CADLE COMPANY II INC V LAKESIDE MACHINE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CADLE COMPANY II, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
October 22, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290426
Delta Circuit Court
LC No. 04-017487-CK
LAKESIDE MACHINE, INC., and PAUL D.
PAULSON JR.,
Defendants,
and
DIXIE PAULSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Bandstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Dixie Paulson (defendant) appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting
plaintiff Cadle Company II, Inc.’s motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1
This action arises from a default on a revolving loan issued to defendant Lakeside
Machine, Inc. (Lakeside), and guaranteed by Lakeside’s owners, including defendant Paul
Paulson. The loan was originally issued by Old Kent Bank, and was later serviced by plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest, Fifth Third Bank (referred to collectively hereafter as Fifth Third), which
assigned its interests in the loan documents underlying this action to plaintiff in 2006.
1
Plaintiff was also granted judgment against defendant Paul Paulson, based on a consent
judgment entered in Paulson’s separate bankruptcy proceeding. Paulson has not appealed that
judgment. Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Lakeside Machine was dismissed for lack of
prosecution, and likewise, it is not at issue here.
-1-
Pursuant to the loan agreement between Lakeside and Fifth Third, the amount of
revolving loan advances that Lakeside was eligible to receive at any given time was based on a
percentage of its accounts receivable and inventory. Consequently, Lakeside obtained loan
advances by submitting “collateral reports,” specifying the value of Lakeside’s accounts
receivables and inventory as of a specific date, to Fifth Third. These collateral reports were
prepared by inserting certain financial information into computer software provided by Fifth
Third.
Paulson served as Lakeside’s controller and chief financial officer after joining the
company in 1990. Generally, Paulson prepared Lakeside’s collateral reports for submission to
Fifth Third. However on at least eight occasions in October and November 2002, defendant,
who was Lakeside’s officer manager at that time, was asked by Paulson to generate, sign and
submit these reports, based on financial information provided to her by Paulson. On November
19, 2002, Lakeside provided Fifth Third with a “restated” collateral report, signed by Paulson,
which indicated that Lakeside had overstated its accounts receivable and/or inventory in
previously submitted collateral reports. Subsequently, an independent review of Lakeside’s
records, commissioned by Fifth Third, revealed that Lakeside had overstated its accounts
receivable and inventory by more than $2 million. As a result, Fifth Third concluded that it had
“overadvanced” $2,196,918 to Lakeside under the revolving loan facility. Thereafter, Fifth Third
declined to provide Lakeside with any additional credit. Lakeside ceased operation in November
2002; its affairs were wound up by March 2003.
In February 2004, Fifth Third filed suit in February 2004, in Delta Circuit Court, seeking
to recover the deficiency on the Lakeside indebtedness remaining after liquidation of all
collateral. Fifth Third alleged claims for breach of contract against Lakeside, and its owners,
including Paulson, each of whom had signed personal guarantees. Fifth Third also asserted a
fraud claim against Paulson, arising from the misrepresentation of Lakeside’s financial data in
collateral reports.
In June 2004, Paulson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief and the state court action was
stayed.2 In September 2004, Paulson was subjected to a debtor’s examination as part of his
bankruptcy proceeding. During that examination, Paulson declined to answer a series of
questions, addressing responsibility for the preparation of the financial data contained in the
collateral reports and for providing that data to Fifth Third, on Fifth Amendment grounds.
In September 2005, the pertinent parties resolved the question whether the Lakeside debt
was dischargeable in bankruptcy and the automatic stay of proceedings was lifted. Thereafter,
plaintiff moved to amend its complaint in the state court action to add a claim of fraud against
defendant, based on her having signed collateral reports submitted in the fall of 2002. During
discovery in this state court action, plaintiff deposed defendant; it did not depose Paulson.
2
Defendant, who was married to Paulson by that time, was not a party to Paulson’s bankruptcy
proceedings.
