PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INS CO V CONTRACT TOWING INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 1, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 286570
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-633349-CK
CONTRACT TOWING, INC., and LARRY
DODSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Meter and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Progressive Michigan Insurance Company appeals as of right the trial court’s
June 25, 2008, order declaring as a matter of law that defendant Larry Dodson was not an
employee of defendant Contract Towing when Dodson was injured on January 21, 2006, and
therefore that plaintiff, Contract Towing’s insurer, could not avail itself of an exclusion in its
commercial automobile insurance policy for employees of Contract Towing. We reverse and
remand. This case is being decided without oral argument in accordance with MCR 7.214(E).
Dodson approached James Wilson, Contract Towing’s owner and operator in response to
a help-wanted sign. Wilson initially suggested that he might engage Dodson at the rate of $6 per
hour, but in fact no such hourly arrangement followed. Instead, Dodson worked at Wilson’s
business, and sometimes Wilson’s home, five or six days per week, and Wilson allowed Dodson
to sleep in a vehicle in his driveway, then live rent-free in a spare residence, while routinely
providing him food, and sometimes providing him small amounts of cash for sundry purposes.
At his deposition, Wilson confirmed that Dodson was present at his business at least five
days a week, but suggested that there was no regular structure to the days or hours worked.
Wilson stated that Dodson was not an employee of Contract Towing, and that nothing he ever
provided to Dodson was bargained-for compensation for his services.
Dodson, in the course of doing work on the premises of Contract Towing, stationed
himself under a car, one end of which was raised by a tow truck, in order to manually disengage
the transmission for easier towing. The car shifted and dropped some distance, injuring Dodson
severely.
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Contract Towing had no worker’s compensation insurance, but had a commercial
automobile insurance policy with plaintiff. That policy excluded coverage for “[b]odily injury
to an employee of an insured . . . arising out of or within the course of employment . . .” (bold in
the original). Plaintiff, seeking to avoid paying benefits in light of that exclusion, brought the
instant declaratory action.
The trial court summarized the evidence, and its conclusions, as follows:
[Dodson] shows up on Mr. Wilson’s door and knocks on the door. Mr.
Wilson sort of takes him in in the broad sense. He lets him sleep in the truck and
then sleep in the house and so forth.
In doing that this man does various things in and about the house for Mr.
Wilson and in and about Contract Towing until this faithful [sic] day until he’s
climbing up under that car, crossed his leg and starts banging on the transmission
and the car fell on his head. Now he’s here.
There was never any checks issued. There was never any deductions, any
reporting to the State, the Feds or anyone else that this man was an employee.
None of those sorts of things.
True enough everybody considered Mr. Wilson the boss. They said he
went over there at Contract and he may have driven the tow truck at times. He
certainly did some cleanups. Maybe he went out with Mr. Wilson at times to pick
up another car or something from Contract.
I looked at the whole situation and I just came to the conclusion that this
man was . . . more like an indentured servant than he was an employee. You guys
know all the things he did or didn’t do. It’s no sense in me repeating them. . . .
The court commented on its expectation that its decision would be appealed to this Court, then
concluded, “I find from the facts and the circumstances in this case that . . . Mr. Dodson was not
an employee, but rather was just a hanger-oner.”
Plaintiff’s counsel asked the court if it did not at least think Dodson’s employment status
presented a question of fact. The court elaborated in response:
There is nothing to suggest that he ever was paid $6 an hour.
There is suggestion that Mr. Wilson, who is the owner of Contract
Towing, did allow him to sleep in the camper. Did allow him to stay in this house
that one man said should have been condemned. . . . Did on his own admission
give him food. When he [sic] wife cooked she cooked for him too. Did take him
to Big Lots or someplace from time to time to buy things. Did on occasion when
he said I need a few bucks did give him, advance him money.
Mr. Dodson did cleanup work at his home, at Mr. Wilson’s home in and
about the property. He also at times did what he was doing apparently when he
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got hurt, that is, to fuss around . . . these cars that they were towing in and out. . . .
He did things, there’s no doubt about it. But those things did not amount under
the circumstances to him becoming an employee because there were never any
checks that were written to him, no evidence of any checks. There was no
reporting of Social Security, no 1099s, no W-2s, no nothing. He was just there.
