ROBERT A RADZIEWICZ V FRANKENMUTH PADDLEWHEEL TOURS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT A. RADZIEWICZ,
UNPUBLISHED
September 17, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
FRANKENMUTH PADDLEWHEEL TOURS and
JENE QUIRIN,
No. 282648
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-063746-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Meter and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant
to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendants operate a paddlewheel boat on the Cass River in the city of Frankenmuth.
The boat is equipped with a whistle that is sounded several times on each tour. Plaintiff filed this
action, asserting that the repeated sounding of the whistle constitutes a nuisance. The trial court
dismissed plaintiff’s complaint on defendants’ motion because plaintiff failed to show that the
noise causes actual physical discomfort to an individual of ordinary sensibilities and because the
sounding of the whistle was “done under color of applicable State and Federal marine navigation
regulations.”
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo on appeal.
Gillie v Genesee Co Treasurer, 277 Mich App 333, 344; 745 NW2d 137 (2007). “Summary
disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen
Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). When reviewing a motion under
subrule (C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant
record evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any
genuine issue of material fact exists warranting a trial. Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 621;
689 NW2d 506 (2004). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the
benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” West, supra at 183.
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“A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land.” Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co, 440 Mich 293, 302; 487 NW2d 715
(1992). Citing 4 Restatement Torts, 2d, §§ 821D-F and 822, pp 100-115, the Adkins Court
stated:
According to the Restatement, an actor is subject to liability for private
nuisance for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land if (a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to
the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion results in significant harm
(c) the actor's conduct is the legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is
either (i) intentional and unreasonable, or (ii) unintentional and otherwise
actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless, or
ultrahazardous conduct. [Adkins, supra at 304.]
With respect to the fourth element, it is the interference with the plaintiff’s rights that
must be unreasonable, not the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 305. The interference is unreasonable
if the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the utility of the defendant’s conduct. 3
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 826, p 119. Where the alleged nuisance is “predicated on conduct of a
defendant that causes mental annoyance,” the annoyance must be “significant” and the
interference must be “unreasonable in the sense that it would be unreasonable to permit the
defendant to cause such an amount of harm without paying for it.” Adkins, supra at 309-310.
This Court has recognized that a possessor of land may bring an action for nuisance when
the possessor’s enjoyment of the land is interfered with by “noise, vibrations, or ambient dust,
smoke, soot, or fumes.” Adams v Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co, 237 Mich App 51, 67; 602 NW2d
215 (1999). Otherwise lawful activity can still constitute a nuisance under certain circumstances.
Gruber v Dodge, 45 Mich App 33, 38-39; 205 NW2d 869 (1973). Generally, noise does not
constitute a nuisance per se; however, it may be of such a character as to constitute a nuisance in
fact, even if it arises from the operation of a lawful business or occupation. Borsvold v United
Dairies, 347 Mich 672, 680-681; 81 NW2d 378 (1957). With respect to a nuisance claim
predicated on noise, courts should consider the character of the industry subject to complaint, the
character, volume, time, and duration of the noise, and all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. Smith v Western Wayne Co Conservation Ass’n, 380 Mich 526, 536; 158
NW2d 463 (1968). We find helpful the opinion in Louisville & N R Co v Commonwealth, 166
SW 237, 237-238 (Ky App, 1914), where the court stated:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the emission of smoke from
engines, and ringing of bells, the blowing of whistles, and the grinding of wheels
are necessary incidents to the operation of railroad trains. A railroad cannot be
operated without burning coal, and the coal cannot be burned without making
smoke; the ringing of bells and the blowing of whistles are not only necessary
incidents to the operation of railroad trains, but the giving of signals in that way is
actually required by law in many instances; and it is perfectly apparent that the
grinding of wheels cannot be avoided in the operation of trains. It will be
observed that there is no allegation in the indictment that the things complained of
were unnecessarily done, or that it was not necessary for the railroad company in
the operation of its trains to blow the whistles, to ring the bells, or to cause the
emission of large volumes of smoke. The necessities of commerce demand the
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operation of railroads, and railroads cannot be operated without these necessary
incidents, and there can be no nuisance in the operation of a railroad or of its
switchyards, unless the noises created thereby are unnecessary in its operation.
The doing of a lawful thing in a careful and prudent manner cannot be a
nuisance; but the doing of a lawful thing in a reckless, careless, or negligent way
may be a nuisance. In this case if the ringing of bells, the blowing of whistles, and
the emission of smoke was not done to any greater extent than was necessary in
the prudent operation of appellant's trains, there was no nuisance[.]
Considering the facts and circumstances relevant to this case, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff resides in the
city of Frankenmuth, a city that is actively promoted as a tourist destination. Defendants’
operation is one of the promoted attractions. The one-hour riverboat tours are conducted during
reasonable hours (9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.), and there are no more than seven tours a day.
Defendant Quirin supplied an affidavit in which he addressed the questions of when and why the
vessel’s horn is sounded on any given tour, averring:
Two short (less than one second each) blasts are blown in order to indicate
that the vessel is going to start its engines; because of the use of hydraulic motors
to propel the exposed paddlewheel, the horn serves as a warning to passengers,
crew and users of the waterway that the paddlewheel may begin to turn at any
moment;
One prolonged blast (4 to 6 seconds) is sounded as the vessel utilizes its
side thrusters to push it away from the dock and immediately before the vessel
begins to turn sideways in the river; the long blast warns all traffic upon the river,
which has included water skiers, swimmers, persons using inner-tubes, kayaks
and boats, etc., that the vessel will be substantially blocking the navigable portion
of the river as it completes its rotation toward an intervening obstruction (bridge)
and a blind bend in the river;
One prolonged blast is sounded again upon the vessel’s return to the dock
for the same purposes as hereinbefore indicated and to indicate the vessel will be
stalled in the channel and will be moving sideways under side thruster power
toward the dock.
The soundings relative to leaving the dock and maneuvering around the bend in the river
and other obstructions are required by law pursuant to Coast Guard rules and regulations. The
other soundings are not required by law, but they clearly serve a legitimate safety function as
indicated in the affidavit. Plaintiff’s competing affidavit, which was from plaintiff himself and
was the only documentary evidence submitted by plaintiff, contains no averments challenging or
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contradicting the above-quoted averments made by Quirin.1 Additionally, even if the soundings
of the whistle required by Coast Guard rules and regulations were not mandated, the soundings
would nonetheless serve a legitimate safety function as reflected in Quirin’s affidavit. All of the
soundings are necessary for the prudent operation of the riverboat. The soundings in no way
evince recklessness, carelessness, or negligence. Given the circumstances, the minor annoyance
caused by any extra soundings of the whistle that go beyond that required by law is not such as
to cause significant harm to plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of his property. Moreover,
because the soundings of the whistle are either required by law and/or serve legitimate safety
concerns, any interference with plaintiff’s rights is not unreasonable to the extent that the
interference outweighs the utility of defendants’ activity. Although the trial court granted
summary disposition for different reasons, this Court will not reverse where the trial court
reaches the right result. Netter v Bowman, 272 Mich App 289, 308; 725 NW2d 353 (2006).
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
1
Where the party opposing summary disposition fails to present documentary evidence
establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion for summary disposition is
properly granted. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 363; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
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