DAVE LINTON V ARENAC COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAVE LINTON and MARILYN LINTON,
UNPUBLISHED
September 22, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 286635
Arenac Circuit Court
LC No. 04-009082-CZ
ARENAC COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Fort Hood and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Dave and Marilyn Linton allege that acts of negligence attributable to defendant
Arenac County Road Commission proximately caused May 2004 water damage on their
property. The Road Commission appeals as of right challenging a circuit court order denying its
motion for summary disposition premised on governmental immunity. We affirm.
I. Background
This case has previously reached this Court, and we reiterate the following procedural
summary from this Court’s prior decision, Linton v Arenac Co Rd Comm, 273 Mich App 107;
729 NW2d 883 (2006):
. . . This case involves a dispute regarding whether a rural, roadside
drainage ditch is a “storm water drain system” as set forth in MCL 691.1416(j). .
..
***
The Lintons alleged that in the fall of 2003, the Road Commission cut
down trees, limbs, and branches along Roseburgh Road, which is near the
Lintons’ Moffatt Township home, and deposited this debris into a roadside
drainage ditch. In March 2004, spring rains floated the debris down the roadside
drainage ditch and formed a dam at a culvert near the Lintons’ property; this dam
in turn caused the Lintons’ property to flood. The Lintons notified the Road
Commission of the problem on March 26 and April 16, 2004. The Road
Commission took no action, and on May 14, 2004, heavy rainfall caused “an
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overflow and back up” of water that damaged the Lintons’ house, barn, furniture,
and other personal property.
The Lintons filed suit against the Road Commission under the “sewage
disposal system event” exception to the governmental immunity act[, MCL
691.1417]. More specifically, they alleged that the roadside drainage ditch and
culvert were “a storm water drain system,” as that term is used in the statutory
definition of “sewage disposal system.” [MCL 691.1416(j).] According to the
Lintons, the Road Commission breached its duty to maintain the roadside
drainage ditch and culvert, which, they asserted, were under the jurisdiction and
control of the Road Commission.
The Road Commission moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), arguing that the roadside drainage ditch and culvert
were not part of any “sewage disposal system” or “storm water drain system” and
that the event at issue was not a “sewage disposal system event.” [MCL
691.1416(k).]
The Road Commission attached an affidavit from its
Engineer/Manager, Darren J. Pionk, stating that Moffatt Township did not have a
sewage disposal system and that residents used private drain fields. Pionk also
opined that the roadside drainage ditch at issue was not a county drain and was
not part of any sewage disposal system or storm water drain system. According
to the Road Commission, the Lintons were attempting to extend its liability to a
“simple roadside ditch, in a circumstance which does not involve the overflow or
backup of sewage ....” The Road Commission asserted that the phrase “storm
water drain system” referred solely to urban, underground storm drains that
connect to a sewage system.
The Lintons responded, arguing that the Road Commission was
impermissibly attempting to read additional language into the plain text of the
statute by contending that “storm water drain system” referred to urban,
underground storm drains. They provided an affidavit from engineer Jon W.
Ledy, opining that “[r]oadside ditches are primarily designed and maintained to
drain storm water from one point to another” and that “[i]n rural areas they
perform the same functions as underground storm drains ....” . . .
After hearing oral arguments on the motion, the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of the Road Commission, stating: “I don’t think
this is a drainage system. I don’t think a road ditch is a drainage system as
defined by that statute. If they meant road ditch or plowed furrow, the legislature
would have said that.”
The Lintons now appeal as of right the trial court’s order granting
summary disposition for the Road Commission on the basis of governmental
immunity. [Id. at 108-110 (footnotes omitted).]
The Court then analyzed, in relevant part as follows, the meanings of several pertinent
statutory provisions:
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(1) Sewage Disposal System Event Exception to Governmental Immunity
MCL 691.1417(2) provides an exception to governmental immunity for
sewage disposal system events as follows:
“A governmental agency is immune from tort liability for the overflow or
backup of a sewage disposal system unless the overflow or backup is a sewage
disposal system event and the governmental agency is an appropriate
governmental agency. Sections 16 to 19 abrogate common law exceptions, if any,
to immunity for the overflow or backup of a sewage disposal system and provide
the sole remedy for obtaining any form of relief for damages or physical injuries
caused by a sewage disposal system event regardless of the legal theory.”
