that the prosecutor offered race-neutral explanations for striking the
jurors, satisfying the second Batson factor.
3
We also reject defendant’s insinuation that simply because Kent County is traditionally thought
to have a “socially conservative composition,” the people of Kent County are racist and would
convict a black man simply because of the color of his skin. Not only is such an insinuation
meritless, but also it perpetrates the very bias that defendant purportedly seeks to avoid: that
(continued…)
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Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
(…continued)
individuals who fit into a broad racial and cultural demographic would automatically act in a
certain way because they are members of that demographic.
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