PEOPLE OF MI V ALAN EUGENE RHEA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 10, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285730
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2000-003516-FH;
2001-001413-FH
ALAN EUGENE RHEA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Stephens, P.J., and Cavanagh and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted from circuit court orders confirming the
validity of previously entered orders to remit prisoner funds. We affirm but remand for
correction of the judgment of sentence in LC No. 2000-003516-FH. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
In LC No. 2000-003516-FH, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree home invasion
and felonious assault. In LC No. 2001-001413-FH, defendant pled guilty to second-degree home
invasion. In imposing sentence, the court, over defendant’s objections of indigency, ordered
reimbursement of expenses for court-appointed counsel. In April 2006, the court entered orders
to remit prisoner funds in both cases, finding that defendant owed $5,867.80, and authorizing the
Department of Corrections to make withdrawals from defendant’s prisoner account. On appeal,
this Court vacated “that portion of defendant’s judgment of sentence assessing attorney fees” in
both cases, finding that the trial court “erred by issuing the April 7, 2006 orders to remit prisoner
funds for fines, costs, and assessments without first assessing his ability to pay” and remanded
for the court to “address defendant’s current and future financial circumstances and foreseeable
ability to reimburse the county for court costs and legal fees before determining whether he
should pay those costs and fees.” People v Rhea, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered August 1, 2007 (Docket No. 275703). After receiving a submission from defendant
regarding his financial circumstances, the trial court determined that defendant did have the
ability to pay for court-appointed counsel and confirmed the prior orders.
Defendant again appeals, contending that the trial court should not have entered the
orders to remit funds because he is indigent. We review preserved sentencing issues for an abuse
of discretion. People v Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 312; 715 NW2d 377 (2006). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the court’s decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes, People v
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Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003), or if the court makes an error of law.
People v Giovannini, 271 Mich App 409, 417; 722 NW2d 237 (2006).
A criminal defendant may be required to reimburse the county for the cost of his courtappointed attorney. People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 251; 690 NW2d 476 (2004),
overruled in part on other grounds by People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271; 769 NW2d 630 (2009).
The Dunbar Court held that before a court orders a defendant to pay the cost of court-appointed
counsel, it must consider whether the defendant has the ability to pay. Dunbar, supra at 254255. If the record shows that the court failed to consider the defendant’s ability to pay, a remand
for further proceedings is required. Id. at 255. However, the Supreme Court recently held that
the trial court is not obligated to consider a defendant’s ability to pay at the time it imposes a fee
for court-appointed counsel. Rather, “[t]he ability-to-pay assessment is only necessary when that
imposition is enforced and the defendant contests his ability to pay.” Jackson, supra at 275, 298.
At that time, “the court must consider whether the defendant remains indigent and whether
repayment would cause manifest hardship.” Id. at 275. Nevertheless, orders to remit funds, such
as those entered in this case, “make[ ] a legitimate presumption that the prisoner is not indigent,”
given that he “is being provided all significant life necessities by the state,” and the defendant
must rebut the presumption of nonindigency with evidence showing that “enforcement would
work a manifest hardship on the prisoner or his immediate family.” Id. at 295-297.
In this case, the trial court obtained updated financial information from defendant and
determined that defendant was not indigent and had the ability to pay. Further, apart from
showing that he has minimal funds in his prisoner account, defendant has not shown that his
individual financial circumstances are so unique as to overcome the presumption of
nonindigency. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. However, we remand for the
ministerial task of correcting the amended judgment of sentence in LC No. 2000-003516-FH,
which erroneously orders restitution in the amount of $260; restitution was ordered in LC No.
2001-001413-FH only.
Affirmed, but remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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