KIM ALEXANDER BRUNS V DENISE MARIE BRUNS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KIM ALEXANDER BRUNS,
UNPUBLISHED
September 24, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289312
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 00-002680-DM
DENISE MARIE BRUNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant mother appeals as of right the order awarding plaintiff father legal and
physical custody of the parties’ minor child. We affirm.
On appeal, mother only challenges the trial court’s findings with respect to four of the
best interests factors: MCL 722.23(b), (d), (g), and (j). She argues that the findings on these
factors were against the great weight of the evidence and, consequently, the trial court’s ultimate
decision to change legal and physical custody solely to father was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. We review the trial court’s factual findings under the great weight of the
evidence standard. McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 125; 580 NW2d 485 (1998); Fletcher
v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). We find that none of the challenged
findings were against the great weight of the evidence.
With respect to factor (b), MCL 722.23(b), “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties
involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising
of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any,” the trial court found that both parties had the
capacity to provide love and affection for the child; however, the court concluded that factor (b)
favored father. The trial court found that “[mother] can react to opposition from her children
with anger and retaliation to the point of alienating the children1 from her for an extended
period,” and that her “emotional ties with the [minor] child may be such that she views [the
child] as a peer, to the point of an emotionally unhealthy enmeshment.” The record reveals that
1
The parties have three children from the marriage, two of whom were adults at the time of the
custody ruling. Mother has an adult daughter through a previous relationship.
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mother was verbally, emotionally, and physically abusive to the point of alienating her older
children. The record further reveals that mother may have difficulty forming friendships, that
she has an unhealthy focus on her children, and that she shared “adult problems” with the
children.2 The facts do not clearly preponderate in the direction opposite that reached by the trial
court. Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 473; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). The trial
court’s findings were not against the great weight of the evidence with respect to factor (b).
With respect to factor (d), MCL 722.23(d), “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a
stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity,” the trial court
found that the minor child did not live in a stable, satisfactory environment when she resided
with mother because of mother’s derogatory attitude towards father and his wife. The trial court
also cited an incident where father may have acted inappropriately in anger toward the minor
child, but noted that father realized that his anger was misplaced at the child. The situation
involved mother’s undermining of father’s authority with the child. The trial court concluded
that factor (d) slightly favored father.
Mother does not provide any discernible facts that serve to outweigh the trial court’s
conclusion that factor (d) favors father. Although mother claims that there was little evidence
presented regarding her derogatory attitude toward father and his wife, the record is replete with
examples of mother’s hostility toward father. The record demonstrates that mother spoke
negatively of father and his wife to the child’s teacher and to the friend of the court supervisor.
There are numerous examples of mother interfering with father's parenting time throughout the
history of this case. The evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings, and the trial court’s
ultimate finding that factor (d) favored father is not against the great weight of the evidence.
With respect to factor (g), “[t]he mental and physical health of the parties involved,” the
record reveals that mother has histrionic personality characteristics that contributed to her
difficulties in interacting with her children. The psychological evaluation of mother, which was
admitted at trial, supported the trial court’s findings. Mother maintains that the trial court
referred only to the psychological evaluation without considering the opinion of a psychologist
who testified on mother’s behalf at the evidentiary hearing. A trial court, however, is not
required to comment upon every matter in evidence. Bowers, supra at 328. Moreover, mother
places too much reliance on her psychologist’s brief testimony. And, notably, mother’s
psychologist did not prepare a psychological evaluation of mother and did not dispute any of the
findings, conclusions, or recommendations in the psychological evaluation admitted at the
evidentiary hearing. Once again, the facts do not clearly preponderate in a direction opposite to
that taken by the trial court, and the trial court’s findings with respect to factor (g) are not against
the great weight of the evidence. Rittershaus, supra at 473.
2
Mother’s assertions on appeal that the trial court failed to give weight to certain evidence lacks
merit. A trial court need not comment on every matter in evidence or declare acceptance or
rejection of every proposition argued. Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich App 320, 328; 497 NW2d
602 (1993).
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With respect to factor (j), MCL 722.23(j), “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the
parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the
child and the other parent or the child and the parents,” the trial court found that this factor
favored father:
[Mother] has consistently demonstrated a high level of hostility toward
[father] to the extent that her inappropriate expression of that hostility in front of
[the child] was a source of concern for school personnel. She has been
substantiated for denying [father] parenting time. [Father] has provided [mother]
with the parenting time ordered by the Court, and has been willing to expand the
amount of time for [mother] to be with [the child] without the necessity of court
involvement.
The same trial judge presided over these proceedings since 2000. At the divorce trial in
2002, father testified regarding mother’s mental, verbal, and physical abuse, as well as her false
allegation of sexual abuse of the minor child by father. The record contains many examples of
mother’s mental, verbal, and physical abuse; her failure to comply with court orders; and her
efforts to undermine father’s authority with the children. On appeal, mother provides a litany of
father’s transgressions during the history of this case, but those facts do not outweigh the trial
court’s findings with respect to factor (j). Further, with regard to mother’s claim that the trial
court failed to give her testimony due consideration, we defer to the trial court’s determination
regarding credibility. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 25; 581 NW2d 11 (1998). The
facts do not clearly preponderate in a direction other than that taken by the trial court. The trial
court’s findings with respect to factor (j) are not against the great weight of the evidence.
Rittershaus, supra at 473. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to award
father physical and legal custody of the minor child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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