EAGLE RIDGE LLC V ALBERT HOMES LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EAGLE RIDGE, L.L.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2009
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
No. 286862
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-082080-CH
ALBERT HOMES, L.L.C.,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Murray and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Albert Homes, LLC appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to plaintiff Eagle Ridge, LLC. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
TriMount/Morgan Lake Development, LLC (TriMount) owned certain real estate in
Independence Township. It planned to develop the property into a golf course and a
condominium site. After the property fell into foreclosure, TriMount quitclaimed the property
and assigned its right of redemption to Albert Homes. Albert Homes sold the property to Eagle
Ridge for $4.5 million. It then used the $4.5 million to redeem the property from foreclosure.
On May 24, 2002, Albert Homes and Eagle Ridge entered into two agreements regarding
the property. The first agreement, the offer to purchase real estate (the purchase agreement),
concerned the golf course. The second agreement, the option agreement, concerned the
condominium site.
In the purchase agreement, Albert Homes agreed to complete the development of the golf
course by February 28, 2004. Eagle Ridge would then sell the golf course to Albert Homes for
$1.00. The purchase agreement contained the following default provisions:
Purchaser’s [Albert Homes] Default. In the event of default by the Purchaser
hereunder, the Seller may, at his option, elect to enforce the terms hereof or
declare a forfeiture hereunder. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Seller shall give
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Purchaser 30 days notice of default to allow Purchaser to cure said default before
taking action under this Purchase Agreement[.]
Seller’s [Eagle Ridge] Default. In the event of default by the Seller hereunder,
the Purchaser may, at his option, elect to enforce the terms hereof.
In the option agreement, Eagle Ridge granted an exclusive option to Albert Homes to
purchase 207 condominium home sites. Eagle Ridge was to develop the home sites in three
phrases (Phases III, VI, and V). Phase III was to be completed “within eighteen months of the
date of th[e] agreement.” The option agreement defined the “completion” of a phase “as the
installation of sufficient improvements such that building permits are available to” Albert
Homes. After being notified that a phase was complete, Albert Homes was to “immediately”
purchase two home sites and begin construction of a model home on each of the sites. The
option agreement contained the following default provisions:
OPTIONEE’S [ALBERT HOMES] DEFAULT. In the event of default
by Optionee, Optionor may declare a forfeiture hereunder and retain any and all
monies paid by the Optionee, maintain an action against Optionee for specific
performance and/or maintain an action against Optionee for any costs, expenses
and damages suffered by Optionor as a result of Optionee’s default. A default on
Optionee’s obligation under the Purchase Agreement for the purchase of the
related golf course property from Optionor shall be a default on this Option.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Optionor shall give Optionee 30 days notice of
default to allow Optionee to cure said default before taking action under this
Option Agreement.
OPTIONOR’S [EAGLE RIDGE] DEFAULT. In the event of default
by the Optionor, Optionee shall be entitled to enforce the terms hereof as the
Optionee’s sole remedy. [Emphasis added.]
The option agreement could only be amended by a writing signed by the parties.
On August 22, 2003, Eagle Ridge and Albert Homes amended the purchase agreement.
The parties agreed that Albert Homes would have until February 24, 2005, to complete the golf
course. They also agreed that Albert Homes would satisfy the existing mortgage of Treadwell
Golf Associates (Treadwell) and that Albert Homes would pay all taxes and assessments owed
after May 24, 2002. The parties never signed a writing amending the option agreement.
In April 2006, Eagle Ridge received a letter from Independence Township, informing
Eagle Ridge that “[b]uilding permits can be applied for and issued,” but that “[n]o certificate of
occupancies will be issued until the remainder of the agreement is completed.” Eagle Ridge
forwarded a copy of the letter to Albert Homes.
In April 2007, Eagle Ridge sued Albert Homes for breach of the purchase agreement and
breach of the option agreement. Eagle Ridge claimed that Albert Homes breached the purchase
agreement by not completing the golf course by February 24, 2005, by not discharging the
Treadwell mortgage, and by not paying all taxes owed after May 24, 2002. It requested specific
performance of the purchase agreement. Eagle Ridge claimed that Albert Homes breached the
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option agreement (1) by failing to immediately purchase two home sites and construct model
homes thereon upon being notified in April 2006 that the Phase III home sites were completed
and (2) not completing the golf course by February 24, 2005. This last claim was based on the
cross-default provision in the option agreement.
