IN RE RACHEL HOLBROOK MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of RACHEL HOLBROOK, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 13, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 291184
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-054238-NA
LUCINDA SUE HOLBROOK,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
THOMAS ABSON,
Respondent.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Wilder and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, Lucinda Holbrook, appeals as of right from an order terminating her parental
rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) [child has been deserted by parent
in excess of 91 days], (c)(i) [conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist], (g) [failure to
provide proper care and custody] and (j) [reasonable likelihood of harm to child if returned to
parent]. We affirm.
Petitioner has the burden of proving a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This Court
reviews the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J). A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Deference is accorded to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. In re
Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 65; 472 NW2d 38 (1991). Once a statutory ground for termination
is established by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall order termination of parental
rights if “termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The
trial court’s best interests decision is also reviewed for clear error. In re Trejo, supra at 356-357.
-1-
Respondent contends that the trial court’s reliance on § 19b(3)(a)(ii) was improper
because that subsection was not identified in the petition as a statutory basis for termination.
However, because the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j)
were each proven by clear and convincing evidence, any error in relying on § 19b(3)(a)(ii) to
substantiate the termination of respondent’s parental rights is deemed harmless. In re McIntyre,
192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
We disagree with respondent’s argument that termination was improper under §
19b(3)(c)(i) because the evidence did not support a finding of educational neglect, or show that
she had a substance abuse problem. Contrary to respondent’s assertions, the trial court did not
rely on these factors in terminating her parental rights and specifically determined at the
adjudication hearing that the allegations of educational neglect were not proven. Rather, the
principal issue was respondent’s mental and emotional instability, which negatively impacted her
ability to meet and understand the child’s needs. In 2005, respondent was diagnosed as having a
major depressive disorder with psychotic features, and it was apparent from her interactions with
caseworkers, and from her confused statements and irrational behavior, that problems pertaining
to her mental health status remained a significant obstacle to reunification. Services were
offered to address this issue, but respondent refused to participate. She never completed a
psychological evaluation, failed to cooperate with in-home service providers, and ceased
attending counseling appointments and parenting classes. Consequently, the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and that
respondent’s failure to participate in services precluded any likelihood that the conditions would
be rectified within a reasonable time. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
Respondent focuses on the physical conditions of the home she provided for her child to
argue that termination of her parental rights was not warranted under § 19b(3)(g). However,
housing was not a significant issue. Respondent failed to provide proper care for her child by
frequently leaving her home alone despite her young age, and by her inability to recognize or
meet the child’s emotional needs. Because respondent routinely failed to participate in proffered
services and demonstrated a lack of insight into the reasons underlying the child’s removal from
the home, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that there was no reasonable expectation
that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time
period. Further, although there was no evidence that respondent had physically harmed the
child, the fact that she frequently left her young child home alone and was unable to recognize or
meet her child’s emotional needs supports the trial court’s finding that the child would be at risk
of harm if returned to respondent’s home. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding
that § 19b(3)(j) was also proven by clear and convincing evidence.
We disagree with respondent’s argument that petitioner should have done more to reunite
her with her child. Petitioner was required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions
that led to the child’s removal from the home by adopting a service plan, MCL 712A.18f(4), and
to provide necessary services to facilitate the child’s return. See In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14,
25-26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). See also In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 104-106; 763 NW2d 587
(2009). The record discloses that petitioner arranged for in-home service providers, a
psychological evaluation, a substance abuse assessment, individual counseling, parenting classes,
and other case management services designed to assess and address respondent’s mental health
and emotional instability, but that respondent did not participate or follow through with the
-2-
services. Hence, the lack of effort to achieve reunification is directly attributable to respondent
and not petitioner.
Respondent also contends that if petitioner believed that she required mental health
treatment, it should have taken steps to have her involuntarily committed to a facility for
treatment. However, there was no basis for believing that respondent was unable to function on
her own or presented a sufficient safety risk to herself or others to necessitate an involuntary
commitment. Significantly, respondent missed several scheduled appointments and failed to
complete a psychological evaluation, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
petitioner to obtain an accurate diagnosis of her current condition and develop recommendations
for appropriate treatment. Petitioner cannot be faulted for not pursuing additional treatment
options when respondent refused to even participate in a preliminary evaluation. Further,
respondent’s criticism of her own guardian ad litem for not requesting that she be involuntarily
committed cannot be attributed to petitioner.
Finally, respondent argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the child’s
best interests. Although there was evidence of a strong bond between respondent and the child
during the early stages of the proceedings, respondent visited the child only six times between
October 2007 and July 2008, and then stopped visiting altogether. By the time of the termination
hearing in early 2009, the child no longer indicated that she missed having contact with
respondent. Considering that any previous bond that existed no longer remained in tact, and that
respondent could not reasonably be expected to provide emotional support or guidance for the
child anytime soon, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
