IN RE FLORES/SCHULTZ MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ASHLEY FLORES, DUANE
SCHULTZ, and EMILY SCHULTZ, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 13, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 290914
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2008-000111-NA
DEBRA JEAN SCHULTZ,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Wilder and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j). Because we conclude that there were no
errors warranting relief, we affirm.
Respondent first argues that the trial court violated her right to procedural due process
when it relied on § 19b(3)(b)(ii) as a statutory basis for termination when this ground was not
specified in the petition. The trial court’s reliance on a statutory ground for termination that was
not cited in the petition does not violate due process, so long as “the respondent was given
adequate notice of the proofs that he would have to present to overcome termination . . . ” In re
Perry, 193 Mich App 648, 651; 484 NW2d 768 (1992). MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) authorizes a
court to terminate parental rights if “the parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical
injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court finds that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the
parent’s home.” The petition contained detailed allegations of sexual and physical abuse
suffered by respondent’s son and oldest daughter at the hands of respondent’s live-in partners. It
also specifically alleged that respondent was aware of a number of the allegations pertaining to
the physical abuse of her son. We conclude that the allegations in the petition provided adequate
notice of the proofs that she would need to present in order to avoid termination of her parental
rights under § 19b(3)(b)(ii). Accordingly, the trial court’s reliance on that statutory ground did
not violate respondent’s right to procedural due process.
Next, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) were both
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 341, 356-1-
357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The evidence showed that respondent had a succession of four livein partners, each of whom abused her children in some manner. She resided in the home at all
times during the occurrences of abuse. There were numerous indications of potential abuse
during the course of the relationships that respondent either did not have the capacity to
appreciate or chose to ignore. One boyfriend maintained a friendship with a person who
frequently spent time with minor girls, and this boyfriend even brought respondent’s children to
socialize with his friend and two minor girls. Respondent admitted that the friendship was a
point of contention between her and her boyfriend, but did not recognize the potential for harm
to her children. Respondent’s boyfriend sexually abused respondent’s daughter.
Another live-in partner, Anthony Prince, tortured animals and physically abused
respondent. Respondent admitted being afraid of Prince, but did not believe her children were
afraid of him despite witnessing the same events. She also gave no thought to the effect on the
children from witnessing Prince commit horrific acts on the family cats. When her son was
burned, despite Prince’s penchant for violence, she blindly accepted Prince’s innocent
explanation. She further failed to appreciate the effect of domestic violence on the children,
even if not directly inflicted on them. At the end of each abusive relationship, respondent had an
opportunity to make better choices, but did not despite warnings from numerous professionals
advising her to make her children her first priority. Respondent allowed her last partner to move
in with her and care for her children after having met him in person for only a few days. She
believed that she knew what kind of person he was based solely on their 12-month Internet
relationship. The result was that this new live-in partner sexually abused respondent’s daughter.
Although respondent had made recent efforts to make different choices in the future, at
the time of the hearing she had only been addressing the issues for five months—issues that took
a decade to accumulate. Whether respondent was truly motivated to make better choices in the
future largely rested on respondent’s credibility; and this Court will defer to the trial court’s
credibility determinations. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). We find no
clear error in the trial court’s determination that respondent had an opportunity to prevent her
children from being abused and that it was reasonably likely that the children would be abused in
the future if returned to her care.
Respondent’s history of willful ignorance or inability to perceive danger signs also
supports the trial court’s decision with respect to § 19b(3)(j). Respondent needed time to change
her pattern of behavior that was a decade in the making. The trial court did not clearly err when
it found that the risk to the children that respondent would make a poor choice in the foreseeable
future was too great and, for that reason, found that the children were likely to be harmed if
returned to respondent’s care.
Lastly, with regard to the children’s best interests, there were substantial risks in
returning the children to respondent’s care, both physically and emotionally. The older children
had been extremely traumatized and needed a stable environment to heal. Respondent had been
unable to provide such a home in the past and, despite her efforts, it was questionable whether
she would be able to do so in the future. Also, continued counseling was critical to the children’s
recovery. Respondent had shown, at best, indifference to the importance of this in her oldest
child’s life after that child’s sexual molestation and attempted suicide. Despite the children’s
professed love for respondent and desire to live with her, the trial court had to consider whether
respondent, with all the issues she was facing in her own right, could provide for the children’s
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needs. The trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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