Mr. Wilson says it was the kindest [sic] of my heart. He says not only
have I done it for him, I’ve done it for other people. He was a kind of a homeless
guy, and I kind of just let him hang around and do all of that.
Plaintiff’s counsel then protested that Dodson did not live in Wilson’s house for free, but rather
“Wilson deducted rent from the money that he owed Mr. Dodson,” adding, “He wasn’t living in
that house for free. He was working and being paid for $6 an hour cash.” The trial court replied,
“Agreed,” but again likened Dodson to an indentured servant. The court concluded, “His motion
for summary disposition is based on the premise that Mr. Dodson was an employee. . . . I find
that as a matter of law that he wasn’t.”
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo
as a question of law. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). A
motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a
claim. Decker v Flood, 248 Mich App 75, 81; 638 NW2d 163 (2001). The court considers the
pleadings, affidavits, and other evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. “The court should grant the motion only if the
affidavits or other documentary evidence show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
In determining whether a party had the status of employee, “[i]f the evidence . . . is
reasonably susceptible of but a single inference, the question is one purely of law to be decided
by the court,” but “where the facts bearing on such issue are either disputed, or conflicting
inferences may be reasonably drawn from the known facts, it is error to withhold the issue from
the determination of the jury.” Nichol v Billot, 406 Mich 284, 306; 279 NW2d 761 (1979)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Comporting with this approach is the general
rule that, when deciding motions for summary disposition, “[t]he court may not make factual
findings or weigh credibility.” Manning v Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 689; 509 NW2d 874
(1993). Accordingly, the court should make this determination only if it can do so from facts not
in dispute. Nichol, supra at 306.
As an initial matter, we note that the trial court seems to have strayed from evaluating
matters not in dispute and engaged in credibility determinations, e.g., apparently crediting
Wilson’s testimony concerning why he provided Dodson with support. We also find error in the
court’s substantive analysis.
Because this case does not arise under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL
418.101 et seq., the inquiry is not restricted to its statutory criteria. See Reed v Yackell, 473
Mich 520, 527, 529-530; 703 NW2d 1 (2005). Under the common law economic realities test, a
court should consider “(1) control of a worker’s duties, (2) payment of wages, (3) right to hire,
fire and discipline, and (4) performance of the duties as an integral part of the employer’s
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business toward the accomplishment of a common goal.”1 Derigiotis v J M Feighery Co, 185
Mich App 90, 94; 460 NW2d 235 (1990).
The trial court acknowledged that, “everybody considered Mr. Wilson the boss,” and that
Dodson occasionally drove Wilson’s tow truck, did some cleanup work, and accompanied
Wilson on towing jobs. “Wages” include “all compensation for services rendered without regard
to manner in which such compensation is computed,” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1579,
and thus potentially include the provision of food or shelter, along with petty cash. Driving tow
trucks, or otherwise assisting in towing operations, and helping with cleanup, constitute
performance of services integral to Contract Towing’s operations.
In his brief on appeal, Dodson describes the trial court’s characterization of him as an
indentured servant as an apt one. But neither Dodson nor the trial court has provided any
explanation why performing services to work off a debt in lieu of direct monetary compensation
constitutes something other than a master-servant relationship.
However, Wilson stated flatly that Dodson was not his employee, and characterized the
support he provided him as mere charity. The tacit implication, then, is that Dodson was a mere
volunteer, showing up at Wilson’s workplace at least five days a week with no sense on the part
of either man that the work Dodson did bore any connection, beyond mutual favors, to the
housing, food, and cash that Wilson provided. Because the evidence admits of this
interpretation, we decline plaintiff’s invitation to decide on appeal that Dodson was in fact an
employee of Contract Towing, and decree that plaintiff is entitled to summary disposition. But,
we accept plaintiff’s alternative suggestion to reverse the decision below and remand this case to
the trial court with instructions for the factfinder to determine at trial whether Dodson was
injured in the course of employment with Contract Towing.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
1
These criteria do not include complying with the laws of taxation, or otherwise documenting
work done or compensation paid. Cases that do call for inquiry into tax withholding and the like
generally concern distinguishing employees from independent contractors. See, e.g., Reed,
supra at 527.
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