PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES TERRY STEWART JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 20, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286266
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-218374-FH
CHARLES TERRY STEWART JR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Sawyer and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of one count of making a false
statement to pass title for a motor vehicle, MCL 257.254. The trial court sentenced defendant to
two years’ probation and 270 days in jail granting two days credit to be suspended after 210 days
served as well as ordered defendant to pay restitution to the victim, Craig Royer, in the amount
of $11,500. Because the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is
sufficient to support defendant’s conviction, and because the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it ordered defendant to pay restitution to Royer, we affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Basic Facts
Defendant’s conviction stems from making a false statement to pass title for a stolen
motor vehicle. The motor vehicle in question is a 2005 Ford 500 owned by Craig Royer, a 21
year old who lives in Goshen, Indiana. Royer advertised the vehicle for sale and was contacted
by a potential buyer named “Bob Wilson.” On March 12, 2007, Wilson traveled to Royer’s
residence to purchase the vehicle and Royer gave Wilson a certificate of title, bill of sale, and the
car in exchange for a bank check in the amount of $11,500. However, after Royer deposited the
bank check, he learned that it was fake and the car was later reported stolen. Defendant applied
for title of the 2005 Ford 500 on March 13, 2007, at the City of Pontiac branch of the Michigan
Secretary of State using his state I.D. and claiming he purchased the vehicle from Craig Royer on
March 12, 2007, for $3,000. Immediately after applying for title, defendant requested a
duplicate for an allegedly lost title before receiving the original title, and sold the car weeks later.
The Secretary of State office later discovered that the vehicle was reported stolen and that it
could not legally be titled in Michigan.
II. Sufficiency of Evidence
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Defendant does not dispute he applied for title of the vehicle. Rather, he argues on
appeal that the evidence provided by the prosecution is speculative and not sufficient to convince
a rational person beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly made a false statement of
material fact in the assignment of a certificate of title. We review challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence de novo. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). In
doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the prosecution proved the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158
(2002). In making this assessment, the trier of fact and not the appellate court determine what
inferences can be fairly drawn from the evidence and the weight to be accorded to those
inferences. Id.
The elements for passing title or transferring possession of a motor vehicle known to be
stolen are set out in MCL 257.254. MCL 257.254 states in pertinent part:
Any person who shall knowingly make any false statement of a material fact,
either in his or her application for the certificate of title required by this act, or in
any assignment of that title, or who, with intent to procure or pass title to a motor
vehicle which he or she knows or has reason to believe has been stolen, shall
receive or transfer possession of the same from or to another, or who shall have in
his or her possession any vehicle which he or she knows or has reason to believe
has been stolen, and who is not an officer of the law engaged at the time in the
performance of his or her duty as such officer, is guilty of a felony[.]1
Here, Royer testified that he gave a man named “Wilson” a certificate of title, a bill of
sale, and the vehicle in exchange for a bank check in the amount of $11,500 on March 12, 2007.
Royer later determined that the bank check was fake and he reported the car stolen. As the trier
of fact, the jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v Brown,
184 Mich App 567, 570-571; 459 NW2d 19 (1990). Although Royer was unable to identify
defendant as Wilson, it can be reasonably inferred defendant either was Wilson or knew Wilson,
such that he knew that the vehicle was not legally purchased. The circumstantial evidence
connects defendant to the scheme because when he applied for the title, he provided Royer’s
1
See also CJI2d 24.7:
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of making a false statement about the
title to a motor vehicle. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(2) First, that the defendant applied for a [certificate / assignment] of title to a
motor vehicle.
(3) Second, that in doing this, the defendant made a false statement of a material
fact. A material fact is an essential matter required for a valid transfer.
(4) Third, that the defendant knew the statement was false when [he / she] made
it.
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name as the seller, indicated that he purchased the vehicle on the same day that Royer testified he
sold the car, and was in possession of the vehicle’s title that Royer had given to “Wilson.” This
evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, tend to show that defendant knowingly
made a false statement of material fact when he applied for title and is sufficient to establish the
first and second elements of MCL 257.254.
Defendant’s actions in procuring a title immediately following the “purchase,” requesting
a duplicate for an allegedly lost title before receiving the original title, and selling the car weeks
later support defendant’s intent to quickly procure title for a stolen vehicle. The expedited
manner in which defendant transferred the certificate of title infers he knew the car was stolen
and was in a rush to sell the car. “An actor’s intent may be inferred from all of the facts and
circumstances . . . and because of the difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal
circumstantial evidence is sufficient.” People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 517-518; 583
NW2d 199 (1998). Therefore, defendant’s actions are sufficient to establish the third element in
MCL 257.254 and the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to establish all three
elements and met its burden.
Defendant, however, provides alternative theories to show he did not knowingly make a
false statement when he presented the title for transfer. A prosecutor “need not negate every
reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence, but [must] merely introduce
evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury in the face of whatever contradictory evidence
the defendant may provide.” People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 560; 679 NW2d 127 (2002),
quoting People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 273 n 6; 536 NW2d 517 (1995).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the
prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.
III. Sentencing
Defendant next contends that he is not directly responsible for the loss incurred by Royer
and therefore the trial court erred by ordering restitution to Royer. We review an order of victim
restitution for an abuse of discretion. People v Gubachy, 272 Mich App 706, 708; 728 NW2d
891 (2006). If the trial court’s decision falls within the range of principled outcomes, it has not
abused its discretion. People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614, 616-617; 727 NW2d 399 (2006).
The Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq., mandates that a trial court, when
sentencing a defendant, order “that the defendant make full restitution to any victim of the
defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction or to the victim’s estate.” MCL
780.766(2). “[D]efendant should compensate for all the losses attributable to the illegal scheme
that culminated in his conviction, even though some of the losses were not the factual foundation
of the charge that resulted in conviction.” People v Gahan, 456 Mich 264, 272; 571 NW2d 503
(1997). Here, although Royer’s loss did not form the factual foundation for the charge that
resulted in defendant’s conviction, his loss is attributable to the illegal scheme that resulted in
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defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that
defendant pay restitution.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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