-2-
During her deposition, defendant testified in pertinent part that she had worked for
Lakeside for nearly 25 years prior to its closing, beginning with the company as a secretary and
becoming its office manager in the mid 1980’s. From the time Paulson joined the company, in
1990, he was defendant’s supervisor. Defendant testified that on those occasions on which she
was asked to do so, she generated collateral reports, based primarily on financial information
provided to her by Paulson, and then signed and submitted them to Fifth Third. Defendant did
not verify the information Paulson gave her for the collateral reports; she was not asked to do so
and the maintenance of that data was not within her job duties. Defendant testified that she
submitted collateral reports to Fifth Third only after being instructed to do so, that she was
“absolutely not” making any representations or warranties in her individual capacity, and that she
was only “the person that faxed the reports.”
In May 2008, plaintiff moved for summary disposition of its claim against defendant,
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that defendant’s failure to verify information provided
to her by Paulson before submitting the collateral reports to Fifth Third constituted reckless
disregard of the truth of those statements sufficient to constitute fraud. In response, defendant
submitted an affidavit from Paulson that, in part, confirmed defendant’s deposition testimony
that she was acting in a ministerial role when she inserted financial information provided by
Paulson into the collateral reports, signed them on behalf of Lakeside, and submitted them to
Fifth Third, and further that defendant had no responsibility or authority for maintaining or
auditing the financial data at issue.
After Paulson’s affidavit was filed with the trial court, plaintiff filed a memorandum of
law in further support of its motion, asserting that the trial court should not consider Paulson’s
affidavit because “he previously invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned in his
deposition about the very matters he testifies to in his affidavit.” In its memorandum, plaintiff
mistakenly asserted that Paulson was deposed in this case and it cited numerous federal cases
holding that a party may not invoke its Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
during discovery and then later submit evidence on issues on which it declined to testify in
opposition to a summary judgment motion. Plaintiff attached the transcript of Paulson’s
September 2004 debtor’s examination in the bankruptcy proceedings to its memorandum.
The trial court granted plaintiff summary disposition on its fraud claim against defendant,
refusing to consider Paulson’s affidavit on the grounds asserted by plaintiff. In so doing, the trial
court made no mention of the fact that Paulson’s prior invocation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was in response to questions tendered to him during his
debtor’s examination in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
consider Paulson’s affidavit. We agree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 76; 684 NW2d 296 (2004). An abuse of
discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of
principled outcomes. Woodard v Custer, 476 Mich 545, 557; 719 NW2d 842 (2006);
Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). However, if the trial
court’s decision involves an examination of the meaning of the Michigan Rules of Evidence, or
of the applicability of a legal doctrine or rule, this Court’s review is de novo. Davis v Forest
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River, Inc, 278 Mich App 76, 80; 748 NW2d 887 (2008), rev’d on other grds, 482 Mich 1123
(2008), recon gtd 483 Mich 985 (2009); People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 442; 669
NW2d 818 (2003); LeGendre v Monroe County, 234 Mich App 708, 721; 600 NW2d 78 (1999).
And, a trial court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets, misunderstands or misapplies the
law. Bynum v ESAB Group, Inc, 467 Mich 280, 283; 651 NW2d 383 (2002); Miller v Varilek,
117 Mich App 165, 170; 323 NW2d 637 (1982).
There being no Michigan case law discussing the issue, plaintiff cites and the trial court
relied on federal case law for the proposition that Paulson could not invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege as a shield during his “deposition” and then later submit an affidavit in opposition to
plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. We recognize that a range of federal appellate,
district and bankruptcy courts have adopted the rule that a “civil litigant who raised the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during discovery may be barred from presenting
evidence on that issue during trial and/or in response to a motion for summary disposition.”
Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc v Taseski, 47 F Supp 2d 867, 871 (ED Mich, 1999); see also, Traficant v
Comm’r of IRS, 884 F2d 258, 265 (CA 6, 1989); In re Edmond, 934 F2d 1304, 1308-09 (CA 4,
1991); US v Parcels of Land, 903 F2d 36, 43 (CA 1, 1990); Pedrina v Han Kuk Chun, 906 F
Supp 1377, 1398 (D Haw, 1995), aff’d 97 F3d 1296 (CA 9, 1996). However, we need not decide
whether that rule applies under Michigan law, because the rule would not extend so far as to
warrant the trial court’s refusal to consider Paulson’s affidavit under the circumstances presented
here.
In Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc v Taseski, 47 F Supp 2d 867, 871 (ED Mich, 1999), the case
relied on by the trial court in its opinion granting plaintiff’s motion, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan addressed the issue whether a “civil litigant who
raised the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during discovery may be barred
from presenting evidence on that issue during trial and/or in response to a motion for summary
disposition.” The plaintiff in that case sought to recover damages resulting from the defendants’
conduct in underreporting sales. The defendants stipulated to liability, but then refused to
answer any questions regarding the amount of the underreported sales or the amount of
restitution owed. The court held that it would not allow the defendants “after invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination and refusing to answer questions on the matter, to introduce
testimony or other evidence in support of their version of the damages amount.” Id. at 872, 874.
The court reasoned as follows:
Plaintiff directs the Court to several cases holding that once a civil litigant
invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege on an issue, he will be barred thereafter
from introducing other evidence on that issue. See Traficant v. Comm’r of I.R.S.,
884 F.2d 258, 265 (6th Cir.1989); In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (4th
Cir.1991); U.S. v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir.1990); Pedrina v.
Han Kuk Chun, 906 F.Supp. 1377, 1398 (D.Haw.1995), aff’d, 97 F.3d 1296 (9th
Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1268, 117 S.Ct. 2441, 138 L.Ed.2d 201 (1997);
U.S. v. Island Park, 888 F.Supp. 419, 431-32 (E.D.N.Y.1995); U.S. v. All Assets
& Equip. of West Side Bldg. Corp., 843 F.Supp. 377, 382-83 (N.D.Ill.1993), aff’d,
58 F.3d 1181 (7th Cir.1995). Federal courts find such a preclusive effect
grounded in the following reasoning:
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[a] defendant may not use the fifth amendment to shield herself from the
opposition’s inquiries during discovery only to impale her accusers with
surprise testimony at trial.
******
Because claimant has asserted a fifth amendment claim in discovery, this
court holds that he may not now waive the privilege and testify. Neither
may he submit affidavits in opposition to the government’s motion for
summary judgment.
U.S. v. Sixty Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 763 F.Supp. 909, 914
(E.D.Mich.1991) (Gadola, J.).
In Traficant, a taxpayer appealed a United States Tax Court decision
imposing a penalty for fraud due to the taxpayer’s alleged failure to report bribes
as income. 884 F.2d at 260. The Sixth Circuit held that “it was proper under
principles of reciprocity for the Tax Court to bar Traficant, once he had invoked
the privilege against self-incrimination on the authenticity of the statement and
the tapes, from introducing other evidence on that matter.” Id. at 265. The court
further held that “[s]uch limits are properly within the scope of cases holding that
a party to civil litigation or other non-criminal proceedings may encounter costs
imposed in exchange for the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as long
as they are not so high as to force abandonment of the privilege.” Id. (citing
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515, 87 S.Ct. 625, 628, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967)
and Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976)).
Because of the potential expansiveness of such a rule of preclusion, the
Sixth Circuit in Traficant was careful to note that “when the issue is whether a
court may impose broad limits on the admissibility of evidence, the cases permit
only limits directly related to the scope of the asserted privilege.” Id. (citing
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cymaticolor, 106 F.R.D. 545
(S.D.N.Y.1985) and In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364
(M.D.Pa.1979)) (emphasis added).3
__________________________________________________________________
3
The general rule articulated in Traficant is also regularly applied in the
summary judgment context. See, e.g., In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1308-09
(4th Cir.1991) (holding that debtor’s refusal to submit to a deposition, based upon
assertion of privilege against self-incrimination, justified bankruptcy judge’s
decision to strike the debtor's affidavit in support of his motion for summary
judgment); U.S. v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that
district court had ample authority to strike claimant’s affidavit offered in
opposition to government’s motion for summary judgment in forfeiture action
after claimant invoked Fifth Amendment and refused to answer government’s
deposition questions); Pedrina v. Han Kuk Chun, 906 F.Supp. 1377, 1398
(D.Haw.1995), aff’d, 97 F.3d 1296 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1268,
-5-
117 S.Ct. 2441, 138 L.Ed.2d 201 (1997) (holding that party may not rely on its
own testimony or affidavits to support its version of disputed fact issue in
connection with summary judgment motion where party has asserted Fifth
Amendment right not to answer questions concerning that very issue); U.S. v.
