PEOPLE OF MI V JEREL DION SMITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 13, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291448
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-000449-FC
JEREL DION SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of felon in possession of a firearm
(felon in possession), MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. We affirm, but remand for resentencing.
I. Basic Facts
The underlying facts of this matter involve the non-fatal shooting of defendant’s fiancé
on December 8, 2007. Sometime early that morning officers were called to a residence, where
defendant and three other individuals were discovered. Defendant had blood on his shirt and his
boots and the other individuals also had stains on their shoes that may have been blood. A
sawed-off Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun was found in the driveway next door.
Later that morning, defendant made a statement to the police after waiving his
constitutional rights. Defendant indicated that he had gone to a club and returned to the
residence where he started consuming alcohol. He stated that he had obtained the gun from the
house and put it in the corner. He admitted that the gun “went off” when his fiancé tried to grab
it from him. Defendant also indicated that he put the gun in the driveway next door in order to
hide it. Based on these facts, defendant was arrested and convicted as charged.
At sentencing, the trial court calculated defendant’s sentence pursuant to the legislative
sentencing guidelines. However, the trial court then concluded that the sentencing guidelines are
an unconstitutional infringement on the power of the judiciary and sentenced defendant, as a
second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to one to five years’ imprisonment for felon in
possession and to two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm. This appeal followed.
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II. Corpus Delicti
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing testimony about his statement
to police because there was no evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti rule for the crime of felon in
possession. We disagree. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence in satisfaction of the corpus delicti requirement. People v Burns, 250 Mich App 436,
438; 647 NW2d 515 (2002).
“The corpus delicti rule is designed to prevent the use of a defendant’s confession to
convict him of a crime that did not occur.” People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 269; 536 NW2d
517 (1995); People v Ish, 252 Mich App 115, 116; 652 NW2d 257 (2002). To meet this end,
such statements may not be admitted into evidence unless a preponderance of direct or
circumstantial evidence, independent of the confession, establishes the occurrence of (1) a
specific injury and (2) criminal agency as the source of the injury. Burns, supra at 438. “‘Proof
of the identity of the perpetrator of the act or crime is not a part of the corpus delicti.”’ Konrad,
supra at 270 (citation omitted). Rather, it is sufficient to show that someone committed the
crime. Id.
Here it is clear that a specific injury occurred: Defendant’s fiancé suffered a non-fatal
gunshot wound. It is also clear that criminal agency is the source of that injury. Evidence
establishing that a crime occurred is sufficient to satisfy the criminal agency portion of the
corpus delicti rule. People v King, 271 Mich App 235, 241; 721 NW2d 271 (2006). The
evidence presented at trial established that defendant’s fiancée was shot in a house and that a
sawed-off shotgun that had been fired was found next door. These facts sufficiently show by a
preponderance of the evidence that a crime occurred. Namely, that someone had committed at
least possession of a short-barreled shotgun, MCL 750.224b, intentional discharge of a firearm in
an occupied structure, MCL 750.234b(2), and intentional pointing of a firearm at another person
causing injury, MCL 750.235. Therefore, because there was evidence that a crime occurred, the
corpus delicti rule was satisfied and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
defendant’s statement.
III. Double Jeopardy
Defendant next argues his convictions of felony-firearm and felon in possession violate
the double jeopardy clause. We disagree. We review an unpreserved double jeopardy challenge
for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 628; 696
NW2d 754 (2005).
In the present matter, there has been no error. This Court and our Supreme Court have
previously held that multiple punishments for felon in possession and felony-firearm do not
constitute a double jeopardy violation because the Legislature clearly intended to permit a
defendant charged with felon in possession to also be charged with felony-firearm. People v
Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 450-452; 671 NW2d 733 (2003); People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163,
167-168; 631 NW2d 755 (2001). Defendant’s reliance on a federal district court opinion in
support of his position is unavailing, as the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on
Michigan state courts. Abela v General Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 606-607; 677 NW2d 325
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(2004). Given this Court and our Supreme Court’s previous holdings on this same issue,
defendant’s argument necessary fails.
IV. Sentencing
Finally, defendant argues, and the prosecution agrees, that (1) the trial court erred by
declaring that the legislative sentencing guidelines are an unconstitutional encroachment on
judicial authority and (2) that the trial court improperly scored the sentencing guidelines, despite
the fact that it did not follow them. We agree. Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo.
See People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 557; 609 NW2d 581 (2001). Further, we review a
trial court’s scoring decision “to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its
discretion and whether the evidence of record adequately supported a particular score.” People v
Wilson, 265 Mich App 386, 397; 695 NW2d 351 (2005).
The constitutionality of the legislative sentencing guidelines is firmly established. People
v Garza, 469 Mich 431, 432-435; 670 NW2d 662 (2003). In Garza, supra, our Supreme Court
held that the legislative sentencing guidelines do not violate the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Id. Thus, the trial court’s departure from the guidelines for this reason
was error that requires resentencing.
We further note that the trial court improperly scored Prior Record Variable 5, which
considers a defendant’s prior misdemeanor convictions. Under that variable, a sentencing court
is to count a prior misdemeanor in the score “only if it is an offense against a person or property,
a controlled substance offense, or a weapon offense.” MCL 777.55(2)(a). The record reflects
that defendant was previously convicted of disorderly person and malicious destruction of
personal property, only the latter of which is a countable misdemeanor. Accordingly, we direct
the trial court at resentencing to properly score the guidelines.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and his sentence for felony-firearm, but we vacate his
sentence for felon in possession and remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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