PEOPLE OF MI V SCOTT BRADY COLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 24, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286408
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 07-009532-FH
SCOTT BRADY COLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Murphy, C.J., and Zahra, J.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2).
Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to 20 to 40 years’
imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the lower courts made certain errors regarding his waiver of
trial counsel. Because this issue was not preserved, our review is limited to plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-765, 774; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
A criminal defendant’s right to represent himself or herself is implicitly guaranteed by
the United States Constitution, US Const, Am VI, and explicitly guaranteed by our state
constitution and by statute. Const 1963, art 1, § 13; MCL 763.1. A trial court must comply with
the waiver of counsel procedures set forth by our Supreme Court in People v Anderson, 398
Mich 361, 367-368; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), as “a necessary antecedent to a judicial grant of the
right to proceed in propria persona.” People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 720-721;
551 NW2d 108 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds People v Rodney Williams, 470 Mich
634 (2004). A trial court must make three findings before granting a criminal defendant’s waiver
of counsel request: (1) “the waiver request must be unequivocal”; (2) “the trial court must be
satisfied that the waiver is knowingly, intelligent, and voluntarily made”; and (3) “the trial court
must be satisfied that the defendant will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court
or the administration of court business.” People v Rodney Williams, 470 Mich 634, 642; 683
NW2d 597 (2004), citing Anderson, supra. Additionally, the trial court must comply with MCR
6.005. MCR 6.005(D) requires trial courts to inform a criminal defendant of the pending charges
and potential penalties; to advise him or her of the risks of self-representation; and to afford him
or her the opportunity to consult with retained or appointed counsel. Ultimately, proper
compliance for the waiver of counsel does not require a litany approach; our case law and court
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rule “are merely vehicles to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
counsel with eyes open.” Adkins, supra at 725. “Proper compliance requires that the court
engage, on the record, in a methodical assessment of the wisdom of self-representation by the
defendant.” Id. at 721. Significantly, a trial court must substantially comply with the substantive
requirements set forth by our case law and court rule. Id. at 726. “Substantial compliance
requires that the court discuss the substance of both Anderson and MCR 6.005(D) in a short
colloquy with the defendant, and make an express finding that the defendant fully understands,
recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of counsel procedures.” Id. at 726-727.
In this case, defendant initially expressed a desire to be represented by trial counsel and
the trial court appointed trial counsel. However, at defendant’s preliminary examination,
defendant’s appointed trial counsel asserted that defendant wanted to represent himself in this
matter. After a cursory colloquy, the district court made an express finding that defendant could
represent himself in this proceeding.
The district court’s colloquy with defendant falls short of our Supreme Court’s mandate
because there was little or no discussion of the substance of Anderson, supra, and MCR
6.005(D). Adkins, supra at 726-727. However, a defendant may not raise errors or irregularities
relating to the preliminary examination on appeal, unless such errors or irregularities were timely
raised before or at trial. People v McKinney, 65 Mich App 131, 134; 237 NW2d 215 (1975).
Defendant did not do so. Further, reversal is not warranted on the basis of an error at the
preliminary examination, where defendant received a fair trial and was not otherwise prejudiced.
People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 600-601, 460 NW2d 520 (1990).
Significantly, this case was not resolved in the district court. The record provides that
the circuit court substantially complied with the advice requirements for self-representation, and
that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In several
subsequent written communications to and at hearings before the circuit court, defendant
asserted his right to self-representation and declined appointed trial counsel. The circuit judge
acknowledged that defendant sought self-representation, and took the time, at various pretrial
hearings, to explain the gravity of undertaking self-representation in this serious felony trial.
We conclude that the record reflects that the circuit court substantially complied with
MCR 6.005(D). Defendant was fully apprised of the charges against him, where he was present
and represented himself at the preliminary examination. Further, the circuit judge explained to
defendant that he faced serious charges, and that he could face life imprisonment based on his
status as an habitual offender. The circuit judge further addressed the risks of selfrepresentations by stating that “if I had charges against me where my potential penalty was life in
person, I would think I would want somebody other than just myself, and I presumably have a
little more knowledge than you do, I’m not sure I would want to represent myself.”