Island Park, 888 F.Supp. 419, 431-32 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that because of
potential for abuse of privilege against self-incrimination by defendants who use
it to obstruct discovery only to waive it and subject the plaintiff to surprise
testimony at trial, courts recognize appropriateness of imposing sanctions for
civil defendant’s assertion of the privilege during discovery; decision to assert
privilege during pretrial depositions may be valid grounds for precluding
defendant from testifying at trial, as well as for striking affidavits opposing
summary judgment motions); U.S. v. All Assets & Equip. of West Side Bldg.
Corp., 843 F.Supp. 377, 382-83 (N.D.Ill.1993), aff’d, 58 F.3d 1181 (7th
Cir.1995) (holding that district court need not consider evidence claimant
presented to show that property subject to forfeiture proceedings was not
acquired with proceeds of claimant’s husband’s drug trafficking activity, where
claimant refused, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer government’s
deposition questions concerning same topics).
_________________________________________________________________
[Id. at 872-874.]
The court then concluded that summary judgment was warranted, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, because, the plaintiff having satisfied its initial burden of establishing
damages, defendants were “unable to satisfy [their] burden [of setting forth specific facts
showing a genuine triable issue] because, as discussed, they are precluded from offering
evidence on the topic of damages due to their invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id.
at 874.
In In re Edmund, supra at 1308-1309, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit likewise upheld the lower court’s exclusion of a debtor’s affidavit in a
nondischargeability proceeding, because the debtor previously refused to submit to deposition,
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege “throughout discovery.” The court explained
By selectively asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege, [the debtor]
attempted to insure that his unquestioned, unverified affidavit would be the only
version. But the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be invoked as a shield to
oppose depositions while discarding it for the limited purpose of making
statements to support a summary judgment motion.
The Supreme Court has written, “‘That the defendant faces such a
dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense
has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled selfincrimination.’” In the context of cross-examination, courts have struck
testimony when the defendant has invoked the Fifth Amendment to refuse to
respond to cross-examination questions.
-6-
The same principle applies when a party seeks to invoke the Fifth
Amendment to avoid discovery while offering an affidavit to compel a certain
result on summary judgment.
Similarly, in Parcels of Land, supra at 43, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held:
. . . that the district court had ample authority to strike [a party’s] affidavit after he
invoked the fifth amendment and refused to answer the government’s deposition
questions. It is well-accepted that a witness’ direct testimony can be stricken if
she invokes the fifth amendment on cross-examination to shield that testimony
from scrutiny. See, e.g., Lawson v. Murray, 837 F.2d 653, 655-56 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 831, 109 S.Ct. 87, 102 L.Ed.2d 63 (1988); Klein v. Harris, 667
F.2d 274, 287-89 (2d Cir.1981); see also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
215, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1471, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971) (“It has long been held that a
defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the privilege
against cross-examination on matters reasonably related to the subject matter of
his direct examination.”); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56, 78 S.Ct.
622, 626-27, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958). The power to strike is grounded in the
principle that once a witness testifies, she may not invoke the fifth amendment
privilege so as to shield that testimony from scrutiny. To allow her to do so
would constitute “‘a positive invitation to mutilate the truth.’” Lawson v. Murray,
837 F.2d at 656 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. at 156).
A number of federal courts have further explained that the authority to prevent a party
from engaging in such duplicitous behavior arises from the court’s discretion to sanction conduct
that impairs or threatens the purposes of discovery. For example, as the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan explained, in Sixty Thousand Dollars, supra at 914,
quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v Cartagena, 882 F2d 553 (CA 1, 1989).]:
Trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning remedies
during discovery. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643, 49 L.Ed.2d 747, 96 S.Ct. 2778
[2781] (1976). Discovery sanctions are appropriate “not merely to
penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a
sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct
in the absence of such a deterrent.” Id. The viewpoint of National
Hockey League was echoed in the advisory committee note to the
1983 amendment of Fed.R.Civ. p. 26: “Rule 26(g) is designed to
curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of
sanctions.” Courts have not been afraid to bar a party from
testifying where doing so was necessary to prevent the “thwarting
[of] the purposes and policies of the discovery rules.” Meyer v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court. etc., 95 Nev. 176, 591 P.2d 259
(1979); see Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540, 541-42 (9th Cir.1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1027, 90 S.Ct. 1273, 25 L.Ed.2d 538 (1970).