Albert Homes filed a three-count counter-complaint against Eagle Ridge. Albert Homes
claimed that Eagle Ridge breached the option agreement by failing to complete the Phase III
home sites by November 2003. And, according to Albert Homes, Eagle Ridge’s “breaches [of
the option agreement] created an impossibility of performance” of its obligations under the
purchase agreement. Albert Homes also asserted claims for fraud and misrepresentation and
promissory estoppel. These claims were based on Eagle Ridge’s representations that it had the
ability and resources to complete the Phase III home sites by the end of November 2003.
Eagle Ridge moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on its
complaint and on Albert Homes’s counter-complaint. At the motion hearing, the trial court
found that Albert Homes breached the purchase agreement by not completing the golf course by
February 24, 2005. In addition, it found that the April 2006 letter from Independence Township
did not satisfy the “completion” requirement of the option agreement. However, it stated that,
because the purchase agreement did not contain a cross-default provision, Albert Homes could
not assert Eagle Ridge’s breach of the option agreement as a defense to its breach of the purchase
agreement. The trial court also found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
whether Albert Homes had satisfied the Treadwell mortgage and whether it had paid the required
taxes. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary disposition.
Thereafter, Eagle Ridge moved for entry of judgment. It stated that after “carefully
considering” the trial court’s oral ruling, it had decided to withdraw its request for specific
performance of the purchase agreement and, instead, seek forfeiture of the agreement, which it
claimed would resolve the litigation in full. Eagle Ridge explained that it was entitled to
judgment on its claim that Albert Homes breached the purchase agreement based on the trial
court’s holding that its failure to complete the Phase III home sites could not be asserted by
Albert Homes as a defense for Albert Homes’s failure to complete the golf course.1 It also
explained that the trial court’s finding that Albert Homes did not timely complete the golf course
entitled it to judgment on its claims that Albert Homes defaulted on the option agreement,
because, pursuant to the cross-default provision in the option agreement, Albert Homes’s breach
of the purchase agreement constituted a default under the option agreement. In addition, Eagle
Ridge reasoned that, even if specific performance of the option agreement was ordered, Albert
Ridge could obtain no relief, because Albert Ridge’s rights to purchase the condominium home
sites under the option agreement were vitiated when it failed to complete the golf course.
1
Eagle Ridge explained that the trial court’s finding that there were genuine issues of material
fact regarding whether Albert Homes paid the Treadwell mortgage or the taxes was moot
because it only “need[ed] one default” by Albert Homes to succeed on its claim for breach of the
purchase agreement.
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After receiving the parties’ arguments, the trial court stated that it was satisfied that Eagle
Ridge’s arguments were correct. It entered an order granting summary disposition to Eagle
Ridge on its claims for breach of the purchase agreement and breach of the option agreement.
The order also declared that the purchase agreement was forfeited and the Albert Homes’s rights
under the option agreement were abrogated. The order stated that it was a full and final
adjudication of all the claims that were or could have been raised in the matter.
II. Standards of Review
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Tevis v
Amex Assurance Co, 283 Mich App 76, 80; 770 NW2d 16 (2009). Summary disposition is
proper under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if, when viewing the documentary evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 80-81. We
also review de novo issues of contract interpretation. Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich
App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006).
III. Purchase Agreement
On appeal, Albert Homes argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition
to Eagle Ridge on Eagle Ridge’s claim for breach of the purchase agreement. Specifically,
Albert Homes contends that the trial court erred in prohibiting it from asserting Eagle Ridge’s
failure to complete the condominium home sites as a defense to its failure to complete the golf
course. Albert Homes also claims that the trial court’s grant of summary disposition was
premature because discovery had not yet been completed.
The fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the parties. Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 275 Mich App 527, 529; 740 NW2d 503
(2007). Where the parties enter into several agreements relating to the same subject matter, the
parties’ intentions must be gleaned from all the agreements. Omnicom of Michigan v Giannetti
Investment Co, 221 Mich App 341, 346; 561 NW2d 138 (1997). Albert Homes and Eagle Ridge
entered into the purchase agreement and the option agreement on the same date and both
agreements related to the property that Albert Homes had redeemed from foreclosure. Because
the agreements related to the same subject matter, the parties’ intentions for whether Albert
Homes could condition its obligation to complete the golf course by February 24, 2005, on Eagle
Ridge’s obligation to complete the home sites must be gleaned from the purchase agreement and
the option agreement.
To determine the intent of contracting parties, we begin by examining the language of the
contract. Randolph v Reisig, 272 Mich App 331, 333; 727 NW2d 388 (2006). “An
unambiguous contractual provision is reflective of the parties’ intent as a matter of law, and if
the language of the contract is unambiguous, we construe and enforce the contract as written.”
Id. (quotations and alternations omitted). We must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause
in a contract, and avoid any interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage
or nugatory. Laurel Woods Apartments v Roumayah, 274 Mich App 631, 638; 734 NW2d 217
(2007).
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The purchase agreement did not contain a cross-default provision. No provision in the
purchase agreement conditioned Albert Homes’s obligation to complete the golf course by
February 24, 2005, on Eagle Ridge’s completion of the home sites under the option agreement.
There was, however, a cross-default provision in the option agreement. The provision provides:
“A default on [Albert Homes’s] obligation under the Purchase Agreement for the purchase of the
related golf course property from [Eagle Ridge] shall be a default on this Option.” Thus, Albert
Homes’s rights under the option agreement were conditioned on the performance of its
obligations under the purchase agreement.
The effect of allowing Albert Homes to assert Eagle Ridge’s failure to complete the home
sites under the option agreement as a defense to its failure to complete the golf course under the
purchase agreement would be to render nugatory the fact that the option agreement, but not the
purchase agreement, contained a cross-default provision. By including a cross-default provision
in the option agreement, the parties intended for Albert Homes’s rights under the option
agreement to be conditioned on its completion of the golf course. In contrast, by not including a
cross-default provision in the purchase agreement, the parties did not intend for Albert Homes’s
obligation to complete the golf course to be conditioned on the completion of home sites.
Accordingly, Albert Homes cannot assert Eagle Ridge’s failure to complete the home sites as a
defense to its failure to complete the golf course. The trial court did not err in granting summary
disposition to Eagle Ridge on its claim for breach of the purchase agreement.2
Further, the trial court’s grant of summary disposition was not premature. Generally,
summary disposition is inappropriate if discovery has not yet closed. Marilyn Froling Revocable
Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 292; 769 NW2d 234 (2009).
“However, the mere fact that the discovery period remains open does not automatically mean
that the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition was untimely or otherwise
inappropriate. The question is whether further discovery stands a fair chance of uncovering
factual support for the opposing party’s position.” Id. The nonmoving party must identify a
disputed issue. Id.; Bellows v Delaware McDonald’s Corp, 206 Mich App 555, 561; 522 NW2d
707 (1994).
The disputed issue identified by Albert Homes is whether the parties intended for its
obligation to complete the golf course to be conditioned on Eagle Ridge’s completion of the
condominium home sites. However, the unambiguous language of the purchase agreement and
the option agreement established that the parties did not intend for Albert Homes’s obligation to
complete the golf course by February 24, 2005, to be conditioned on Eagle Ridge’s completion
of the home sites. Because unambiguous contractual language must be enforced as written,
2
We reject Albert Homes’s argument that Eagle Ridge’s “unclean hands” prevent Eagle Ridge
from obtaining relief on the purchase agreement. The clean hands doctrine requires that “[o]ne
who seeks the aid of equity must come in with clean hands.” Isbell v Brighton Area Schools, 199
Mich App 188, 189; 500 NW2d 748 (1993). “An action for damages for a breach of contract is
historically an action at law, not in equity.” Stroud v Glover, 120 Mich App 258, 261; 327
NW2d 462 (1982). Because Eagle Ridge’s claim was for breach of contract, Eagle Ridge was
not seeking the aid of equity. Thus, the clean hands doctrine is not applicable.
