PEOPLE OF MI V PATRICK DAMEN SHORTY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 1, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284798
Eaton County Circuit Court
LC No. 07-020124-FC
PATRICK DAMEN SHORTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P. J., and Markey and Borrello, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of a person under 13 years of age),
and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual
contact with a person under 13 years of age). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of
140 to 360 months on the CSC I conviction, and to 50 to 180 months for each of the CSC II
convictions. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm. This appeal has been decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s minor daughter testified that defendant engaged in several sexual acts with
her, including vaginal penetration. Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the evidence at
trial was insufficient to convict him. Specifically, defendant argues that the victim’s testimony
was compromised because of her memory, as well as language and communication disabilities,
and that the evidence supporting his convictions was therefore insufficient. We disagree.
When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence de novo in a
light most favorable to the prosecution and must consider whether a rational trier of fact could
find, based on that evidence, that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002); People v
Fetterly, 229 Mich App 511, 515; 583 NW2d 199 (1998). Questions regarding the credibility of
a witness and the weight of the evidence are left to the trier of fact and are not to be resolved
anew by this Court. People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624 (2005).
In arguing that the victim’s testimony should not be deemed sufficient to sustain his
conviction, defendant impliedly challenges her competency to testify. However, this Court has
specifically held that if a child is found competent to testify under MRE 601, then “a later
showing of the child’s inability to testify truthfully reflects on credibility, not competency.”
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People v Coddington, 188 Mich App 584, 597; 470 NW2d 478 (1991) (citation omitted). Here,
the victim was deemed competent under MRE 601, and the record supports this conclusion. We
see no reason in the record before us to depart from the well-established principle to defer to the
jury’s credibility determinations. People v Hughes, 217 Mich App 242, 248-249; 550 NW2d
871 (1996).
The victim’s testimony was detailed and provided all the evidence from which a rational
jury could determine that the elements of both CSC I and CSC II were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Smith, 149 Mich App 189, 195; 385 NW2d 654 (1986); see also
MCL 750.520h (“The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under
sections 520b to 520g.”).
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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