-7-
The district court’s decision to bar [the defendant] from
testifying at trial due to his previous refusal to testify during
discovery is supported by ample precedent. The Federal Rules
contemplate that there be “full and equal mutual discovery in
advance of trial” so as to prevent surprise, prejudice and perjury.
“It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false,
fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.” 4 Moore, Federal
practice para. 26.02[2] at 1034-35. The court would not tolerate
nor indulge a practice whereby a defendant by asserting the
privilege against self-incrimination during pre-trial examination
and then voluntarily waiving the privilege at the main trial
surprised or prejudiced the opposing party. . . .
******
. . . The district court’s decision to bar [the defendant’s]
testimony did not burden his due process rights, it merely forced
him to abide by his decision and protected plaintiff from any unfair
surprise at trial. A defendant may not use the [F]ifth [A]mendment
to shield herself from the opposition’s inquiries during discovery
only to impale her accusers with surprise testimony at trial.
Similarly, in Traficant, supra at 265, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
noted that case law “permit[s] only limits [on the admissibility of evidence] directly related to
the scope of the asserted privilege.” This is because,
[w]hen one party invokes the privilege, he receives a benefit from that
invocation in that he need not divulge information which he believes may
incriminate him. However, this invocation is not without consequences. The trier
of fact and the opposing party are handicapped by the denial of possibly relevant
information. To compensate for this handicap, courts have imposed a cost on the
claimant to facilitate the proceeding or to “level the playing field” for the party
opposing the claimant.
***
[Nevertheless, case law has established that a] negative consequence may
not be used solely to punish a claimant for having invoked his privilege. It may,
however, be used to compensate the non-invoking party or to better administer the
proceeding. [In re Moses, 792 F Supp 529, 538 (ED Mich, 1992).]
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained, more fully:
In a civil trial, a party’s invocation of the privilege may be proper, but it
does not take place in a vacuum; the rights of the other litigant are entitled to
consideration as well. One of the situations in which that concern comes into play
arises when one party invokes the Fifth Amendment during discovery, but on the
eve of trial changes his mind and decides to waive the privilege. At that stage, the
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adverse party—having conducted discovery and prepared the case without the
benefit of knowing the content of the privileged matter—would be placed at a
disadvantage. The opportunity to combat the newly available testimony might no
longer exist, a new investigation could be required, and orderly trial preparation
could be disrupted. In such circumstances, the belated waiver of the privilege
could be unfair.
***
A trial court must carefully balance the interests of the party claiming
protection against self-incrimination and the adversary’s entitlement to equitable
treatment. Because the privilege is constitutionally based, the detriment to the
party asserting it should be no more than is necessary to prevent unfair and
unnecessary prejudice to the other side. [SEC v Graystone Nash, Inc, 25 F3d
187, 191-192 (CA 3, 1994) (emphasis added).]
Because of these considerations, the determination of the appropriate “effect that an invocation
of the privilege against self-incrimination will have in a civil suit depends to a large extent on the
circumstances of the particular litigation.” Id. And, an appellate court will reverse a trial court’s
decision to exclude evidence based on a prior assertion of the privilege where the opposing party
cannot show that it would be prejudiced by the admission of that evidence. See, Id. at 193.
Each of the cases cited by plaintiff and relied on by the trial court involve factual
scenarios in which the affiant/witness declined to submit to discovery on the basis of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the same action as they later sought to submit
testimony at trial or by way of affidavit. The reasoning set forth above makes clear that the
ability to bar the testimony arises from the trial court’s authority to sanction discovery abuses
that, if not sanctioned, would result in unfairness by preventing “full and equal mutual discovery
in advance of trial” and allowing one party to surprise the other(s) with self-serving testimony
that the other(s) may no longer test. See, e.g., Sixty Thousand Dollars, supra at 914. The
overriding concern of the courts in each of these cases is one of fairness; it is patently unfair to
permit a litigant to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a shield
during discovery, to refuse to answer difficult questions about his or her conduct, only to later
have that litigant attempt to testify to a self-serving version of events, which the remaining
parties were then unable to effectively challenge.