Additionally, the circuit judge appointed standby counsel for defendant early in the proceedings,
and standby counsel remained with defendant throughout trial. The circuit judge’s advice
certainly rises to a level that we previously deemed appropriate. See People v Hicks, 259 Mich
App 518, 531; 675 NW2d 599 (2003).
Further, the record demonstrates that the circuit court substantially complied with the
requirements of Anderson, supra. Defendant essentially argues on appeal that he did not present
an unequivocal request to represent himself at trial. This argument lacks merit, where defendant
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went to great lengths to act as his own counsel, and unequivocally stated that he wanted to
represent himself. The test for a defendant’s competency to waive counsel is whether the
defendant has the ability to understand the proceedings. Godinez v Moran, 509 US 389, 401;
113 S Ct 2680; 125 L Ed 2d 321 (1993). Defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings was
evidenced at the preliminary examination, where he extensively cross-examined the victim, he
asserted a defense of misidentification, and he argued that the prosecution failed to establish all
of the elements of the charged offense. Moreover, defendant clearly demonstrated that he
wanted to represent himself throughout the course of these proceedings. Defendant also filed a
number of motions and advocated his positions at subsequent motion hearings. Defendant’s
assertion on appeal that these were meritless motions fails to acknowledge that the trial court
ruled in defendant’s favor on some of those motions. The circuit judge was satisfied that
defendant could represent himself in this matter. The record demonstrates that defendant’s
request to represent himself was unequivocal, that that waiver was knowingly, intelligent, and
voluntarily made. Further, the circuit judge was satisfied that defendant would not disrupt,
unduly inconvenience, and burden the court or the administration of court business. Rodney
Williams, supra at 642. Ultimately the record demonstrates that the circuit court substantially
complied with the mandates of Anderson, supra, and MCR 6.005(D). Adkins, supra at 726-727.
As such, defendant failed to establish plain error. Carines, supra.
Defendant also contends that the trial court failed to take defendant’s waiver at every
stage of the proceedings contrary to MCR 6.005(E).1 Defendant is correct; however, reversal is
not warranted. The requirements of MCR 6.005(E) are fairly minimal and can be met so long as
it is apparent from the record that the trial court reaffirmed the availability of a lawyer and the
defendant decided to forego one. People v Lane, 453 Mich 132, 137; 551 NW2d 382 (1996).
1
MCR 6.005(E) provides:
If a defendant has waived the assistance of a lawyer, the record of each
subsequent proceeding (e.g., preliminary examination, arraignment, proceedings
leading to possible revocation of youthful trainee status, hearings, trial or
sentencing) need show only that the court advised the defendant of the continuing
right to a lawyer’s assistance (at public expense if the defendant is indigent) and
that the defendant waived that right. Before the court begins such proceedings,
(1) the defendant must reaffirm that a lawyer’s assistance is not wanted; or
(2) if the defendant requests a lawyer and is financially unable to retain
one, the court must appoint one; or
(3) if the defendant wants to retain a lawyer and has the financial ability to
do so, the court must allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to
retain one. The court may refuse to adjourn a proceeding to appoint
counsel or allow a defendant to retain counsel if an adjournment would
significantly prejudice the prosecution, and the defendant has not been
reasonably diligent in seeking counsel.
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Subsequent waivers do not carry the same constitutional, structural, due process implications as
an initial waiver. Id. at 138-139. After defendant properly initially waives his right to counsel,
failure to comply with the subsequent requirements of MCR 6.005(E) is reviewed for actual,
rather than presumed, prejudice. Id. at 140. The record demonstrates that defendant sought to
represent himself early in these proceedings. Further, defendant had standby counsel available
following one of the trial court’s pretrial orders. The trial transcripts demonstrate that standby
counsel was present and available to defendant at trial. Nevertheless, at each of the seven days
of trial, defendant represented himself. Defendant on appeal asserts that he suffered prejudice as
a result of the chaos that erupted at trial; however, the record undermines that self-serving
assertion. Ultimately, there is no indication that defendant suffered actual prejudice from selfrepresentation. Id. We conclude that defendant failed to establish plain error affecting his
substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763.
