IN RE JEREMY LEON SCHERMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re JEREMY LEON SCHERMAN.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2009
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 289732
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2001-647953-DL
JEREMY LEON SCHERMAN,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murphy and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by leave granted from the family court order granting
respondent’s motion to vacate his plea. We affirm.
Respondent was a minor when he was accused of inappropriate behavior while
babysitting a two-year old girl. In 2001, an attorney represented him when he pleaded no contest
to second-degree criminal sexual conduct. However, in 2008, after reaching the age of 21,
respondent filed a motion to vacate his plea or alternatively for rehearing or a new trial because
of deficiencies in the plea procedure and the ineffective representation by counsel. The family
court agreed that procedural deficiencies occurred and granted the motion to vacate the plea.
The prosecutor appeals by leave granted, alleging that respondent was over 21 years of age when
he filed his motion, and therefore, the family court was without jurisdiction. We disagree.
This Court’s review of jurisdictional issues is de novo. Pontiac Food Center v Dep’t of
Community Health, 282 Mich App 331, 335; 766 NW 2d 42 (2009). Issues involving the
interpretation of statutes or court rules are also reviewed de novo as questions of law. Id. “The
term jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to act and the authority a court has to hear and
determine a case.” Wayne Co Chief Executive v Governor, 230 Mich App 258, 269; 583 NW2d
512 (1998). “Const 1963, art 6, § 15 grants probate courts ‘original jurisdiction in all cases of
juvenile delinquents and dependents, except as otherwise provided by law.’” In re AMB, 248
Mich App 144, 167; 640 NW2d 262 (2001). The family division of the circuit court (family
court) now exercises this jurisdiction. People v Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 36; 610 NW2d
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571 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Petty, 469 Mich 108; 665 NW2d 443
(2003).1 “In construing jurisdictional statutes, retention of jurisdiction is presumed, and any
intent to divest a court of jurisdiction must be clearly and unambiguously stated.” In re Waite,
188 Mich App 189, 202; 468 NW2d 912 (1991).
MCL 712A.2 provides that the family court has the following authority and jurisdiction:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction superior to and regardless of the jurisdiction of
another court in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 17 years of age who is
found within the county if 1 or more of the following applies:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this sub-subdivision, the juvenile has
violated any municipal ordinance or law of the state or of the United States . . . .
MCL 712A.2a allows for continuing jurisdiction beyond the maximum age of 17:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), if the court has exercised
jurisdiction over a juvenile under section 2(a) or (b) of this chapter, jurisdiction
shall continue for a period of 2 years beyond the maximum age of jurisdiction
conferred under section 2 of this chapter, unless the juvenile is released sooner by
court order.
(2) If the court has exercised jurisdiction over a juvenile under section 2(a)(1) of
this chapter for an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a violation or
attempted violation of . . . [MCL] 750.520c. . . jurisdiction may be continued
under section 18d of this chapter until the juvenile is 21 years of age.
In this case, respondent filed a motion to vacate his plea or, in the alternative, for
rehearing or new trial, on November 4, 2008, seven and a half years after his disposition on May
22, 2001, and nearly seven years after the court terminated jurisdiction on December 20, 2001.
Moreover, respondent’s date of birth is April 11, 1987, and therefore, he had reached his 21st
birthday nearly seven months before he filed the motion. Nevertheless, respondent brought the
motion under MCR 3.992, which states, in relevant part:
(A) Time and Grounds. Except for the case of a juvenile tried as an adult in the
family division of the circuit court for a criminal offense, a party may seek a
rehearing or new trial by filing a written motion stating the basis for the relief
sought within 21 days after the date of the order resulting from the hearing or
trial. The court may entertain an untimely motion for good cause shown. A
motion will not be considered unless it presents a matter not previously presented
to the court, or presented, but not previously considered by the court, which, if
1
See also MCL 600.1009 that provides: “A reference to the former juvenile division of probate
court in any statute of this state shall be construed to be a reference to the family division of
circuit court.”
