PEOPLE OF MI V LABEED SAMI NOURI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 6, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 290178
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-218065-FC
LABEED SAMI NOURI,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Stephens, P.J., and Jansen and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with the sexual assault of one of his employees at his Oakland
County medical office. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(f), and two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520e(1)(b). Defendant then moved for a Ginther1 hearing and a new trial,
arguing that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by interfering with his
constitutional right to testify. The trial court agreed, ruling that counsel had been ineffective for
failing to inform defendant of his absolute right to testify and for preventing defendant from
testifying in his own defense. The court therefore issued an order granting defendant’s motion
for a new trial. The prosecution now appeals that order as on leave granted.2 We reverse and
remand for reinstatement of defendant’s convictions.
We review for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact at a Ginther hearing, People v
Grant, 470 Mich 477, 484-485; 684 NW2d 686 (2004), but review de novo the underlying legal
question whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, People v Kevorkian,
248 Mich App 373, 410-411; 639 NW2d 291 (2001). The trial court’s ultimate decision whether
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Miller,
482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008).
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
2
This Court initially denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. People v Nouri,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 13, 2009 (Docket No. 290178). In
lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court remanded this case for consideration as on
leave granted. People v Nouri, 483 Mich 947 (2009).
-1-
On the defendant’s motion, a trial court “may order a new trial on any ground that would
support appellate reversal of the conviction . . . .” MCR 6.431(B). The trial court must state its
reasons for granting a new trial orally on the record or in a written order. MCR 6.431(B). Here,
the trial court stated, among other things, that defendant “was denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel because counsel deprived [d]efendant of his right to testify.” After
thoroughly reviewing the Ginther hearing transcripts, we conclude that the trial court erred in its
determination that defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel.
We fully acknowledge that a criminal defense attorney may be ineffective in the
constitutional sense when he prevents his client from testifying against his client’s wishes. See,
e.g., Nichols v Butler, 953 F2d 1550, 1552-1553 (CA 11, 1992). A defendant’s right to testify in
his or her own defense is personal and fundamental, see People v Solomon, 220 Mich App 527,
533-534; 560 NW2d 651 (1996), and a criminal defense attorney must “abide by the client’s
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, with respect to . . . whether the client will testify,”
MRPC 1.2(a). As this Court has held, “[i]f the accused expresses a wish to testify at trial, the
trial court must grant the request, even over counsel’s objection.” People v Simmons, 140 Mich
App 681, 685; 364 NW2d 783 (1985). However, this Court has also held that if a criminal
defendant “acquiesces in his attorney’s decision that he not testify, ‘the right will be deemed
waived.’” Id. (citation omitted).
“[A]n accused’s decision to testify or not to testify is a strategic decision best left to an
accused and his counsel.” People v Martin, 150 Mich App 630, 640; 389 NW2d 713 (1986).
Defense counsel’s advice to his client with respect to whether the client should testify is
generally a matter of trial strategy, People v Pace, 102 Mich App 522, 531; 302 NW2d 216
(1980), and a criminal defense attorney is presumed to follow the rules of professional conduct
when advising his client concerning the decision whether to testify at trial, United States v
Webber, 208 F3d 545, 551 (CA 6, 2000). A defendant’s mere allegations that he wanted to
testify and was prevented from doing so are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
defendant acquiesced in counsel’s tactical decision that he not testify. See Hodge v Haeberlin,
___ F3d ___, ___ (CA 6, 2009).
It is beyond dispute in this case that defendant informed one of his attorneys, David
Griem, that he wanted to testify in his own defense. It is also beyond dispute that Griem urged
defendant not to testify in the strongest possible language. Griem testified at the Ginther hearing
that he “made it crystal clear that [defendant] should not take the stand,” that he informed
defendant that it would be “a horrible mistake in judgment to take the witness stand,” that he told
defendant that “it would be a huge mistake for you to testify,” and that he told defendant either
“[y]ou can’t [testify]” or “you shouldn’t [testify].” But Griem explained that “if I used the word
can’t, it would have been in a figurative sense . . . .” Griem could not specifically recall whether
he had informed defendant that he had an absolute right to testify, but acknowledged that it is his
general practice to tell all his clients that the matter of testifying at trial “is the client’s decision.”
Griem testified that after discussing the matter with defendant, and twice advising defendant not
to testify, “we looked at each other, we looked each other in the eye and I don’t believe that
[defendant] said anything more after the second time that we discussed it.” Defendant’s other
attorney, Deanna Kelley, confirmed that Griem had strongly discouraged defendant from
testifying, but did not specifically know what Griem had told defendant during several one-onone conversations dealing with the issue of defendant’s possible testimony.
-2-
Defendant testified at the Ginther hearing that he had not been aware of his absolute right
to testify, and that he had believed at the time of trial that the question whether he would testify
was solely for defense counsel to decide.
Following the Ginther hearing, the trial court found that defendant had been unaware of
his absolute right to testify and that counsel had failed to sufficiently explain to him that it was
ultimately his own choice whether to testify. These findings of fact were clearly erroneous.
Grant, 470 Mich at 484-485. As an initial matter, we conclude that defendant acquiesced in
Griem’s strategic determination that he should not testify. See Simmons, 140 Mich App at 685.
Moreover, our review of the record reveals that Griem never expressly informed defendant that
he did not have the right to testify or that it was not his choice whether to testify.
It is true that Griem strongly urged defendant not to testify. Griem was concerned that
defendant might be a less-than-ideal witness, and also believed that the prosecution had failed to
prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. But the record establishes that Griem
never actively prevented defendant from testifying. Indeed, Griem spent numerous hours
preparing defendant to testify, discussed the issue of testifying with defendant several times, and
ultimately told defendant that testifying would be “a horrible mistake in judgment.”
Griem did not tell defendant that he was not permitted to testify. Instead, Griem merely
stated that defendant “should not,” “could not,” or “can’t” testify. Defendant therefore
apparently believed that it was not his choice whether to testify. But defendant’s faulty
impression in this regard arose from a simple misunderstanding of Griem’s words. Indeed, as
noted previously, Griem explained that “if I used the word can’t, it would have been in a
figurative sense . . . .” Furthermore, Griem’s warning to defendant that testifying would be “a
horrible mistake in judgment” surely conveyed that the decision to testify was a matter within
defendant’s judgment, and therefore, defendant’s discretion. The word “judgment” means the
capacity to make a decision or form an opinion. See Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary (1997). Despite the fact that English is defendant’s second language, there is simply
no evidence that defendant did not understand the meaning of the common English word
“judgment.” It was implicit in Griem’s very words that the decision whether to testify was
ultimately defendant’s own.
The trial court clearly erred by finding that defendant was unaware that it was his right to
testify and by finding that defense counsel prevented defendant from taking the stand. Grant,
470 Mich at 484-485. While defense counsel strongly discouraged defendant from testifying, it
is clear that Griem never actively prevented defendant’s testimony. Instead, the record
establishes that defendant acquiesced in Griem’s strategic recommendation that he not testify at
trial. On de novo review, Kevorkian, 248 Mich App at 410-411, we conclude that defendant was
not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Because the reasons cited by the trial court would
not support appellate reversal of defendant’s convictions, MCR 6.431(B), we must also conclude
that the court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion for a new trial, Miller, 482
Mich at 544; see also People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 580; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). We
reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for a new trial and remand for
reinstatement of defendant’s convictions.
-3-
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of defendant’s convictions. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-4-
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