(Emphasis added).
(2) MCL 691.1416(k): “Sewage Disposal System Event”
MCL 691.1416(k) defines the term “sewage disposal system event” as
follows:
“‘Sewage disposal system event’ or ‘event’ means the overflow or backup
of a sewage disposal system onto real property. An overflow or backup is not a
sewage disposal system event if any of the following was a substantial proximate
cause of the overflow or backup:
***
“(i)
An obstruction in a service lead that was not caused by a
governmental agency.
“(ii) A connection to the sewage disposal system on the affected
property, including, but not limited to, a sump system, building drain, surface
drain, gutter, or downspout.
“(iii) An act of war, whether the war is declared or undeclared, or an act
of terrorism.” (Emphasis added).
(3) MCL 691.1416(j): “Sewage Disposal System”
MCL 691.1416(j) defines the term “sewage disposal system” as follows:
“‘Sewage disposal system’ means all interceptor sewers, storm sewers,
sanitary sewers, combined sanitary and storm sewers, sewage treatment plants,
and all other plants, works, instrumentalities, and properties used or useful in
connection with the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and industrial
wastes, and includes a storm water drain system under the jurisdiction and control
of a governmental agency.” (Emphasis added).
Importantly, there is no definition in the statute of a “storm water drain system.”
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D. Interpreting the Provisions
(1) Instrumentalities Dealing with Sewage
The Road Commission argues that the roadside drainage ditch is not part
of a sewage disposal system because it is neither used nor designed for sewage.
The Road Commission also argues that, even though the Legislature provided that
a “‘(s)ewage disposal system’ ... includes a storm water drain system,” the sewage
disposal system event exception applies only to storm drains that also service
sewage, such as a combined sanitary and storm sewer. We find these arguments
without merit.
The phrase “sewage disposal system” does evoke an interpretation that
relates to the disposal of sewage, or waste matter, as that term is commonly
understood. However, it is significant that the Legislature made a point to clearly
differentiate between “storm sewers, sanitary sewers, (and) combined sanitary and
storm sewers(.)” If the Legislature had intended that the exception apply solely to
sewers that only service the discharge of sewage, then it would not have made a
point of individually listing these different classes of sewers. Similarly, if the
Legislature had intended that the exception only apply to sewage, then it would
also not have made a point of specifically clarifying that the exception applies to
“a storm water drain system.” [Emphasis in original.] To agree with the Road
Commission’s interpretation would impermissibly render the noted language
nugatory.
Further, in Jackson Co Drain Comm’r v Village of Stockbridge, [270 Mich
App 273, 285-287; 717 NW2d 391 (2006),] this Court held that the sewage
disposal system event exception applies to county drains that carry drainage
water. . . . Thus, we conclude that the sewage disposal system event exception
clearly applies to more than just “sewage” disposal systems, as that term would
ordinarily be understood. Pursuant to the statutory language, the exception
applies to systems designed for storm water drainage.
(2) “Storm Water Drain System”
Having concluded that the sewage disposal system event exception applies
to more than just “sewage” disposal systems, we next consider, as the Road
Commission aptly puts it, “whether the overflow of a simple county roadside
ditch, ... which allowed surface water from heavy spring rains to flood (the
Lintons’) property, falls within this exception.” More specifically, we consider
whether the roadside drainage ditch and culvert are “a storm water drain system,”
as that term is used in the statutory definition of “sewage disposal system.”
Unfortunately, as mentioned, none of the relevant statutory provisions
defines the term “storm water drain system.” Indeed, that phrase is not mentioned
anywhere else in any Michigan statute. Thus, in an effort to discern the meaning
of this phrase, we find it appropriate to consider separately the meaning of its
remaining components, i.e., the term “drain” and the term “system.”
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a. “Drain”
Courts may consult a dictionary to determine the meaning of a term that is
not defined within a statute. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997)
defines the term “drain” as a “pipe, conduit, etc., by which a liquid drains.” But
this definition is of only marginal assistance in resolving this issue.