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Randolph, supra, additional discovery would not uncover factual support for Albert Homes’s
position that it could assert Eagle Ridge’s failure to complete the home sites as a defense to its
failure to complete the golf course.
IV. The Option Agreement
Albert Homes argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Eagle
Ridge on its claim for breach of the option agreement. It contends that because Eagle Ridge was
the first party to breach the option agreement, Eagle Ridge cannot maintain an action for breach
of the agreement against it.
A party who first breaches a contract may not maintain an action against the other
contracting party for the latter party’s subsequent breach or failure to perform. McCarty v
Mercury Metalcraft Co, 372 Mich 567, 573; 127 NW2d 340 (1964); Able Demolition, Inc v City
of Pontiac, 275 Mich App 577, 585; 739 NW2d 696 (2007). This rule, however, only applies if
the initial breach is a substantial breach. Able Demolition, Inc, supra at 585. “To determine
whether a substantial breach occurred, a trial court considers whether the nonbreaching party
obtained the benefit which he or she reasonably expected to receive.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Eagle Ridge claims that its failure to complete the condominium home sites does not
invoke the “first to breach rule” because its breach was not substantial when considered in light
of the fact that, under the terms of the purchase agreement, Albert Homes could not assert Eagle
Ridge’s failure to complete the home sites as a defense to Albert Homes’s failure to complete the
golf course. We disagree with this reasoning. The benefit that Albert Homes expected to receive
under the option agreement was completed condominium home sites that it could sell to the
public for a profit, which would provide it with income while it finished the golf course.
Because Eagle Ridge has not completed the home sites, Albert Homes did not receive this
benefit. Eagle Ridge’s failure to complete the condominium home sites was a substantial breach
of the option agreement.
The option agreement provides that a default by Albert Homes on its obligations under
the purchase agreement is a default on the option agreement. Considered relative to the crossdefault provision of the option agreement, the question becomes whether Eagle Ridge breached
the option agreement before Albert Homes breached the purchase agreement and, thereby,
defaulted on the option agreement. Pursuant to the purchase agreement, Albert Homes was to
complete the golf course by February 24, 2005. Pursuant to the option agreement, Eagle Ridge
was to complete the Phase III home sites by November 2003. Thus, pursuant to the written
terms of the two agreements, it appears that Albert Homes’s breach of the purchase agreement
occurred after Eagle Ridge breached the option agreement. However, Eagle Ridge has asserted
that the parties worked cooperatively on the development of the home sites, that control over the
timeliness of the completion of the sites was in the hands of third parties, and that Albert Homes
knew of the regulatory hurdles that it faced in developing the home sites.3 We express no
opinion regarding which party first breached the option agreement. We only hold that the
3
Eagle Ridge’s assertions are not supported by record evidence.
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documentary evidence presented to the trial court does not establish that Eagle Ridge breached
the option agreement after Albert Homes breached the purchase agreement.
Additionally, Eagle Ridge claims that requiring it to complete the home sites would be
worthless because Albert Homes breached the purchase agreement and, consequently, has no
rights under the option agreement. In support, Eagle Ridge notes that Albert Homes’s only
remedy under the option agreement is specific performance. This argument is based on the
premise that, even if Eagle Ridge committed the first breach of the option agreement, it may still
enforce the cross-default provision against Albert Homes. In other words, even assuming that it
was the first party to breach the option agreement, Eagle Ridge is attempting to use Albert
Homes’s subsequent breach to maintain its action against Albert Homes to have the option
agreement forfeited. This is prohibited by case law. McCarty, supra; Able Demolition, Inc,
supra. If Eagle Ridge was the first party to breach the option agreement, Eagle Ridge is
precluded from enforcing the agreement’s cross-default provision against Albert Homes.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Eagle Ridge on its claim for
breach of the option agreement and abrogating Albert Homes’s rights under the option
agreement.4
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219,
neither party having prevailed in full.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
4
In its oral opinions, the trial court never addressed Albert Homes’s counterclaims for fraud and
misrepresentation and promissory estoppel. Albert Homes may pursue these claims on remand.
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