PEOPLE OF MI V EARNEST LEE ROBINSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 29, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 286555
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-009901
EARNEST LEE ROBINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Meter and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted from his sentences in connection with his
plea-based convictions of two counts of receiving or concealing a stolen motor vehicle, MCL
750.535(7). We affirm.
In exchange for dismissal of several other charges, and a downgrade of his habitual
offender status, defendant pleaded no contest to the two charges underlying this case. Without
defense objection, the prosecuting attorney reported that, on May 17, 2007, in a parking lot in
Dearborn, defendant had possession of a Dodge Ram truck and also a Dodge van, knowing at the
time that those vehicles were stolen and that he did not have the true owners’ permission to
possess them. The trial court sentenced defendant as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to
serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of two to ten years, as agreed in exchange for the plea.
The trial court specified that because defendant was on parole at the time of the instant offenses,
he would receive no credit for time he spent incarcerated before sentencing.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in not awarding jail credit, and in
scoring one of the offense variables under the sentencing guidelines.
I. Jail Credit
Defendant reports that he was incarcerated for 56 days leading up to the date of
sentencing in the instant case. Defendant, acting in propria persona, filed a postsentencing
motion with the trial court to have that time applied to his instant sentences, which resulted in a
letter from the court’s clerk advising defendant that the 56 days of jail time had been credited
against the sentence from which he had been on parole at the time. Defendant now asks this
Court to have those 56 days applied or credited against the instant sentences.
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MCL 769.11b provides:
Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state
and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or
unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in
imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such
time served in jail prior to sentencing.
In People v Idziak, __ Mich __; __ NW2d __, issued July 31, 2009 (Docket No. 137301),
slip op at 1-2, our Supreme Court addressed the issue of jail credit, stating and holding:
In this case, we consider whether a parolee who is convicted and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony committed while on parole is
entitled, under Michigan's jail credit statute, MCL 769.11b, to credit for time
served in jail after his arrest on the new offense and before sentencing for that
offense. We hold that, under MCL 791.238(2), the parolee resumes serving his
earlier sentence on the date he is arrested for the new criminal offense. As long as
time remains on the parolee's earlier sentence, he remains incarcerated, regardless
of his eligibility for bond or his ability to furnish it. Since the parolee is not being
held in jail “because of being denied or unable to furnish bond,” the jail credit
statute does not apply.
Further, a sentencing court lacks common law discretion to grant credit
against a parolee's new minimum sentence in contravention of the statutory
scheme. Finally, the denial of credit against a new minimum sentence does not
violate the double jeopardy clauses or the equal protection clauses of the United
States or Michigan constitutions. US Const, Am V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1,
§§ 2 and 15.
With respect to a parolee’s earlier sentence and its impact on applying and calculating jail
credit, the Idziak Court further elaborated:
In sum, under MCL 791.238(2), the parolee is “liable, when arrested, to
serve out the unexpired portion of his or her maximum imprisonment” and
actually resumes serving that term of imprisonment on the date of his availability
for return to the DOC, which in this case is synonymous with the date of his
arrest. The parolee is not incarcerated “because of being denied or unable to
furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted . . . .” MCL 769.11b.
Because the parolee is required to remain in jail pending the resolution of the new
criminal charge for reasons independent of his eligibility for or ability to furnish
bond for the new offense, the jail credit statute does not apply. [Idziak, supra, slip
op at 17-18 (omission in original).]
The Supreme Court did caution that, for a parolee who has reached his maximum
discharge date while being held in jail, the independent reason for keeping him or her jailed, i.e.,
being a parolee who was arrested on a new crime, would be removed. Id., slip op at 18 n 17.
Therefore, “[i]f the parolee was then ‘denied or unable to furnish bond,’ the sentencing court
would be required to grant jail credit under MCL 769.11b.” Id.
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Here, there is no dispute that defendant was on parole at the time of the instant offenses;
defendant himself acknowledged that fact when his no-contest plea was taken. The presentence
investigation report (PSIR) indicates:
The instant offenses represent the defendant’s 12th and 13th felony
convictions: At the time of the instant offenses, the defendant was serving a
parole term . . . for Police Officer – Assault/Resist/Obstruct and Receiving Stolen
Property less than $200.00, docket #05-1692FH. The defendant was sentenced to
1 year 6 months – 3 years in 16th Circuit Court on 8/16/05. Additionally, the
defendant was on parole for Receiving Stolen Property 1M less than 20M, docket
#05-5163. The defendant was sentenced on 8/19/05 to 1 year – 10 years
incarceration. He was paroled on 10/17/06.
The instant offenses occurred on May 17, 2007, and, according to the PSIR, he was also
arrested for those crimes on that date. The PSIR shows that 56 days of jail time were served by
defendant from the date of arrest to the date of sentencing; the date of sentencing was July 12,
2007. Given the maximum sentences for the crimes upon which defendant had been on parole
(three and ten years), the dates that he was sentenced on those crimes (August 16 and 19, 2005),
the date of the instant offenses and arrest (May 17, 2007), and given the date of his sentencing
for the instant offenses (July 12, 2007), the full 56 days spent in jail could only be credited
against his earlier 2005 sentences upon which he had been granted parole. Defendant, as a
parolee, never reached his maximum discharge dates on the earlier sentences while being housed
in jail for the 56 days between arrest and sentencing.1 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
refusing to give defendant jail credit against the sentences on the instant convictions.