Thus, we look to the Drain Code to provide additional interpretation
assistance. Although the terms of one statute are not dispositive in determining
the meaning of another, especially if the statutes were not designed to effectuate a
common result, the terms of one statute may be taken as a factor in determining
the interpretation of another statute. The sewage disposal system event exception
expressly includes overflows or backups of “storm water drain systems.”
[Emphasis in original.] Thus, it is relevant that, under the Drain Code,
“(t)he word ‘drain’ ... shall include the main stream or trunk and all tributaries or
branches of any creek or river, any watercourse or ditch, either open or closed,
any covered drain, any sanitary or any combined sanitary and storm sewer or
storm sewer or conduit composed of tile, brick, concrete, or other material, any
structures or mechanical devices, that will properly purify the flow of such drains,
any pumping equipment necessary to assist or relieve the flow of such drains and
any levee, dike, barrier, or a combination of any or all of same constructed, or
proposed to be constructed, for the purpose of drainage or for the purification of
the flow of such drains, but shall not include any dam and flowage rights used in
connection therewith which is used for the generation of power by a public utility
subject to regulation by the public service commission.” [MCL 280.3 (emphasis
in original).]
As the emphasized language indicates, the term “drain” under the Drain
Code specifically includes a “ditch.” The term “ditch” is not further defined in
the Drain Code, but Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) defines
“ditch” as “1. a long, narrow excavation in the ground, as for drainage or
irrigation; trench.” Further, in § 323, the Drain Code refers to “a ditch or drain ...
constructed ... primarily for drainage of private lands ... along a public highway
....” These definitions provide strong support for a conclusion that the roadside
drainage ditch here is a storm water drain for purposes of the sewage disposal
system event exception.
b. “System”
Jackson is again relevant for providing some instruction on whether the
roadside drainage ditch here qualifies as “a storm water drain system.” Jackson
arose “when the village of Stockbridge contracted with the Ingham County Drain
Commissioner to discharge its excess wastewater into the Jacobs Lake Drain,
which flows through the Wild River and Portage River drains and ultimately the
Grand River Drain.” [Id. at 275.] Addressing the applicability of the sewage
disposal system event exception to save the plaintiffs’ claim from being barred by
governmental immunity, the Jackson panel concluded that “(t)he plain language
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of the statute includes the drains at issue here in the definition of ‘sewage disposal
system.’” [Id. at 286.] The Jackson panel reached this decision because the
Jacobs Lake Drain was clearly part of a system of several connected drains.
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) defines the term
“system” as “1. an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a
complex or unitary whole.” Applying this definition here, the question that must
be answered is whether the roadside drainage ditch at issue is, like the Jacobs
Lake Drain, part of a system of connected drains, i.e., an assemblage or
combination of drains that forms a complex or unitary whole. [Linton, supra at
114-120 (footnotes omitted).]
The Court then applied the meanings of the relevant statutory provisions to the parties’ dispute:
The Lintons argue that the roadside drainage ditch was part of a storm
water drain system, noting that the debris floated downstream and dammed a
culvert. Further, during oral argument on the motion for summary disposition,
Dave Linton interjected that the ditch did connect to a river, but the trial court
appropriately dismissed the statement because it was improper testimony during
the summary disposition hearing. Given the absence of any admissible evidence
or testimony on the matter, it is unclear from the record whether the roadside
drainage ditch here was part of a larger drainage system. Thus, there remains a
question of fact regarding whether the roadside drainage ditch is part of a
“system.” Accordingly, we conclude that this case should be remanded for
discovery on the issue whether the roadside drainage ditch was part of a system
of drains. [Id. at 120-121 (emphasis added).]1
II. Proceedings on Remand
After the parties engaged in discovery, the Road Commission again filed a motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), insisting that as a matter of law “the
roadside ditch and culvert herein are not part of a County Drain; do not connect to a county
drain; are intended only to drain the roadbed of Roseburgh and Allen Road within a short,
natural radius; and are not part of any established system of drains.” The Lintons responded that
a documented field investigation of the area by licensed engineer and surveyor Timothy Lapham
established that “[t]he storm water drainage system in the instant action is composed of parts
[ditches and culverts that convey the storm water runoff to Wells Creek and other natural
watercourses thereafter] . . . forming a complex or unitary whole, the purpose of which is the
conveyance of water through the system to the natural watercourse.” The circuit court held a
1
The Court also observed “that if the trial court concludes on remand that the roadside drainage
ditch was a sewage disposal system, then it follows that the overflow and flooding that occurred
here was a sewage disposal system ‘event’: ‘the overflow or backup of a sewage disposal system
onto real property.’” Id. at 121.