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true, would cause the court to reconsider the case.
added).]
[MCR 3.992 (emphasis
Clearly, respondent sought relief more than 21 days after the date of the order, but he
contends that because MCR 3.992(A) does not contain a time or age limit “for good cause
shown,” the family court still had jurisdiction. The prosecutor argues on appeal that the good
cause exception of MCR 3.992(A) applies only if the family court has jurisdiction in the first
place, and because respondent was over 21 years old when he filed his motion, the family court
was without jurisdiction. It follows, according to the prosecutor, that the family court judge
could not redress errors that occurred while respondent was within the court’s jurisdiction. We
disagree.
“The doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction has long been recognized in Michigan.” In
re Forfeiture of Certain Personal Property, 441 Mich 77, 85; 490 NW2d 322 (1992). The
doctrine generally provides that once a court has exercised jurisdiction, other courts of “coordinate authority” may not interfere with the action taken by the first court. Id.
It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction has become
possessed of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority,
until the matter is finally and completely disposed of; and no court of co-ordinate
authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. The principle is essential to the
proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be
required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such
considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of process. [Maclean v Wayne Circuit
Judge, 52 Mich 257, 259; 18 NW 396 (1884).]
Additionally, rules governing procedure in juvenile delinquency proceedings “are to be liberally
construed to secure fairness, flexibility, and simplicity so that each minor coming with the
jurisdiction of the court receives the care, guidance, and control that is conducive to the minor’s
welfare and the best interests of the public.” In re Alton, 203 Mich App 405, 407; 513 NW2d
162 (1994).
Defects in personal jurisdiction may be waived, but subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
waived and may be raised at any time. People v Richards, 205 Mich App 438, 444; 517 NW2d
823 (1994). Personal jurisdiction refers to the court’s jurisdiction over a particular individual,
and subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s power over a class of cases. Id. In this instance, by
filing the motion to review the plea procedure and the effective assistance of counsel, petitioner
waived personal jurisdiction regardless of his age. The juvenile court clearly possesses subject
matter jurisdiction over juvenile cases and is in the best position to evaluate the propriety of
handling challenges to juvenile dispositions. The argument and interpretation raised by the
prosecution eliminates any individual who has exceeded the statutory age from seeking a remedy
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for defects that occurred during the juvenile proceedings. That is simply untenable.2
Accordingly, the challenge to jurisdiction is without merit. Maclean, supra; Richards, supra.
Furthermore, courts of this state have allowed juvenile jurisdiction to continue beyond
the statutory age when necessary for continued administration or resolution of the case. See In
re Summerville, 148 Mich App 334, 339; 384 NW2d 152 (1986) (“[T]he juvenile court has
jurisdiction over contempt proceedings involving contempt of juvenile court orders, even where
the contemner is over 19 years of age at the time of the hearing.” Id. at 340-341); In re Reiswitz,
236 Mich App 158, 162; 600 NW2d 135 (1999) (The parent of an adjudicated delinquent cannot
“avoid the requirements of a proper reimbursement order, entered by the probate court at a time
when it had jurisdiction,” pursuant to MCL 712A.18(2), despite the fact that before the parent
“had fully complied with that order, the probate court’s statutory jurisdiction over the parties had
ceased.” Id. at 163.)
In light of petitioner’s submission to the juvenile court to challenge his juvenile
disposition and case law that allows the juvenile court to address matters that previously came
within its jurisdiction, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.3
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
2
We note that the parties did not raise alternatives. There was no positing that the case could be
transferred to a court of general jurisdiction, and the prosecution objected to the application of
the MCR 6.500 et seq. rules because the rules did not apply to juvenile proceedings.
3
We note that the merits of the family court’s decision to grant the motion to vacate the plea was
not raised and addressed by the parties, and therefore, we do not address it.
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