II. Guidelines Scoring
Review of the PSIR reveals that the recommended range for defendant’s minimum
sentence came to 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment, putting the minimum actually imposed within
that range, albeit at the high end.2 Offense Variable (OV) 16, MCL 777.46, was scored at ten
points. MCL 777.46 pertains to property obtained, damaged, lost, or destroyed. Ten points are
1
This is true even considering that the time defendant spent on parole until the time of the instant
offenses and arrest, approximately 7 months, is counted as time served against the earlier
maximum sentences. Idziak, supra, slip op at 16 and 18 n 16 (a paroled prisoner is considered to
be serving his or her sentence as long as the prisoner remains in compliance with parole terms;
“each day on parole counts toward the service of the maximum sentence”).
2
We note that the scoring calculation sheet indicates that there was no enhancement whatsoever
for habitual offender status, even though the judgment of sentence, consistent with the no-contest
plea, reflects that defendant was treated as and guilty of being a third-habitual offender, which
fact defendant himself acknowledges in his brief. If one considers defendant a third-habitual
offender, the correct sentencing guidelines range becomes 12 to 36 months. MCL 777.66; MCL
777.21(3)(b). It is apparent from the record that the court and parties were not focused on the
scoring given the specific sentence agreement.
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to be scored where “[w]anton or malicious damage occurred beyond that necessary to commit
the crime for which the offender is not charged and will not be charged[,]” or where “[t]he
property had a value of more than $20,000.00 or had significant historical, social, or sentimental
value.” MCL 777.46(1)(a) and (b). Defendant argues that the trial court lacked a sufficient
evidentiary basis for scoring ten points on OV 16.
Defendant presents this argument for the first time on appeal. If OV 16 was scored at any
amount of points less than the ten points actually scored, the OV level would change and the
appropriate guidelines range, treating defendant as a third-habitual offender, would be 9 to 34
months. MCL 777.66; MCL 777.21(3)(b).3 Despite the change in the guidelines range relative
to a presumed error, the minimum sentence imposed here, 24 months, would still fall within this
range. In People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311; 684 NW2d 669 (2004), our Supreme Court,
citing MCL 769.34(10), ruled that, “if [a] sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence
range, it is only appealable if there was a scoring error . . . and the issue was raised at
sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or in a motion to remand.” (Emphasis added.)4 The
issue was not so raised here.5
3
If habitual-offender status was not considered, the guidelines range would be 9 to 23 months.
MCL 777.66.
4
In Kimble, the guidelines range used at sentencing was 225 to 375 months, the minimum
sentence imposed was 360 months (within range), and the appropriate guidelines range was
actually 180 to 300 months (pushing minimum sentence outside the range), after the Supreme
Court concluded that OV 16 had been scored incorrectly. The Court held, “Because defendant’s
sentence is outside the appropriate guidelines sentence range, his sentence is appealable under
§ 34(10), even though his attorney failed to raise the precise issue at sentencing, in a motion for
resentencing, or in a motion to remand.” Kimble, supra at 312 (emphasis added). However,
even though the scoring challenge was appealable, because the defendant had not properly
preserved the issue, the Court reviewed the scoring challenge under the plain-error standard. Id.
5
In People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82; 711 NW2d 44 (2006), our Supreme Court, finding a
scoring error, remanded for resentencing where it addressed a properly preserved scoring error
that altered the guidelines range, even though the minimum sentence imposed fell within both
the range used below and the appropriately scored range. Consistent with Kimble, the Francisco
Court stated:
Where a scoring error does not alter the appropriate guidelines range,
resentencing is not required. Resentencing is also not required where the trial
court has clearly indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence
regardless of the scoring error and the sentence falls within the appropriate
guidelines range. Finally, if the defendant failed to raise the scoring error at
sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand
filed in the Court of Appeals, and the defendant's sentence is within the
appropriate guidelines range, the defendant cannot raise the error on appeal except
where otherwise appropriate, as in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
[Francisco, supra at 89-90 n 8 (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
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Regardless, because defendant’s minimum sentence is precisely what he bargained for in
negotiating his plea, and is valid on its face, it is not subject to appellate review. Defendant
specifically agreed to a sentence of two to ten years’ imprisonment. Our Supreme Court has held
that, “a defendant waives appellate review of a sentence that exceeds the guidelines by
understandingly and voluntarily entering into a plea agreement to accept that specific sentence.”
People v Wiley, 472 Mich 153, 154; 693 NW2d 800 (2005). Logic dictates that this principle is
all the more applicable when, as in this case, the challenged sentence in fact falls within the
appropriate sentencing guidelines range. And assuming that the guidelines range was 9 to 23
months, on the basis of a presumed error in scoring OV 16 at ten points and a decision not to
consider defendant’s status as a third-habitual offender, thereby placing the two-year minimum
sentence imposed outside of the guidelines, Wiley dictates that any challenge is waived given the
sentencing agreement. As this Court put it earlier, “where the prosecution and defendant agreed
to the minimum sentence imposed, what are we to review and what are we to demand of the trial
court?” People v Vitale, 179 Mich App 420, 422; 446 NW2d 504 (1989).
Moreover, the issue of defendant’s minimum sentence would appear to have become
moot, considering that the Michigan Department of Correction’s Offender Tracking Information
System (OTIS) indicates that defendant was paroled on July 14, 2009. See People v Rutherford,
208 Mich App 198, 204; 526 NW2d 620 (1994) (where a subsequent event renders it impossible
for this Court to fashion a remedy, an issue becomes moot). Remand is simply unwarranted in
the case at bar.6
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
6
We decline to accept the prosecution’s invitation to engage in speculation regarding the value
of the property at issue; it is unnecessary for us to do so given our ruling.
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