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hearing at which it entertained the parties’ arguments, but withheld a ruling “until we can take
testimony and have other evidence considered . . . .”
At a June 2008 evidentiary hearing, the parties each presented testimony by an expert
witness in the field of civil engineering and introduced documentary evidence, including maps
and photographs. The circuit court ultimately reasoned as follows that it would deny the motion
for summary disposition:
Basically, I think this is . . . part of a system, all right. When we had the
hearing that went to the Court of Appeals, I thought, and I don’t know if it was
that well-presented or maybe I wasn’t listening well enough, but I had the
impression that it was basically a road ditch and a culvert, or a road ditch maybe
with a culvert, and this is more than that, this has multiple components. And the
law on this, seems to me like it’s very unclear. Maybe it is only unclear to me.
But you have these ditches on the west side of Roseburgh Road, you have
this pretty good-size ditch coming south, then you have this 42-inch culvert,
which I can’t understand why that’s there, why you would need a 42-inch culvert
there when you have a 15 downstream, but I am not a civil engineer. You have
these ditches along the west side of Allen Road, or, rather, I should say you have
these ditches to the west going along Allen Road, you have that culvert west of—
a ways there on Allen Road, but according to this drainage area, that’s west of this
particular drainage area, and I’m referring to Defendant’s Exhibit No. 3. You
have the ditch going south from Allen Road along, I guess, the west side of
Roseburgh Road, you have the 15-inch culvert going east across the road, you
have this at least remnants of what looks to me like a ditch heading east, and the
testimony was it goes to Wells Creek.
Now, . . . I am not specifically finding in this case where I think the
system ends, whether it’s Saginaw Bay or the Rifle River . . . but I think, at a
minimum, from Wells Creek, going up this ditch remnant or old ditch, and then
going on up to where I started a few minutes ago, I think that probably is a
system, I might be completely wrong, a system as the Court of Appeals at least
apparently wants us to consider one, or consider that term, you know, this
definition, an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or
unitary whole.
Well, . . . this, quote, “system,” as I have just described it, isn’t all that
complex, and certainly isn’t as complex as probably lots of places, but we have
more than just a road ditch out in front of a house here, too. We have more than
just a road ditch that may not . . . drain either of the two directions, if I am saying
that right. In other words, it might just be a segment of a road ditch that holds
water until it seeps away or something. And I am not insinuating . . . that that’s . .
. the situation here that we have. But in that example that I just gave, that
certainly wouldn’t be a system, I don’t think, but I think here we are, or it is as the
Court of Appeals seems to want us to interpret the statute. So anyway, that’s my
finding.
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The court entered an order denying the motion for summary disposition “for the reasons stated
on the record.”
III. Analysis
A. Standards of Review
The circuit court did not specify pursuant to which subrule of MCR 2.116(C) it found
summary disposition appropriate here. In finding that the facts presented demonstrated the
existence of a “storm water drain system” for purposes of MCL 691.1416(j), the court apparently
intended to conclude that the Road Commission was not entitled to governmental immunity
under MCR 2.116(C)(7). “To survive a C(7) motion . . . , the plaintiff must allege facts
warranting the application of an exception to governmental immunity.” Linton, 273 Mich App
111. If the parties submit admissible evidence in support of or in opposition to a (C)(7) motion,
the circuit court must consider it. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Linton, 273 Mich App 111. “[T]he
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, affidavits, and other admissible documentary
evidence are accepted as true and construed in the plaintiff’s favor, unless contradicted by
documentation submitted by the movant.” Id. “Additionally, ‘where material facts are not in
dispute . . . , the MCR 2.116(C)(7) analysis parallels the MCR 2.116(C)(10) analysis and is a
question of law for the trial court.’” Id. at 111-112 (citation omitted). This Court considers de
novo a circuit court’s summary disposition rulings, Robinson v City of Lansing, 282 Mich App
610, 613; 765 NW2d 25 (2009), as well as determinations concerning “[t]he applicability of
governmental immunity” and decisions involving “questions of statutory interpretation.” Linton,
273 Mich App 112.
B. Proofs Regarding a Storm Water Drain System
Our review of the testimony and documentary evidence introduced at the evidentiary
hearing reflects that the parties do not dispute the key facts underlying the circuit court’s ruling.