Of significance here, a party’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination does not carry over from one proceeding to another separate and distinct
proceeding; rather, the privilege must be invoked or waived in each separate proceeding or
forum. Parcels of Land, supra at 43 (“[I]t is true that had [the] affidavit been filed and
[the]deposition taken in separate, distinct proceedings, neither would have affected the treatment
of the other.”); Nationwide Life Ins Co v Richards, 541 F3d 903, 911 (CA 9, 2008) (“[A] waiver
of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver
occurs.”). Thus, where as here, a party invokes the privilege during discovery in proceedings in
one forum and then submits an affidavit during subsequent separate and distinct proceedings in a
different forum, the previous invocation of the privilege does not to impact a court’s
consideration of the subsequent affidavit. Parcels of Land, supra. Consequently, under the
federal rule as articulated above, Paulson’s invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination
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during his prior debtor’s examination in his bankruptcy proceedings does not prevent him from
testifying, by way of affidavit or otherwise, in this state court action because Paulson was never
deposed, and has not asserted the privilege, in this case. Thus, the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to consider Paulson’s affidavit when ruling on plaintiff’s motion for
summary disposition.
Furthermore, considering the purpose and policy behind the federal rule, there is no basis
arising from Paulson’s conduct in this case to bar consideration of his affidavit. This is
underscored by the fact that, while recognizing that a party to civil proceedings “may encounter
costs imposed in exchange for the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege,” Dunkin’ Donuts,
supra at 873, the federal courts have employed a cautious approach to barring the admission of
testimony or evidence because a party has previously asserted the privilege. As is apparent from
nearly every case discussing the issue, the overriding concern is one of fairness and prejudice.
Thus, the federal courts have aptly noted that, when considering the appropriate effect of a
party’s prior invocation of the privilege, trial courts should impose limitations on the subsequent
admission of evidence only in so far as is sufficient to “to prevent unfair and unnecessary
prejudice to the other side.” Graystone Nash, supra at 192.
When balancing the interests of plaintiff and defendant in the instant matter, we find it
dispositive that plaintiff did not attempt to depose Paulson and Paulson did not invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination in this case. Thus, there is nothing unfair about defendant’s
submission of Paulson’s affidavit in response to plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. It
cannot be said that plaintiff was unable to effectively challenge Paulson’s testimony or that
plaintiff was otherwise unfairly or unnecessarily prejudiced by the submission of Paulson’s
affidavit in this action. Consequently, the trial court’s refusal to consider the affidavit was not
justified by the circumstances of this particular litigation, or by any showing of prejudice
resulting to plaintiff from submission of the affidavit. Graystone Nash, supra at 192.
Additionally, such a conclusion is further warranted by the fact that the trial court
extended the rule to bar consideration of Paulson’s affidavit in the context of plaintiff’s claims
against defendant. In the cases discussed above, the barring of testimony was considered an
appropriate response to a prior assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination because the
party invoking the privilege was assumed to have acquiesced to certain costs or consequences of
that decision in exchange for receiving the benefit of not having to provide incriminating
information. In re Moses, supra at 538. Here, the trial court imposed costs on a party other than
the party asserting the privilege, and it did so absent any showing of prejudice or unfairness to
justify that result.
Plaintiff does not point this Court to any case with a similar outcome. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan did prevent the plaintiffs from relying, in
support of their motion for summary judgment, on the affidavit of a defendant based on that
defendant’s subsequent assertion of the privilege, in Tolliver v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 265
F Supp 2d 873, 875-876 (WD Mich, 2003). However, it did so because to do otherwise would
have been “grossly unfair” to the other defendants, who were implicated by that affidavit and yet
were rendered unable to test the statements in it through discovery and cross-examination. In
other words, other parties would have been prejudiced by the court’s consideration of the
affidavit. Again, the same is not true here. Paulson never asserted the privilege in the instant
case and thus, neither defendant, nor plaintiff, was prevented from testing the statements in that
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affidavit during discovery in this case. And, plaintiff made no showing of any prejudice, under
these circumstances, resulting from the submission of Paulson’s affidavit. To the contrary, in the
absence of any attempt by plaintiff to take discovery from Paulson in the instant case, fairness
considerations favor allowing defendant to rely on the Paulson affidavit, the pertinent content of
which is corroborated by those portions of defendant’s own deposition testimony placed before
the trial court by plaintiff in support of its motion for summary disposition.