Next on appeal, defendant complains that the trial
court was not impartial and deprived defendant of a fair trial based on its comments, conduct,
and questions during the trial. We disagree. Defendant failed to object to the alleged improper
comments, conduct, or questions; and, without a timely objection, reversal based on alleged
judicial misconduct is only warranted if such misconduct resulted in manifest injustice. People v
Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. People v
Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 307; 715 NW2d 377 (2006). Trial courts have wide discretion and
power in the matter of trial conduct; however, that power is not without limits. Id. at 307-308. If
a trial court’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality, then a defendant’s conviction must
be reversed. Id. at 308. In determining whether the challenged judicial remarks or conduct were
improper, we consider whether the remarks or conduct were of such a nature as to have unduly
influenced the jury, thereby depriving the defendant of his right to a fair and impartial trial. Id.
In reviewing the challenged remarks or conduct, “[p]ortions of the record should not be taken out
of context in order to show trial court bias against defendant; rather the record should be
reviewed as a whole.” Paquette, supra at 340. After reviewing the challenged comments,
conduct, and questions in context, we conclude that the trial court did not unduly influence the
jury to the extent that it deprived defendant of a fair an impartial trial. People v Sharbnow, 174
Mich App 94, 99-100; 435 NW2d 772 (1989).
The record demonstrates that the trial court discerned whether points of inquiry were
relevant; focused questions to ensure that the testimony remained relevant; precluded repetitious
questions; prevented defendant from mischaracterizing testimony; prohibited defendant from
testifying while asking witnesses questions; and properly admonished defendant for arguing with
witnesses. There is no evidence of judicial bias, and reversal is not warranted. Paquette, supra
at 340.
Finally, defendant asserts that the warrantless search of the residence of defendant’s
parents was illegal because the police failed to obtain valid consent to search that residence. A
trial court’s factual findings at a suppression hearing are reviewed for clear error, People v John
Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005), and due deference is given to the trial
court’s resolution of the factual issues. People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 733; 705 NW2d
728 (2005).
The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” with reasonableness
assessed by the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v Robinette, 519 US 33, 39; 117 S Ct 417;
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136 L Ed 2d 347 (1996). “Generally, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
inadmissible as substantive evidence in criminal proceedings.” People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich
411, 418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). To demonstrate Fourth Amendment compliance, the police
must have a warrant or the search or seizure must fall within one of the narrow, specific
exceptions of the warrant requirement.” Id. Consent is the exception at issue in this case. See
People v Davis, 442 Mich 1, 13-14; 497 NW2d 910 (1993). “[T]he consent must be
unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given,” People v Dagwan, 269 Mich App 338,
342; 711 NW2d 386 (2005), and, the validity of an individual’s consent to search depends on the
totality of the circumstances. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597 NW2d 1
(1999).
Here, the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that defendant’s mother consented to
allow police to search the residence, and that consent was valid. While defendant essentially
claims that the police used oppressive or deceptive tactics to secure his mother’s consent to
search the residence, a recording of the search that was admitted at the hearing refutes his claims.
The relevant exchange between the police and defendant’s mother regarding her consent to the
search lasted approximately four minutes. The recording provided that the police explained that
they were looking for a suspect, who may have entered her residence. Even though defendant’s
mother initially declined to consent to the search, a police officer explained the gravity of the
situation. The police officers obviously wanted defendant’s mother to reconsider, but the
recording does not demonstrate that they used unduly or improper coercive tactics to do so.
Nothing precluded the police from asking defendant’s mother to reconsider a request for consent,
where she merely gave a conditional rejection because her husband was not yet home. Although
she would have preferred to have her husband present, she unequivocally, specifically, and freely
and intelligently gave her consent to the police to search her residence: “Go on and do it. Go on
and do it.” The police officers did not inform defendant’s mother that she could refuse consent;
however, “knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not a prerequisite to effective consent.”
Borchard-Ruhland, supra at 294. Here, these facts establish an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that defendant’s mother’s consent to search was valid. Illinois v Rodriguez, 497 US
177, 185-186; 110 S Ct 2793; 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990); People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634,
648; 675 NW2d 883 (2003). Thus, the trial court properly concluded that, viewed in the totality
of the circumstances, the consent to search was valid. People v Marsack, 231 Mich App 364,
378; 586 NW2d 234 (1998). Ultimately, we conclude that the trial court’s determination was not
clearly erroneous. Dagwan, supra at 342.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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