The Lintons’ real property that flooded in May 2004 sits on the east side of Roseburgh Road, a
short distance from Roseburgh Road’s intersection with Allen Road, which travels in an eastwest direction but does not continue beyond Roseburgh Road. Ditches extend along Allen Road
from its intersection with Roseburgh Road to the west for approximately 1,170 feet. Ditches also
extend along each side of Roseburgh Road for about 3,500 feet north of its intersection with
Allen Road. A 42-inch culvert directs water toward the south through the Allen Road
intersection with Roseburgh Road. Another ditch runs for 350 feet along a “seasonal” portion of
Roseburgh Road south of its intersection with Allen Road, then a 15-inch culvert directs water to
the east. A trench or ditch takes water from the 15-inch culvert to the east for some unspecified
distance toward wetlands, Wells Creek, the Rifle River, and beyond. A former, deceased
husband of Marilyn Linton excavated this trench in the 1970’s; the trench commenced within the
Road Commission’s right of way, but then proceeded southeasterly over land owned by the state.
The ditches and culverts served a natural drainage area of approximately 0.2 square miles. The
Road Commission’s engineer, Pionk, and the Lintons’ retained engineer, Lapham, both agreed
that within the 0.2-square mile drainage basin surface water naturally flowed in a southeasterly
direction. Both engineers also confirmed at the hearing that the ditches and culverts along
Roseburgh Road and Allen Road transported storm water off the roadways and away from the
roadbeds, and additionally transported surface water that flowed into the ditches from the
surrounding 0.2-square mile area of countryside.
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Applying the definition of “system” previously adopted by this Court, “an assemblage or
combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole,” Linton, 273 Mich App 120,
we find that the undisputed facts in this case establish the existence of a “storm water drain
system” as a matter of law. In summary, the evidence agrees that the nearly 1-mile series of
ditches and culverts along Roseburgh Road and Allen Road work together to convey storm water
or surface water away from the 0.2-square mile drainage area toward wetlands, Wells Creek, and
other natural watercourses beyond. Furthermore, as the circuit court found, the evidence agrees
that the ditches along Roseburgh Road, the ditches along Allen Road, the several culverts in this
drainage area, and the ditch or trench across state land that begins in the Road Commission right
of way all comprise parts of a unitary storm water drain system in this 0.2-square mile drainage
area. Contrary to the Road Commission’s position, the fact that the majority of the ditch dug by
Marilyn Linton’s former husband fell outside Road Commission jurisdiction and control does not
operate to remove the entirety of the unitary storm water drain system that exists here from the
definition previously delineated by the Court. We recognize that the governing statutory
definition of “sewage disposal system” “includes a storm water drain system under the
jurisdiction and control of a governmental agency,” MCL 691.1416(j) (emphasis added), but the
parties do not dispute that the other ditches and culverts comprising the system here, including
the ditch and culvert that allegedly generated the May 2004 backup of water onto the Lintons’
property, all fell within the Road Commission’s jurisdiction and control. Moreover, MCL
691.1417(2) sets forth the basic proposition that “[a] governmental agency is immune from tort
liability for the overflow or backup of a sewage disposal system unless the overflow or backup is
a sewage disposal system event and the governmental agency is an appropriate governmental
agency” (emphasis added), and MCL 691.1416(b) unambiguously defines an “[a]ppropriate
governmental agency” as “a governmental agency that, at the time of a sewage disposal system
event, owned or operated, or directly or indirectly discharged into, the portion of the sewage
disposal system that allegedly caused damage or physical injury.” (Emphasis added).
