SHARON CAMPBELL V TIMOTHY WOLANIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHARON CAMPBELL,
UNPUBLISHED
October 13, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286331
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 08-747233-PH
TIMOTHY WOLANIN,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Markey and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right from a personal protection order (PPO) entered against him.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This appeal has
been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Petitioner was leasing a house from respondent. At some point, respondent lost his
landlord’s license because he was behind on making necessary repairs to the rental property.
According to petitioner, respondent had several months to complete the repairs but did not do so.
Petitioner testified that during the period just before the re-inspection of the house, respondent
came in and out of the house without providing her notice and without her knowledge.
Respondent testified that he had tried and failed to contact petitioner in an effort to complete the
necessary repairs.
Petitioner was behind on rent, and respondent began the eviction process sometime
before the proceedings at issue here. According to petitioner, because respondent did not have
his landlord’s license, she was at risk of losing her Section 8 housing.1 Petitioner sought a PPO
against respondent alleging that he had entered her house without notice, had screamed at and
threatened her, and had left intimidating messages on her voicemail. She also stated that she was
losing her Section 8 status and needed some time to get organized and stop respondent from
entering the house. The lower court granted the PPO, precluding respondent from entering
petitioner’s rental unit for 60 days.
1
See 42 USC 1437f.
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We will first address respondent’s argument that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the case because petitioner’s claim centered on a landlord/tenant dispute, which
should have been heard in district court. We disagree. When “determining jurisdiction, this
Court will look beyond a plaintiff’s choice of labels to the true nature of the plaintiff’s claim.”
Manning v Amerman, 229 Mich App 608, 613; 582 NW2d 589 (1998). When discerning the true
nature of the claim, courts do not look to the “truth or falsehood of the charge, but upon its
nature: it is determinable on the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry.” Altman
v Nelson, 197 Mich App 467, 472; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). Here, petitioner’s petition alleged
that respondent threatened her, screamed at her, swore at her, entered her home without
permission or notice, and left intimidating messages on her voicemail. Thus, despite the fact that
the case involves on a dispute between the parties in their capacities as tenant and landlord, the
nature of petitioner’s claim comports with that of a personal protection claim over which the
circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the case was properly before the
circuit court.
But, we do agree with respondent that the court erred in granting the PPO. We review
the granting of a PPO for an abuse of discretion. Pickering v Pickering, 253 Mich App 694, 700;
659 NW2d 749 (2002). A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. MCR
2.613(C).
MCL 600.2950a(1) makes clear that a circuit court may grant a PPO only if the “petition
alleges facts that constitute stalking” as defined by MCL 750.411h or 750.411i. Subsections
411h(1)(d) and 411i(1)(e) define stalking as “a willful course of conduct involving repeated or
continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that actually causes the
victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.”
Looking at the evidence and making some basic assumptions about the reasoning of the
trial court, we could conclude that the evidence adduced was sufficient to establish that
respondent’s actions constituted stalking as statutory defined. Still, we are leery about wading
into such an analysis in light of the dearth of relevant findings by the court, and we are mindful
of the well-established roles of the trial and appellate courts in our system of jurisprudence.
Because there is a question as to whether the trial court considered all the necessary elements of
stalking, we believe it prudent to remand to the trial court for further consideration consistent
with this opinion.
We acknowledge that because the PPO terminated on August 10, 2008, a question arises
as to whether this appeal is moot. An issue is moot when an event occurs that makes it
impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief. People v Cathey, 261 Mich App 506, 510; 681
NW2d 661 (2004). However, an issue is not moot if “it will continue to affect the party in some
collateral way.” Id. MCL 600.2950a(14) requires a law enforcement agency that is provided
with a copy of a PPO to enter it on the Law Enforcement Information Network (LIEN). If a PPO
is rescinded, that information must also be entered on the LIEN. See MCL 600.2950a(17).
Accordingly, respondent may be granted relief, so the issues presented here are not moot.
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We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. As the prevailing party, defendant may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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