IN RE JAYNAZE MARVIN KING JR MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JAYNAZE MARVIN KING, JR.,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 22, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291029
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-418829
JUANITA ARIZEE KING,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
Respondent.
Before: Saad, C.J., and O’Connell, and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Juanita King appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (h), (i), (k), and
(l). We affirm.
Although respondent challenges the trial court’s decision with respect to several of the
statutory grounds for termination, she does not dispute that termination was justified under
§§ 19b(3)(i) (parental rights to child’s siblings were previously terminated after attempts to
rehabilitate the parent were unsuccessful) and (l) (parent’s right to another child were previously
terminated). A trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights need only be supported by a
single statutory ground. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 632; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Thus, because
respondent does not challenge the trial court’s decision with respect to §§ 19b(3)(i) and (l), it is
unnecessary to consider the remaining statutory grounds.
-1-
Nonetheless, we briefly address § 19b(3)(c)(i),1 which provides for the termination of
parental rights under following circumstances:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either
of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child's age.
Here, Jaynaze was adjudicated a court ward primarily because respondent continued to
abuse marijuana, failing to stop even while she was pregnant. Other conditions leading to
adjudication were respondent’s unstable housing and income status. These problems were never
resolved. Respondent failed to complete two drug treatment programs. She submitted only two
drug screens in 2008, both of which were ordered on a day when she attended a court hearing,
and both tested positive.
Respondent argues that petitioner failed to prove that she could not benefit from a drug
treatment program if she were able to complete one. She blames petitioner for preventing her
from completing a program by not giving her bus tickets. However, we conclude that
respondent’s long history of abusing marijuana for nearly 14 years, including repeated failures to
complete treatment in recent years, clearly outweighs her speculative claim that she could
complete a program if she had bus tickets or if she enrolled in an inpatient program.
Additionally, respondent failed to establish housing or an income. She denied petitioner
access to the home where she lived with her aunt. She failed to make any progress at her plan to
obtain her own home. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in terminating her
parental rights under § 19b(3)(c)(i).
We also conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
The trial court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s
best interests was supported by the ample evidence of respondent’s longstanding substance abuse
problem, her repeated failure to complete and benefit from treatment, and her failure to comply
1
Petitioner concedes that the trial court erred in relying on §§ 19b(3)(c)(ii) and (h) as additional
statutory grounds for termination, because neither of these subsections are applicable to
respondent’s situation. The trial court did not specify which subsection of § 19b(3)(k) it found
was established. Because respondent does not contest the termination of her parental rights
pursuant to §§ 19b(3)(i) and (l), and because we have concluded that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) were also both established, it is unnecessary to
consider whether any of the subsections in § 19b(3)(k) might apply to respondent and, if so,
whether they were established by clear and convincing evidence.
-2-
with the trial court’s condition to obtain visitation, i.e. drug screening. Evidence that respondent
fed and diapered the child properly on one occasion is insignificant in contrast to the
overwhelming evidence of parental unfitness.
Respondent’s prognosis to change her
circumstances was poor. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