To the extent that the Road Commission suggests that the ditches and culverts do not
constitute a storm water drain system because they do not substantially redirect the flow of storm
or surface water, which given the natural topography of the area would have migrated in a
southeasterly direction even in the absence of any ditches or culverts, the natural topography
simply has no relevance to the question whether a storm water drain system exists here, in
conformity with the definition prescribed in Linton, 273 Mich App 117-121.2 Furthermore, the
2
Pionk’s opinion that the ditches and culverts did not amount to a system as defined by this
Court focused on the definitionally irrelevant fact that storm or surface water would have
migrated toward the southeast even without the ditches and culverts. Pionk summarized as
follows at the evidentiary hearing:
Defense counsel: . . . Have you formed an opinion as to whether the
ditches and two culverts that we have shown and measured on Exhibits 3 and 5
are a stormwater drainage system?
Pionk: Yes.
Defense counsel: And what is that opinion?
(continued…)
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“storm water drain system” definition elaborated in Linton nowhere mandates that a system
consist of officially designated county drains. Lastly, with respect to the Road Commission’s
emphasis of the discrepancy between the approximate 1-mile area of storm water drain system
here and the more extensive storm water drain system involved in Jackson, 270 Mich App 275,
286, we observe that Jackson does not control the storm water drain system analysis in this case.
The Court in Linton, 270 Mich App 119, plainly referred to Jackson as “relevant for providing
some instruction on whether the roadside drainage ditch here qualifies as a storm water drain
system” (emphasis in original), not as containing any dispositive criteria concerning the requisite
extensiveness of a system.3 The Court in Linton, 270 Mich App 120, subsequently phrased the
question in this case as “whether the roadside drainage ditch at issue is, like the Jacobs Lake
Drain [in Jackson], part of a system of connected drains, i.e., an assemblage or combination of
drains that forms a complex or unitary whole,” but remanded for discovery whether “the
roadside ditch [here] was part of a system of drains,” as the Court in Linton described in the
governing definition of a “system.” Id. at 121. In summary, because the instant “system” is
comprised of ditches and culverts that form or function as a unitary whole in conveying storm or
surface water, the purported insignificance of the storm water drain system present in this case
has no bearing on its identity as a “system,” as defined by this Court.
In conclusion, the circuit court properly denied the Road Commission’s motion for
summary disposition on governmental immunity grounds because (1) the undisputed facts
establish as a matter of law that the ditches and culverts at issue in this case qualified as a storm
water drain system, (2) the storm water drain system involved here meets the statutory definition
of “sewage disposal system” in MCL 691.1416(j), (3) this Court previously expressed that “if the
trial court concludes on remand that the roadside drainage ditch was a sewage disposal system,
(…continued)
Pionk: That is not part of a stormwater drainage system.
Defense counsel: And what do you base that opinion on?
Pionk: I base that opinion on the use of a roadside ditch is to provide
drainage for the base material of the roadway as well as the natural flow of the
water within this area traversing in the southeasterly direction with or without a
roadway.
***
Because the intent of the roadside ditches is to provide base drainage for
the roadbed. With or without the roadway intersecting along that section line of
Roseburgh Road, the general path of water is still in the southeasterly direction,
therefore, I . . . my determination is that it is not part of a system for drainage.
3
The entirety of the Court’s “system” analysis in Jackson, 270 Mich App 285-286, quoted MCL
691.1417(2), then stated, “The plain language of the statute includes the drains at issue here in
the definition of ‘sewage disposal system.’ MCL 691.1416(j). Therefore, the statute is
applicable to the instant case, and defendants are immune unless the backup would be considered
a sewage disposal system event (event).”
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then it follows that the overflow and flooding that occurred here was a sewage disposal system
‘event,’” Linton, 273 Mich App 121, as defined in MCL 691.1416(k), and (4) the parties do not
dispute that the portion of the storm water drain system that allegedly caused the water backup
event here fell within the Road Commission’s jurisdiction and control, in other words that the
Road Commission constituted “an appropriate governmental agency,” MCL 691.1417(2), as
defined in MCL 691.1416(b). Consequently, the Lintons may attempt to prove the remaining
elements of their claim in conformity with MCL 691.1417(3).
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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