Having determined that the trial court should have considered Paulson’s affidavit, we
conclude that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff summary disposition of its fraud claim
against defendant. As our Supreme Court has explained:
The elements constituting actionable fraud or misrepresentation are wellsettled in this jurisdiction. In Candler v Heigho, 208 Mich 115, 121; 175 NW 141
(1919), we set forth those elements:
“The general rule is that to constitute actionable fraud it
must appear: (1) That defendant made a material representation;
(2) that it was false; (3) that when he made it he knew that it was
false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth, and
as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the intention that it
should be acted upon by plaintiff; (5) that plaintiff acted in reliance
upon it; and (6) that he thereby suffered injury. Each of these facts
must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, and all of
them must be found to exist; the absence of any one of them is
fatal to a recovery.”
See also, A&A Asphalt v Pontiac Speedway, 363 Mich 634, 639; 110 NW2d 601
(1961); Marshall v Ullmann, 335 Mich 66, 73; 55 NW2d 731 (1952); Waldbauer
v Hoosier Casualty Co, 285 Mich 405, 408; 280 NW 807 (1938). The burden of
proof rests with plaintiffs. Fraud will not be presumed but must be proven by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. Youngs v Tuttle Hill Corp, 373 Mich
145, 147; 128 NW2d 472 (1964). [Hi-Way Motor Co v Int’l Harvester Co, 398
Mich 330, 336; 247 NW2d 813 (1976).]
Plaintiff argued, and the trial court determined, that it was entitled to summary
disposition because, by signing collateral reports containing information provided to her by her
supervisor and then submitting them to Fifth Third as instructed by that supervisor without
independently verifying the information contained therein, there can be no question but that
defendant made a material misrepresentation recklessly without knowledge of its truth and as a
positive assertion, and that as a result, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We
disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003); Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Rice v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 252
Mich App 25, 30; 651 NW2d 188 (2002). Whether a representation was made recklessly,
without knowledge of its truth is a factual question. Hi-Way Motor, supra at 336.
-11-
In his affidavit, Paulson indicated that defendant performed a “purely ministerial function
by entering” the information he provided to her into the collateral reports and sending them, as
instructed, to Fifth Third.3 The question thus posed is, generally, whether an employee can be
said to have acted recklessly, and thus to have committed fraud, by following the direction of a
supervisor to forward certain information, which the employee has no responsibility or authority
over, to a third party, without first verifying that information; the question more specifically, is
whether considering the fact presented, defendant acted recklessly, as a matter of law, by doing
so here.
This Court has explained that “[r]eckless misconduct is not willful in the sense that there
is actual intent to cause harm,” but rather that reckless misrepresentations are the functional
equivalent of willfully made misrepresentations because they exhibit a level of indifference to
whether harm will result that is equivalent to a willingness that it does. Echelon Homes, LCC v
Carter Lumber Co, 261 Mich App 424, 443-444; 638 NW2d 171 (2004), rev’d in part on other
grds, 472 Mich 192 (2005). The determination whether an employee, who is acting as requested
by a supervisor in the ordinary course of her employment to forward information provided by
that supervisor without first verifying the accuracy of the information provided, has “exhibited a
level of indifference to whether harm will result” that is “equivalent to a willingness that” such
harm result, is a factual determination to be made based on the circumstances presented. Hi-Way
Motor, supra at 336. Considering the evidence submitted before the trial court, by way of
Paulson’s affidavit, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
defendant acted with reckless indifference to the truth of the representations being made by
Lakeside as to its financial status by not verifying the financial data provided to her by Paulson,
especially where the evidence submitted establishes that neither the maintenance of that
information, nor the auditing of it, was within the purview of defendant’s job responsibilities or
authority. We also note that plaintiff has not conclusively established that by signing the report,
defendant was herself representing or warranting any financial information. Rather, the evidence
presented suggests that it was Lakeside, the “Borrower,” that was making the representations, as
well as the warranties, set forth in the collateral reports. With these and similar fact questions
unresolved, summary disposition was improperly granted against defendant.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
3
Because we determine that Paulson’s affidavit suffices to create fact questions sufficient to
protect defendant from summary disposition, we need not consider the other issues raised on
appeal.
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