PEOPLE OF MI V DONALD NELSON CLEMENS JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 288217
Lake Circuit Court
LC No. 08-004622-FH
DONALD NELSON CLEMENS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of operation of a vehicle while
under the influence of liquor (OUIL), third offense, MCL 257.625, and one count of resisting
and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Facts
A prosecution witness testified that he observed defendant’s car swerving on the road on
the afternoon of March 16, 2008. According to the witness, defendant’s car then turned, pulled
off the road, and struck a mailbox. Defendant appeared to be intoxicated, and the witness
contacted the police to report defendant’s behavior.
As the witness was contacting the police, defendant backed his vehicle into a snowy yard
and got stuck. He walked to a nearby house, returned with a shovel, and was attempting to free
his car from the snow when Lake County Sheriff Deputy Donald Maiville arrived. Maiville
testified that defendant did not notice his arrival. Maiville spoke to defendant, who appeared to
have a hard time standing up and was stumbling around. Defendant said he was trying to back
into his driveway but got stuck. Defendant appeared to Maiville to be “highly intoxicated.” His
eyes were glassy and red, his speech was slurred, and he smelled of intoxicants.
In response to the prosecutor’s question at trial concerning whether Maiville then directed
defendant to do anything, Maiville stated:
At that point, we engaged in a brief conversation. Like, again, I had asked
what had happened. I had also brought up the fact of him hitting a mailbox,
which he stated to me he didn’t recall hitting any mailbox, but that if he hit a
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mailbox that he was sorry. Through the course of the conversation, he proceeded
to ask me why I was doing this to him and that he was going to go back to prison.
And I asked him, you know, for doing what, and–
The prosecutor interrupted Maiville and again asked him whether he had directed defendant to
go anywhere. Maiville testified that he asked defendant to stand next to the vehicle’s driver’s
side door while he checked the VIN number, but that defendant left and went into a house, where
he began smoking a cigarette. Maiville took defendant outside and told him to stop smoking, but
defendant continued to smoke. Maiville reached out to grab the cigarette from defendant, and
defendant grabbed Maiville’s arm and started to turn away. Both Maiville and defendant fell to
the ground as they struggled for the cigarette. After defendant refused field sobriety tests, he was
arrested. Two Breathalyzer tests taken at the jail showed that defendant had a .26 blood alcohol
level. The prosecutor also presented testimony from another police officer and a jail corrections
officer who stated that defendant appeared to be intoxicated.
II. Introduction of Defendant’s Prior Incarceration
First, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the introduction of his statement
that he had been incarcerated. He maintains that this was improperly admitted evidence of a
prior bad act under MRE 404b. He acknowledges that defense counsel did not challenge this
evidence, and he maintains that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to do so.
Defendant did not challenge the introduction of his statement concerning his previous
incarceration and, thus, the issue was not preserved. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 508; 674
NW2d 366 (2004). We review unpreserved evidentiary issues for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Id. Reversal is appropriate only if the plain error resulted in the
conviction of an innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id.
No Ginther1 hearing was held; thus, our review of defendant’s claim is limited to
mistakes apparent on the record. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 453; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and [a] defendant bears a heavy
burden of proving otherwise. In order to overcome this presumption, defendant
must first show that counsel’s performance was deficient as measured against an
objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances and according to
prevailing professional norms. Second, defendant must show that the deficiency
was so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial such that there is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the trial
outcome would have been different. [People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 625;
709 NW2d 595 (2005) (internal citations omitted).]
References to a defendant’s prior incarceration generally are inadmissible. People v
Spencer, 130 Mich App 527, 537; 343 NW2d 607 (1983). Yet, we note that even if Maiville’s
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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brief reference to defendant’s statement regarding his prior incarceration were erroneous,
defendant was not prejudiced by the error because it did not affect the outcome of the trial. After
Maiville gave his non-responsive answer, the prosecutor skillfully continued the questioning of
Maiville without pause, returning the focus to defendant’s actions during the immediate
encounter and downplaying the error’s significance to the jury. In addition, given the strong
evidence of defendant’s guilt, reasonable jurors would have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt even if the unresponsive evidence of defendant’s criminal history had been
suppressed. Under the circumstances, defendant cannot show outcome-determinative error. See
People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 7; 532 NW2d 885 (1995); People v Lumsden, 168 Mich
App 286, 299; 423 NW2d 645 (1988).
Likewise, defendant cannot show that he is entitled to relief due to trial counsel’s failure
to object to Maiville’s testimony. It is conceivable that counsel did not want to draw attention to
the fleeting reference and chose to remain silent rather than highlight the issue and trust the
jurors to follow a curative instruction. See People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 287 n 54; 531
NW2d 659 (1995). We will not substitute our judgment for that of trial counsel on matters of
trial strategy. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242-243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). In addition,
given the strength of the evidence presented, defendant cannot show that any error by counsel on
this point was outcome-determinative.
III. Trial Court’s Response to Jury Request
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to answer a question
submitted by the jury. After deliberating for nearly an hour, the jury submitted two requests.
First, it asked to rehear the testimony of the first witness, and his testimony was replayed. In
response to the second request, the trial court provided the following answer:
The second question is that you needed to know when the first phone call
came into dispatch and how long it took for officers to arrive. I or no one else is
really allowed to give any additional facts that the witnesses haven’t already
testified to. So the best suggestion I have is to really, you know, try and, you
know, go through your notes and refresh your memory as best you can. But—But
I can’t add any testimony. I’m not allowed to do that.
So—So—So I guess with—with that in mind, I think I’d, you know, send
you back to your jury room, then, so . . . .
Defendant maintains that the jury was, in effect, requesting Maiville’s testimony and argues that
the jury should have been given the opportunity to at least hear that testimony to clear up its
questions and aid in its deliberations. Defendant acknowledges that defense counsel did not
object to the trial court’s statement and maintains that counsel was ineffective for failing to do
so.
We disagree. The trial court’s response was not clearly erroneous. The trial court
properly stated that it could not add to the evidence presented at trial. Maiville’s testimony did
not include when dispatch first received the emergency call. Maiville only testified regarding
when he received the dispatch to go to the scene and that he arrived five minutes later. The
jury’s request could have been read as a request to rehear other parts of Maiville’s testimony, but
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this was not clear from the language the jury used. Further, the jury knew how to request to
rehear the testimony of a witness because it had just done so. Contrary to defendant’s assertion,
the trial court did not foreclose the possibility of replaying Maiville’s testimony. Thus, the trial
court did not clearly err. MCR 6.414(J).
We further find that counsel did not render ineffective assistance. Given that the trial
court’s response to the actual request was appropriate, and the trial court did not prevent the
jurors from rehearing Maiville’s testimony, defendant cannot show that trial counsel acted in an
objectively unreasonable manner by not raising an objection at that time.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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